What Does It Mean to Control Migration? Soviet Mobility Policies in Comparative Perspective

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The migration policies of the former Soviet Union (or USSR) included a virtual abolition of emigration and immigration, an effective ban on private travel abroad, and pervasive bureaucratic controls on internal migration. This article outlines this Soviet package of migration controls and assesses its historical and international distinctiveness through comparison with a liberal state, the United States, and an authoritarian capitalist state, Apartheid South Africa. Soviet limitations on external migration were more restrictive than those of contemporary capitalist states, and Soviet regulation of internal migration was unusual in its direct bureaucratic supervision of the individual. However, Soviet policy did not aim at the suppression of internal migration, but at its complete regularization. The ultimate goal was "regime adherence": the full integration of the citizen into the Soviet political order. In contrast to the USSR, migration in the contemporary world is marked by "irregularization": policies that lead to the proliferation of insecure and unauthorized migration.

I.   INTRODUCTION: TOTAL CONTROL OVER MOBILITY?

Migration is regulated in all states, yet the goals and methods of migration control differ and, consequently, so do the mobility rights of the state's subjects, as well as those of aliens. The former Soviet Union (or USSR) regulated migration much more bureaucratically and, at least in some respects, more repressively, than did contemporary liberal states. While other scholars have analyzed particular features of Soviet migration policies, this article conceptualizes them as a coherent system, or package, and assesses their historical significance for theories of migration policy. The most striking features of Soviet policy were the minimization both of emigration and of immigration, severe limits on foreign travel by Soviet citizens, and the systematic bureaucratic control of internal migration. These policies constitute an almost unprecedented effort to create a form of migration that was fully state directed, or "regularized." This effort is explored both in the context of the broader Soviet political order, and also in comparative context.

Part II reviews the relation between regime type and migration policy. The Soviet experiment in migration governance contradicts many assumptions about systems of migration control derived from the study of Western industrialized democracies. Part III

outlines Soviet migration policies and argues that the USSR's attempts to control human mobility were much more significantly driven by geopolitical and security concerns than was the case in the West. Moreover, Soviet migration policies were generally effective in achieving the regime's goals, perverse as those may have been.

Part IV addresses the historical and theoretical significance of the Soviet migration control model through comparisons with two twentieth-century states: Apartheid South Africa, an authoritarian capitalist regime controlled by a white minority, which deployed a comprehensive system of migration restrictions against its black population; and the United States, a liberal capitalist regime with more decentralized migration regulation. At the level of international migration, where the Soviet state directly controlled mobility as a sovereign among other sovereigns, its policies were indeed anomalously restrictive. At the level of domestic migration, however, the results of the comparison are more complex. Soviet internal migration controls were applied directly to the body of the subject by a state bureaucracy, whereas in liberal states they tend to be exercised more indirectly, thus partially obscuring the act of regulation itself.

Thus, contrary to appearances, internal migration was not more intensively governed in the USSR than in other societies; rather, it was the goals and methods of Soviet migration policies that were distinctive. The Soviet attempt to fully regularize migration was part of a broader project of creating complete "regime adherence"—the full integration of the individual into the Soviet order—and promoting the regime's objective of maintaining superpower status. Moreover, the Soviet government consciously sacrificed many potential benefits of more spontaneous migration in order to achieve these goals.

Finally, Part V argues that the Soviet experience helps illuminate the nature and possible future of restrictions on mobility in the contemporary world. Although migration today is subject to increasing repression around the world, such repression is diametrically opposed to the compulsory regularization of migration in the USSR. Repressive migration policies today primarily involve "irregularization"—the proliferation of illegal and insecure migration.

II. FRAMING THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE: MIGRATION THEORY AND THE USSR'S MIGRATION CONTROLS

The study of migration in the Soviet Union has primarily been the preserve of Soviet specialists (both in the USSR and its successor states, and in the West), not migration theorists. Below I first review the development of the scholarly literature on Soviet migration issues, and then consider how findings from that literature may contribute to broader theories of migration.

In the Soviet Union itself, academic discussion of internal migration was renewed in the early 1960s following a long period of enforced silence resulting from Stalinist repression. Between the 1960s and the reformist "Glasnost" period of the late 1980s, Soviet social scientists did the spade work of collecting and interpreting data on internal migration trends in the USSR, although they generally steered clear of explosive topics such as the internal exile of various Soviet ethnic groups and other population categories under Stalin, or even the basic legal mechanisms of Soviet internal migration controls. However, Soviet scholars did propose reforms such as the liberal-

ization of restrictive policies and greater attention to the needs of migrants.[1] In the same era, but on the other side of the Iron Curtain, Western social scientists and Soviet émigrés more directly addressed Soviet internal migration controls, often with the goal of explaining their mechanisms to a Western policy audience.[2] In most cases, such studies did not integrate Soviet data into the emerging scholarly literature on migration policies based around international comparisons.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian historians have assessed the human toll of Stalin-era oppression,[3] and Russian social scientists have analyzed the long-term consequences for Russia of Soviet-era migration policies.[4] Western historians and social scientists have also produced retrospective analyses of Soviet internal migration controls, although these tend not to integrate the internal and external dimensions of Soviet migration policy.[5] Some contemporary historians address migration controls in the context of other substantive issues, such as criminal justice or agrarian policy.[6] Like their Russian counterparts, some Western social scientists have also analyzed Soviet migration policies in order to understand their implications for post-Soviet Russia.[7]

Unlike these primary research studies, the goals here are analytical and integrative: to bridge the gap between studies of Soviet internal and external migration policies, as well as the gap between the geographically and professionally fragmented scholarly literature(s) on Soviet migration policies, and the emerging interdisciplinary theoretical literature on migration regulation. In particular, several questions addressed in the scholarly literature on migration policy would benefit from reexamination in light of Soviet migration controls.

- How does a state's regime type influence the broad patterns of mobility regulation in that state?
- What factors support or limit the state's ability to regulate aspects of migration?
- How can we understand the nature of mobility rights, and constraints on them, in the contemporary world?

As will be argued, the migration policies pursued in the Soviet Union diverge radically from those in the industrialized Western democracies that are most widely studied by migration scholars.

One major concern of historians of migration involves changes in the degree and nature of state control over international migration. In a path-breaking study, Torpey

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1. Examples of such works that are cited later in the article are Khorev and Chapek (1978), Khorev and Kiseleva (1982), Platunov (1976), and Zaionchkovskaia (1972).

2. See Ginsburgs (1957), Houston (1979), and Liubarskii (1981).

3. Examples include Polian's studies of forced migrations under Stalin and the internment of returning Soviet prisoners of war after World War II; see Polian (2004, 2005).

4. On the consequences for the Russian Federation of Soviet urban and demographic policies, see Vishnevskii (1998, 2003).

5. On Soviet policies on both internal and external travel and migration, see Matthews (1978, 1993). Later reappraisals of Soviet internal migration policies include Buckley (1995) and Garcelon (2001). The most comprehensive account of Soviet border controls is by Chandler (1998).

6. See the reassessments of the mass release of prisoners following the death of Stalin (Dobson 2009), the Great Terror (Hagenloh 2009), and the internal exile of the so-called kulaks, that is, "rich peasants," viewed by the Stalin regime as exploiters (Viola 2007).

7. Thus, Hill and Gaddy (2003) critically analyze the consequences for Russia of Soviet policies that promoted settlement of Siberia and other cold, remote regions.

(2000) argues that both the state's interests in migration controls and its capacities have changed significantly over the last several hundred years. In early modern Europe, the state's main migration regulatory activities included limiting internal mobility (within national territory), often to restrict the movement of the poor, or to prevent the emigration of useful subjects, such as highly skilled workers. In contrast, the period after 1800 saw the emergence of a new pattern of migration control in most Western countries: relatively liberal internal migration and emigration policies, combined with increasingly rigorous and sophisticated controls on immigration. Torpey attributes these changes to the creation of national market economies and national labor forces, freer trade in agricultural products (thus reducing the need to secure the food surplus of peasants), and the creation of national welfare states. These trends facilitated liberalized *domestic* migration, notably by the poor, while also creating incentives to assert greater control over entry by foreigners. Eltis (2002) adds a further dimension to the nature of modernity in migration controls: the gradual elimination of slavery and other forms of coerced migration (including penal servitude) after about 1800.

The nineteenth century could thus be seen as a golden age of freedom of movement, at least for Europeans and their descendants in white settler societies, who temporarily enjoyed an almost unprecedented formal right to move across borders and throughout colonial empires. This moment, however, proved to be of short duration. According to Torpey, by the late nineteenth century, political leaders' growing fears of revolution and interstate war led to increasing limitations on immigration, new administrative methods of controlling it—notably the modern passport and visa system—and increasingly restrictive quota and national origins policies intended to block the immigration of undesired ethnic groups. As a result of these trends, during the twentieth century, mobility rights in liberal capitalist states took on a new pattern, which, with some modifications, they retain to this day. While citizens of such states are (at least in theory) free to move around their own countries at will and to emigrate without restriction, *immigration* is now characterized as a highly regulated and limited privilege granted by the government to selected foreign nationals.

Other studies seek to explain the origins of anti-immigration movements and policies in contemporary states. Some authors offer economic explanations. Money (1999) argues that opposition to immigration in developed countries generally emerges because of the saturation of regional labor markets by immigrants and the fiscal strain generated by their increased demand for social services. Similarly, Freeman (1997) argues that the class interests and greater political power of the wealthy tend to produce higher levels of immigration than working-class people would support, as the rich seek to reduce the wages paid to highly priced domestic labor. In contrast to these strictly economic explanations of anti-immigration movements, Zolberg's (1999a) study of the restrictive trend in US immigration policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries contends that new restrictions on immigration were actually intended to preserve the ideological basis of the political system. As Zolberg notes, major employers actually supported the continuation of large-scale immigration, yet they were overruled on this issue by political and intellectual elites, who feared that immigration was stimulating the growth of radical politics in the United States (307). Zolberg refers to this motivation for immigration restrictions as "regime maintenance" (308).

Perhaps because the systematic theoretical study of migration initially emerged mainly in industrialized democracies, many of these studies of migration policy assume an essentially "pluralist" political system, in which policy is the product of a regulated struggle between organized competing interests within society (Dahl 1961). In such a model, although social actors may have unequal weight in the process of legislation, no interest group is powerful enough to fully dominate or overwhelm the others.

Likewise, studies of migration in industrialized democracies tend to agree that fully eliminating unauthorized migration is impossible in democratic states, mainly because contemporary norms of human rights and due process prevent mass deportations, and thereby guarantee that at least some unauthorized immigrants will always be present in a given state (Zolberg 1999b; Hollifield 2004). Studies of the US-Mexican migration relationship have argued that social networks, labor market integration, and the costs of enforcement frustrate governments' attempts to control unauthorized immigration (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Hollifield (2004) has coined the concept of the "migration state," in which norms of due process and civil liberties constrain it to tolerate (at least tacitly) a certain level of unauthorized mobility.

Soviet migration policies turn most of these assertions (or assumptions) about the nature of migration policy on their heads. Contra Hollifield and Massey, the USSR created an elaborate system of mobility controls that constrained the individual at every turn and, as I shall argue, overcame most obstacles to its success. Contrary to Torpey's ideal type, the Soviet government dramatically *reduced* the right of its citizens to leave their country and severely constrained even their formal right to move around within it. Contra Money and Freeman, the Soviet government's migration policies were determined not by the interplay of competing interest groups in a political arena, but instead were the product of a closed policy-making process within an authoritarian regime. To borrow Zolberg's concept of "regime maintenance," Soviet policies were ultimately motivated by what could be termed "regime adherence": the full integration of the individual into the Soviet order, which it pursued by the bureaucratic regulation of migration, out of, into, and within the USSR.

These peculiarities of the Soviet experience point to certain questions: Why did the Soviet Union choose the route of maximally bureaucratic, and highly prohibitive, migration controls? What, if anything, was historically distinctive about the Soviet model of migration governance? What implications does the Soviet regime of mobility hold for the future of freedom of movement in the contemporary world?

III. SOVIET MIGRATION POLICY: COERCION, RATIONING, AND REGIME ADHERENCE

Joseph Stalin became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1922. After gradually eliminating his political rivals, Stalin effectively ruled the USSR from the late 1920s until his death in 1953, and Soviet history is conventionally divided into the Stalin and post-Stalin phases. Although this article primarily analyzes the Soviet system of migration of the post-Stalin decades, key features of the Soviet system of migration control were established under Stalin, and were retained

under subsequent Soviet leaders, notably Nikita Khrushchev (in power 1953–1964) and Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982). The following outlines the evolution of the USSR's policies on external migration, and then turns to the regulation of internal migration.

Soviet policies on emigration and foreign travel evolved rapidly toward total prohibition. Following their triumph in the Russian Revolution of October 1917 and the subsequent civil war, the Bolsheviks[8] initially permitted the departure abroad of many of their political opponents, judging that hostile elements should be removed from the polity, rather than left to undermine it from within. As a result, an estimated 1.5 to 2 million people emigrated from Bolshevik-controlled territory between 1917 and 1922 (Iontsev et al. 2001, 52). The émigrés included political refugees of varying affiliations, from monarchists to moderate socialists, as well as much of the prerevolutionary economic and social elite.

Over the course of the 1920s, however, the Soviet regime gradually imposed an effective ban on emigration and even foreign travel, so that "[t]he right to cross the Soviet frontier . . . soon became a rare political privilege" (Matthews 1978, 83). From 1922, travel abroad required the special permission of the Commissariat (i.e., Ministry) of Foreign Affairs. After a slight relaxation in the mid-1920s during the period of semicapitalist development known as the New Economic Policy, further exit restrictions were instituted, including a new requirement of approval by the secret police. No *published* law actually spelled out the Soviet policy prohibiting foreign travel, as the Soviet government frequently did not wish to publicize its more repressive policies. In effect, though, privately organized visits abroad were prohibited from the late 1920s until almost the end of the Soviet Union's existence.[9]

The ban on emigration and travel abroad resulted indirectly from Stalin's economic program of nationalization of business enterprises, collectivization of agriculture, and rapid, centrally planned industrialization.[10] From the late 1920s, these policies imposed extreme economic hardship on Soviet citizens, adding to the incentive to leave the Soviet Union. In response, the regime stepped up efforts to control information, retain or reestablish custody over individuals it regarded as threatening, and coerce citizens' labor. These objectives necessitated severe limitations on external migration (Chandler 1998).

The Soviet government sought to control both the presentation of the Soviet Union to outsiders, and the depiction of the outside world to Soviet citizens. Emigration of dissidents was halted in part because Russian émigrés were spreading unfavorable reports about the USSR and lobbying Western governments to adopt anti-Soviet

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8. The Bolsheviks later renamed themselves the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

9. Beginning under Brezhnev, some Soviet citizens were permitted to travel abroad as part of official "tourist delegations," whose members were carefully screened for worthiness and political reliability. Relatively few people had access to this privilege. The total number of visits abroad by Soviet citizens in the late 1970s was limited to "a few hundred thousand trips a year . . . mostly in the form of short visits to countries of the communist bloc" (Matthews 1978, 51).

10. Stalin's model of economic development—encapsulated by the Stalinist slogan "socialism in one country"—was based on import substitution as a means to overcome the West's domination of the capitalist world system, and the consequent relegation of developing countries to a peripheral role as suppliers of raw materials; see Polanyi (1957, 247–48).

policies. Likewise, even temporary travel abroad allowed Soviet citizens to learn about foreign countries, or to convey news from the USSR to foreign interlocutors. Such information flows were unacceptable to a regime that viewed itself as internationally and domestically embattled, and whose Western neighbors were hostile capitalist states (Chandler 1998, 24).

The USSR also often sought to recapture émigrés in the West. Thus, in the aftermath of World War II, the USSR demanded the return from abroad of Soviet prisoners of war and civilian slave laborers who had been captured by the German occupiers.[11] The Soviet authorities even demanded (and in some cases obtained) the "repatriation" of displaced persons who had never been Soviet citizens, such as Cossack officers who had served in the tsarist army, or refugees from the former Baltic republics, which had recently come under Soviet rule. Such émigrés were viewed as enemies of the regime who needed to be neutralized (Ginsburgs 1957; Overy 1997, 300–02). Many forced repatriates were shot or imprisoned, and others were stigmatized and monitored for the rest of their lives.[12]

At the same time, the Soviet government also expelled unwanted subjects. Polian estimates that a total of some 6 million persons were expelled from Soviet-controlled territory between 1919 and Stalin's death in 1953 (2004, 312–13). There was a particularly large wave of such expulsions after the Soviet Union's westward territorial expansion at the end of World War II, in which communities such as Germans in East Prussia and Poles in western Ukraine were deported *en masse*. It is true that ethnically based mass expulsions are widespread in modern states, and the Soviet Union's behavior in this respect was not exceptional. Nonetheless, as Polian wryly notes, the scale of Soviet expulsions was certainly impressive. As these population transfers demonstrate, the Soviet Union did not simply seek to maximize the number of its subjects: only certain subjects were acceptable.

Similarly, while many foreign observers are aware of the Soviet government's restrictions on *emigration*, fewer have considered the significance of its restrictions on *immigration*, which further promoted the regime's attempt to isolate the Soviet population from outside influence and ensure that the regime's subjects were fully reliable. Soviet policies marked a clear historical break with previous Russian practice. For centuries, the tsarist government had actively recruited immigrants, and the Russian Empire actually had a positive migration balance (i.e., received more immigrants than it lost emigrants) until the onset of mass emigration, mainly Jewish, in the late nineteenth century (Bubnova 1992). Early in the Soviet period, however, spontaneous immigration was halted. For example, the immigration of Koreans and Chinese into the

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11. Under Stalin, former prisoners of war and slave laborers were viewed as presumptively guilty of treason, and many were imprisoned in labor camps. Even following their release and a partial amnesty under Khrushchev, they—and their children—experienced official restrictions on their rights for decades. A standard employment questionnaire used until the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 included the inquiry: "Were you or your relatives in captivity or in occupied territory [during World War II]?" (Polian 2005, 133). According to an informal conversation with a former Soviet merchant seaman, as late as the 1980s, an affirmative answer to this question meant that a sailor would be prohibited from serving outside the USSR's territorial waters (author's fieldnotes, Belgorod, Russia, 2005).

12. Despite the USSR's efforts to recoup all its subjects, an estimated 2 million Soviet citizens abroad refused to return after the war and thus in effect emigrated illegally (Bubnova 1992, 157–58).

Russian Far East (which had been taking place in a trickle since late tsarist times), was abruptly terminated, and many Chinese and Korean residents of the country were expelled (Rybakovskii, Zakharova, and Mivdogulov 1994, 11–12).[13]

From the 1920s until the end of the Soviet Union, immigration was permitted only in exceptional cases, mainly on the basis of ad hoc political decisions. Unlike capitalist countries in the same period, the USSR did not have fixed national immigration quotas, laws, or goals, and over the seven decades of its existence, it accepted a negligible number of immigrants, primarily through specific agreements negotiated directly between the Kremlin and foreign governments or international organizations. The organized resettlement of ethnic Armenians from outside the Soviet Union to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (one of the 15 constituent republics that made up the USSR), which was probably the largest wave of immigration to the USSR, illustrates how the Soviet government viewed immigration.

The Armenian resettlement took place in two major waves of officially authorized "repatriation." First, in the early 1920s, following the genocide of Armenians perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire during World War I, some 20,000 ethnic Armenian refugees were permitted to settle in the newly established Soviet Armenia (Stepanian and Sarkisian 2003, 302–05). Shortly after World War II, the Soviet Union reached agreements with the Armenian Church and Armenian organizations abroad to bring Armenian refugees from the Middle East and Mediterranean countries to Soviet Armenia. Under this policy, more than 100,000 Armenians immigrated to the USSR between 1945 and 1948. This repatriation drive was apparently launched in support of Soviet efforts to pursue certain territorial claims against Turkey, which shared a border with Soviet Armenia. However, the program was abruptly terminated with the onset of the Cold War, and many Armenian immigrants found themselves under political suspicion. Some were arrested and sent to prison camps (Suny 1997, 367–68).

This peculiar episode illustrates the extremely limited appeal that immigration held for the Soviet government and the political constraints that made a more pro-immigration policy impossible. The leaders of the USSR viewed immigration primarily through the lens of geopolitical advantage and security concerns. Here, the contrast with Western states' limits on immigration is instructive. Of course, early twentieth-century immigration policies in the United States, Canada, Australia, and other major Western receiving countries were overtly racist in character, as in the US exclusion of Asians, and as discussed above, such policies aimed at "regime maintenance" (Zolberg 1999a, 1999b). Yet, even after the United States imposed annual quotas and national origins (i.e., ethnic) restrictions in the 1920s, US legislation still provided for the continuation of substantial authorized immigration from the 1920s to the 1960s, in part as a result of family reunification provisions. In contrast, the Soviet Union implemented an effective ban on immigration while occasionally authorizing specific exceptions.

Moreover, the Soviet Union was also reluctant to accept even *temporary* labor immigrants, often called "guest workers." During the early post–World War II decades,

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13. When one considers the long border between the two countries, the miniscule number of ethnically Chinese persons residing in the Soviet Union (approximately 26,000, according to the 1959 census) is especially striking (Rybakovskii, Zakharova, Mivdogulov 1994, 12).

only guest workers from socialist countries were recruited, in extremely small numbers, and they were isolated from the local population as much as possible (Moskoff 1984, 79). Later, as the Soviet Union acquired allies in developing countries such as Cuba and Vietnam, it negotiated agreements with these governments to send guest workers to the USSR. Such agreements provided for compulsory assignment of the guest workers to specific projects in the USSR, their accommodation (often in squalid dormitories), and payment for their labor in hard currency directly to the sending governments (Perez-Lopez and Diaz-Briquets 1990). Furthermore, the significance of foreign workers in the Soviet economy remained minor. A 1977 study reported that foreign nationals accounted for only 0.05 percent of all workers employed in the Soviet Union (Levcik 1977, 18).

This Soviet policy of minimizing immigration appears even more anomalous when we reflect that the Soviet government considered itself to be suffering from a permanent labor shortage and viewed workers as a scarce resource (Kotkin 1995, 34). After World War II, in particular, the Soviet Union experienced labor shortages due to wartime mortality and, later, declining fertility, yet unlike other countries with similar demographic problems (such as West Germany), the postwar USSR failed to recruit replacement workers from abroad in large numbers.

The Soviet government's behavior suggests it viewed immigrants as undesirable subjects, despite their labor utility, because (by definition) they had been shaped by influences beyond the control of the Soviet government. Hollifield has written of the "risk" that states accept when they open their territory to immigration, which implies a certain degree of uncertainty and loss of control (2000, 151). From the perspective of the Soviet state, this perceived risk outweighed the potential gains to the state from immigration. In a similar vein, foreign tourism in the USSR was also strictly limited despite its potential economic value to the regime as a source of hard currency, again in order to control the presentation of the USSR to foreign audiences and to limit Soviet citizens' contact with foreigners.[14]

True, immigration (and even emigration) policy in Western countries during the same period was also influenced by foreign policy and ideological considerations. For example, the US government expelled left-wing activists (including both foreign leftists and naturalized US citizens) during the post-World-War-I "Red Scare." Likewise, Western governments have also practiced selective denial of exit to some regime opponents: under the Internal Security Act of 1950, the US State Department was instructed not to issue passports to members of the Communist Party.[15] Likewise, US

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14. Despite the value of foreign tourism as a source of hard currency for the regime, the development of a tourism business was constrained by the government's "wish to keep an eye on foreigners and to prevent them from visiting sites of strategic significance" (Shaw 1991, 137–38). Foreign tourists were required to adhere to a preset itinerary, and often had to be accompanied by an approved guide. Large parts of the country were also off limits to foreigners altogether (137–38). In the 1970s, the growth of international tourism to the USSR led the government to become concerned that tourists were distributing subversive printed materials, including the Western press, to Soviet citizens. Such materials were subject to confiscation (Chandler 1998, 86, 88). In 1985, Soviet border guards confiscated a copy of a US news magazine from the author's father as he entered the USSR.

15. This policy was ultimately struck down as unconstitutional in the US Supreme Court's decision in the case of *Aptheker v. Secretary of State* (1964) on the grounds that the right to travel abroad is one of the fundamental freedoms implicitly guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution.

refugee policy in the postwar decades was essentially constructed to further Cold War political imperatives and so gave priority to refugees from the USSR and other socialist states (Zolberg 1995). Yet, while the contrast between the Soviet Union and liberal capitalist states is not total, the latter were far more willing than the Soviet government to accept the "risks" of international migration, as evidenced by their ongoing acceptance of large-scale immigration and tourism, as well as the relatively unrestricted emigration and foreign travel of their own citizens.

Within the borders of the USSR, Soviet policies on internal migration evinced a similar determination to maintain an extremely high degree of direct official supervision of individual geographic mobility. As I shall argue, internal migration controls resulted from a combination of economic goals (i.e., distribution and rationing), purely coercive ones (the repression of dissent, surveillance), and regime adherence.

The principal Soviet tools for regulating domestic travel and resettlement were the internal passport and *propiska* (residence permit). The passport/propiska system (or passport regime) was developed under Stalin and maintained, with some modifications, by his successors. The passport regime itself was established in stages by a series of decrees in 1932 and 1933 (Matthews 1993, 27). "Passportization" (i.e., the issuing of internal passports) was initially limited to 25 major cities and the districts around them, together with a 100-kilometer strip along the USSR's western border. The system was gradually expanded to include towns, district centers, "machine-tractor stations" (depots containing agricultural equipment), areas within a 100-kilometer radius of certain large cities, frontier zones, building sites, and state farms. Such locations were known as "regime areas" (a more idiomatic translation might be "restricted areas"). In the remainder of the country, mainly rural areas, residents did not receive passports, although they were recorded in local population registers. Thus, most of the population (mainly peasants, but also others, such as Central Asian nomads) did not receive a passport at all. As a result, without special permission, they could not take up residence or employment in the regime areas, which were generally the most developed parts of the country.

The second feature of the new system, the propiska (residence permit), further restricted population mobility. The propiska authorized the holder to reside in a particular town and, indeed, at a specified address. While every person in the "passportized" area was issued with a propiska for some location, receiving a new propiska for another city (i.e., moving out of town) was not a right. Moreover, all major cities were subject to special limitations on the number of propiskas that could be issued, as well as to restrictions on the categories of persons who were eligible to receive a propiska. By the late Soviet period, these so-called *rezhimnye goroda* (literally, "regime cities," but usually translated as "closed cities," or perhaps more accurately as "restricted cities") included "all capitals of Soviet national republics, almost all cities with a population in excess of 500,000, and several smaller towns and regions, which, for various reasons [were] especially attractive for migration" (Zaslavsky 1982, 140). The permitted growth of closed cities was further curtailed by restrictions on the construction of new businesses and housing within them. Moreover, secret instructions to the police prohibited the granting of new propiskas in such cities, with exceptions made for certain firms that were allowed to sponsor specified numbers of new employees (Liubarskii 1981, 48). The system's prohibitions were backed by criminal sanctions ranging from fines to imprisonment with hard labor for more serious or repeated infringement of passport regulations.

Thus, the system created a tripartite division of geographical mobility within the Soviet Union: the "nonpassportized" countryside, whose residents could not move to the regime areas; unrestricted towns and cities, where any passport holder could, in principle, reside; and closed cities, where even passport holders could reside only with special permission. Finally, the passport/propiska system regulated internal travel as well as residence. Even short visits were not exempt: one's passport had to be presented within 24 hours of arrival at any place of sojourn, creating constant encounters between travelers and passport officials.

Table 1 provides an overview of contrasts between the main features of migration policies in the USSR and in an ideal-typical liberal capitalist state, drawing on the work of Torpey.

TABLE 1.
Regulation of Mobility in a Modern Liberal Capitalist State and the USSR, Showing Stylized Contrasts

Regulation of Mobility in a Modern Liberal Capitalist State (Ideal Type Derived From Torpey)	Contrasting Policies in USSR (Stylized Facts Based on Post-Stalin Period, 1953–1991)
Unrestricted emigration and temporary exit from national territory by citizens	Emigration allowed only in exceptional cases, mainly pursuant to agreements between Soviet government and foreign states; occasional expulsions of dissidents; private foreign travel banned; organized foreign travel a rare privilege
Formally free internal migration; (mostly) unsponsored (i.e., at election of migrant, not coordinated with specific employment offer or social benefits)	Internal migration regulated through passport/propiska system; migration to major urban centers severely restricted; migration "sponsored," i.e., coordinated with employment and social benefits
Entry of foreigners defined as privilege, not right, and governed through ubiquitous passport-visa system; permanent immigration limited but still a mass phenomenon; immigration takes place pursuant to formal policies that identify eligible categories of migrants; individuals or other actors (e.g., employers) submit applications for specified *individuals/families*	Spontaneous permanent immigration prohibited, i.e., policies do not provide procedures and eligibility for individual immigrants; occasional instances of immigration authorized by ad hoc decisions of Soviet government, mainly for specified *populations* (e.g., postwar Armenian "repatriation")
Extensive use of foreign guest workers; recruited both officially (postwar West Germany, United States during the Bracero program) and unofficially (contemporary US undocumented Latin American immigration); payment directly to migrants	Relatively limited use of foreign guest workers; recruited pursuant to agreements between USSR and other socialist states; efforts to segregate guest workers from Soviet society; payment to governments of sending countries
Undocumented immigration a mass phenomenon, especially in contemporary period	Undocumented immigration a trivial phenomenon
Privileges (i.e., desirable places of residence) allocated mainly by economic status, i.e., wealth	Privileges allocated mainly by political status, i.e., reliability, position in political hierarchy or utility to the regime

Because of the limits of mid-twentieth century information technology, the introduction of this system represented a massive administrative undertaking that required the employment of an enormous staff.[16] Why did Stalin call this bureaucratic monstrosity into being? Scholars differ on this question. Earlier interpretations of the passport/propiska system focused on its utility for labor control, and especially on its role in preventing the mass flight of peasants from their newly collectivized farms during the 1930s. The passport/propiska requirement created a "fateful conjuncture between the passport, place of residence, and place of employment" (Matthews 1993, 28). And, indeed, the introduction of the regulations coincided roughly with other measures intended to control labor.[17]

However, recent studies have also noted the Stalin regime's numerous failures to institute total compliance with official migration policies.[18] Some scholars thus argue that a major function of the passport/propiska system was to facilitate surveillance of the population. According to Moine (1997), the system was essentially a police measure intended to purge Soviet cities of population groups the regime regarded as dangerous or parasitic.[19] Subsequently, Kessler (2001, 502) has argued that the system was an attempt to gain "levers of control" over people's lives by identifying politically suspect individuals.

Likewise, another dimension of what could be termed (perhaps somewhat ghoulishly) "Stalin's migration policies" also suggests a concern with state security rather than economic planning: the mass use of internal exile (or "deportation") of several disfavored population categories. An estimated total of 5.9 million persons in the USSR, spanning several social categories, were sent into internal exile from 1919 to 1953 (Polian 2004, 312–13). First, there were the prosperous peasants pejoratively known as *kulaks*, whom the Stalinist regime accused of exploiting other peasants and

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16. Special passport departments and address bureaus were established within the police hierarchy to enforce the residence rules. Because passports were required to contain a photograph of the holder, these bureaus created a photographic database of *everyone* in "regime" areas of the country—an impressive bureaucratic and technological accomplishment in the 1930s (Matthews 1993, 29).

17. These included the introduction of the "labor book" (*trudovaia knizhka*, a mandatory document recording a person's employment history) in 1938 and the abrogation of the right to quit one's job in 1940. Also, the Soviet government initiated developed official programs that permitted industrial employers to recruit collective farm workers. A 1931 decree authorized individual enterprises to recruit such workers through agreements negotiated with collective farms that had surplus labor to offer (Platunov 1976, 141). As part of the agreement, the enterprise was supposed to provide housing and moving expenses to its new workers. This "organized recruitment" (*orgnabor*) continued into the 1980s, accounting for a significant portion of employment placements, especially in Siberia and the far east. Workers recruited in this manner were usually young single men (Clarke 1999, 15).

18. For example, Fitzpatrick (1994) found that many peasants fled the countryside for factory towns without authorization. Industrial enterprises, which were often shorthanded, frequently welcomed them despite their passport violations. Similarly, Kotkin writes that passport controls in Magnitogorsk were intended to prevent the *departure* of industrial workers dissatisfied with unsatisfactory living conditions, rather than the *arrival* of new workers (1995, 95–96).

19. Categories of persons deemed inadmissible for residence in Soviet cities included both political and common criminals, kulaks, and members of ethnic groups who had been internally exiled (see main text for explanation of these categories). According to Moine, the passport system was also a means of forcing people to disclose their ethnic background (*natsional'nost'*), which was included in all Soviet internal passports.

threatening Soviet power in the countryside.[20] In 1930–1931, some 1.8 million kulaks were removed from their homes in agricultural regions of the European USSR and banished to a network of "special settlements" in isolated and inhospitable portions of the country, such as Siberia and the far north, where they were required to perform forced labor, although many perished in the horrific conditions.[21] The Stalin regime also carried out the internal exile of ten Soviet ethnic groups (including the Far East Koreans, Volga Germans, Chechens, Meskhetian Turks from Soviet Georgia, and other groups) numbering some 2.5 million people.[22] Most of these groups, notably the Volga Germans and Chechens, were accused of complicity with the Nazi invaders during World War II. Recent studies generally conclude that despite the ostensible economic value to the regime of millions of slave laborers, the primary purpose of the Stalinist internal deportations of both kulaks and punished ethnic groups was punitive and repressive, not economic.[23]

After Stalin's death, his successor, Khrushchev, rejected Stalin's extreme brutality and distanced himself from the Stalin regime's obsession with internal enemies. These changes were reflected in some relaxation of migration and employment controls.[24] Some of the internally deported ethnic groups, such as the Chechens, were allowed to return to their places of origin, although others (notably the Volga Germans) were not authorized to return and remained subject to special residence restrictions until the Perestroika period (Polian 2004, 201–10).

Under Khrushchev's successor, Brezhnev, further steps were taken to moderate the harshness of migration policies. For the first time since the 1920s, the Soviet government began to use expulsion as a means to rid itself of at least some political dissidents, such as the novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was expelled to the West in 1975. Draconian as this treatment of Solzhenitsyn may appear, when compared with Stalin's favored methods of dealing with political opponents—execution, imprisonment, or internal exile—expulsion abroad certainly represents a less violent means to neutralize regime opponents. Likewise, the Soviet government negotiated the mass emigration of members of some ethnic groups with national homelands abroad, such as Germans and

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20. The official depiction of the kulaks as exploiters is widely disputed. Many observers do not even consider them a genuine social category at all. See the classic study by Conquest (1986) as well as a more recent review of the same issues (Viola 2007, 5–7).

21. The figures are drawn from Viola (2007, 196).

22. According to a statistical analysis by a Russian demographer, some 500,000 of the deportees perished during or immediately after the deportations (Ediev 2003).

23. Thus, Polian argues that the economic value of slave laborers in carrying out major construction projects (e.g., the Moscow metro) must be weighed against the loss of their (possibly more productive) free labor, often agricultural, in their places of origin. Moreover, the economic benefits of slave labor accrued primarily to the secret police, which oversaw the special settlements, rather than to the state as a whole (2004, 319). Viola, too, argues that use of kulak "special settlers" for slave labor was an opportunistic policy improvisation, not the reason for the internal exile itself (2007, 72). Finally, a recent study of the mass arrests and executions of 1937–1938, commonly called the "Great Terror," has argued that their goal was the elimination of suspect social categories. The mass arrests employed social categories first developed in the early 1930s campaign against the kulaks (Hagenloh 2009).

24. For example, the period for which passports were valid was gradually increased, and people were permitted to make somewhat longer out-of-town visits without police registration. In 1956, workers regained the right to quit their jobs at their own election. In 1974, collective farm workers (i.e., peasants) gained the formal right to apply for an internal passport and leave their village, although this right did not really become effective until 1988 (Matthews 1993, 31–34).

Jews.[25] Finally, under Brezhnev, the regime displayed greater tolerance for social science research, and academic demographers writing in scholarly venues began to offer mild criticisms of migration policy and suggest limited reforms.[26]

Despite these changes, however, the major migration control institutions of Soviet policy remained in place, although their function evolved toward the management of resources in a mature planned economy. Buckley (1995) has argued that the continuing existence in the post-Stalin period of "closed cities" essentially constituted a form of rationing. Closed cities were attractive to migrants precisely because they featured better social services and consumer goods. Yet, the state set rents on housing in the closed cities that were not significantly higher than elsewhere in the country, so that administrative controls were the only way of preventing people from flooding into major cities. Especially strict restrictions were placed on propiska in Moscow, reflecting the cost to the state of providing superior amenities to Muscovites.

Even so, the function of restrictions on Moscow residence was never limited to rationing, and overtly political restrictions on eligibility for Moscow residence continued to be applied to potential migrants to the capital. Separate unpublished residence statutes were adopted for Moscow in 1964 and 1972, and augmented in 1975 and 1985. Under these policies, twenty-three separate categories of persons were declared ineligible for Moscow residence, including "parasites"—homeless people, beggars, and all citizens who refused to hold down an approved job (Matthews 1993, 33–34). In essence, political status—reliability and utility to the state—rather than wealth (as in the West) determined access to urban residence (Buckley 1995). Similarly, a Soviet émigré author perceptively notes that one goal of restricting migration to Moscow and other closed cities was to "establish control over undesirable elements [i.e., undesirable people] in the 'showcase' [*vitrina*] cities that were visited by foreigners" (Liubarskii 1981, 49).

Indeed, the attempt to distinguish between strictly political and economic motivations for migration controls should not be carried too far. In particular, control of labor in the Soviet Union was not necessarily aimed at extracting more work from the employee at the lowest possible cost to the state. Instead, the goal was primarily to integrate the individual into the Soviet workplace, and ultimately into the Soviet political and social order.[27] Several Soviet policies support this interpretation, notably the difficulty of dismissing employees in Soviet enterprises. Since most adult Soviet citizens were required to have a job at all times, firing a worker was discouraged because it simply passed on the burden of a disruptive or unproductive subordinate to a new employer (Clarke 1999, 16). In addition, the Soviet practice of providing most social welfare services via workplaces (rather than, e.g., through local governments)

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25. Around a third of a million people were permitted to leave between 1971 and 1982, with the peak year 1979 accounting for 67,000 departures (Matthews 1993, 39).

26. For example, in two books written toward the close of the Brezhnev era, Soviet demographers argued that coercive measures to control population movement had exhausted their usefulness, and suggested more use of positive incentives to channel migration (Khorev and Chapek 1978; Khorev and Kiseleva 1982).

27. For that matter, exactly what an "economic" objective would mean in the Soviet context is unclear, since most potential economic priorities were essentially sacrificed to the goal of maximizing the country's military might (Kontorovich and Wein 2009).

also served to create a "pervasive system of social control" (Clarke 1999, 57).[28] Workplace committees of the Communist Party also served as units of surveillance and indoctrination.

What made this system work? Despite Cold War images of the Berlin Wall, physical violence played a relatively limited role in securing compliance with Soviet migration policies, with the partial exception of the external borders of the USSR. In the late 1920s and 1930s, Stalin undertook the full militarization of the country's western border, including the closing of most border crossings, the delineation of closed frontier zones that citizens were forbidden to enter, and the construction of watchtowers and other fortifications (Chandler 1998, 75–79). These installations were staffed by a corps of border troops, who eventually came under the control of the Committee of State Security (the KGB, or secret police) (38–41, 83). Impressive as these measures may be (and in many respects they foreshadowed later socialist border technologies, such as the East German-West German border), they nonetheless represented the regime's last line of defense against unauthorized exit, rather than the primary means by which migration control was exercised. Instead, the system relied on a seamless web of repression and inducements administered by numerous agencies, including the monopolization of urban housing by the state, the deployment of internal guest workers with limited residence rights, and the use of informants and other agents of the Soviet police.

In the Soviet Union, the state exercised a virtual monopoly over the supply of housing in major cities, especially Moscow (Colton 1995, 487). Moreover, in contrast to the West, most public housing was obtained through employers, who often partially funded construction of new housing (Clarke 1999, 57–58). In effect, to obtain living quarters one was required to hold an approved job, a requirement that impeded unauthorized permanent residence in Moscow or other urban centers. In addition, the state's control of housing promoted surveillance of residents. Residential building managers (known in Russian as *upravdomy*) were required to report to the police on illegal activities in their buildings, including unauthorized residence. The police also made use of an extensive network of informants and anonymous denunciations (Shelley 1996, 122–23).

Beyond such repressive measures, the USSR's migration policies, like those of other modern states, also included positive incentives to promote desired migration. Resettlement was particularly encouraged in certain priority regions, often those with strategic significance to the regime, including the far north, Siberia, and the far east, where the regime subsidized the development of infrastructure and transportation.[29]

In the post-Stalin period, policy tools to promote desired migration began to include direct subsidies to individuals who undertook voluntary resettlement to hardship posts, for example, in the far north, whose settlement depended on labor-intensive,

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28. "A large enterprise would provide housing for its employees, as well as social and welfare services, subsidized food, cultural, sporting, and leisure activities, child care, education and training, and primary health care" (Clarke 1999, 57). Indeed, enterprises were often forced to provide social services, sometimes including power, sewerage, water, and public transport, to the local community.

29. For example, Kotkin notes that in the 1930s steel was transported by train from the newly founded mining city of Magnitogorsk in the Urals to customers in the European USSR at far below the actual cost of carriage, in effect subsidizing the city's growth (1995, 38, 67).

backward technology; subsidized transport and the lure of higher wages—the so-called *severnaia pribavka*, or "northern bonus" (Fuellsack 2000). Preferential housing benefits were also offered to workers willing to accept hardship postings. Under a policy known as *bronirovanie* (reservation), citizens could sometimes retain their propiska and housing allocation in their original city of residence as a way of encouraging temporary work stints in the far north or (more rarely) abroad (Liubarskii 1981, 48).[30]

Another key instrument in the Soviet policy toolkit was the use of temporary migrant workers, known as *limitchiki* (from the word "limit," in the sense of "quota"). When additional workers were needed at an enterprise, the state could recruit such migrants, who received only temporary residence rights at their new location, not a propiska or permanent housing allocation. Although not restricted to Moscow, the use of limitchiki was especially significant there because of the capital's perennial labor shortage (Houston 1979, 41). Between 1971 and 1986, approximately 700,000 limitchiki were admitted to Moscow, where they typically lived in extremely spartan conditions (Colton 1995, 465).

In contrast to the *foreign* guest workers recruited in Western countries during the postwar decades (such as Mexican *Braceros* in the United States, or Turks in Germany), the limitchiki were in effect *internal* guest workers. They offered the state a supply of labor whose legal (and often physical) separation from other residents allowed their stay in closed cities to be controlled. Although liberal capitalist states in the developed world did not feature such a status for their citizens, as will be discussed in Part IV, internal guest workers were also a feature of Apartheid South Africa. However, unlike black workers in South African cities, limitchiki could sometimes look forward to an improvement in their status. In particular, the state often recruited them by dangling the prospect of permanent resettlement, particularly in Moscow. The process of adjusting one's status from limitchik to permanent resident of Moscow took at least four years, and the success of the application was not guaranteed. Still, many limitchiki did eventually receive a Moscow propiska, thus contributing to the capital's unplanned (but legal) permanent population growth (Houston 1979, 41; Colton 1995, 467).

Thus, the Soviet migration control system relied on a complex array of mutually reinforcing components; these are summarized in Table 2.

With the elements of the Soviet government's migration control system outlined, we can now address an obvious follow-up question: Did the system achieve the goals set for it by the Soviet political leadership? In addressing this question, we should bear in mind that the systems goal's changed over time, may not always have been fully elaborated, and could even be contradictory. In particular, we should distinguish between the Stalin and post-Stalin periods.

Gauging the effectiveness of Stalin's policies may seem a quixotic, if not morally dubious, enterprise. Recent scholarship has tended to emphasize the crudity, haphazardness, and sometimes surprising incompetence of Stalin-era efforts to control popu-

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30. The Soviet government facilitated mobility in other ways as well, such as through subsidized recreational travel. Many Soviet employees benefited from package vacations at health spas, for which their employer (or union) covered up to 80 percent of the cost (Burns 1998, 557).

TABLE 2.
Mutually Reinforcing Components of Soviet Migration Controls (Assumes Stylized Post-Stalin Model)

Component	Function
Passport/propiska system	Surveillance; labor coercion (by conditioning benefits on compliance); resource allocation; restrictions on negatively privileged groups; limited access to restricted areas (e.g., border zones); more broadly, regime adherence
Emigration/foreign travel restrictions	Labor coercion (by removing emigration as exit option); control of information to and about Soviet citizens
Immigration restrictions	Control of information to and about Soviet citizens; maintenance of ideological cohesion within population; exclusion of potentially disloyal or unreliable citizens
State ownership of most housing; allocation of much housing and social benefits at place of employment	Incentives for compliance and provision of labor; integration of labor control and ideological control; surveillance (e.g., by building concierges)
The apparatus of day-to-day migration enforcement: "passport desks" for permanent and temporary registration, maintaining and cataloguing records, and the huge staff (mainly in the police and related agencies) needed to operate the system	Can be understood as a cost incurred by the regime in order to make possible a higher degree of surveillance than could be achieved in Western societies
Privileges (e.g., the "northern bonus," housing "reservation," desirable postgraduate job assignments, inclusion in "tourist delegations" for foreign travel)	Incentives offered to Soviet citizens to provide labor in difficult conditions, rewards for superior job performance or political privilege and reliability
Physical border controls and related staff (e.g., identity document checks in border regions, border fences and watchtowers, border troops)	Necessary in the last instance to prevent flight abroad, but not the primary method of preventing unauthorized migration

lation mobility.[31] On the other hand, this does not mean that Stalin did not achieve his broad objectives for migration control: he largely succeeded in closing off Soviet borders, limiting urban residence to favored citizens, and disposing of disfavored ones through mass executions, expulsions, and internal exile. In the post-Stalin period, while migration controls took on a more systematic and far less violent character, scholarly opinions differ regarding the effectiveness of the migration control system as a whole. I

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31. Viola writes, "Stalinism was lawlessness constrained and empowered by ideology" (2007, 113). For that matter, even in Stalin's USSR, escape abroad was sometimes possible. In the 1930s, during the forced sedentarization of Kazakh nomads that caused mass starvation in Central Asia, some 200,000 nomads fled across the Soviet border; see Kozybaev, Abylkhozhin, and Aldazhumanov (1992, 226), cited in Vishnevskii (1998, 263).

shall argue that on balance, post-Stalin Soviet migration control policies did achieve the objectives set for them by the Soviet government.

As many authors have observed, communist societies were marked by "deeply habituated beat-the-system/bend-the-rules . . . modes of operation" (Morawska 2001, 176) and migration was certainly no exception.[32] Studies that dispute the efficacy of Soviet migration restrictions point to a number of ways in which the system failed to create compliance. First, implementation of restrictive policies was not always consistent across regions or even across individual officials.[33] The system's overt failures—such as incidents of fraud or bribery of police and other officials—are also cited as evidence that it did not, in fact, coerce people very effectively.[34] Moreover, Buckley finds that the closed cities contained substantial numbers of undocumented internal migrants, and concludes that the system served more to create a class of clandestine shadow-residents without social rights, rather than to actually prevent unauthorized residence (1995, 911). She argues that because the Soviet government was unwilling to finance basic infrastructure and social needs throughout most of the country—largely because of the priority given to military expenditures—it had to strictly limit migration to the most desirable cities, such as Moscow.[35]

In addition, even official plans sometimes had to yield to economic constraints. For example, Moscow's population growth over the Soviet period routinely exceeded official plans for the city's size, as enterprises in the capital that found themselves shorthanded offered jobs to out-of-town workers and sponsored their applications for propiska. This led to an unplanned but technically legal increase in the city's population (Colton 1995, 459–62). Late Soviet scholars publicly stated that *legal hiring* of migrants was responsible for a much more substantial proportion of the unplanned increase in Moscow's population than *illegal residence* in the city (Khorev and Chapek 1978, 226). Similarly, the unappealing living conditions in the officially favored destinations of labor migration—such as Siberia—tended to limit permanent resettlement there.[36]

Yet, all these lacunae do not prove that the system as a whole was a failure. Such a standard of success would be impossible for *any* system to meet. Indeed, one might note that both the United States and contemporary Russia offer examples of migration regimes that feature far more noncompliance than the USSR's.[37] A fairer test of

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32. For example, illicit trading was carried on in the 1970s by citizens of Soviet-bloc countries vacationing in other socialist countries. In the post-Soviet period, such tourism became the basis for both expanded informal trade and long-term labor migration (Morawska 2001, 183).

33. Thus, following Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev authorized the mass release of prisoners from the Gulag system, yet across the Soviet Union, returning ex-convicts experienced extremely inconsistent decisions from officials regarding their residence and employment rights (Dobson 2009, 110).

34. This argument has been made by Colton (1995) and Shelley (1996), both of whom found extensive police corruption in the enforcement of internal migration controls.

35. During the Cold War, the Soviet military's share of annual GDP has been estimated at between 25 and 40 percent, compared with roughly 5 percent in the United States during the same period (Malia 1994, 372). The Soviet policy of strictly limiting residence rights in closed cities thus reflected the underfunding of the consumer sector elsewhere in the country in order to maintain the country's superpower status.

36. A leading Soviet (and now Russian) demographer drew attention to this problem in an empirical study published in 1972—which is in itself an interesting example of limited policy critique by a social scientist in the Soviet Union (Zaionchkovskaia 1972).

37. Unlike the Soviet Union, the contemporary United States contains millions of undocumented immigrants, and has also experienced large-scale immigration fraud: in the 1980s, hundreds of thousands of

the system's effectiveness is whether, at the macro level, Soviet policies actually distributed population in accordance with official goals. Much evidence suggests that they did so.

Thus, contra Buckley, one statistical analysis contends that population growth in closed cities was indeed restrained—as intended—by official policies during the late Soviet period (Gang and Stuart 1999). Indeed, the Soviet Union as a whole was underurbanized: apart from Moscow and St. Petersburg, it lacked large cities with populations of at least several million, in part because many of these large cities were centers of defense production and thus were subject to stricter propiska restrictions (Hill and Gaddy 2003, 21).[38] Similarly, because propiska regulations prohibited released prisoners from taking up residence in major cities and discouraged young single men from doing so, these population categories tended to be concentrated in smaller factory cities (Shelley 1981). In other words, Soviet migration restrictions strongly influenced the spatial distribution of the population.

Even the forms of abuse that were most prevalent in the Soviet migration control system actually demonstrate the system's overall effectiveness. Open defiance of the passport/propiska system was dangerous: bribing officials to obtain the right documents, or overlook their absence, entailed a high risk of detection and punishment (Houston 1979, 38). As a result, Soviet citizens attempting to game the system preferred less overt methods. For example, because a Moscow resident who married a nonresident could sponsor the nonresident spouse's application for a Moscow propiska, Soviet-era Moscow was a hotbed of fictitious marriages between registered Muscovites and desperate propiska seekers, who often paid their new "spouse" substantial sums for this fraudulent service (Khorev and Chapek 1978, 229; Moiseenko, Perevedentsev, and Voronina 1999, 44). Such practices actually suggest that it was easier to *circumvent* residence restrictions than to *defy* them openly, and they thus constitute a backhanded compliment to the effectiveness of the passport/propiska system.

In conclusion, Soviet migration controls formed part of and were supported by a broader array of post-Stalin methods of governance. Brezhnev's Soviet Union was a highly effective police state that did not routinely rely on brutal violence to create public order (Beissinger 2002). As applied to migration, while physical barriers and lethal violence could be deployed at the border to prevent unauthorized exit, on a routine basis what proved more important was the everyday functioning of a bureaucratic migration control apparatus comprised of the KGB, police, passport and address bureaus, and other agencies, all working to deter and punish noncompliance. The migration control agencies developed a subculture oriented toward control and surveillance, which strongly resisted liberalizing influences until the collapse of the USSR itself (Chandler 1998, 26). This bureaucratic structure, in turn, rested on the overtly repressive features of the Soviet state—citizens' lack of political rights, strict censorship

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undocumented migrants used fraudulent documents to apply for amnesty under the so-called Special Agricultural Worker Program (Martin 2003). Likewise, there is much more systemic corruption and widespread defiance of residence restrictions in contemporary Moscow than there was in the Soviet period, as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet police state and coordinated planned economy (Light 2010).

38. They argue that the Soviet Union's far north and far east were actually *over*populated as compared to their counterparts in Scandinavia and Canada. Without Soviet migration controls, the USSR's population would probably have concentrated in warmer regions closer to European markets (Hill and Gaddy 2003).

on what could be written or spoken in public forums, and the extreme powers of police, prosecutors, and state security agencies. Internal and external migration controls also reinforced each other: by closing off Soviet citizens' "exit option" of departure abroad, the ban on emigration gave citizens little choice but to comply with the regime's directives concerning employment and internal migration. Finally, strictly repressive measures were supplemented by the state's distribution of housing and other social goods, often through employers, and by positive incentives for encouraged internal migration. All these methods allowed the Soviet government to reshape the human geography of Eurasia, and to monitor and supervise its citizens' mobility to an impressive extent.

Now, the USSR is long gone, and with it the "passport desks," postgraduate employment assignments, and all the other Soviet migration control institutions that fascinated a generation of Kremlinologists. Yet, Soviet migration policies hold continuing theoretical relevance. The next section considers Soviet mobility controls in comparative perspective.

IV.   RIGHTS VERSUS OPTIONS: THE SOVIET GOVERNANCE OF MOBILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Complete freedom of movement is a theoretical abstraction that can never exist in practice because mobility is always dependent on external factors, notably the state itself, which both provides security and other resources that make mobility possible, and at the same time restricts it (Torpey 2000). Therefore, a given state's governance of migration can only really be understood through assessing the concrete mobility options it makes available to individuals—and comparing the total package of migration controls with analogous packages provided by other states. Just how distinctive were Soviet migration policies, and what is their significance in the global history of migration governance? To approach this question, below I compare and contrast the Soviet system of mobility governance with analogous systems in two contemporary states, Apartheid South Africa and the Cold War–era United States.

These two states differ in important ways from the Soviet Union and from each other. Apartheid South Africa featured an authoritarian political system that denied most of its citizens the right to select representatives to govern them. The Apartheid regime also deployed a pass system somewhat similar to the Soviet passport/propiska system. Yet, South Africa was also a capitalist society with very different political institutions from those of the USSR. Because South Africa was authoritarian but not socialist, its inclusion in the comparison helps elucidate what was distinctively *socialist* (and not merely authoritarian) in Soviet migration control policies. In contrast, the United States during the Cold War era was a liberal capitalist state in which goals and methods of migration control ostensibly differed dramatically from those of the Soviet Union yet, as I shall argue, the contrast between the two countries is not total. Thus, the Soviet, South African, and US cases allow us to construct a rough typology of the regimes of migration control that are characteristic of socialist, authoritarian capitalist, and liberal capitalist states, and to derive some tentative explanations for the differences between them. This exercise also makes it possible to arrive at a more reflective

and critical understanding of the nature of freedom of movement in the United States and similar liberal regimes.[39]

Both the USSR and Apartheid South Africa explicitly limited the rights of citizens to settle in places of their choosing within the state's territory, pursuant to a formalized national policy. Also, both governments developed mandatory identity documents to enforce their restrictions. Under the 1950 Group Areas Act, South Africa's majority black population was to be systematically removed from white residential areas, and (except for permitted laborers) from urban areas in general. The Act was implemented through a comprehensive system of "passes" that blacks had to obtain, keep up to date, and present constantly—much like Soviet citizens, and in particular, the limitchiki. As in the Soviet passport/propiska system, Apartheid mobility restrictions were implemented by a specialized agency for record keeping and surveillance, the Ministry of Native Affairs (Brewer 1994, 199).

In a further parallel with Soviet policies, Apartheid South Africa also limited both permanent immigration and tourism, although less drastically than the USSR did. While white immigration was actively solicited, there was no legal provision for black immigration until 1984, and even then, legal black immigration remained trivial in scale (Brown 1987; Lucas, Amoateng, and Kalule-Sabiti 2006). Because of its fear of external subversion by the Soviet Union and its allies, the Apartheid regime also rejected UN conventions that required it to provide residence rights to refugees and asylum seekers (Klotz 2000, 837–38). Finally, South Africa, somewhat like the USSR, also chose to forego mass foreign tourism, instead marketing the country as a boutique destination for a few wealthy foreign visitors, who were considered likely to be sympathetic to the anticommunist regime (Grundlingh 2006).

On the other hand, the South African and Soviet mobility regimes featured some major differences. The main goal of the South African "pass laws" was to remove blacks from white society while exploiting black labor. True, legal segregation of blacks and whites was pursued fanatically: it extended to the use of public amenities such as beaches and restaurants, and even to sexual relations between people of different races (Brewer 1994, 206). Yet, by comparison with the USSR, South Africa's migration controls were characterized by the crude brutality of their methods and their relatively limited objectives.

Thus, Apartheid policing concentrated pathologically on enforcing pass laws in white areas, while allowing violence and criminality to proliferate unchecked in the black "townships," something the Soviet government would not have tolerated (Brewer 1994, 200). In addition, the actual enforcement of mobility restrictions in South Africa was far more brutal and violent than in the post-Stalin Soviet Union. The South African police have been described as a "killing machine" (222). Their extreme use of force against blacks was displayed in a series of notorious massacres of anti-Apartheid protesters, such as Sharpeville (1960) and Soweto (1976). As a peculiar corollary, in

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39. For space reasons, this article does not undertake another potentially highly instructive comparison with the Chinese system of *hukou*, or household registration, which was partially modeled on the Soviet passport/propiska regime and is still in effect in modified form in the People's Republic of China. Both systems were originally intended to control rural migration to the cities. Yet, *hukou* is still used to govern mobility in post-Mao China, and thus represents an intriguing adaptation of a socialist technology of migration control to capitalist economic development (Fan 2008; Wang 2010).

contrast to the huge staff of the Soviet Ministry of Interior, the Apartheid-era police were actually relatively understaffed. As Brewer notes: "The simple containment of residents in townships requires fewer men than the patrolling of streets in pursuit of ordinary crime" (222).

Moreover, as one might expect, limiting the mobility of whites in South Africa was not a primary object of Apartheid legislation, and whites were essentially free to travel around South Africa. It also appears that both whites and blacks could leave South Africa without special permission, like most citizens of liberal capitalist states but unlike citizens of the USSR, although the Apartheid regime did selectively block the exit of regime opponents, as in the case of lawyers who defended opponents of Apartheid (Dugard 1992, 444).

How should these similarities and differences between the USSR and South Africa be interpreted? As noted above, the Soviet migration control system was part of a broader political system that aimed to indoctrinate, mold, and utilize every Soviet citizen. After Stalin, the regime eschewed extreme violence against citizens, and it offered some benefits, such as subsidized (if low-quality) housing, free (often excellent) education to all citizens, as well as basic security (i.e., repression of serious crime by the police). Unlike the USSR, the South African regime was essentially a racialized oligarchy. It pursued capitalist economic development in order to offer a high standard of living to whites, while making no effort to alleviate the poverty of blacks. In its intrusive official control over the person and civil society, and its methodical pursuit of racial separation, the South African regime, like the Soviet one, can certainly be considered a police state.[40] Yet, the Apartheid police state primarily pursued the containment and marginalization of its subaltern subjects—the black population—and used extreme violence to repress them. In contrast, the Soviet regime intended to create an alternative to capitalist social development for an entire society. This entailed the close surveillance and more refined molding of *all* subjects.

Unlike Apartheid South Africa, the United States presents fewer obvious bases for a comparison with Soviet migration controls. In the twentieth century, the US government permitted the immigration of millions of people. US citizens moved around without a national system of migration "passes," "residence permits," or even (in contrast to most European states) a national identity card. Yet, while US borders have been far more open to entry and exit than were Soviet borders, US citizens have been subject to a complex web of policies and incentives, comprised of direct and indirect, and state and nonstate components, which have channeled and constrained their mobility.

Like the Soviet Union, the US government has shaped internal migration through infrastructure investments. In the US case, public investment decisions in the mid twentieth century led to the creation of mass suburbs for the middle class.

Beginning in the 1930s, market-driven decisions were supported and strengthened by public policies that financed single-family home ownership and promoted

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40. Note, though, that while the Soviet Union practiced systematic ethnic discrimination against some ethnic groups, and as noted above sometimes limited their residence rights, it never legislated ethnic segregation of the Apartheid variety. I thank Professor Anne-Marie Singh of Ryerson University for this insight.

residential segregation by race and class. Taken together, the government's approach on a wide array of issues led to explosive suburbanization. Federal loan policies encouraged the construction of new housing over the renovation of old. At the same time, tax laws favored homeowners over renters and rewarded construction on suburban "greenfields" rather than the rehabilitation of industrial and commercial properties in central cities. Public housing programs pinned low-income projects in racially isolated neighborhoods in central cities, while federal officials channeled transportation funds toward sprawling highway construction and away from centralized mass transit. (Kruse and Sugrue 2006, 2)[41]

Yet, while both the USSR and twentieth-century United States employed methods of governing migration indirectly through financial incentives, as compared with the Soviet Union, the US federal government has rarely supervised individuals' internal migration directly through administrative controls. Rather, migration within the United States has generally been regulated far less through direct prohibitions or commands applied to the individual's body, and even indirect regulation of mobility has mainly taken place at state and local levels of government. The clearest example of this point is the system of zoning laws and building codes that proliferated in the twentieth century. Despite their pervasive consequences for residential patterns—and for individuals' residential options—such codes are actually state and local ordinances: while national in scope, they are not formally a national policy. Indeed, these rules are also formally different from the Soviet passport/propiska system in their application, in that they nominally regulate the characteristics of structures, or permitted activities, rather than individuals' mobility.

Likewise, even the most blatantly illiberal restraint on US internal migration in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries—racial segregation—also contrasts with the centralized migration control system of the Soviet Union. Residential segregation of blacks and whites in the United States, while ubiquitous, was maintained in part by informal social practices of racial subordination, often backed by extralegal violence. To the extent that segregation was implemented through explicit legal provisions, these were enacted at the state and even municipal levels of government, not the federal level (Litwack 1998, 233–35). In practice, racial segregation had an ambiguous relationship with legislation and judicial decisions. Thus, it survived US Supreme Court decisions that struck down municipal segregation ordinances and even private "covenants" (conditions of sale) binding home purchasers not to resell their property to blacks (Goluboff 2007, 21, 229–30). For that matter, the most drastic repression of mobility associated with segregation, so-called debt peonage (whereby black sharecroppers in the US South could be forced to continue working for the same employer year after year to pay off a debt), was also technically illegal, although tacitly tolerated (Litwack 1998, 139–40). In other words, US racial segregation was essentially a social and economic system that permeated all of society, although it did sometimes involve the deployment of governmental authority.

In contrast to the US experience, the Soviet control of migration through the passport/propiska system indisputably constituted a set of formal policies imposed on

41. I thank Professor Mariana Valverde of the University of Toronto for the reference.

society as a whole by the state acting through a bureaucratic apparatus, and its most repressive features were completely state dominated. One result of this contrast is the emergence of differing discourses surrounding mobility rights. Migration restrictions in the USSR were unmistakably "about" the state's enforcement of its will on individuals. With the citizen frequently spending long hours waiting to receive required documents at various passport desks, or presenting his or her passport and propiska to police officers, there was not even a pretense to the contrary. In contrast, constraints on migration in the United States have tended either to be completely obfuscated (i.e., perceived as part of the natural order of things), or at least to be interpreted as "about" something else, such as racial or economic inequality, rather than "about" the state's migration policy.[42]

However, the contrast between the two systems is not purely discursive. It also had palpable consequences for the options available to individuals and hence for actual migration trends. First, the United States (and other modern liberal capitalist states) never experienced a system of sponsored internal migration that conditioned residence rights on employment and secured them with housing. In the US labor market, workers have been formally free to accept, decline, and quit jobs all over the country. An unemployed worker can even move to a new location where he or she has no job in hand, and can continue to receive unemployment insurance there. Conversely, the state has not directly facilitated workers' mobility through the provision of housing conditioned on employment, as it did in the USSR. US workers have had the freedom to pull up stakes and move, but like the Okies in John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*, this did not mean that they could expect even a roof over their heads at the end of their journey.

Another consequence of the less centralized and less state-directed control of internal migration in the United States is the virtual impossibility of mobilizing state authority to stymie mass migration around the country. Thus, during the 1920s, a large proportion of the black population of the US South left the region, mainly for northern cities, in what came to be called the "Great Migration" (Litwack 1998, 481–96). While southern whites frequently opposed this mass exodus of the region's subaltern labor force (even to the point of dispatching local police to remove black passengers from trains heading north), they were ultimately powerless to prevent it. To do so would have required a Soviet-like system of formalized, centralized, and state-organized controls on internal migration.

Given the major differences in countries' underlying political and social systems as well as their modalities of migration control, is it possible to compare Soviet and foreign migration policies and make statements about which one was "freer"? Turning first to external migration controls, the Soviet Union's monumental attempt to block off emigration and immigration was indeed sui generis. Moreover, comparison with the United States and other liberal states is a fairly straightforward task because of the inherently prohibitive nature of external border controls: this is an area where all modern states act as sovereigns, directly imposing their will on the individual. The fact

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42. As a final coda to this story, the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation—unlike the US Constitution, for example—contains an explicit clause guaranteeing freedom of movement, which itself demonstrates how contemporary Russian citizens perceive the state's repression of mobility in the USSR as an iniquitous feature of that regime.

that the Soviet Union barred its citizens from leaving the country, and the United States did not, could be plausibly interpreted—and during the Cold War, was indeed presented—as evidence of the repressive nature of the Soviet regime.[43]

When we compare the three states' *internal* migration controls, however, a more complex picture emerges. Migration in the USSR was not more *intensively* governed than in South Africa or even the United States. Nonetheless, Soviet migration was *distinctively* governed, namely, through mechanisms that were totally state dominated, state enforced, and (so to speak) state centered. Foucault (1994) has identified the indirect regulation of society through incentives as the characteristic method by which the modern state exercises control. Soviet internal migration controls, with their reliance on direct coercion by the state, stand out from this modern tendency, just as they differ from Torpey's ideal-typical tendency toward the deregulation of intrastate migration in the modern period. Moreover, the basis for distributing privileges and benefits in the Soviet governance of migration was nakedly political in a way that the distribution of benefits in the US system was not. In the USSR, benefits such as organized holiday trips abroad or residence in Moscow were distributed on the basis of individuals' loyalty to the regime (e.g., party membership) and utility to it (e.g., the preferences given to workers in the defense sector).

Moreover, many aspects of Soviet migration policy—notably the ban on foreign travel by Soviet citizens—were not deployed in order to ration scarce resources at all (contra Buckley) but simply were intended to prevent the citizen from challenging the state's authority over him or her. They can thus be considered purely repressive. Likewise, the gargantuan system of residence controls (necessitating registration of even short stays out of town, not to mention permanent relocations), involved the citizen in constant friction with the police to a degree unparalleled in liberal states (Shelley 1996).

To recapitulate, Soviet migration controls resembled those of an authoritarian capitalist state (South Africa) in their direct application of prohibitions to internal migration by at least some subjects, and to a lesser extent in both states' efforts to limit contact with foreigners through restrictions on their entry and exit. However, Soviet migration policies were both more comprehensive and less violent than those of South Africa. Internal migration controls in the liberal capitalist United States, in contrast to the USSR, tended to be implemented more indirectly, and in general were less state dominated and less overtly politicized. Also, liberal capitalist regimes such as the United States (and, to a lesser extent, authoritarian capitalist regimes such as South Africa) were considerably more open to foreigners' entry and exit. Compared with other contemporary states, Soviet migration controls were distinctive in their attempt to drastically limit entry and exit from the state's territory, while fully regularizing desired internal migration by integrating it into a system of administrative controls and social policies. This comparison is summarized in Table 3, and the significance of the contrasts identified above is discussed in the next section.

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43. Hence, from the Soviet government's point of view, one drawback of permitting Western tourists to visit the Soviet Union was that by their very presence, they demonstrated to Soviet citizens that Westerners could leave their home countries and travel abroad (Chandler 1998, 87).

TABLE 3.
Features of Migration Controls in the Post-Stalin USSR, Apartheid South Africa, and Cold War–Era United States

	USSR	South Africa	USA
Internal migration controls formalized in overt national policy?	Yes, passport/propiska system (although some aspects not published)	Yes, pass laws and other mobility restrictions applied to black residents by national legislation	No
Level of government that sets most mobility restrictions; extent of "governing indirectly" and role of nonstate actors	National government; most important aspects of passport/propiska system involve direct repression of the individual, but incentives and opportunities also used; extremely limited role for nonstate actors (e.g., informants)	National government; most important aspects of Apartheid mobility controls involve direct repression of the individual by state actors	State and local governments (e.g., segregation ordinances, zoning); supporting policies or tacit role for federal government; racial segregation has extensive nonstate component; economic segregation partially driven by market
Goals/outputs	Surveillance; labor coercion; regime adherence (integration of citizen into Soviet political order and way of life; ideological conformity)	Economic and territorial marginalization of black majority; creation of white enclaves; prevention of black insurrection	Diverse regulatory goals, some related to health and welfare of the population, but also economic and racial segregation
Role of physical violence in implementation of mobility restrictions	Relatively low, although militarized border controls used to prevent illicit exit; greater reliance on administrative controls and conditioning benefits on compliance	Extreme violence routinely deployed against blacks by police	Relatively low, although official or unofficial violence often used to maintain racial segregation
Major sources of privileged mobility options	Political status (e.g., party members), utility to the regime (e.g., defense workers)	Racial and economic	Racial and economic
Major targets of control and restrictions	All citizens; special restrictions on some negatively privileged ethnic groups (e.g., those internally exiled by Stalin) and regime opponents	Almost exclusively the black population	All citizens, but application is highly differentiated by race and class

TABLE 3.
(*Continued*)

	USSR	South Africa	USA
Limitations on emigration and travel abroad	Systematic and pervasive; an integral part of the system	Selective and targeted; sometimes used against regime opponents	Selective and targeted; sometimes used against regime opponents
Limitations on entry of foreigners	Legal permanent immigration negligible; restrictions on foreign guest workers and students; tourism severely limited for political reasons	Legal immigration restricted to whites; tourism somewhat limited for political reasons	Legal immigration on a large scale, although until 1960s limited to eligible racial categories; tourism on large scale but regulated by passport/visa system
Greatest success	Creation of pervasive surveillance and widespread compliance with passport/propiska system	Maintenance of apartheid system; spatial separation of races	Obfuscation of migration regulation; i.e., disguising migration control so that it is seen as natural (or trivial) rather than as political
Examples of limited effectiveness or failure	Covert residence, fraud, or circumvention in restricted areas (e.g., unauthorized enterprise recruitment, fictitious marriage); unwillingness to settle permanently in Siberia or other priority areas	Unauthorized mobility or residence by blacks; major protests by blacks	Limited state capacity for comprehensive surveillance; difficult to prevent spontaneous inter-regional migration (e.g., the African-American "Great Migration")

V. CONCLUSION: SOVIET MIGRATION CONTROLS AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

What does the Soviet experience suggest about the reasons why particular states in recent history have chosen differing migration control policies? As a corollary, does the fate of Soviet migration policies help us predict what kinds of policies we might expect to see emerge in the contemporary world?

Based on the cases of the United States and Apartheid South Africa, internal migration policies in both liberal and authoritarian capitalist states clearly reflect and reinforce racial and class inequalities. At the same time, there remains a major contrast between liberal and authoritarian capitalist systems of migration control, namely, the liberal state's recognition of at least formal legal equality and civil and procedural rights

for all citizens. In pluralist political systems, policy conflicts are generally resolved by negotiation between the state and society or, more precisely, between competing interest groups within the state and within society. The key distinction between the United States and the racialized oligarchy of Apartheid South Africa thus lies in the exclusion of the black majority in South Africa both from participation in the policy-making progress and (as a corollary) from the formal equality of liberal citizenship and the right to free internal migration that such citizenship confers. The result of migration regulation in South Africa was the system of formalized controls over black mobility contained in the "pass laws." This is not at all to say that all US citizens can live wherever they want; rather, restrictions on the internal migration options available to Americans, especially since the formal abolition of racial segregation, result from deeply engrained features of US society itself, notably economic inequality and continuing racial hierarchy (which in turn is normalized through the system of land-use controls and zoning).

What set Soviet migration policies apart from those of both contemporary South Africa and the United States was the Soviet government's radically different aspirations for the reordering of the state-society relationship, namely, its program of creating state ownership of major businesses and eliminating market mechanisms for allocating many scarce goods in favor of subsidized administrative distribution. Where privately owned enterprises and marked mechanisms exist, they increase the bargaining power of society vis-à-vis the state and in some respects reduce the state's direct control over citizens, although they also permit the state to finance its activities through taxation (Tilly 1990). The Soviet Union's migration policies diverged from those of both liberal and authoritarian capitalist states of the twentieth century because the Soviet government (at least in theory) rejected such bargaining with society, a rejection that led it to a distinctive system for regulating mobility. The historian Martin Malia describes the USSR as an "ideocratic partocracy," that is, a state dominated by the Communist Party and dedicated to a maximalist ideological program of eliminating private ownership of most businesses and suppressing markets (Malia 1994, 494). Soviet migration policy reflects the overriding objective of binding the state and citizen together far more closely than any capitalist state attempted to do, in what I have termed *regime adherence*. This objective required the Soviet government to resort to extreme measures to directly restrict unauthorized migration. Because these restrictions generated resistance and noncompliance, the state had to commit substantial human and financial resources to the police and other agencies that monitored and regulated migration. To put this in terms of contemporary social theorists such as Michel Foucault or James Scott, the Soviet state aspired to a much higher degree of "discipline" over its subjects' mobility and demanded to "see" their location much more clearly than its Western counterparts (Foucault 1995; Scott 1998; Garcelon 2001).[44]

To achieve its aim of fully regularizing migration, the Soviet regime also incurred considerable opportunity costs. For example, it suffered from continuing labor and skills

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44. The Soviet use of unpublished statutes and instructions to the police in the context of migration controls shows that, unlike liberal states, the Soviet government could not be compelled to provide basic information about its own migration policies. The Soviet state made its subjects' mobility highly transparent to the state, yet the state's mobility policies remained opaque.

shortages, which could not be satisfied by foreign workers. It incurred reputation costs, in the form of damage to its image abroad. Indeed, the Soviet attempt to severely restrict international mobility ultimately helped to doom the Soviet economy to technological stagnation. The high-tech revolution that took place in capitalist economies during the 1970s and 1980s required extensive international cooperation between firms, and hence individual mobility and communication across borders. Soviet policies made such cooperation impossible, and led to the country's growing technological backwardness. Recognition of this backwardness prompted Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of economic restructuring (Chandler 1998; Brooks and Wohlforth 2004, 90). The failure of Gorbachev's attempt to reform the economy and political system while preserving the Soviet Union's basic institutions eventually precipitated the regime's demise. In turn, the Soviet collapse of 1991 consigned Soviet migration controls to oblivion. Now that twenty years have passed since the collapse of the USSR and the Leninist model of political and social development it represented, we are in a position to ask: What does the end of the Soviet system of migration regulation suggest about the future evolution of mobility rights in the contemporary world?

On the one hand, Soviet-like migration controls are unlikely to reemerge as a major feature of the global governance of migration. While the 1990s and early twenty-first century have not seen the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy, fewer and fewer states in the contemporary world match the prototype of the "closed authoritarian regime" of the mid twentieth century, of which the Soviet Union was the leading exemplar. Instead, the post–Cold War period has been characterized by the increasing prevalence of milder (or at least less ambitious) forms of authoritarian rule that go under various names, including "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002), "pseudodemocracies" (27), and "competitive authoritarian regimes" (Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010). In the post–Cold War world, few states are animated by the USSR's ardent ideological zeal to create a state-owned economy partially isolated from the world economy, which underlay the Soviet Union's effort to seal its borders and to directly control internal migration.

In consequence, most contemporary authoritarian capitalist states neither seek to choke off external migration, nor to create a comprehensive state-directed system of internal migration controls.[45] Even contemporary Russia, whose political system has been variously characterized as "autocratic" (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong 2002), an "oligarchy" (Fish 2005), and a "petrostate" (Goldman 2008), nonetheless permits its citizens to engage in foreign travel and even emigrate. As a result, Russian tourists now throng the beaches of Turkey, and Russian magnates flock to London to visit and to live. At the same time, the fall of the USSR does *not* mean that repressive migration controls will wither away as the Soviet state did; rather, what we witness around the world, and should expect to see more of in the future, is the emergence of repressive limitations on mobility that are nonetheless very different from those that existed in the USSR.

As this article has emphasized, the Soviet government was not opposed to migration per se. While the Soviet Union did not permit spontaneous internal migration of

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45. Exceptions include a few embattled surviving communist regimes, such as Cuba and North Korea (Dauvergne 2008, 162). China could also be considered a partial exception, given its continuing application of the *hukou* system under conditions of capitalist economic development and some continuing restrictions on exit. China does, however, permit significant levels of foreign travel and emigration by its citizens.

the kind that people in the West think of as "free," it nonetheless developed a system of sponsored labor migration in which the rights and duties of both the migrant and the new employer (e.g., provision of housing and other social goods) were regularized and strictly enforced.[46] True, Soviet citizens did not have migration rights in the way that Westerners understood them—the right to pick up and move, without asking anyone's permission, assuming one had the means to do so. Yet, Soviet citizens did have what might be called migration "options," the possibility of moving to new locations within their country with substantial economic support from their government. The corollary of the repressiveness of Soviet migration controls was their inclusiveness: every Soviet citizen—foreigners were permanently excluded from the system—was assigned a location where his or her presence was authorized, and housing and other basic social rights were, in theory, linked to that residence.

In contrast, what is characteristic of much of the contemporary world is what could be called the progressive irregularization or "illegalization" of migration. For example, contemporary Russia itself is experiencing a boom in undocumented labor migration, mainly from other post-Soviet republics. However, both this new immigration and intra-Russia internal migration are proceeding in a much more chaotic and irregular fashion in the new Russia than in the USSR. I have argued elsewhere that severe abuse of migrants by police and other officials is more widespread in Russia than it was in the Soviet Union (Light 2006, 2010).

Even in established democracies, recent trends call into question Hollifield's view that liberal states are constrained by their own political systems to guarantee certain procedural rights to immigrants. As Dauvergne (2008) argues, policy changes throughout the contemporary developed world are increasingly leading immigration to be classified as illegal, so that more and more people hold no legal status in the country in which they reside. Other scholars detect similar trends. Virginie Guiraudon has coined the concept of the "de-nationalizing" of immigration policy, in which control over international migration has ebbed away from the state and toward supranational, subnational, and even private entities; often this entails increased powers by police and local governments to interdict undocumented migrants (Guiraudon 2001, 37). Since the events of September 11, 2001, the United Kingdom has limited immigrants' legal rights through measures such as the partial dismantling of the system of political asylum, a renewed emphasis on cultural compatibility ("preserving British identity") as a prerequisite for immigration to the United Kingdom, and procedures that empower the government to strip even naturalized citizens of their British citizenship, creating a kind of "permanently contingent" citizenship for immigrants (Bosworth and Guild 2008, 709–10).

The United States, too, is currently in the grip of a major debate regarding its policy on undocumented labor migrants, mainly from Latin America. Proposals to militarize and physically seal off the border with Mexico, as well as calls for more deportations of the undocumented, have recently found far more official favor than legislation to

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46. In some ways, this sponsored internal migration is actually quite similar to the sponsored immigration that is a feature of *immigration* policy in many Western states. The present author immigrated to a new country under a work visa that was issued for a specific employer, much as Soviet citizens were required to find a new employer within their own country.

regularize the status of current undocumented workers and legalize the flow of future immigrants. As a result, the US-Mexican border has now been partially fortified, and a less publicized series of measures has created a de facto zone of immigration enforcement near the Mexican border in which individuals' procedural protections against searches and interrogations are limited (Dauvergne 2008, 157; McHeyman 2009). Thus, the United States, like other liberal regimes, is increasingly experimenting with repressive police methods that ostensibly aim to reassert state control over immigration.

Yet, in fact, such a goal is illusory, if not disingenuous. The Soviet experience suggests that the elimination of unauthorized migration can only be approximated in a state that enjoys much more systematic control over civil society than is possible in Western democracies. For example, efforts to apprehend undocumented workers from Mexico have met resistance in Texas, where established Mexican-American communities strenuously object to a campaign that treats them as suspected undocumented immigrants. Measures such as the systematic interrogation of every person in the border region who appears to be of Mexican heritage would be both logistically and politically impossible (McHeyman 2009, 378, 385). Even should the elimination of undocumented immigration through such police measures be attempted, this effort would entail a "de-globalization" that is incompatible with modern capitalist economic development (Dauvergne 2008, 157, 162).

In other words, repressive migration policies in a country such as the United States cannot lead to the Soviet-like regularization of immigration—although they may lead to its Apartheid-like irregularization. The USSR's model of regularized and sponsored migration did not rely mainly on brutality or even selective repression; rather, Soviet migration policies functioned because all their elements worked together to create an integrated system of control that consigned every individual to a particular regularized status, and that was difficult for the individual to defeat. The Soviet experience demonstrates that efforts to eliminate unauthorized migration can indeed be highly successful—but only as part of a seamless dragnet of administrative measures maintained by a state that is prepared to pay a heavy price to achieve this goal.

Thus, while twenty-first-century states are seeking to repress unauthorized migration by imposing police measures (such as border fortifications, document checks, or expulsions) that resemble their Soviet analogs, such states will find it impossible to replicate Soviet policies in their totality. As a result, we may be entering a new phase in the history of human mobility, in which international migration will accelerate, but will be accompanied by ever more disorder and violence.

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