[Book] Ernst Topitsch - Stalins War - Joeys Notes

[JoeySteel]

Stalins' War Topitsch

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Ernst Topitsch is a reactionary werrhmacht soldier having had his brigade wiped out in World War 2 by the Soviets. Writing later in his life he analyses world war 2. Reading the full book he even admits his target audience is Anglo-Americans (who now rule the world). His motivation for writing his book seems to be in portraying how the Soviets were the real enemy and utilised various tactics to "start a new world war which they could benefit from".
Abandoned are the trotskyite myths that Stalin was an idiot and midwit with Topitsch instead admitting Stalin was a military genius always considering long term strategy. Topitsch useage of language ("Demonic Georgian" etc) it displayed to show his ideological persuasion and his longing of better competancy of the Hitlerites.
Despite the authors huge anti-communist pro-German and pro-Anglo-Saxon bias this book still has some gems in to fight within the info-war.
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Stalin Is An Outstanding Figure of World History
7 Even in Soviet Russia, during the ‘de-Stalinisation' which followed the personality cult, the part played by the demonic Georgian in the rise of his country to superpower status is frequently and unjustifiably disparaged. However, as the events in question recede in time it becomes much clearer that Stalin is an outstanding figure, not merely in Russian history, like Peter the Great or Ivan the Terrible, but also in world history. Particular emphasis must be laid on the cunning and finesse dis played by the red czar in executing that long-term strategy, and on the tactics he employed, neither of which have so far received the appreci ation they deserve. The basic premises on which these tactics are based have proved enduringly efficient and should be carefully considered, especially by future generations.

Molotov Ribbentrop Pact - Hitler and Ribbentrop lacking Political Intelligence Whilst Stalin/Molotov Laid Trap of Long Term Soviet Strategy
49 After the conclusion of this treaty Hitler and Ribbentrop may have regarded themselves as statesmen of the highest calibre; instead their actions betrayed a frightening lack of political intelligence. Whereas Stalin had thoroughly pondered over the content and phraseology of the agreements, his opposite numbers were obviously incapable even of carefully reviewing the consequences which might result for Germany from those fateful documents in point of fact, the two treaties fitted in perfectly with Soviet long-term strategy, to involve Germany in a war with the British and the French, make it dependent on Russia and, if the opportunity should arise, bring about its extinction as an independent power. Far-sighted as he was, Stalin was already thinking at this early stage of obtaining a favourable starting point for the realisation of such plans. This

51 Thus during the first weeks of 'co-operation' the cunning Georgian proved his superiority over the 'genius' of the Führer. While Hitler went storming at his victims like a mad bull, accompanied by an orches tration of ear-splitting propaganda, Stalin was, according to the excel lent characterisation by George F. Kennan, a man of the greatest skill as far as political tactics and intrigue were concerned, a master not only in the choice of the right moment, but also in what Boris Nikolaievski has described as the art of dosing – doing things step by step and measuring out in every situation exactly how much he may allow himself; above all, Kennan suggests, in the art of playing people and forces off against each other for his own ends.

Far Sightedness of Stalin
138 These momentous decisions were made long before Yalta. In the summer of 1945 Stalin was able to keep the Western powers to their word, just as he had done in 1940 with the Germans over Finland. And just as he had safeguarded the offensive bulges of Bialystok and Lem berg by the treaties with Hitler and Ribbentrop, in the same way he now reserved for himself the Thuringian bulge, which protruded like a fist into the central Rhine area. In both cases it is hard to decide which is more astonishing – the far-sightedness and purposefulness of Stalin, or the lack of these qualities in his opposite numbers.

63. After the defeat of Germany Stalin set about harvesting the fruits of his policy in the Far East. In Teheran and Yalta he had already been allowed to lay claim to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin; in return he had promised to attack the Japanese within two to three months of the victory in Europe. In doing so he was disregarding the neutrality pact signed with Japan on 13 April 1941, and on 5 April 1945 the pact was formally cancelled by the Soviet Union.

Pact With Japan Allowed Soviets To Face Nazi Army
25 With the same intention, Stalin later guaranteed the Japanese a cover for their rear by the neutrality treaty of 13 April 1941, and so encouraged them to undertake military action against Great Britain and the U.S.A.

52 Another version stated that the father land of all workers' had been forced to sign the pact to avoid a war on two fronts: in evidence, reference was made to the fact that in the sum mer of 1939 serious fighting had broken out between Soviet and Japanese troops on the border between Manchuko and Outer Mongolia.

Author Bias - Was A Werhrhmacht Soldier Who's Division Perished At Stalingrad
9 A few personal details may be worth mentioning: I belonged to one of the divisions which, following the Western Campaign of 1940, was sent from France to Poland, into the area of the Demarcation Line. There I lived through those fateful months when the hopes for peace of the early summer dwindled away, to be replaced by a gnawing worry that the real war was now about to start. The soldier in the ranks had, of course, no insight into the policy and strategy of his superiors; but my deductions from the censored news at home and occasional infor mation from abroad yielded more and more the impression that, in spite of victories already won, Germany had reached a dead end. Eng land was not yet defeated, American hostility was growing, and behind the Demarcation Line the Russian sphinx was lying in wait. Then, on 22 June 1941, the die was cast. The division to which I belonged perished in Stalingrad, a fate which I myself escaped only by a stroke of good fortune.

63 This means that both in England and France the advocates of the war against Germany have declared a kind of ideological war, in the manner of the old religious crusades. The National Socialist ideology, as indeed any other, can be supported or rejected, but everyone understands that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force, so it is senseless and even criminal to wage such a war to destroy Hitlerism by cloaking this con flict in the mantle of the struggle for democracy.? 79
Stalin Had Foresight
12Yet a more thor analysis of the interplay of the main events has led me to the conviction that at the very least this viewpoint needed a radical modification. It became more and more apparent that Stalin was not only the real victor, but also the key figure in the war; he was, indeed, the only statesman who had at the time a clear, broadly-based idea of his objectives.

14 after making allowances for the defeat of Germany in the west – by taking up a frontal position against the USA and Great Britain extending into Central Europe'.

Stalin A Chess Grandmaster To Hitler The Gambler
15 The events of the summer of 1939 show the fateful consequences of Hitler's lack of statesmanlike qualities and a world-orientated political vision, and make him look very inferior to his Russian counterpart. With regard to political intelligence and political style, their relationship is like that of a gambler to a chess grandmaster, and the assertion that the Führer fell like a schoolboy into the trap set for him by Moscow can hardly be called exaggerated. The

15 If war is to break out, we won't be able to watch in idleness; we will have to enter the fray, but we will be the last ones to do it, in order to put the decisive weight into the scales, a weight that should tip the balance. 8
Soviet Foreign Policy
23 Till the final victory of socialism in the whole world (the principle would apply) that we must exploit the contradictions and opposition between two imperialist power groups, between two capitalist groups of states and incite them to attack each other. 19 (If it should prove impossible to defeat both) then one must know how to group one's forces so that the two begin to fight each other, for when two thieves quarrel the honest man gets the last laugh. But as soon as we are strong enough to over throw the entire capitalist world, we will seize it at once by the throat.? 20

25 Thus Soviet foreign policy was, in the long term, dedicated to unleashing a new war between the imperialist powers - one which would weaken them and, more importantly, make them ripe for revolution.

74 We are now more than ever convinced that our brilliant comrade Lenin made no mistake when he asserted that the Second World War would enable us to seize power in Europe, just as we did in Russia after the First World War. For this reason you should be starting now to introduce your people into the Soviet system, which in future will rule all Europe. 100

Stalin Expecting German Attack In Spring 1941
76 Stalin told the British Ambassador that he wanted to avoid an open conflict with Germany for the present, but was expecting to face a German attack in the spring of 1941, provided that England had been conquered by then.

Hitler's View of Russia
Some time ago, at the suggestion of Gauleiter Koch, Hitler had been pondering the idea of an alliance with Russia against Poland. He did not, however, see such an alliance as a lasting solution to the problem of mastery over Europe, for Germany and Russia could never become one great entity, ruling the world:
" Then we would really mistrust each other, and such a pact would inevitably end in a decisive battle. Only one of us can rule, and if we are to be the one we must defeat Russia. It must not be forgotten that Russia is not only the land of Bolshevism, but also the greatest continental empire of the world, with an impetus powerful enough to pull all Europe with it. The Russians take over their partner, body and soul, that is the danger; one can either give oneself over to them completely, or steer well clear of them."36
Britains Labour Pacificsm in 1930s
38 These tendencies became even more pronounced in the autumn of 1933 when Labour, using pacifist slogans, won a triumphant by-election victory in which the Conservatives suffered heavy losses. Now the Labour Party begin in earnest to demand complete disarmament, and through fear of losing more votes the Tories had to do the same. 43

Ludwig Beck's Foresight
42 He was admittedly now confronted by a much more difficult problem than hitherto, for the Czechoslovakia of Masaryk and Benes was well-armed, protected by strong fortifications and had treaties of alliance with France and the Soviet Union. Because of this the danger of an armed clash in Europe became increasingly real and was a cause of serious worry to the German general staff. Its chief, Ludwig Beck, resigned and warned of the possibility of a new war: "A war begun by Germany will at once involve other countries as well as the one attacked. In a war against a world coalition Germany would lose and then be subjected to the whims and caprices of the victors."49

Only Soviets Were Wililng To Help Czechoslovakia
42 The Soviet Union alone expressed willingness to help Czechoslovakia, but this had no practical significance as the two countries had no common border and Poland and Rumania refused to allow their territory to be used in any way by Russian troops. Indeed, the Russian offer to help only served as an ad ditional argument for those who suspected that Czechoslovakia was the end of Moscow's long arm reaching into Europe. That is why Chamber lain, who deeply distrusted the Russians, was not at all sorry that the Munich Agreement was fixed without their participation.
77% Of French Favour Opposing Germans by Force In Case of German Aggression
44 In June 1939 a French public opinion poll showed that seventy-six per cent of the populace would favour op posing the Germans by force in the event of an armed aggression against Danzig.
Britain Supported Poland To Push Poland To War
44 The British Government's guarantee to Poland has been widely criti cised because it made Britain dependent on an unpredictable partner, encouraged Warsaw to adopt an intransigent policy, and thus contribu ted towards the outbreak of war.

Soviets Made Germans Dependent on Them Via trade Relations Until They Were In A Favourable Position
50 (These facts reveal clearly enough that from the outset Stalin was con cerned with keeping as firm a grip as possible on his German tool – from the economic, political and also, if need be, from the military point of view yInitially he had some success in this. How long and to what degree his supplies could protect his treaty partner from the effects of the Brit ish blockade now depended on him. By skilfully apportioning Soviet aid Stalin had it in his power to save Germany from defeat, but also to pre vent them from achieving victory and so make the war drag on till both parties were exhausted, while the Soviet Union carried on rearming in safe neutrality in order to have the last word.

54 Quite apart from this the German economy - owing to the maritime blockade – was largely dependent on imports from or via the Soviet Union. Although the autocratic policy of the pre-war years had certainly achieved some success, even in the textile branch the dependence on imports could only be cut down from ninety-five to about thirty-five per cent by 1939. The 'fat gap' was still there, with imports of forty-three per cent. In spite of the annexation of Austria and the erection of the Reichswerke, and also taking into consideration the inland scrap iron supplies, forty-five per cent of the iron ore needed still had to be impor ted. Likewise, after allowing for the conversion of used material, the dependence on foreign supplies amounted in 1939 to twenty-five per cent in zinc, fifty per cent in lead, seventy per cent in copper, ninety per cent in tin, ninety-five per cent in nickel, ninety-nine per cent in bauxite, sixty-six per cent in mineral oils, and eighty per cent in rub ber.65

55Looking back over the history of these events it seems quite incomprehensible that the Führer allowed himself to become dependent on such a dangerous opponent.68 But in this case he was not dealing, as hitherto, with intimidated bourgeois politicians, full of moral scruples, but with an opponent who was at least his match in ruthlessness and far superior in cunning. During the negotiations and settlement of the fateful Moscow agreements, the Bohemian-like dilettante Hitler and the vain braggart Ribbentrop displayed astonishing frivolity and a stag gering lack of political intelligence, master of the Soviet empire.
Soviets Gain Access To German Armament Factories - Even Obtaining Construction Plans of the battleship Bismarck
55 Another aspect of German - Soviet trade relations at the time is worthy of mention. While Moscow delivered almost exclusively raw materials to its partner, the Soviets demanded - and for the most part received - armaments and industrial equipment in return. This enabled Soviet experts to gain completely legal access to German armament factories and so establish some idea of their capacity. They were thus able to make comparisons – which often enough confirmed their fav ourable impression of their own country's war potential. The Soviet interest in the German navy was such that they asked for construction plans of the battleship Bismarck – additional evidence that Moscow considered the Western sea powers to be its real opponents.

Western Leaders Wanted To Bomb Soviet Union And Land Invade the Caucasus
58 Soviet anxieties regarding the Western powers were by no means imaginary. Leaders in London and Paris were considering how they could take military measures against the Soviets, who were considered to be allies of Germany. Besides contemplating actions in the north, consideration was also given to bombing the oilfields of Baku, or even sending land forces into the Caucasus, possibly with the co-oj ion of Turkish or Iranian troops.
Author Displays Bias To Nazi Ideology


Soviet Military Science
78 Such convictions were cherished a long time before the Second World War: Soviet military science is in accordance with the possibilities inherent in the structure of the Soviet state and society; it reflects the incomparable superiority of the Soviet armed forces over the armies of the capitalist countries, and in the hands of the Soviet people will prove to be a power ful weapon for victorious warfare against the enemies of the socialist state. 108 The military doctrine of the Red Army was also founded on this basic conviction in the years before the outbreak of war. In the regulations and instructions, as well as in the ideas behind operational and strategi cal wargames, the thought of the victorious attack was always expressed as the active method of warfare - as was stated, for example, in the plans for the field service regiments in the year 1939:

79 achieve a breakthrough into the enemy positions, while the second, using mobile forces, was to press forward into the gaps, overtake the retreating enemy, and destroy or encircle him together with his re serves.111 These tactics were confirmed by observation of the motorised war as exemplified by the German army in Poland and France. Stalin regarded this doctrine as his ‘new theory', and he ordered it to be tried out in wargames and exercises during the winter of 1940–41.112

Soviet's Vow A War Of Annihilation
78 The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics will answer every attack with a destructive blow from the whole might of their armed forces. Our war against the attacker will be the most just war in the history of mankind. If the enemy forces war on us, then the Red Army will be the most offensive of all armies. We will wage an offensive war and carry it right into the territory of our opponents. The fighting methods of the Red Army will be annihilating ...109 The Soviet Union felt itself more and more in the position, ... in the case of war, to set itself decisive, strategic goals, which went as far as completely wiping out the enemy aggressor on his own terri tory." 110 As must be emphasised again, this was not merely propaganda and rhetoric, but the basis upon which the armed forces were founded and the guiding principle in the training of its staff and troops.

Soviets Defy German Guarantees and Demand More and More
87 140 In a surprise action at the end of October 1940 the Red Army occupied some Rumanian islands in the main arm of the delta, thus not only gaining strategic advantages, but also intentionally defying the German guarantee. Moscow was also seeking a political settlement on its own terms. It demanded the dissolution of the European Danube Commission, created in 1856 after the Crimean War, which exercised rights of sovereignty in the Lower Danube basin. This authority, in which England and France had a seat and a vote, had been set up as a barrier against Soviet ambitions to the south towards the Straits or along the open Danube waterway and right into the heart of Europe. Moscow wanted this authority to be replaced, at least provisionally, by a Soviet-Rumanian administration of the Lower Danube – including all the arms of the delta – in which the Soviets would naturally have an overwhelming majority and

93 Molotov hinted at how he imagined this third stage - and possible further stages to follow – in his final conversation with Ribbentrop in the Foreign Ministry's air raid shelter on the evening of 13 November. Here he not only re-emphasised the demands already made relating to Finland, Bulgaria and the Turkish Straits, but also declared his country's interest in Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece - in other words the whole of south-east Europe. Scarcely less perturbing was the re minder he gave of the protocol dealing with the future configuration of Poland, agreed upon by Germany and the Soviet Union, and the sugges tion that an exchange of opinion on this would be necessary to put it into practice.

94 The subject of Swedish neutrality was also broached, as was the question of the sea passages out of the Baltic (Big Belt, Little Belt, Sund, Kattegat and Skagerrak). The Soviet government believed that discussion of these points was necessary, along the lines of those in progress at the time regarding the Danube Commissions - in other words with Moscow claiming the dominant position.157 These enor mous demands have been accurately described as follows: Russia is getting ready to turn the Baltic into a Russian inland sea, to subjugate the Balkans, to regulate Polish conditions in such a manner that, if possible, the fourth division of Poland of August and September 1939 can be replaced by a kind of Polish congress under Russian sover eignty. 158

94All this was unacceptable to Germany. To pull out of Finland would have meant losing an important strategic position and making the vital nickel and timber supplies a hostage to Soviet goodwill. The conditions regarding Bulgaria were unacceptable – firstly because Hitler might need to use this country as a deployment area against the Greeks or British, and secondly – and more importantly – because a Soviet mili tary presence there would have been a threat from the south to Rumania, which for military and economic reasons was indispensable to Germany. Furthermore, on the basis of his previous experiences and Molotov's candid statement, Hitler had every reason to fear that as soon as their present wishes were granted the Soviets would be making new and even more dangerous demands.

96 Although Hitler recognised Russia's conquests and spheres of interest in the Middle East and in the Baltic countries to an extent which went far beyond all Russian aspirations since Peter the Great and up to Alexander Isvolski, Molotov curtly demanded further concessions in the Balkan area and the Dardanelles, fully knowing that this would enrage the Führer and so lure him to declare war on Russia. The plan was a success and on 21 June 1941 Hitler started his fateful attack. 162

Soviet's Extorting German's
95 There could be no doubt that the Kremlin was applying to Germany the very strategy which Hitler had practised so long and so successfully – namely, to extort concessions in order to gain a more favourable vantage point for further extortion, and thus step by step to completely subjugate the victim. The Soviet encroachment into Finland and Bulgaria was dangerous enough, but Molotov's further extravagant claims amounted to nothing less than an encircling movement from Poland and the Balkans - one which would have made a successful defence against attack from the east impossible, and which would reduce Germany's role from representative to satellite. What Stalin's ambassador had handed over was certainly not an ultimatum with a time limit, but it was a scarcely disguised sum mons, a demand for submission.

95 Whether Hitler would have attacked if the discussions with Moscow had taken a different course must remain open to question. In ‘Instruction No. 18' Hitler had reserved this military option for himself, irrespective of the outcome of the talks. In any case, if the Soviet Union did join the Three Power Pact then Germany would be dependent on the Kremlin's loyalty to the agreed terms, which would have meant a further element of uncertainty. Now, however, Molotov had let the cat out of the bag and had dispelled all doubts about Moscow's intentions. Germany had a choice: to submit or to fight.

99 If all these things are considered, Molotov's behaviour in Berlin appears as part of a well-conceived and far-sighted project. He re fused to react to the nebulous thoughts and suggestions of his treaty partners, but concentrated completely on the points at issue in order to exacerbate the conflict. By his ominous revelations in the air raid shel ter he impressed upon the Germans, with the utmost bluntness, that they had to choose either to fight or to give in to Soviet wishes, and by making this challenge he hoped to provoke them into an attack. In this he was successful.

Nazi's Vow to Crush Russia
95 On 18 December 1940 he issued his historic 'Instruction No. 21'about Operation Barbarossa: The German Army must be ready, even before the end of the war with England, to crush Russia in a rapid campaign.

Hollow Ring To the German-Soviet Relationship
102 167 It was obvious that Stalin was looking for me, for as soon as he saw me he came up, put his arm round my shoulders and said: 'We must remain friends, and you must do everything to keep this so'. Somewhat later Stalin turned to the German Deputy Military Attaché, Colonel Krebs, first made certain that he was German, then said to him, 'We will remain friends with you, in any case.' There is no doubt that Stalin greeted myself and Colonel Krebs deliberately to create a situation which would be noticed by the many people present. But these assertions of friendship had a hollow ring. When, contrary to his usual habits, Stalin made any demonstrative appearance in public, there were always significance reasons for him doing so, and if one con siders the background to that theatrically sentimental scene then it seems to assume an almost Shakespearian character. While the sly Georgian was embracing the Germans in public, he had just covered his rear for the war against Germany; and while he was honouring Matsuoka by appearing personally to see him off, he had encouraged Japan to make the most fateful mistake in its history.

Soviet Foreign Policy Forces Japanese To Observe Neutrality in Event of German Invasion And Give China Breathing Space
103 168 It had taken quite some time to arrive at the neutrality pact with Japan. As a result of suffering many defeats in clashes with the Red Army, and because of the erosion of its alliance with Germany through the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Japan had got into a very unfavourable situation and was attempting to improve its relations with the Soviet Union, ef forts which were also supported by Berlin. However, a dispute about Japanese prospecting rights in North Sakhalin had brought these nego tiations to a dead end, and in April 1941 they seemed close to failure, before the personal intervention of Stalin led to the signing of the neu trality pact. It is worth noting that the wording of this pact was such that - according to one possible interpretation - the Japanese would be obliged to observe neutrality even in the case of a Soviet attack against Germany, as were the Russians in the event of a Japanese action in the Pacific. Stalin was, of course, seeking to secure his rear before the collision with Germany, but he was perhaps also pursuing other more important aims.

103 Stalin's plans went further, however, as Grigore Gafencu has pointed out with particular clarity: Japanese penetration to the south would free eastern Siberia from the Japanese threat, relieve China, which was find ing it difficult to breathe in the stranglehold exerted by Tokyo, and involve Japan in a war with the U.S.A. In the long run, this would spell disaster for Japan, but it would also reveal the weakness of the British Empire, strengthen the nationalist feeling of the broad mass of the people in central Asia, and further Asia's fight for freedom. 171

106 Whether during those last months the Kremlin hoped to gain time by this ostensible display of friendship towards Germany is open to dis pute. It was probably more designed to make the perfidiousness of the German attack contrast all the more strongly with the background of Russian loyalty, and so to camouflage Stalin's own imperialist inten tions regarding the British and Americans. This stratagem of psycho logical warfare was to have a much more convincing effect later on as a result of the remarkable success of the German army at the beginning of the invasion. Even Churchill failed to see through it - he wrote in his memoirs after the war that ‘Stalin and his commissars were the most outwitted bunglers of the Second not in Moscow at the time.

140 According to the concept developed by Lenin as early as December 1920 Germany and Japan were to be man oeuvred into a position of conflict with the Western 'imperialists'.

141 According to Stalin's plans Japan - a continual source of tension and trouble for the Soviet Union – was to be turned round and employed against the British and Americans. This goal was assisted by the neu trality treaty of 13 April 1941 by which Moscow was guaranteed the cover in the east that it needed for the war with Germany and at the same time gave similar assurances to Japan, thus freeing that country for an armed conflict with the British and Americans. Roosevelt's harsh policy towards Japan fell completely in line with Kremlin intentions and eventually led to the attack on Pearl Harbour - which signalled the outbreak of the 'imperialist war' in the Far East and gave evidence that the manipulative concept devised by Lenin and developed by Stalin had largely been realised. From then on a large proportion of U.S. forces would be tied down in the Far East and unavailable for action in Europe. In any event, the Kremlin could hope to oust the Japanese and Western 'imperialists' from the East Asian continent and establish its own pre dominance in this area.

Anti-German Propaganda In Red Army Was Never Abandoned Not Even During Molotov-Ribbentrop
107 Meanwhile, anti-German propaganda in the Red Army, which had not been abandoned even when German-Soviet friendship was at its height, was noticeably increased.183 On 1 May Marshal Timoschenko issued an order of the day which stated: The Red Army has augmented its experience of war and is ready to offer annihilating resistance to any imperialist blow against the interests of our Soviet state or our Soviet people.184 In view of the situation at the time, it was not hard to guess who was expected to deliver such a blow.
Stalin Issues Secret Speech Saying War Was Imminent
108 This assumption is also confirmed by Stalin's own behaviour at the time. On 5 May 1941 he delivered a forty-minute speech at a passing out parade of cadets at the Military Academy, the text of which was un fortunately not made public. On the next day Pravda made a short re port of this under the heading 'We must be ready for any surprise', stat ing how Stalin had emphasised that, in accordance with the demands of modern warfare, the army had been reorganised and to a large extent re-equipped. 186 There are various versions of the contents of the speech, but they all agree that the Soviet dictator was of the opinion that war was imminent and would almost inevitably be fought out in 1942, in which case the Soviets would have to take the initia tive.187 The account given by Gustav Hilger, German Ambassador

108 In flagrant contradiction of this are the accounts given to me during the war by three high-ranking Russian officers, prisoners of war, who had been present at the banquet. According to them the head of the academy, Lieutenant-General Chosin, had wanted to propose a toast to the peace ful policies of the Soviet Union to which Stalin reacted with sharp disapproval, saying that it was time to drop this defensive attitude be cause it was out of date. Admittedly this attitude had helped to push the borders of the Soviet Union well forward in the west and north, increas ing its population by thirteen millions in the process, but now not another foot of ground could be gained with such peaceful sentiments. The Red Army must get used to the idea that the era of the peace policy was finished and the era of a violent extension of the socialist front had dawned. Anyone who failed to recognise the necessity of offensive action was a bourgeois and a fool. It was also time to put an end, once and for all, to the adulation of the German Army.

Soviets Had Forward Deployments of Troops In Bulge Around Bialystok and Lemberg Prior to Ww2
114 Further indications of the Soviet plan of action are given by the great concentrations of motorised and tank units in and behind the front lines, which protruded so as to form a bulge202 around Bialystok and Lemberg203. About this General Halder correctly commented at a later hearing in Nuremberg: “No troops deployed for defence would be concentrated in such numbers in an area projecting into the enemy'. a 204

Soviets Aware Of Nazi Invasion
115 At the beginning of June reliable news had come in that the Germans ... had requisitioned all military and other hospitals and sent their medical personnel there. Germans had been put in charge of all the main railway depots. All German military trains to the border were being accompanied by strong guards. On theterritory of occupied Poland a state of war had been declared. They had just learnt ... that the Fascists are everywhere replacing their border troops by regular army troops. Close to the border they are concentrating a vast number of requisitioned farm vehicles.

115 The staff of the Kiev Special Military Region was very well informed of German preparations. The head of intelligence, Colonel Bondarev, had received reports early in spring that the enemy is constructing a number of emergency landing grounds and branch railways, and that numerous unmetalled roads run straight to our border. In April large troop movements were begun which could perhaps have been a manoeuvre. Every manoeuvre and every exercise should have an end, but the advance of fascist troops up to the border never ceased. In the area bordering on the Ukraine up to two hundred trains arrived daily with troops and war materials.

116 The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, General Ptuchin, “pointed out to the council of war that there were frequent violations of the air space near our borders by German aircraft'. All this caused the Com mander in Chief of the Military Region to make this statement: 107 One thing is clear: the situation is alarming. The fascists are making serious preparations aimed at us, either a great provocation ner of their allies, the Japanese Samurais, or ...? 210

118 Of course it was impossible to carry out these orders. They were not reactions to the realities of the situation but, without regard to the facts, merely reflected the familiar war dogma. The fact that numerous airfields were constructed fairly close to the border,221 which would have been completely senseless for defence purposes, gives yet more evidence of the Soviet desire to invade Germany, with or without a Ger man attack.222 Captured documents and statements from prisoners fill in the picture. In Soviet military staff quarters maps of areas far beyond the Demarcation Line were found. This suggests that, for example, the Soviet motorised unit number twenty had been allocated a specific sec tor for attack, which extended over the Bug and far beyond the Weichsel, south of Warsaw, and into the west. Such documents fur nish clues as to the Soviet schedule. A captured document gave details of Soviet plans for attack, which must be completed by the late summer or autumn. This date was often confirmed by officers who had been taken prisoner, amongst them General Vlassov.

Despite Soviets Having An Idea Germans Might Invade Their Main Concern Was Delaying War And Not Being Drawn into A Provocation
119 On the other hand another conundrum of the Second World War can very probably be solved: why did Stalin delay so long in warning his forces, and thus enable the Germans to inflict a number of tactical sur prises with dire consequences for Red Army units? The Soviet dictator has been severely criticised for this delay and accused of being credu lous, gullible or obstinate. However, considering the assumptions he had to make at the time his reticence was in fact both clever and respon sible. There is no reason to doubt the account given later by Schukov, based on his own experiences of those events, although admittedly he does not go into their political background. The ever more frequent reports of an imminent German attack were received by Stalin with great mistrust, and he was concerned neither to provoke the Germans nor to let himself be provoked by them. In this, as already mentioned (see pages 97ff) he had two main objects: to create the myth of an unprovoked attack and, for military reasons, to delay the coming con flict as long as possible. If he was misled into hitting out too soon, then the myth would be exposed and he would have to put an army not yet completely ready for war into action; and the same disadvantages threat ened if he openly challenged the Germans. 226 1,

Deluded Nazis'
121 On the German side, illusions began to flourish. Even a very sober observer like General Halder wrote in his diary on 3 July 1941: It is not an overstatement if I say that the campaign against Russia was won in fourteen days. Of course, it isn't finished yet. 229
Churchil on 'Russian Barbarism'
133 Churchill - must admit that first and foremost my thoughts are directed towards Europe. It would be an unthinkable misfortune if Russian barbarism were to swamp the cultural independence of the old European states ... Though it is difficult to say such a thing today, I still hope that the European family of nations will act together in a European council.249
Excellent Soviet foreign Policy
133 Some days after this conference one of the American participants summarised what aims the policies of Stalin and Molotov might be pursuing in a memorandum: Germany is to be divided up and must remain so. The states of East, South-east and Central Europe may not form themselves into alliances or unions. France is to be robbed of its colonies and foreign strategic bases, and not allowed to maintain more than nominal armed forces. Poland and Italy retain approximately their present territories, but it is doubtful if they will be allowed to maintain armed forces in keeping with the size of these territories. As a result of this, the Soviet Union would be the only important political and military force on the European Conti nent. The rest of Europe would be condemned to military and political impotence.250

144 In this way the Soviet Union was able inflict a heavy defeat on the West ern powers in the Second World War using purely political and strategic means. The Red Army never needed to cross swords with British or American forces: this was done for them by the Germans and the Japanese. Britain and America, indeed, shipped abundant supplies to the Soviet Union - far more than were needed to prevent a German victory in the east. Under the influence of the emotions engendered by the war against Hitler and the psycho-strategical tricks of Stalin - the myth of the unprovoked fascist attack and the continual demands for a second front - neither politicians nor public in the great democracies appreciated that the most dangerous enemy isn't necessarily the one directly embroiled in military conflict. Through this art of indirect, concealed and undramatic advances, which Stalin developed in mas terly fashion, the cunning Georgian achieved his greatest success. The weakness of the Western powers was not due to a lack of the instru ments of power, but to a deficiency in political intelligence.

145 in the realisation of Lenin's grand strategy to subjugate the capi talist or 'imperialist' nations – in other words, all those which had not yet undergone the process of Sovietisation. The 'worldwide anti imperialist struggle' was continued and after England had ceased to be a great power Soviet efforts were concentrated on the U.S.A. - especially by mobilising the Third World against that nation - once again in ac cordance with the thoughts of Lenin. There are instances too numerous to mention of his strategy in operation – it is an example, indeed a model lesson in sophisticated power politics, and as such deserves speical consideration. -

68. 148 Since the appearance of the first German edition of this book in April 1985, Victor Suvorov has published two articles of particular interest in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 267
Stalin Intended to Being War Himself in Summer of 1941 (According to author)
149 In every major human endeavour there exists a critical moment at which events reach a point of no return. This moment for the Soviet Union fell on 13 June 1941. After that day masses of Soviet troops were secretly but inexorably moving towards the German border. Once 13 June had passed the Soviet leadership could no longer turn these troops back or even halt them, for economic and military reasons. War became inevitable for the Soviet Union, irrespective of how Hitler might have acted. Finally, the composition and disposition of the forces in the fron tier zone did not indicate that they were intended to remain there. Such features as the airborne corps in the first crust of the 'defences', artillery units in the forward locations, the dismantling of the Stalin line and the absence of any defence in depth or effort to construct one do not point to the intention of maintaining any permanent defensive position along the border. If all this is viewed in the context of the Zhukov doctrinal framework outlined earlier, then it becomes clear that the only credible military intention which Stalin could have had was to begin the war himself in the summer of 1941.2 268

156 'On 5 May, in a private circle of officer cadets ... Stalin had praised the heroism of the Russian Army and declared that the soldiers of the Soviet Union must not keep to the defensive, but must be ready to show their attack capabilities in order to oppose the powers which are seeking world dominion.'J. Hoffmann (note 110), pp 73 ff, gave a very similar interpretation of Stalin's speech. Also important in this connection is the statement, quoted there, of Major-General Meandrov, later head of the Officer Training School of the Red Army, before his repatriation in 1946: 'The policy of the government to get ready for a great war was perfectly clear to us ... what was put to us as defence measures turned out to be a long prepared and carefully disguised plan of aggression.'