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Harpal Brar was born in Muktsar, Punjab, India in 1939. Since June 1962 he has been working in the United Kingdom. Throughout his stay in the U.K. he has been an active participant in the British working class and anti-imperialist movement; in particular he has been active in the Indian Workers Association (G-B). Presently he occupies the office of Secretary for Fraternal Relations in the IWA(GB) and earns his living by teaching law at the Polytechnic of Central London.

Perestroika—The Complete Collapse of Revisionism

In this short work, the author pursues two aims. First, to explain the completely bourgeois and anti-Marxist-Leninist essence of the Gorbachev reforms, launched under the twin policies of Perestroika and Glasnost, allegedly for the purpose of renewing and strengthening socialism, which led to the collapse of socialism in the once mighty USSR. Secondly, he explains, by reference to the wholesale revision, and downright distortion, of Marxism-Leninism in the field of political economy, philosophy and class struggle, committed by the CPSU under the influence of Khrushchëvite revisionism ever since the 20th Party Congress. The long process, which over a period of more than three decades, resulted in the emergence of the Gorbachev leadership and the restoration of capitalism in the land of Soviets, the land of Lenin—the land of once triumphant socialism.

In short, the author makes an attempt to answer the most important question, namely, how was it that the USSR, which at a time when she was in comparably weaker, could not be defeated by the interventionist armies of the fourteen countries, representing the combined strength of imperialism and its stooges, during the war of intervention, following the Great October Revolution, and which broke the back of the powerful Hitlerite war machine, thus making the single most powerful contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany—how was it that the same USSR collapsed as a socialist State so ignominiously? No one can deny the importance, for the communist movement, of finding a correct answer to this question. Only time, and further debate, will show whether the author has succeeded in providing a correct answer to it. It is to be hoped that this attempt on his part will stimulate further discussion and debate, and thus contribute to a clarification of the questions which are the subject matter of this book.

PERESTROIKA : The Complete Collapse of Revisionism

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The Complete Collapse
of
Revisionism

HARPAL BRAR

Introduction by
Sitaram Yechury

PERESTROIKA

The Complete Collapse of Revisionism

Harpal Brar

Dedicated to

J. V. Stalin

**Fearless and Faithful Friend of the International Proletariat
and Resolute Defender of Socialism
and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat**

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INTRODUCTION

This book by Harpal Brar, besides being a timely study is a serious contribution to a scientific inquiry into the momentous developments that have taken place in the former USSR and Eastern Europe.

These developments have had a profound multi-dimensional impact on contemporary history. They are also shaping the contours of a 'new world order'. An 'order' that permits imperialism to strengthen its stranglehold of global domination. An 'order' that has a grave bearing on the social and economic well-being of millions of peoples, especially of the developing countries, who are already in the midst of a grim struggle against hunger, deprivation and misery.

As a consequence of these developments, Marxism as a science, has become the target of a renewed offensive. This comes, not only from outrightly reactionary forces but also from forces within various parties claiming communist pretensions. Many such parties, capitulating under this offensive of world imperialism, are reneging on Marxism-Leninism and embracing historically discredited social democracy.

Under these circumstances, it is necessary that a scientific enquiry be undertaken into the events that permitted such a gigantic counter-revolution to succeed in the Soviet Union. It is obvious, that what the forces of world reaction failed to achieve, despite all their previous tireless efforts, has now occurred with relative ease. Such an inquiry is not for the purpose of satisfying historical curiosity alone. It, in the final analysis, is to sharpen and strengthen the revolutionary weapon of social change. "*Is it not a fact*", Lenin had asked, "*that the task of theory, the aim of science, is here defined as assistance for the oppressed class in its actual struggle.*" (Lenin Vol. I Page 327-8). Marx in a letter to Ruge, in September 1843 says: "*We do not say to the world; that cease struggling—your whole struggle is senseless. All we do is to provide it with a true slogan of struggle. We only show the world what it is actually struggling for, and consciousness is a thing which the world must acquire, whether it likes it or not.*"

What can be the philosophical basis of such a scientific inquiry? In the midst of this deep crisis and in spite of it, various communist parties in the world have asserted—Marxism-Leninism. For, even the most servile confirmist of imperialism and their paid pen-pushers have not had the courage to assert that capitalism is the last stage of human social evolution. This stems from the fact

that the *raison d'être* of capitalism is human exploitation. And, as long as human exploitation exists, the urge for liberation can never be snuffed out. Such a liberation can be delayed, the struggle can be prolonged, but humanity cannot and will not accept its denial.

This urge for liberation finds expression in the revolutionary ideology of Marxism. Its founders had stated that this "*is not a dogma but a guide to action.*" It remains the supreme instrument to understand the contemporary world, comprehend its complexities and intervene to change it.

Such an assertion, that many a bourgeois ideologue would decry as anachronistic, at their charitable best, is based on what Lenin had once said about this emancipatory ideology. "*The irresistible attraction of this theory, which draws to itself the socialists of all countries lies precisely in the fact that it combines the quality of being strictly and supremely scientific... with that of being revolutionary. It does not combine them accidentally, and not only because the founder of the doctrine combined in his own person the qualities of a scientist and a revolutionary, but does so intrinsically and inseparably.*" (Lenin's Collected Works Vol. I, Page 327).

The history of the International Communist movement is witness to the fact that ideological deviations like revisionism had robbed Marxism-Leninism of its revolutionary content while dogmatism had robbed it of its scientific basis.

Embarking on a hitherto uncharted path of human progress, socialism had to confront many obstacles and hardships. Despite the relentless and vicious attempts made by imperialism to destroy the system, socialism not only survived but flourished to emerge as the main force that liberated humanity from the scourge of fascism. Such gigantic achievements, which even the worst bourgeois critics of socialism should loath to disclaim, demonstrates the superiority of a social system that abolishes human exploitation and is based on the ever growing people's initiative.

In the process of building socialism in a relatively less capitalistically developed country and in the most hostile of international circumstances, many concrete problems arose. Lenin was acutely conscious of these and steered the Party and the Soviet Union through such a period. Stalin carrying the mantle forward, had built socialism. Innumerable problems were created. Many were corrected. It was only natural that mistakes would occur and that the Communist Party wedded to the principles of Marxism-Leninism would have the strength and capability to overcome all these. It is precisely this strength that modern

revisionism, beginning with Krushchev and culminating with Gorbachev, had undermined. For its historical direction was not the consolidation and strengthening of socialism but restoration of capitalism.

It is precisely addressing to this issue has Harpal Brar undertaken this painstaking study.

A crucial area of such a study has to be an enquiry into the political economy of socialism. Marx's analysis was confined to the discovery of what he said was the "*laws of motion of modern society*". By modern society, he meant capitalism. A lot of work remains to be done in the field of political economy of socialism. The revisionist domination had prevented such an enquiry, particularly since after Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR."

Engels, in *Anti-Duhring*, defines political economy as : "*the science of the laws governing the production and exchange of material means of subsistence in human society. The conditions under which men produce and exchange, vary from country to country, and, within one country from generation to generation. Political Economy, therefore, cannot be the same for all countries or for all historical epochs.... Political Economy, therefore, is essentially a historical, that is constantly changing.... At the same time, it goes without saying that the laws that are valid for a definite mode of production and forms of exchange hold good for all historical periods in which these modes of production and forms of exchange prevail.*"

Engels was thus clearly warning, that while the fundamental laws of political economy remain valid for the entire period of the mode of production, as productive forces develop within this mode of production itself, constantly changing the 'conditions under which production takes place'; the economic and therefore the social relations also change. Such a scientific study of the political economy of socialism was unfortunately lagging.

While identifying the stagnation that set in, in the Soviet economy in the 1970s, as due to non-correspondence of the methods of economic management to the developing social productive forces (a point that Stalin foresees in his "Economic Problems"), the Gorbachev leadership, instead of drawing correct scientific lessons from the experience of economic construction under socialism, that made gigantic strides, advocated capitalist reforms as a cure to socialism's problems of growth. The international bourgeoisie, which never did reconcile to the establishment and development of socialism, found ideal circumstances to intervene and strengthen the internal forces of counter-

revolution for the dismantling of socialism.

Harpal Brar's study, is a contribution to this much needed analysis and not, as the author himself says, the conclusion. He raises many issues that need further rigorous analysis.

The situation today, is somewhat similar to what Lenin said regarding the conditions in Russia in 1910. *"It is precisely because Marxism is not a lifeless dogma, not a completed, ready-made, immutable doctrine, but a living guide to action, that it was bound to reflect the astonishingly abrupt change in the conditions of social life. That change was reflected in profound disintegration and disunity, in every manner of vacillation, in short, in a very serious internal crisis of Marxism. Resolute resistance to this disintegration, a resolute and persistent struggle to uphold the fundamentals of Marxism, was again placed on the order of the day"* (Emphasis original Lenin Vol. 17 Page 42).

He proceeds to state: *"The questions raised by this crisis cannot be brushed aside. Nothing can be more pernicious or unprincipled than attempts to dismiss them by phrase-mongering. Nothing is more important than to rally all Marxists who have realised the profundity of the crisis and the necessity of combating it, for defence of the theoretical basis of Marxism and its fundamental propositions, that are being distorted from diametrically opposite sides by the spread of bourgeois influence to the various "fellow-travellers" of Marxism."*

"...The bourgeois press is creating far more fallacious ideas on this score than ever before, and is spreading them more widely. Under these circumstances, disintegration in the Marxist ranks is particularly dangerous. Therefore, to understand the reasons for the inevitability of this disintegration at the present time and to close their ranks for consistent struggle against this disintegration is, in the most direct and precise meaning of the term, the task of the day for Marxists. (Lenin's Collected Works Vol. 17, Page 43-44)

It is such a struggle in which the Marxists are today involved in. An essential component of this is to arrive at a Marxist-Leninist understanding of the manner in which such a counter-revolution succeeded in the Soviet Union. Harpal Brar's work is a contribution to such an inquiry.

15-2-1992
New Delhi

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PREFACE

With the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), a qualitative change took place. Notwithstanding his constant invocations of Lenin and Leninism, his repeated assurances that his twin policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* were aimed at renewing socialism, strengthening it and realising its inexhaustible potentialities, it soon became evident that under Gorbachev the USSR was proceeding at an ever-accelerating, almost breakneck, speed in the direction of the restoration of capitalism in the once mighty and proud Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Every ritual reference to Lenin and Leninism, made with the sole aim of hoodwinking the Soviet proletariat and the collective peasantry, was accompanied by wholesale distortion of Marxism-Leninism and emasculation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy and teachings on class struggle.

In the circumstances every class conscious worker was raising questions which had to be answered and which could no longer be avoided. My very close comrades and collaborators pressed me to comment on, and explain, in *Lalkar*, the organ of the Indian Workers' Association (Great Britain) the unfolding events in the USSR. Owing to the enormity of the task I was most reluctant to undertake it. I was lured into it, however, by the comforting assurance that it would involve no more than a couple of - albeit long - articles. But once begun it soon became evident that the matter could not be disposed of in such summary fashion; that it required a rather detailed treatment, a fact which I would have to come to terms with whether I liked it or not. Hence this work which, to use Engels' expression "is by no means the fruit of any 'inner urge'" (*Anti-Duhring*, p.9). On the contrary. In two and a half decades as a political publicist, rarely have I felt such pain in writing anything as the series of articles which this book comprises. For someone who has all his life with pride and joy related the glorious achievements of the Soviet proletariat under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and under the leadership of the CPSU, writing on the events leading up to the counter-revolution of August, 1991, was like a journey through hell. Yet the job had to be performed.

One faced a two-fold task. First one had to expose the utter bankruptcy,

and complete departure from Marxism-Leninism, of the propositions advanced by Gorbachev and his cohorts in the field of political economy, philosophy and class struggle. Secondly, one had to explain the origin and development of what we call the Gorbachev phenomenon. How, it may be asked, was it possible for such a charlatan and renegade to become the General Secretary of a once great revolutionary party - the party of Lenin and Stalin - and then go on to help restore capitalism, disband the CPSU and break up the once mighty USSR? How was it that the USSR, at a time when she was much weaker, could not be defeated during the Civil War by the interventionist armies of the fourteen countries representing the combined strength of all the imperialist countries, their satellites and the White Russian counter-revolutionaries, which could not be defeated by the Nazi beasts - how was it this mighty socialist state was brought to its nadir, to ruin and destruction? How were the gains of socialist construction reversed and by what process was capitalism restored?

As a matter of deliberate intent these questions are only tackled in the last chapter, entitled *The Economics of Class Struggle*. The reader, from reading the earlier articles, may gain the impression that the present writer attributes the origins of the process of capitalist restoration to the Gorbachev years alone, that is, the period from March 1985 to August 1991. Such an impression would be entirely misplaced. Anyone who takes the trouble of reading all the way through to the last chapter will certainly be disabused of any such impression. It is true though that with the rise of Gorbachev a qualitative change takes place: the accumulated practice of revisionist politics and revisionist economics strikes with a virulence hitherto unknown and makes way for the restoration of capitalism at a breathtaking pace.

But, as an old Chinese saying has it, it takes more than one cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep. Likewise the restoration of capitalism in the once mighty and glorious USSR did not take place overnight. It is devilishly difficult to put a date on a social phenomenon of this type and magnitude. It is rather like putting a date on the English industrial revolution. While being fully cognisant of the difficulty involved in dating such a phenomenon as is by its very nature the result of a long process, one cannot completely avoid mentioning some crucial dates, for without reference to these it is impossible to explain the emergence of Gorbachev and the rest of his restorationist clique. This is precisely the reason that an attempt is made in the chapter *Economics of Class Struggle* to trace the origins of the

process which has, over three decades, led not only to the restoration of capitalism in the former USSR but also to what I prefer to call the final collapse of revisionism, which is a "*manifestation of bourgeois influence on the proletariat and bourgeois corruption of workers.*" (Lenin, *Hasty Conclusions*, May 1914).

The rot, the downhill process along the road leading to the restoration of capitalism, started with the triumph of Khrushchevite revisionism at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and the distortions of Marxism-Leninism in its aftermath and under its direct stimulus in the fields of philosophy, political economy and the class struggle. Under the 'economic reforms' instituted from the late 1960s onwards central planning was whittled away bit by bit and commodity production was expanded on a large scale. Production came to be regulated more and more by one sole criterion, i.e., the profitability of individual enterprises. Along with this, under various schemes based on individual incentives, pay differentials widened on an unprecedented scale, with the technical and other intelligentsia, government and party functionaries, gaining enormously at the expense of the productive proletariat, thus creating a substantial privileged layer which in due course became the neo-bourgeois who, by the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, openly and vociferously clamoured for, and secured, official acceptance of a return to the market economy, to wit, the restoration of capitalism. Eventually, when push came to shove, there was hardly anyone to resist; for the CPSU, through three decades of revisionist practice, of distortion of Marxism-Leninism, had been all but expurged of its former revolutionary spirit and militant proletarian essence. Notwithstanding its 19 million strength it had been reduced to a hulk. Even if there were individual members - perhaps even in their thousands - who wanted to resist capitalist restoration, they departed from the scene without making too much noise.

An important aspect of the *modus operandi* of Khrushchevite revisionism throughout has been this, that each step in the direction of capitalist restoration was taken in the name of Marxism-Leninism and of advancing to the higher stage of communism (and, of course, fighting against Stalin's 'personality cult' and the 'administrative-command' economy engendered by that 'cult'). Furthermore, each new bourgeois measure was presented as being the last, while being actually accompanied by a redoubled effort to prepare the ground for the next bourgeois reform. And it could not be otherwise in a society which had experienced planned socialist production on a vast scale, and in which, therefore, production had to a great extent

been brought under conscious control by the associated proletariat. Control of the economy by the proletariat, the conscious organisation of production under a central national plan, excludes the spontaneous development of the market. This system of centrally planned production had to be deliberately and systematically vandalised and the market reconstituted through - to use the words of a revisionist economist - a "*well thought-out system of measures*." And this involved the hoodwinking and emasculation of the membership of the party of the proletariat, which was, after all, the party of a class in power. This is precisely what the revisionists, from Khrushchev onwards, have been doing. The development in this instance has been the opposite to that which accompanied the development of capitalism from feudalism, where practice preceded economic theory. The various economic categories of capitalism, for instance prices of production, existed long before they could be subjected to analysis, having developed as they had spontaneously with the development of the market. In 'market socialism', theory had perforce to precede practice.

Eventually quantity is transformed into quality. Now everyone can see what has been happening. Gorbachev who, in the deceitful manner so characteristic of all revisionists and capitalist roaders, launches his *perestroika* in the name of Lenin and the renewal of socialism, has finally taken the bow with the words: "*My life's work is done. I think that in my place others would have given up long ago.*" (*Sunday Times*, 15 December 1991). At long last revisionism is able to drop its mask and reveal its hideous capitalist features for everyone to see. Now that capitalism is restored, actually as well as officially, there is no need to pay lip service to Lenin; the neo-bourgeoisie can now set about openly exploiting the working class and showing its innate hatred for Marxism-Leninism, of which hatred it has given sufficient proof by removing the symbols of the October Revolution to the applause of the imperialist bourgeoisie as well as its agents in the working class - the Trotskyites, revisionists and social democrats of all varieties.

This revolting gentry - in particular the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites - have been gloating with delirium over the alleged collapse, in Eastern Europe and the USSR, of Stalinism. Just the contrary. What has collapsed is revisionism, and its inevitable degeneration into ordinary capitalism. What is called 'Stalinism' by these despicable creatures is only Leninism in practice. When Leninism was practised in the USSR, as it undoubtedly was during the three decades of Stalin's leadership of the CPSU, it achieved world-historic feats on all fronts - economic, social, cul-

tural, diplomatic and military - which is precisely the reason why the very name of Stalin has become the target of so much abuse on the part of the bourgeoisie and its "*hired prize-fighters*". So what has collapsed is revisionism, even though in order to confuse the proletariat the sly and yet unthinking and uncouth Trotskyites, using the word 'Stalinism' as a swear word rather than as a political characterisation, have been applying it to the very revisionists who entertain mortal hatred of Stalin.

The imperialist bourgeoisie is celebrating over what it regards as the demise of communism. It is blaring forth with ever-increasing frenzy the assertion that 'Marxism is destroyed.' There is nothing new in these assertions which are as old as Marxism itself. Let us answer these assertions in the following, never to be forgotten, words of Stalin:

"It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism has already been destroyed. It is said that it has been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy the working class. More than 80 years have passed since Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. Moreover, Marxism has achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; moreover, it has achieved it in the very country in which Marxism was considered to have been utterly destroyed. It cannot be regarded as an accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved complete victory is now the only country in the world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas in all other countries, including the fascist countries, crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four years now. No, comrades, that is no accident.

"Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin.

"Hence, the second conclusion: We must remain true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin." (*Works*, Vol 13 pp.386-7).

Capitalism has very little to offer the working class even in the heartlands of imperialism, let alone the oppressed and super-exploited people in the vast continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who are groaning under the burden of debt repayments and sacrificing at the altar of the rob-

ber barons of international imperialism, according to the latest UNICEF figures, a quarter of a million children each week who are dying as a result of malnutrition and malnutrition-related diseases. Millions of workers in the imperialist countries are unemployed thanks to the latest economic crisis of capitalism. In every major town one witnesses the spectacle of hundreds of unemployed, homeless workers, the victims of 'free' society who have no work to do and nowhere to go, and not much to eat. The picture of these victims is not very different from that painted by Stalin at the beginning of 1933. Speaking on *The Results of the First Five-year Plan*, he has this to say on the plight of the unemployed in the capitalist countries:

"... Look at the capitalist countries: what horrors are taking place there as a result of unemployment! There are now no less than 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 unemployed in those countries. Who are these people? Usually it is said of them that they are 'down and out'.

"Every day they try to get work, seek work, are prepared to accept almost any conditions of work but they are not given work, because they are 'superfluous.' And this is taking place at a time when vast quantities of goods and products are wasted to satisfy the caprices of the darlings of fate, the scions of the capitalists and landlords.

"The unemployed are refused food because they have no money to pay for it; they are refused shelter because they have no money to pay rent. How and where do they live? They live on the miserable crumbs from the rich man's table; by raking refuse bins, where they find decayed scraps of food; they live in the slums of big cities, and more often in hovels outside of the towns, hastily put up by the unemployed out of packing cases and the bark of trees. But this is not all. It is not only the unemployed who suffer as a result of unemployment. The employed workers, too, suffer as a result of it. They suffer because the presence of a large number of unemployed makes their position in industry insecure, makes them uncertain about their future. Today they are employed, but they are not sure that when they wake up tomorrow they will not find themselves discharged.

"One of the principal achievements of the Five-Year Plan in four years is that we have abolished unemployment and have relieved the workers of the USSR of its horrors." (Problems of Leninism, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1953, pp. 527-8).

Only now, for the first time since 1931, is unemployment once again, thanks to the restoration of capitalism, menacing the workers of the former

USSR. Socialism brought tremendous benefits for the Soviet working class and peasantry. Despite the sabotage of central planning and the institution of bourgeois economic reforms over a long period, the position until only the other day was that Soviet workers retired much earlier (men and 60 and women at 50) than their Western counterparts; they paid no more than 5-10% of their wages for accommodation; their small children enjoyed universal and free day care; there was free medical care for all; there were 3.6 million hospital beds and 1.2 million doctors and dentists, a number proportionately higher than in any other country.

In the field of culture too the gains of the Soviet masses are truly enormous. For example, there are 326,000 libraries there as compared to 141,000 in the US. 131,200 primary, secondary and vocational schools provide education for 45 million students.

Even during the last ten years the USSR has been producing 160 million tonnes of steel, compared with the 100 million tonnes produced in the US.

All these are gains inseparable from the October Revolution and the period of socialist construction. But very soon the Soviet workers will be able to have a first-hand taste of the 'freedoms' of a market economy - unemployment, homelessness, hunger, deprivation, degradation and misery. It is inconceivable then that they will not hanker after a society and a system of production, consciously organised by the associated proletariat, which safeguarded them against these ills. It is inconceivable then that they will not successfully overthrow their new czars.

Lenin once said: *"One step forward, two steps back ... It happens in the lives of individuals, and it happens in the history of nations and in the development of parties. It would be the most criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable and complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy [i.e., Marxism] ..."* (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol 7, p.414).

There is no denying the reverses suffered by socialism as a result of developments in Eastern Europe and the USSR, but it would indeed be *"the most criminal cowardice to doubt even for a moment the inevitable and complete triumph of the principles of revolutionary"* Marxism-Leninism - of communism.

For this to happen, however, the proletariat and the proletarian parties the world over must analyse in a most thoroughgoing manner the developments in Eastern Europe and the USSR; they must draw therefrom the proper conclusions and learn appropriate lessons. Furthermore they must

sharpen their ideological weapons and fight against the lowering of theoretical standards that has been going on for far too long and which explains why such a large number of working-class parties the world over turned out to be helpless against the onslaught of revisionism. They must firmly grasp the truth that "*without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement*" (Lenin, *What is to be Done?*).

And further they must realise that the "*role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory*" (*ibid.*)

"*This thought,*" to repeat after Lenin, "*cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity.*" (*ibid.*)

Each chapter of this book appeared in the form of an article in *Lalkar*, and is now presented in the same sequence with the date of its original publication indicated at the beginning of each chapter. It has been decided, however, to include two appendices. In the first appendix are reproduced the articles on the counter-revolution in Eastern Europe, (Jan-Feb 1990), the 28th Party Congress of the CPSU (July 1990) and the suppression of the counter-revolution in China (Aug-Sept 1989), as well as the article on the August 1991 counter-revolution (Nov-Dec 1991), as the subject matter of these articles has a bearing on the rest of the contents of this book. The second appendix is devoted solely to Trotsky's contribution to economic thought. In the text Trotsky is frequently referred to as an advocate of 'market socialism'. One must not merely assert, one must also prove. In order not to spoil the narrative the substantiation of this allegation is thus relegated to the second appendix.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the British and Irish Communist Organisation, which was very active in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the British anti-revisionist movement, whose excellent two-part pamphlet on Stalin's *Economic Problems* I found invaluable. It is the best work of its kind that I have ever come across, and I have drawn upon it whenever I felt the need to do so.

Last but not least I wish to thank my close comrades without whose ideological, political, moral and material support, without whose technical skills and without whose tireless and self-sacrificing devotion to the cause of the proletariat, these articles - and therefore this book - would have been a near impossibility.

I also wish to thank the Executive Committee of the Indian Workers' As-

sociation (Great Britain) for showing me the indulgence of letting the columns of its organ *Lalkar* be used for the publication of the material included in this book.

I close this preface with the following words borrowed from Marx:

"*Every opinion based on scientific criticism I welcome. As to the prejudices of so-called public opinion, to which I have never made concessions, now as aforesaid the maxim of the great Florentine is mine: 'Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti'*" - [Do what you have to do, and never mind what people say]

Harpal Brar
December 1991.

Chapter 1

LALKAR

March/April

1990

Perestroika - A Complete Departure from Leninism

In March 1985, exactly five years ago, Mikhail Gorbachev, following the death of Chernenko, was appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It is a sufficiently long period for us to be able to make an assessment of his leadership of the CPSU and, much more importantly, of the latter's performance in the arena of internal and external affairs. We state at the very outset that these five years have been a period of unmitigated disaster for the cause of socialism, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in the USSR itself, where economic chaos, nationalist turmoil, political and moral decay, are increasingly posing a serious threat to the integrity and very existence of the USSR. Although this rot can be traced to the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956, when, under the leadership of Khrushchev, the Party adopted a series of erroneous positions, in the present acute form the crisis in the USSR and in Eastern Europe is the direct outcome of the policies that go under the twin names of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*, adopted at the Plenary Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee in January and June 1987 respectively - policies which are, not surprisingly, leading to wrong, nay, disastrous, consequences. The rest of this article is devoted to substantiating this contention of ours. It is hardly possible to do justice to a subject like this in the context of a single newspaper article. Unfortunately, we shall doubtless have to return to this topic. The present article is, therefore, intended to serve as our preliminary contribution to the debate that is currently taking place in working-class parties, organisations and working-class circles the world over.

The foremost documents referred to in this series of articles, and which form the subject of our critique, are:

1. *Perestroika*, by Mikhail Gorbachev (published by Collins and referred to in this article as *Perestroika*),

2. Gorbachev's report on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution (the 1987 Report),

3. Gorbachev's report to the 19th All Union Conference of the CPSU in June 1988 (the 1988 Report), and

4. *The Challenge: Economics of Perestroika*, by Abel Aganbegyan (published by Hutchinson, referred to in this article as *The Challenge*). Academician Aganbegyan, incidentally, is described in Soviet literature as "the man at the hub of perestroika."

Definition of Perestroika

Gorbachev defines *perestroika* not merely as restructuring but as a "revolution from above." He says: "What is meant is profound and essentially revolutionary changes implemented on the initiative of the authorities themselves but necessitated by objective changes in the situation and in social moods." (*Perestroika* p.55).

Gorbachev assures us again and again that he does not share the view held by some people that "socialism is in a deep crisis and has brought our society to a dead end;" that he does not agree with those who say: "we have only one way out ... : to adopt capitalist methods of economic management and social patterns, to drift towards capitalism." He criticises those who "go so far as to claim that the October 1917 Revolution was a mistake which almost completely cut off our country from world social progress" (*ibid.* p. 36). "Nothing could be further from the truth," he says, than the interpretation that *perestroika* has been "necessitated by the disastrous state of the Soviet economy and that it signifies disenchantment with socialism and a crisis for its ideals and ultimate goals" (p. 11). He goes on to say: "we are not going to change Soviet power, of course, or abandon its fundamental principles, but we acknowledge the need for changes that will strengthen socialism and make it more dynamic and politically more meaningful." (p.54).

Far from being a detraction from socialism, Gorbachev is bold enough to characterise the policy of *perestroika* in the following terms:

"... in its Bolshevik daring and in its humane social thrust the present course is a direct sequel to the great accomplishments started by the Leninist Party in the October days of 1917. And not merely a sequel, but an extension and a development of the main ideas of the Revolution. We must impart new

dynamism to the October Revolution's historical impulse and further advance all that was commenced by it in our society." (p. 50).

And to make such an advance *perestroika* must be accompanied by *glasnost* (literally, openness), that is, by a process described as "complete democratisation" at all levels of society for without democratisation *perestroika*, it is claimed, is bound to fail, as did earlier reforms that were unaccompanied by *glasnost*. We shall see shortly the practical results of these twin policies, results which belie the bold claims made by Gorbachev in their name.

Why Perestroika?

Before analysing the content of the various aspects of this new policy, it is legitimate to ask the question: why *perestroika*? Gorbachev tells us that the origins of *perestroika* can be directly ascribed to the stagnation of the Soviet economy from the late 1970s onwards. Here is how he puts it:

"At some stage - this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies - something happened that was at first sight inexplicable. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society. A kind of 'braking mechanism' affecting social and economic development formed. And all this happened at a time when the scientific and technological revolution opened up new prospects for economic and social progress.

"Analysing the situation, we first discovered a slowing of economic growth. In the last fifteen years the national income growth rates had declined by more than a half and by the beginning of the eighties had fallen to a level close to economic stagnation. A country that was once quickly closing in on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another." (pp. 18-19).

And further: "Our rockets can find Halley's comet and fly to Venus with amazing accuracy, but side by side with these scientific and technological triumphs is an obvious lack of efficiency in using scientific achievements for economic needs..."

Parallel with the economic stagnation, says Gorbachev, there has been a "gradual erosion of the ideological and moral values of our people ..." and a relaxation of party guidance: "great values born of the October Revolution

and the heroic struggle for socialism were being trampled underfoot;" not only have Soviet people been losing interest in social affairs, but *"labour no longer had its respectable status,"* and *"people, especially the young, were after profit at all cost."* Thus the ideas of *perestroika* have been prompted not only by economic considerations but also *"by the troubled conscience, by the indomitable commitment to ideals which we inherited from the Revolution ..."* Thus far Gorbachev.

If we take into account all the important pronouncements of Gorbachev, as contained in the three most authoritative documents referred to at the beginning of this article, we can say that his thesis of *perestroika* can be subdivided into the following categories:

1. A reassessment of Soviet history - a euphemism for unwarranted and unscientific attacks on Joseph Stalin and an attempt, albeit not a very convincing one, at negating that glorious chapter in the history of the world proletariat in which the USSR, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the leadership of the CPSU, with Stalin at its head, performed unparalleled feats in the building of socialism.

2. *Glasnost* (openness) - *"democratisation of Soviet society."*

3. Restructuring of the Soviet economy.

4. Socialism and the world.

We prefer to discuss these aspects of *perestroika* in reverse order. This article is confined to 4. above. Other articles will follow dealing with the other aspects.

SOCIALISM AND THE WORLD

Half of Gorbachev's book is devoted to this issue. His report on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution contains a section dealing with the international situation - *"The October Revolution and Today's World"* - in which Gorbachev gives his analysis of the contemporary world and comes up with some fantastic (in the sense of unbelievable) theoretical formulations which, to say the least, are at odds with reality, at variance with the analysis of the world situation endorsed even by the CPSU at its 27th Party Congress, and a clear departure from the science of Marxism-Leninism. The 1988 Report too repeats these selfsame formulations.

Integral and Interdependent World.

Gorbachev's main thesis is that the world we live in is an interdependent and integral world. Ignoring all the basic contradictions of our epoch (the contradictions between socialism and imperialism; between imperialism and the oppressed nations and peoples of the world; between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; and between the various imperialist countries), Gorbachev says:

"As you know this concept proceeds from the idea that for all the profound contradictions of the contemporary world, for all the radical differences among the countries that comprise it, it is interdependent and integral" (1987 Report).

On what grounds can one characterise this world as interdependent and integral? Here is Gorbachev's answer:

"The reasons for this include the internationalisation of the world economic ties, the comprehensive scope for scientific and technological revolution, the essential novel role played by the mass media, the state of the earth's resources, the common environmental danger and the crying social problems of the developing world which affect us all. The main reason however is the problem of human survival. This problem is now with us because the development of nuclear weapons and the threatening prospects of their use have called into question the very existence of the human race." (ibid.).

There is nothing new about this *"internationalisation of world economic ties,"* for it is as old as modern capitalism itself. From its very early days capitalism has sought nothing short of a world market. This factor was at the basis of the geographical discoveries from the 15th century onwards, not to mention the slave trade, colonisation of the new world and subsequently that of Asia and Africa. If one is to talk of this phenomenon in terms of interdependence, one might as well go on to talk just as legitimately of the interdependence of the robber and the one who is robbed. That imperialists, and their ideologues, should speak in such terms in an attempt to conceal their exploitation of the oppressed peoples is understandable. But on the part of communists it is an impermissible departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

As for the much-trumpeted *"scientific and technological revolution,"* again there is nothing new about that either. The never-ceasing capitalist chase after the extraction of greater and greater amounts of surplus value,

expressing itself through the law of competition, sees to it that technical progress takes place continually. But no one who calls himself a communist should allow himself to be so dazzled by such technological revolution as to forget that " ... *within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of the individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work and turn it into a hateful toil ... subject him to a despotism the more hateful for its meanness.*" (Marx, *Capital* Vol I, p. 645).

Further, the advanced capitalist countries are busily pressing into service this scientific and technological revolution for the intensification of the super-exploitation of the people in the vast continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America and now increasingly those of Eastern Europe, e.g., Poland, Hungary, etc.

Nor are the imperialists particularly concerned about "*the common environmental danger and the crying social problems of the developing world.*" Thanks to imperialist super-exploitation, the people of this "*developing world*" are sinking ever deeper into poverty and debt, to repay which they are increasingly destroying rain forests, growing cash crops instead of the food they need to eat, importing food at great cost, and getting into further indebtedness as a result.

But above all, Gorbachev in his Report presses home his main argument:

"The main reason, however, is the problem of human survival."

And this problem of human survival, this fear concerning the possible extinction of the human race through a nuclear exchange, argues Gorbachev, is compelling even the imperialists to come to terms with the fact that we are all interdependent in an integral world and must cooperate with each other. And in this passionate, not to say wishful, pursuit of a world of cooperation - between imperialism and socialism, between exploiters and the exploited, between the oppressors and the oppressed - all the real contradictions of the contemporary world are swept under the rug.

True, there is the fear of mutual destruction. But this has not stopped the imperialist war plans. What has prevented a nuclear attack by imperialism so far has been the ability of the Soviet Union to launch an effective re-

taliatory strike, and not some common concern on the part of the warmongers of the NATO Alliance for saving humanity from the scourge of a nuclear war. While Gorbachev is busy putting the best gloss on the foreign policies of the imperialist countries, the US busies itself with the Star Wars project, which is aimed at enabling the US to break out of the restrictions of nuclear parity and acquire a first-strike capacity against the USSR. While Gorbachev makes the assertion "*a new comprehensive system of international security in the context of disarmament is needed and possible,*" while he gropes in the dark, out of faith rather than reason, "*to identify the laws governing the inter-action of the forces which through rivalry, contradiction and conflicting interests, can produce the desired effect*" [desired by whom, one might ask], the imperialists are going about their usual business of undermining the moral, political, social, economic and military foundations of socialism with truly American - or shall we say Japanese - efficiency. Without firing a single shot they have achieved the virtual disintegration of the Warsaw Pact as a cohesive defensive alliance for peace and social progress, while keeping intact the aggressive warmongering NATO Alliance.

Nature of Imperialism

On the fundamental question of the nature of imperialism, Gorbachev asks:

"But given the current stage of the world's development and the new level of its interdependence and integration is it possible to influence that nature and block its more dangerous manifestations? In other words, can we be sure that the laws operating in the integral world in which universal human values have top priority will restrict the scope of the destructive effects produced by the operation of the egocentric laws which benefit only the ruling classes and are basic to the capitalist system." (Our emphasis - 1987 Report, page 48).

The formulation above is nothing short of a self-annihilatory, self-contradictory mumbo-jumbo. On the one hand we are told that ours is an integral world with its own laws; on the other hand the question is asked: can the laws of this integral world block the working of the basic law of the capitalist system? It is the type of question of which it is said that a fool can ask more of than ten wise men can answer. One's head begins to swirl on reading such a formulation. One does not know which is more powerful, the laws of the integral world or the basic law of the capitalist system, or universal human values, which, we are told, have top priority.

Be that as it may, Gorbachev answers his own above question in the affirmative. And this affirmative answer of his is firmly grounded in wishful thinking rather than on any concrete analysis of the concrete conditions of our world, which is characterised by a frantic arms race, monstrous oppression and exploitation of the third world, naked aggression against small sovereign nations (such as Nicaragua, Grenada and Panama), and intensification of various contradictions. One has only to cast a cursory glance to realise that ours is not an integral world but one which is split right down the middle.

Gorbachev, then, goes on to ask further questions:

"Can capitalism get rid of militarism and function and develop in the economic sphere without it? ..."

And further:

"How realistic is our hope that this awareness of the terrible threat the world is facing and we know that this awareness is making its way even into the higher echelons of the Western ruling elite [i.e., imperialists] will become a part of practical policies? After all however forceful the arguments of common sense, however well-developed the sense of responsibility, however powerful the instinct of self-preservation there are still things which must not be underestimated and which are determined by economic and consequently class based interests."

In view of Gorbachev's determination to ignore *"economic and consequently class based interests,"* one is baffled by the inclusion of the last sentence in the above-quoted paragraph, which sentence, reflecting the reality around us, effectively demolishes all the nonsense about our 'integral' and 'interdependent' world with its own laws.

Finally, Gorbachev repeats the same question in the following general form:

"In other words, the question is whether capitalism can adapt itself to the conditions of a nuclear weapons free world, to the conditions of a new and equitable economic order, to the conditions in which the intellectual and moral values of the two world systems will be compared honestly."

In view of Gorbachev's own admission that there are *"things which must not be underestimated and which are determined by economic and consequently class based interests,"* why does he need to ask this question unless it is for the purpose of reaching some groundless conclusions precisely by

underestimating those very class based economic interests that he himself is aware of?

Modification of Contradictions.

Before long Gorbachev reveals to us the secret behind his belaboured questions in the following terms:

"The post-war period has witnessed an indepth modification of the contradictions that used to determine the principal trends in the world's economy and politics. I refer above all to the trends that inevitably lead to wars between capitalists themselves."

First, to characterise the post-war period as a time of *"an indepth modification of contradictions"* is a travesty of all truth. It is in fact a period of great advance in human history through the highest intensification and resolution of contradictions - particularly contradictions between socialism and imperialism on the one hand, and between imperialism and the oppressed nations and peoples of the world on the other hand. It is a period that witnessed the emergence of the Peoples' Democracies in Eastern Europe, the triumph of the Chinese, Korean, Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions, the achievement of independence by several scores of Asian, African and Caribbean countries. All these advances took place in the teeth of frantic opposition from imperialism - not through indepth modification of contradictions in our supposedly integral world.

Nor can this period be credited with an indepth modification of the contradictions merely on the ground that the imperialist countries have not seen fit to wage war against each other. We know why they have not done so. Gorbachev himself supplies an answer, which, like the curate's egg, is good in parts:

"Today the situation is different. It is not only the lesson of the past war but also the fear of sapping its strength in the face of socialism, by now a world system, that have prevented capitalism from allowing its 'internal' contradictions to go to extremes. These contradictions began to evolve into a technological race against competitors and were dampened with the help of neo-colonialism. A kind of new 'peaceful' partitioning of the world was started with the rule Lenin identified - 'according to capital', the big share going to whoever was the strongest and wealthiest at the moment. Some countries began to 'ease' tensions in the economies by rechannelising the resources into the military industrial complex under the pretext of 'Soviet threat'. The changes occurring within

the technological and organisational infra-structure of capitalist economy also helped to clear contradictions and balance different interests."

In the opening sentence, Gorbachev makes the correct remark that imperialists have not come to blows with each other for fear of sapping their strength in the face of socialism. This, far from being evidence of an in-depth modification of contradictions in our allegedly integral world, only goes to prove subordination of one type of contradiction - the inter-imperialist one - in the face of another type - the one between imperialism and socialism - and the attempts of the imperialist countries to solve their crisis at the cost of socialism. And sadly, the attempt appears to be succeeding thanks to the theory of the integral world with its own laws and modification of contradictions.

The extraction of superprofits "with the help of neo-colonialism" is presented by Gorbachev as a "kind of new 'peaceful' partitioning" and as yet another proof of the in-depth modification of contradictions in our wonderfully integral and interdependent world. It scarcely needs proof that in this instance too the picture painted by Gorbachev is violently discordant with reality. In order to impose these neo-colonial relations, to achieve this 'peaceful' partition, imperialism has waged, and continues to wage, wars against the newly-emergent countries. The wars of intervention and imperialist-inspired civil strife in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Salvador and a host of other countries are hardly a testimony to the modification of contradictions and peaceful partition of the world. Equally, the people of the third world continue to wage their revolutionary wars against imperialism and its puppets with increased ferocity. They do not peacefully submit to such 'peaceful' partition, which is aimed at solving the inter-imperialist contradictions at their expense. If Gorbachev were to visit places such as Soweto, San Salvador, the Occupied Territories of Palestine, etc., and talk to the peoples there about this 'peaceful' partition, it is not hard to imagine that the response he would get would be terse and less than civil.

It is equally wrong of Gorbachev to present the military industrial complex in the imperialist countries as a rather harmless agency for easing tensions, rather than presenting it for what it really is, namely, the natural and inevitable product of monopoly capitalism, an integral part of its very being, and an instrument directed against socialism and national liberation movements the world over.

Of course, the imperialist 'peaceful' partition and the dampening of contradictions with the help of neo-colonialism could have met a challenge from the socialist bloc refusing to accept such 'peaceful' partition. But Gorbachev in his 1987 Report gives touching assurance that the USSR understands that "*developed capitalism has been and will be unable to do without these countries' resources. This is an objective fact. The calls for severing historically shaped world economic ties are dangerous and offer no solution.*" (p. 51).

He is even more candid in his book where he says:

"I have explained on many occasions that we do not pursue goals inimical to Western interests. We know how important the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, other third world regions and also South Africa are for American and West European economies, in particular as raw material sources. To cut these links is the last thing we want to do, and we have no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed, mutual economic interests." (Perestroika p. 178).

Thus, it turns out, it is not the nature of imperialism that has changed, but the attitude of the leadership of the USSR to the needs of imperialism - that has changed beyond recognition. Instead of opposing imperialist pillage and robbery, instead of giving all possible assistance to those fighting against it in the third world, as hitherto had been the practice, the present leadership of the Soviet Union shows such a complete understanding of the imperialist need to plunder the resources of these countries as not to want to rupture "*the historically formed, mutual economic interests*". Presumably from now on no "*historically formed*" economic relations, including those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, under which the latter exploits the former, must be challenged. Presumably too it was a mistake to "*rupture*" the "*historically formed relations*" between Czarism and the Russian people in 1917! Such touching regard for the interests of capitalist exploitation and imperialist super-exploitation is to be tolerated, nay, sanctified, in the name of the integral and interdependent world, in which an in-depth modification of contradictions has taken place because of the fear of the extinction of the human race posed by nuclear weapons. No wonder such arch reactionary and rabidly anti-communist representatives of imperialism as Ronald Reagan (former US President) and Premier Margaret Thatcher declare with a grin on their faces: "*We like Mr Gorbachev. We can do business with him.*" Yes indeed!

The Question of Militarisation

In his report to the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU, these are the terms in which Gorbachev describes the militarism of the age of electronics:

"The facets and consequences of the scientific and technological revolution differ in different socio-political systems. Capitalism of the 1980s, the capitalism of the age of electronics and information science, computers and robots, is throwing more millions of people, including young and educated people, out of jobs. Wealth and power are being increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few. Militarism is thriving on the arms race greatly, and also strives gradually to gain control over the political levers of power. It is becoming the ugliest and the most dangerous monster of the 20th century. Because of its efforts, the most advanced scientific and technical ideas are being converted into weapons of mass destruction."

This is absolutely correct, but this was in February-March, 1986. But barely eighteen months later, in his 1987 Report, he goes on to assert that militarisation is neither inherent to, nor the inevitable consequence of, monopoly capitalism. He gives the examples of Japan, West Germany and Italy and the "economic miracle" they achieved without militarisation in the aftermath of the Second World War. He is forced to admit that when this miracle "came to an end they switched back to militarism again". However, he insists, this was not rooted "in the essential laws governing the operation of the contemporary monopoly capital" but "by extraneous factors - the 'contagious example' of the US military and industrial complex, the cold war, and its spirit, considerations of prestige, the need to have one's own 'mailed fist' to be able to talk to one's competitors in a commonly-understood language and the desire to back one's economic invasion of Third World countries with power politics. Whatever the actual reason, there was a period when the modern capitalist economy developed rapidly in several countries where military spending was minimum. The relevant historical experience is available."

In other words, development of monopoly capitalism does not necessarily lead to militarisation. It is strange indeed to suggest that factors such as the cold war (which is an expression in 'peaceful' times of the irreconcilable hatred of imperialism for socialism), inter-imperialist rivalry (".... the need to be able to talk to one's competitors in a commonly understood language," if you please), and "the desire to back one's economic invasion of Third World countries with power politics" (i.e., imperialist bullying aimed at securing the

continued flow of tribute to imperialism from these countries) are extraneous, chance, occurrences and not the result of the working out of the laws inherent to contemporary monopoly capital.

In passing we may note that, whereas earlier Gorbachev talks of the 'peaceful' partition of the third world, we are now told that this 'peaceful' partition is not so peaceful after all. It is actually backed by massive armed force (or "power politics," for what is in a name?)

The thesis that Gorbachev is now presenting us with runs counter to all the teachings of Lenin on imperialism and is at odds with the realities of our world.

Imperialism and the Third World

The 1987 Report, on the basis of Gorbachev's new analysis, has some interesting things to say on the relations between imperialism and the Third World countries. It says:

"The neo-colonialist methods of using resources of others, the arbitrary practices of the transnational corporations, the bondage of debt, debts that are nearing the trillion dollar mark and obviously cannot be paid, also lead to an impasse ..."

And further: *"Inequitable trade remains a fact that will eventually culminate in an explosion."*

So what is the solution? It would appear that the explosion must be avoided in the interests both of humanity and the all-pervasive law of our integral world, with its indepth modification of contradictions. And "it appears that some Western leaders are beginning to understand that this outcome (i.e., explosion) is a distinct possibility," which must be avoided. He goes on to say:

"There will either be a disaster or a joint quest for a new economic order which takes into account the interest of all on an equal basis. We see the way to establishing such an order in the implementation of the 'disarmament for development' concept."

Thus, Gorbachev's efforts are directed at demonstrating to the imperialists the short-sightedness of their approach and showing to them that it is in their own interests to modify the existing international order in such a way that the change, while bringing economic development to the third world, will at the same time help their own economics. In short, Gorbachev is ap-

pealing to the sensibleness and self-interest of imperialism. His passionate plea ends in this crescendo: "... we are facing a historic choice dictated by the laws of the largely interconnected and integral world."

The drooping flowers pine for love, but the heartless brook babbles on - so runs an ancient Chinese saying. Gorbachev's passionate pleas, in the name of "*the laws of the largely interconnected and integral world*" are certain to be ignored by imperialism and the people of the third world alike, for how can the exploiters and the exploited, the oppressors and the oppressed, the robbers and the victims of their robbery, sit down and amicably sort out their differences? Gorbachev is demanding the impossible of both sides. He is asking the exploiters not to behave like exploiters: he is asking the super-exploited vast masses in the Third World to stop resisting and stop behaving like the exploited. Such pleas are bound to fall on deaf or bemused ears.

Gorbachev bases his vision of the future economic relations between imperialism and the third world on the following premises:

1. that imperialism's need for the resources of the third world has been accomplished by a 'peaceful' partition through neo-colonialism;
2. that the Soviet Union will do nothing to rupture this historically evolved economic relation;
3. that there is a need for imperialism to understand that its development does not require, and need not lead to, the growth of militarism;
4. that the present method of exploiting the third world could lead to a debt crisis and an explosion.

Consequently, if the imperialists were to give up the arms race and devote resources, through the implementation of the "*disarmament-for-development concept*," to the development of the third world countries, then they will be in a position to avert militarisation as well as an explosion in the third world. And Gorbachev offers them help in this regard, while promising to do nothing which would rupture the blessed historically formed relations between imperialism and the third world. If this were to happen, everyone will benefit - the imperialists, the socialist countries and the third world, and, into the bargain, humanity will be spared extinction from a nuclear holocaust. We shall all be members of one happy human family.

"*The Soviet Union and the United States are especially responsible for the future of the world,*" says Gorbachev in his book *Perestroika*. They could, he

continues, pool their resources and "*scientific and intellectual potentials in order to solve the most diverse problems for the benefit of human kind.*"

"*Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy only by different means, which was classical in its time, has grown hopelessly out of date,*" declared Gorbachev, without adducing any proof of it. It was not only Clausewitz who subscribed to this dictum. For our purposes, it is much more important that Lenin subscribed to it too - not because Lenin was a war-monger, but because as long as imperialism lasts war cannot be eliminated. Of course, the forms and methods of waging war may undergo change, partly in response to development of technology in the field of weaponry, but war as such cannot be eliminated without eliminating imperialism. Gorbachev's theory, according to which imperialism can peacefully solve its crisis and resolve its contradictions, avoiding militarisation and war, brings him closer to Kautsky's ultra-imperialism rather than Lenin's thesis of imperialism.

The countless wars waged by imperialism or inspired by it since the end of the Second World War - the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia; the strife in Mozambique and Angola; the struggle of the people of Namibia and Palestine; the revolutionary struggles for national liberation of the countries of Latin America; the US-inspired Contra war in Nicaragua; the murderous military coup in Chile which overthrew the Allende government; the American aggression against tiny Grenada and Panama; the struggle of the people of South Africa against the hated apartheid regime - all these and many other wars and conflicts, with their billions of dead and mutilated, belie the silly tales about our integral world, with laws of its own and an in-depth modification of contradictions.

On the question of class struggle in the imperialist countries, Gorbachev's thesis is silent - merely assigning to them a role in the peace movement for demilitarisation and a world without nuclear weapons. The contradiction between the working class and the imperialist bourgeoisie, the problems of unemployment, the crisis of imperialism, let alone the fight for socialism, are simply passed over with a deafening silence.

The role of the masses in the third-world countries for carrying out peoples' democratic revolutions is ignored, with a corresponding overemphasis on the role of the reactionary governments of many of these countries.

All this is prompted not by any concrete analysis of reality but by the notorious laws of the integral world which require, *a priori*, the modification of contradictions.

Conclusion

Gorbachev's theses of an integral and interdependent world - this world of modified contradictions - in which the exploiters and exploited devote themselves to averting the rupture of historically formed economic relations, is a complete departure from the thesis, accepted hitherto, by the world communist movement, of sharpening contradictions, the intensified resistance of the people of the third world to imperialist plunder, exploitation and oppression, the growing power of the liberation movement, of the intensification of the general crisis of imperialism, and of the inevitable victory of socialism and communism the world over. It represents a complete break with the teachings of Leninism and can only serve as an instrument for the emasculation and liquidation of the revolutionary working class and national liberation movements alike. For this reason Gorbachev's thesis must be rejected by every class-conscious worker.

Chapter 2

LALKAR

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Economics of Perestroika - A complete departure from Marxism-Leninism.

In the last issue of *Lalkar* (March-April 1990), we dealt with one of the aspects of *perestroika*, namely, socialism and the world. We concluded that article with the observation that Gorbachev's thesis of an integral and interdependent world of modified contradictions, in which the exploiters and the exploited devote themselves to averting the rupture of historically-formed economic relations, represents a complete departure from the teachings of Leninism and can only serve as an instrument for the emasculation and liquidation of the revolutionary working class and national liberation movements alike.

In this, the second article, we deal with the economics of *perestroika*. We are equally convinced that the economics of *perestroika* too represent a serious departure from the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in the field of socialist construction and, if allowed to continue, it will result in the complete dismantling of the planned socialist economy, the dissipation of the gains of the October Revolution (which was realised through heroic feats of socialist construction, socialist planning and collectivisation) - with the resultant disastrous consequences for not only the Soviet working class, but also for the world proletariat and the oppressed people everywhere. With this opening remark, let us now turn to the economics of *perestroika* and examine its content, aims and consequences. First, though, why the Soviet reforms, why this restructuring at this point in time?

Why *perestroika*?

The present Soviet reforms can, and must, be seen in the light of the tremendous restructuring of industry in the principal imperialist countries - the US, Japan, Germany, France and the UK - that has been proceeding at a furious tempo for over a decade under the impact of the scientific-techno-

logical revolution. The growth rate of the Soviet economy was enormously ahead of that of the imperialist countries in the 1930s, 1940s and even in the 1950s and 1960s. But in the late 1970s, whereas the growth rate (we emphasise these words in order to make it clear that we are not talking of absolute growth, for since 1919 there has not been a single year in which the soviet economy did not grow absolutely - something that not a single capitalist country can boast of) of the Soviet economy began to drop, the industrial activity in the capitalist countries gained a new momentum. This is how Gorbachev describes the situation:

"At some state - this became particularly clear in the latter half of the seventies - something happened that was at first sight inexplicable. The country began to lose momentum. Economic failures became more frequent. Difficulties began to accumulate and deteriorate, and unresolved problems to multiply. Elements of what we call stagnation and other phenomena alien to socialism began to appear in the life of society. A kind of 'braking mechanism' affecting social and economic development formed. And all this happened at a time when the scientific and technological revolution opened up new prospects for economic and social progress.

"Analysing the situation, we first discovered a slowing of economic growth. In the last fifteen years the national income growth rates had declined by more than a half and by the beginning of the eighties had fallen to a level close to economic stagnation. A country that was once quickly closing in on the world's advanced nations began to lose one position after another." (Perestroika, pp. 18-19).

The reasons for this slowdown in the rate of growth, and the resultant restructuring, according to Abel Aganbagan, formerly an economic consultant to the Soviet Government and presently the chairman of the Commission on Manpower and Natural Resources of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and a bourgeois to boot, are: (a) the shortage of natural resources; and (b) the shortage of manpower. Whereas the earlier method, characterised by Aganbagan as the Extensive Method, worked in the conditions of seemingly unlimited availability of natural and human resources, in the present circumstances there is a limited supply of the same which necessitates investment in technology that would make for more cost-effective, economic, use of these resources. The scarcity of natural and human resources, he says, necessitates a switch over to an Intensive Method, which relies increasingly on increased productivity.

Statistics of industrial output in Aganbagan's own book belie his assertions that the period prior to the introduction of *perestroika* was characterised by the so-called Extensive Method. According to him the Soviet economy had reached the levels of 1913 by 1927, and Soviet industrial output at that time accounted for 4% of the world's industrial output. Her industrial output climbed to 10% of world output by 1941, thus enabling the Soviet Union to defeat Hitlerite Germany. Today Soviet industrial output amounts to 20% of world industrial output - and this notwithstanding the diversion of economic resources to the production of nuclear armaments forced on the USSR by the USA and other imperialist countries in the war-mongering, aggressive NATO alliance, the near-complete economic blockade of the USSR, her exclusion from membership of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the denial to her by the USA of most-favoured-nation status (i.e., equal treatment with other countries trading with the United States) in trade relations, and the strict enforcement of the ban on the sale of high technology to the USSR organised by COCOM in obedience to the US baton. Notwithstanding these formidable obstacles, if the USSR today accounts for one-fifth of the world's industrial output, it is in no small measure due to the fact that she has been continuously re-equipping and re-tooling her industry, that she has been progressively engaged in a systematic increase in the productivity of labour (Intensive Method, if it pleases Mr Aganbagan). The history of industrialisation the world over has not known technical feats the like of those achieved by the working class of the USSR in the 1930s, 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the entire gigantic enterprise to industrialise the Soviet Union since the Great October Revolution has been one giant effort at applying the latest achievements of science and technology to industry and agriculture as quickly and effectively as possible. Even the Brezhnev years, characterised though they were by the increasing implementation of the bourgeois economic reforms,¹ let alone the Stalin era (which are so maligned by the present Soviet administration out of malice and vendetta rather than as an attempt to evaluate objectively that period in Soviet history), were remarkable for their technological feats. One has only to mention the Siberian gas pipe project to be convinced of that.

¹ See Chapter 11, 'The Economics of Class Struggle'.

In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration imposed an embargo on the sale by US companies of gas turbines, blades and compressors for the pipeline. The US bullied Western governments into compliance with this embargo, believing that the Siberian project would simply collapse in the face of the US and European embargo. The Brezhnev administration successfully mobilised the technical, industrial and political might of the Soviet Union to overcome the imperialist embargo. This is how Ed Hewett, an American specialist in Soviet energy policy, describes the process of this Soviet mobilisation:

"The Soviet response to this action was to mobilise local party and government organisations in an all-out effort to meet the goals of the pipeline expansion programme by relying almost exclusively - contrary to the original strategy of the ambitious plans - on Soviet turbines and compressors. That is precisely what happened, and more. The entire pipeline expansion programme was completed ahead of schedule, and without further imports of Western turbines and compressors beyond those few purchased before the Reagan embargo.

"That was no mean feat, and how the Soviets managed it is still somewhat of a mystery. What is clear is that the Soviet leadership responded to the Reagan threat by mobilising the entire system through the party, signalling to all levels that the gas pipeline programme was a first priority ... Local party officials all along the route of the lines were mobilised to see that construction moved on schedule, ministries were mobilised to see that they contributed their part in the supply of necessary equipment and where possible Eastern European technology was substituted for what were to have been imports from the West. This is but one example of an important source of strength in the system ... " (Ed Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy*, Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1988, pp.169-70).

That the Soviet system is strong enough to overcome technological obstacles and blockades is recognised even by Gorbachev, who at least on one occasion explains the Soviet lag in the field of technology in terms of *"too great a reliance on external ties"* and an underestimation of the USSR's scientific potential. This is what he says:

"We have found ourselves in this situation technologically because we underestimated our scientific potential and placed too great a reliance on external ties.

"As I see it, we accepted the policy of detente with too radiant hopes; I would say, too trustingly. Many thought it would be irreversible and open up

unbounded possibilities, in particular for expanding trade and economic relations with the West. We even discontinued some of our research and technological developments, hoping for the international division of labour, and thinking that some machines would be more advantageous to buy than to manufacture at home. But what happened in reality? We were seriously punished for our naivete. There came a period of embargoes, boycotts, bans, restrictions, intimidation of those trading with us, etc. Some Western politicians even publicly anticipated the collapse of the Soviet system. But they ranted in vain." (*Perestroika*, pp. 93-4).

Continues Gorbachev:

"On the whole, the various US 'sanctions' and 'embargoes and other bans helped clarify a great deal. As they say, every cloud has a silver lining. We have drawn lessons from the decisions taken by the US and some other Western countries to refuse to sell the Soviet Union advanced technology. That is perhaps why we are now experiencing a real boom in the fields of information science, computer technology and other areas of science and technology." (*ibid*).

This is in stark contrast to the gloomy picture of 'stagnation' painted by Gorbachev elsewhere and by his slick advisers everywhere. We merely wish to add that the Gorbachev administration, more than any other previous Soviet administration, is guilty of accepting the *"policy of detente with too radiant hopes"*, of underestimating Soviet scientific potential and placing *"too great a reliance on external ties"*, and the USSR is already being punished for its naivete.

Detente has always been a one-way fare with imperialism. The latter carries on regardless with its war-mongering and aggressive activities, motivated by its rabid class hatred of socialism, while pocketing any concessions made by the socialist countries. For instance, for decades, the imperialists justified the massive re-armament of the NATO Alliance by reference to the alleged danger emanating from the Warsaw Pact. Now that the Warsaw Pact has, in all but name, ceased to be a fighting force, the imperialists are not only insisting on keeping NATO in existence, but they are also working furiously to strengthen it. They even want a united Germany to be a member of this aggressive war machine, and thus directly threaten the physical safety of the USSR. The imperialist bourgeoisie neither makes concessions in the field of defence nor in that of trade and ideology. While Gorbachev is never tired of rambling on about *"universal human values"* (among others,

witness his speech on 7 December 1988 to the Plenary Meeting of the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly - the very session to attend which Yasser Arafat, the PLO Chairman, had been denied a visa by the US government), the imperialists press on with their relentless crusade against communism and in favour of 'democracy', 'freedom', and 'free market', all code words for imperialist exploitation, plunder, oppression and aggression. While Gorbachev was in New York to address the 43rd Session, the US government not only unveiled the Stealth bomber, but also dispatched a large naval force for aggressive action against Libya.

The US is continuing with its Star Wars (SDI) project, in an attempt to gain first strike nuclear capability, while signing various arms limitation treaties, such as the INF treaty, with the USSR. While the Gorbachev administration makes concession after concession in the sphere of foreign and domestic policy, the US continues to refuse it a trade treaty guaranteeing it the so-called most-favoured nation treatment, just as was done by the US in October 1972 when Congress refused to ratify such a trade treaty under the Jackson Vanik Amendment, which sought to deny to any "non-market economy" (i.e., socialist economy) the most-favoured nation status if the latter restricted the right of emigration.

It is clear that the Gorbachev administration has not "*drawn lessons from the decisions taken by the US*".

To get a clear picture of the economic content of *perestroika*, it is not enough to confine ourselves to official Party documents and the reports and speeches of Mikhail Gorbachev, which for the most part express the economic content of *perestroika* in contradictory, not to say mutually self-annihilatory and confusing, terms. It is as though these documents and speeches are written by two hands and by two sets of persons unable to reach any agreement. Each sentence glorifying the advantages of socialism is balanced by a sentence bemoaning the tragedy of socialism; each pronouncement in favour of the strength of the planned socialist economy is countered by a pronouncement outlining the disasters consequent upon the operation of the planned economy; it is maintained on the one hand that the centrally-planned economy must not be jettisoned, and on the other that a market economy must be introduced. And the absurd conclusion is reached that the Soviet Union must introduce a regulated or planned market economy. Gorbachev leadership, with an eye to the Soviet working class and the collectivised peasantry, both of whom have benefited so enormously from the

building of socialism under the centrally-planned economy, have had to tread very carefully, uttering phrases in praise of socialism to assure the Soviet people and to assuage their apprehensions, while getting on with the job of introducing on a vast scale capitalist norms of production.

One must therefore consider the Party documents and Gorbachev's reports and speeches in conjunction with the writings of the so-called reforming intelligentsia, who are much more candid and bold in what they say. And much more bold than the revisionist economic theoreticians of the late 50s and 60s. No doubt their candour and boldness is at times embarrassing to Gorbachev, and at times he is obliged to distance himself from these people, but of two things we are absolutely certain:

First, what the 'reforming' intelligentsia said yesterday, Gorbachev is bound to follow tomorrow - that is, if the Soviet working class does not stop him. It is as though the reforming intelligentsia were Gorbachev's team of scouts for reconnoitring and softening up the opposition to the planned (excuse the tragic pun) reforms.

Secondly, this intelligentsia, who occupy very high positions in the most prestigious economic and other institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, are not just a collection of individuals, but representatives of a significant minority of the population, who would stand to gain enormously at the expense of the working class and the vast majority of the population from the introduction of a market economy. The reforming intelligentsia have little in common with the Soviet working class and should therefore be correctly characterised as neo-bourgeois. This is not to say that there are no revolutionary intelligentsia in the USSR, but it is not the revolutionaries who are making the running at the present time.

What emerges from a study of all the materials is that the reforms are aimed at introducing a market economy, which in turn would involve the complete dismantling of the centrally-planned economy; wholesale de-nationalisation of state property; break-up of collective farms; relaxation of the state monopoly of foreign trade; joint ventures with foreign capitalist companies; establishment of a stock exchange and commodity exchanges; instituting private co-operatives; removing restrictions on the hire of labour by private entrepreneurs; closing unprofitable concerns; disciplining workers through large-scale unemployment; raising prices of essential commodities; increasing wage differentials. In short, what is intended is not, contrary to official assertions, the reform of management mechanisms, but a

change in the very relations of production. The reforms, if carried out, would end in the final replacement of socialist property relations by capitalist property relations by totally demolishing the three pillars of socialism, viz., the public ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange; centrally-planned economy; and the state monopoly of trade. It is a most reactionary, retrogressive, attempt which seeks to negate the gains of the Soviet working class over the last seven decades - an attempt which, we hope, the Soviet working class will not allow to succeed.

Gorbachev's June 1987 Report

The content of the Soviet economic reforms can be gleaned from Gorbachev's report of 25 June 1987 to a plenum of the central committee. He said:

"The restructuring was started on the initiative of the Party and is carried out under its guidance. The Party has roused the country, its ideas have captivated millions of people, it has engendered tremendous hopes" (p. 12).

The report claims that the reforms will help the USSR to renew all aspects of Soviet society and its virtual transformation. The document produced by the Plenum on restructuring summarises the tasks as follows:

"The CPSU Central Committee believes the main political task of the Party in the economic field is to carry out a radical reform and create a streamlined, effective, and flexible system of management, making it possible to make maximum use of the advantages of socialism.

"The radical reform of managing the country's economy is directed at ...

-Turning scientific and technological progress into the main factor of economic growth;

-Ensuring balance, overcoming shortages of material resources, consumer goods and services that obstruct efficient management and intensification of production;

-Giving the consumer priority in economic relations, rights and possibilities of economic choice;

-Creating a reliably operating cost-restricting mechanism for the functioning of the national economy ...

"The essence of the radical restructuring ... is the transition from predominantly administrative to economic methods of management at all levels ...

[and] *an extensive democratisation of management ...* " (*Basic Provisions for Radical Restructuring of Economic Management, Pravda, 27 June 1987*). (Our emphasis: this is a code expression for dismantling the centralised planned socialist economy and replacing it with a market economy).

Gorbachev, in his report, says that changing the economy entails "*a drastic extension in the margins of independence*" of state enterprises, a transition to "*full-scale profit-and-loss accounting and self-financing*", "*radically restructuring centralised economic management*" by relieving the centre of "*interference in day-to-day activities of subordinate economic bodies*". Further, "*a cardinal reform in planning, pricing, financing and crediting*" is to be effected with the aim of creating a "*transition to wholesale trade in productive goods*". And, finally, the reforms have the declared aims of effecting a transition from "*an excessively centralised, command system of management to a democratic one*" (All the above quotations are from Gorbachev's June 1987 Report, p. 43).

Although the plenum document assures us:

"The Central Committee of the CPSU point out that the planned management of the economy as a single national economic complex is the major gain and advantage of the socialist economic system and the main instrument of the realisation of the Party's economic policy" (Basic Provisions, etc.p.6) The passage of time since then has proven that these measures were aimed at a wholesale decentralisation of the economy by jettisoning centralised planning.

Attacking the system of subsidies, Gorbachev, in his report to the 19th Conference of the CPSU in June 1988, says that it is "*not a normal situation. It undermines the incentives for the producing products, and gives rise to a wasteful attitude especially towards bread. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to resolve this problem no matter how difficult it may be and no matter what doubt and fears it may create at first glance*". (p.22).

In other words, the prices of essential consumer goods, especially of bread, must be raised. No matter what the consequences may be. Well, we already know the reactions of the Soviet working class, who emptied shops of their two months' supplies in a matter of 2 days in anticipation of price rises, not to mention the coalminers' strike in the Summer of 1989, which was a striking (pardon the pun) demonstration of the lack of confidence on the part of the Soviet working class in the programme of economic reforms being pushed through by the present leadership.

Gorbachev laments that "*the employees' incomes do not depend on the end results of the collectives' work*" and goes on to say that "*employees' incomes must strictly depend on end production results, on profits*". (*Perestroika* pp. 85-86 - our emphasis).

The same point is pressed home even further in his June 1988 Report, in which Gorbachev speaks of the "*Khozraschot principles of running the economy [i.e., complete operational autonomy], which make it possible to link not only earnings, but also the satisfaction of social requirements, with the work contribution of a person*" (p.43).

Does it mean - can it possibly mean anything else? - that social security payments and other benefits to be paid to the unemployed victims of these reforms will be related to the work contribution of the recipients?

Aganbegyan too sees the problem in the same light: "*To make the basic wage dependent on results is the key problem*" (*The Challenge*, p.162).

The message is clear. Unprofitable enterprises must be shut, no matter what the consequences; unemployment, which cannot be avoided with the best will in the world while pursuing such a policy, must be accepted as normal; and wage differentials must be further exacerbated, for the impact of payment according to results alone will be just such. And all the indications are that the skilled sections of the working class, not to mention the vast layers of the intelligentsia, party and government officials, will gain preponderantly over the unskilled and manual sections. In this regard the following sentence in Aganbegyan's book has an ominous ring to it:

"*In the light of the requirements of the new technology, the decline of the occupational prestige of skilled engineers is unacceptable*" (*The Challenge*, p.162).

In a staggering attempt to initiate the privatising of the housing sector, Gorbachev, in his 1988 Report, speaks in the following tender terms:

"*Many proposals on letting people pay the state the cost of their flats so as to be able to leave them to their heirs, seems to be reasonable as well*" (op. cit. p. 14).

The reasonableness of such proposals depend on one's class position. Certainly from a proletarian standpoint such proposals, if implemented, would be a most retrogressive step after more than 60 years of socialism. It would not only be an implicit slur that socialism cannot solve the housing problem, but an introduction of capitalist private property, which nowhere

in the world has solved the housing question. In capitalist countries multiple house ownership by the rich is only matched by the homelessness of millions of poor people, the palaces of the rich are only reflected in the cramped quarters of the workers in working-class districts

Belittling Socialism and Equating Efficiency with Capitalism

At every opportunity attempts are made to knock down, denigrate and belittle socialist planning: "*to expect that the state planning committee will be able to trace all inter-sectoral loans and choose an optimum variant is to harbour an illusion*" (*Perestroika*, p.42). From the top political leadership, from Gorbachev and his close associates in the Party, as well as that section of the intelligentsia who are, to use the memorable words of Nina Andreyeva, being influenced by "*the preachings of the 'democratic' charms of present-day capitalism and fawning over its achievements, real and imagined*", one hears an endless tale of misery and misfortune brought on the Soviet people by the centrally-planned economy (the so-called administrative command economy) and a rising crescendo of praise in favour of the system of "*economic methods of management*" (i.e., a market economy). A ceaseless campaign has been going on for several years, particularly since 1987, to equate inefficiency with socialism and a planned socialist economy, while efficiency has become synonymous with the free market, viz., capitalism.

Here is yet another example. Mr V.L. Makarov, director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, wrote a review of Ed Hewett's book, *Reforming the Soviet Economy*, published in 1988 by the Brookings Institution. Makarov's review appeared in the *New York Times* Book Review, under the title "*Two Views*", on May 29, 1988. Hewett's thesis is summed up in the subtitle of his book: "*Equality versus efficiency*". He argues that the socialist system is inherently inefficient because it aims to achieve equality. Therefore, he continues, the recent retardation in the growth rate of the Soviet economy is to be explained by its centrally-planned, socialist economy. His conclusion is that Soviet reforms do not go far enough in introducing market mechanisms, without whose introduction the retardation in the rate of growth cannot be checked, let alone achieving higher rates of growth.

Before ourselves dealing with Hewett's thesis, it would be interesting for the reader to know how our highly-placed 'Soviet' economist responds to

Hewett in explaining the decline in growth of the Soviet economy during the last 15 years. This is what he has to say:

"From 1928 to 1955 the rate of growth of the Soviet economy was relatively high (between 5 and 10 percent a year) and during that time the Soviet Union became the second greatest power in the world from an economic point of view. At the same time there were marked advances in the social and economic lives of the people; they could be assured of economic security, full employment, certainty about income levels. It seemed to us that we had achieved everything we could desire.

"But there was a weakening of the factors that contribute to long-run economic growth. During the last 15 or 20 years the rate of growth slowed down steadily; the quality and variety of consumer goods deteriorated; people became increasingly indifferent to political and economic life and there were fewer incentives for them to work hard or become involved in difficult initiatives. That was also a period when information was becoming rapidly available through the growth of modern communications. People in the Soviet Union became much more aware of conditions in the rest of the world and it was no longer possible to maintain the closed position of Soviet society. As Mr Gorbachev has said, this was a precrisis and prerevolutionary situation." (p.4).

While in the first paragraph cited above, Makarov is obliged to admit the spectacular growth between 1928 and 1955 of the Soviet economy and the "marked advances" of the Soviet people in the economic and social spheres, with the assured "economic security, full employment, certainty about income levels" that these advances guaranteed, in the paragraph immediately following he utters the most vile and unspeakable gibberish which is offensive to truth and decency alike. Far from explaining why the rate of growth of the Soviet economy has slowed down, why is there a shortage of good-quality consumer goods, why is there increasing indifference to political and economic life and on the part of which classes or sections of the Soviet population, Mr Makarov merely makes vulgar assertions, worthy of a bourgeois economist, to the effect that there are fewer incentives to work in the USSR and that the USSR is a closed society. While such a position, he continues, could be maintained up to the mid-1970s, it became increasingly impossible to do so in the face of a complete revolution in information technology which made the Soviet people "more aware of condi-

tions in the rest of the world", and this, he says following Gorbachev was "a precrisis and prerevolutionary situation."

The conclusion, albeit unstated, is that at long last the Soviet people are learning about the inherent strength of the market economy, with its wonderful concomitants of capitalist exploitation and imperialist oppression; that they are beginning to understand that socialism, while it may have served well at the earlier stage when the Soviet economy was not very well developed, is inherently incapable of efficiently running and advancing it; that only market mechanisms can guarantee the smooth and efficient running of a complex economy such as the Soviet economy; the Soviet Union must, therefore, jettison its socialist centrally-planned economy and make way for a market economy. And if that brings in more incentives, greater differentials in earnings, unemployment, economic insecurity, uncertainty about income levels, increasing privatisation of all sectors of the Soviet economy, break-up of collective farms, the chaos of the market, then so be it.

It is word for word a repetition of what has for decades been said by the ideologues of imperialism. It is a sad, if shameful, fact that it is being said by a highly-placed official at the once- prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences.

Sad or not, we still have to deal with Makarov's, and by implication Hewett's, assertions, which will not withstand the light of historical truth. First, Makarov does not, nor does Hewett, explain why some sectors of the Soviet economy perform so spectacularly while other do not. According to Hewett, the Soviet Union "produces a titanium-hulled alpha-class submarine that goes faster and deeper than any submarine in the world", adding that it has "one of the world's largest gas distribution systems by relying on domestically produced compressors and turbines and all of this realised ahead of schedule despite the US administration's best efforts to delay construction" (Hewett, op. cit. pp 32-33).

He goes on: "With its own technology the Soviet Union has sent remote-operated machinery to the moon, established and maintained a working space station, drilled the deepest oil wells in the world, and developed a technology for producing continuous cast aluminium that the US defence contractors have purchased" (ibid.)

"More important", adds Mr Hewett, "over last quarter of a century it has moved from a position of distinct strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the US to one of at least parity, if not superiority" (ibid).

Well! How is it possible for the USSR, with all the alleged encumbrances and obstacles of the socialist system of economy, to make such spectacular advances in the field of space science, and in gas, drilling, nuclear, space and defence technology? Hewett, to give credit to this openly bourgeois expert, at least admits occasionally that this is due to the "strength of the system" (p.170). But our disguised bourgeois expert, to wit, Makarov, to his eternal shame, can't even make such an obvious admission, so much is he under the spell of the charms of present-day 'democratic' capitalism and so much does he fawn over its achievements, real or imagined.

Secondly, as is admitted on all sides, it is the rate of growth of the Soviet economy that has declined and not its absolute growth. Since 1929, the year the first Five-Year Plan was introduced, the Soviet economy has achieved phenomenal growth. There has not been a single year in which the Soviet economy experienced contraction or retrenchment.¹ There is not a single capitalist country in the world which could make such a boast. This fact alone is indicative of the inherent strength of a centrally-planned socialist economy on the one hand, and of the inherent weakness of the capitalist system of economy - the market economy - on the other hand.

Thirdly, it is much harder to maintain the earlier rate of growth as the economy develops, as the rate of increase has to be computed on a much larger base. This is particularly so in the conditions of an imperialist economic blockade and an imperialist-inspired and imperialist-led arms race, factors which are completely ignored by Makarov in his review.

Fourthly, Makarov advances the argument, by way of explaining the decline in growth rate, that "people became indifferent to political and economic life". But he does not explain who these "people" are and what sections of the population they represent. Is it the working class or the upper stratum of the intelligentsia, with its bourgeois aspirations, which has become indifferent to political and economic life? Is it the former or the latter which has suffered an erosion of socialist morality, socialist solidarity and co-oper-

¹ This was true at the time of writing this article, namely June-July, 1990

ation, and socialist initiative? Is it the former or the latter that is clamouring for the replacement of socialist solidarity by individual bourgeois greed and acquisitiveness, greater material incentives and income differentials? Makarov does not offer any evidence to prove that it is the working class which has become indifferent to political and economic life, for if it had it would be impossible to imagine, let alone achieve, the remarkable successes achieved by the Soviet Union in the areas of the economy in which its performance has impressed even bourgeois critics of the Soviet Union, to wit, gas distribution, nuclear and space technology, etc.

Fifthly, Makarov is unable to prove that greater incentives and differentials would cure the decline in growth rate. Incentives are not new to the Soviet economy. They were used in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, and to very good effect. But as the socialist economy develops, the need is to reduce these incentives and income differentials for without narrowing income differentials it is impossible to move from the lower, first, stage of communism (generally referred to as socialism) to the higher, second, stage of communism, in which the formula "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work" (which is characteristic of the lower stage) will be replaced by the formula "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs". But such a tremendous change in the criterion for distribution cannot take place overnight; it has to be worked for consciously and consistently in that direction. Makarov wants Soviet society to move in the opposite direction, that is, he does not want merely to arrest the march of Soviet society in the direction of the higher stage of communism; he desires in fact to abandon that goal and move backward in the opposite direction which leads, if through various twists and turns, through alleyways, on to the broad highway of a capitalist economy. This question is too important, and too complex, to be dealt with in a small article. We shall therefore return to in the next issue and endeavour to show that the Makarov diagnosis is faulty to the core and that the solutions offered by him and by other proponents of the Soviet economic reforms offer nothing but misery to the vast masses of the Soviet people, while conferring huge benefits on a privileged small section of Soviet society, in particular that portion of the intelligentsia which is the most ardent advocate and vociferous supporter of the economic reforms currently being proposed and implemented in the USSR. Certainly, by all accounts, the overwhelming majority of the Soviet people have no stomach for them. That is why the Soviet authorities dare not put their package of reforms to the test of a referendum as they had promised to begin with.

Finally, Makarov says that with the revolution in information technology, the Soviet people "*became much more aware of the conditions in the rest of the world*". It is a pity that this information technology has not brought awareness "*of the conditions in the rest of the world*" to Mr Makarov. Which world is he talking about? Has he, for instance, in mind the majority of the countries in the vast continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America whose people are oppressed and super-exploited by a tiny handful of imperialist countries, who have used the scientific technological revolution to intensify further still this super-exploitation - or has he in mind the latter group, a tiny minority of countries, who grow fat by literally driving tens of millions of people every year into premature death through disease, malnutrition, hunger and poverty? One has only to pose this question to be convinced that Makarov has the latter, tiny, category in mind. He wants to follow the road to a market economy even if that were to involve the USSR in joining this tiny group in plundering the vast masses in the so-called third world - a prospect that must make Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin shudder in their graves - and of course all in the name of Marxism-Leninism.

All in all, Makarov's thesis is only a prelude to saying, in the fashion of other neo-bourgeois economists in the USSR whom we shall meet shortly, that the Soviet working class has become indolent and indifferent to economic life; that, therefore, it should be shaken out of this indolence and indifference through the application of such economic mechanisms as unemployment. In short, the Soviet working class should be made to produce more and more through intimidation and subjection to the threat of hunger and starvation in the manner characteristic of capitalist economies.

Chapter 3

LALKAR

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Economics of perestroika - A complete departure from Marxism-Leninism Part II

In the previous issue (June-July), we began the discussion of the proposed Soviet economic reforms and emphasised that these reforms, if carried out, would lead to the replacement of the centrally-planned socialist economy by a market - that is, a capitalist - economy, with its inevitable consequences in the form of unemployment, poverty, great disparity in wealth and cyclically recurring crises of production. In this regard we presented the arguments advanced by Gorbachev as well as some academics in favour of these reforms. They all concur, Gorbachev in language more cautious than that used by the academics, that unemployment is a good thing. We concluded our previous article by reference to the thesis put forward by Makarov, a 'Soviet' bourgeois economist.

The Shmelyov Thesis

We continue with the aid of the thesis presented by Nikolai Shmelyov, a bourgeois academic of Makarov's ilk and an economist at the Institute for the US and Canada in Moscow. In an article in the June 1987 issue of the Soviet magazine *Novy Mir*, Shmelyov, who, far from being an isolated individual, is a representative of economic and political thinking of a significant section of the Soviet intelligentsia, presented his views in a manner far more candid, and language far less veiled, than that of Makarov. As a cure for the problems of the Soviet economy, he prescribes a large dose of unemployment, slanders the Soviet working class as a bunch of indolent slothful drunks, dismisses the burden of military expenditure imposed by the imperialist-led arms race as though it was of no significance, characterises the laws governing society as "*objective laws of economic development*" for all time, equates Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) with the advance of

socialism, advocates a return to capitalism and the de-collectivisation of agriculture.

Unemployment as the only cure

Shmelyov is irreconcilably opposed to full employment, which had hitherto been rightly regarded as one of the precious jewels in the crown of socialist achievement. This is how he chooses to formulate his stance:

"We must also not close our eyes to the economic harm that results from our parasitical certainty of guarantee of full employment."

Hitherto full employment in the conditions of working-class power and working-class ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, had been quite correctly regarded as a source of security, initiative and ingenuity on the part of the working class, but from now on, according to this oracle of bourgeois economics, it is to be regarded as being parasitical and productive of harmful results.

And further:

"I think it's clear to everyone that we owe much of today's disorder, drunkenness and shoddy workmanship to overemployment."

Our bourgeois pundit does not produce even a shred of evidence to counter the generally known truth in the capitalist world that it is unemployment, not overemployment, which is a great source of drunkenness and social disorder.

Continues Shmelyov:

"We should have a businesslike and unflinching discussion of what the benefits might be from a relatively small reserve work force (one that the state would not entirely abandon to the whims of fate, of course)."

And further:

"A real danger of losing one's job and going on temporary unemployment pay, or having to work where one is sent, is rather good medicine against sloth, drunkenness and irresponsibility. Many experts feel that it would be cheaper to pay adequate unemployment compensation for a few months to such temporarily unemployed than it is to keep a lot of loafers in the work force who could scuttle (and are scuttling) any and all economic accountability and any and all efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of social labour".

Shmelyov goes on to slander socialism by invoking the authority of a fellow renegade in economic science:

"The well-known Soviet economist S Shatalin stresses that 'socialism has yet to create a mechanism that ensures not just full employment ... but full employment that is socially and economically effective and rational. Socialist principles are not charity principles that automatically guarantee everyone a job, irrespective of his aptitude for it."

Interestingly this same Shatalin is a member of Gorbachev's Presidential Council. He slanders the Soviet working class as showing signs of an "almost physical degradation" for no other reason than for having a well-founded "scepticism about the possibility of organising economic and social life in a more sensible fashion", i.e., on bourgeois lines. Here is what he has to say on this score:

"Apathy, indifference, theft and lack of respect for honest work are rampant, as is aggressive envy toward those who enjoy high earnings - even in cases where the earnings are honestly come by. There are signs of an almost physical degradation of the Soviet people as a result of drunkenness and sloth. And finally, there is distrust of announced goals and intentions, and scepticism about the possibility of organising economic and social life in a more sensible fashion."

Completely ignoring the burden of military expenditure, which is one of the main causes of the decline in living standards in the USSR and elsewhere, Shmelyov pronounces thus:

"The reason for our difficulties is not merely the heavy burden of military expenditures and the very costly scope of the country's global responsibilities."

Last, but not least, he lets the cat out of the bag with the following 'profound' pronouncement:

"It is the persistent and prolonged attempts to circumvent the objective laws of economic life and to suppress established, age-old work incentives that has ultimately led to results opposite from those being sought" (all the above quotations are from pages 3-5 of Shmelyov's article in *Novy Mir*).

We do not know, and Shmelyov does not enlighten us on this score, the circumvention of which objective laws he is referring to. There is no such thing as objective laws of economic life applicable to all social and economic formations, unless of course one has in mind the economic law, according to which the relations of production must necessarily conform with

the character of productive forces - a law which has for long been forcing its way to the forefront in the capitalist countries and encountering the stubborn resistance of the historically obsolescent forces of society. Other than this, and in accordance with this law, each system of production has its own objective laws. For instance, under capitalism, there exists the law of competition and anarchy of production, arising from the dichotomy between the social character of the productive forces, on the one hand, and their private, capitalistic ownership, on the other hand. Under socialism there arose, in opposition to the law of competition and anarchy of production under capitalism, the law of balanced development of the national economy. As Stalin put it:

"Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, the Soviet government socialised the means of production, made them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied upon it, it could not have accomplished its mission." (Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Peking, 1972, p.6).

But in doing so, the Soviet government had not 'abolished' the old laws or created 'new' laws in place of the old. It simply was the case that in the face of the new economic conditions, the old laws lost their validity and made way for new laws for *"One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man, but which arise from the new economic conditions"* (ibid. p. 4).

With the socialisation of the means of production consequent upon the October Revolution, the law of competition and anarchy of production characteristic of capitalism (with its extraction of surplus value and capitalist accumulation) lost its validity and gave way to the law of the balanced development of the national economy, a law which so infuriates the advocates of bourgeois reforms in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's evasive response to the Shmelyov thesis.

Shmelyov's article caused such a stir that Gorbachev was obliged personally to respond to it. On 22 June 1987, at a meeting in a Moscow electoral district, Gorbachev was questioned by a *Pravda* correspondent about

"controversial materials" in the Soviet press on restructuring. The correspondent asked if recent writings on restructuring gave *"questionable prescriptions for surmounting our difficulties? For example, economist Shmelyov's article in Novy Mir"*.

Gorbachev's answer is characteristically jesuitical and evasive: *"I would divide that article into two parts"*, he says, *"The first is an analysis of the state of affairs in the economy, and it presents a picture that is close to what actually exists and we will talk about it at the plenary session."*

"The second part is what the author proposes. He apparently proposes, for example, that there be unemployment. That is not for us. We are well aware of our weaknesses and unresolved problems, but neither can we forget that socialism has given every one of us the right to work and to an education, free medical service, and accessible housing. These are genuine values in our society which provide social protection for the individual today and for the future". (Pravda, 22 June, 1987).

What is remarkable about Gorbachev's answer is not that he distances himself from Shmelyov's conclusions (his prescriptions), but that he approves of the latter's criticisms, which are inextricably inter-twined with his conclusions. But then, this is not the only time that Gorbachev has distanced himself from his candid and outspoken - not to say brazen - fellow travellers only to continue along the path charted by them. Here is what he said at the end of 1987 in his book *Perestroika*:

"True, the press carried some proposals which went outside our system. There was an opinion, for instance that we ought to give up planned economy and sanction unemployment. We cannot permit this, however, since we aim to strengthen socialism, not replace it with a different system. What is offered to us from the West, from a different economy, is unacceptable to us. We are sure that if we really put into effect the potential of socialism, if we adhere to its basic principles, if we take fully into consideration human interests and use the benefits of a planned economy, socialism can achieve much more than capitalism." (p.86).

Since these assurances were given - barely two years ago - the centrally-planned economy has virtually been dismantled and the much-vaunted 'regulated' economy, after which Gorbachev and his slick associates, the Aganbegyans, the Makarovs and the Shmelyovs, pant as the hart pants after clean water, has not been instituted - thanks to the stiff opposition from the rank and file within the CPSU and the working class in the USSR. In fact

the economy of the USSR has never been in such a mess since the early '20s of this century. Gorbachev's attempts to distance himself from the Shmelyovs and his assurances about wanting to reject unemployment and "put into effect the potential of socialism" turn out to be mere devices for lulling the Simple Simons of this world into a false sense of security. The proposals submitted to Soviet parliament - and rejected - in May 1990 are an eloquent proof of this.

Let us return to Shmelyov.

Advocacy of capitalist restoration.

That Shmelyov has in mind nothing but the restoration of capitalism in the USSR is clear from his denunciations of the 'administered' economy and his advocacy of the re-introduction of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). These are the terms in which he denounces the building of socialism in the USSR and expresses a passionate desire for the reversion to capitalist norms of economic life:

"If we do not admit that the rejection of Lenin's New Economic Policy imposed severe difficulties on the building of socialism in the USSR, we will doom ourselves once again - as in 1953 and 1965 - to half-measures, and half-measures, as we know, are often worse than no measures at all. The 'administered' economy that replaced the NEP was by its very nature unable to address questions of quality and efficiency and achieved its quantitative results in spite of the laws of economics, and therefore at great cost in material and human resources" (ibid. p.1).

The above remarks are not only full of innuendo against the centrally-planned socialist economy in the USSR which, it is alleged, is inherently incapable of addressing "questions of quality and efficiency", but is a downright falsification of the truth and of Lenin's views on the New Economic Policy (NEP). The author is making the assertion that the NEP should never have been discontinued; that only through the indefinitely continued application of the NEP could the Soviet Union have successfully built socialism; that the abandoning of the NEP and its replacement by the centrally-planned economy ('administered' economy if it pleases our bourgeois reformist) was nothing short of a violation "of the laws of economics" - a violation that cost so dearly in "material and human resources", a violation which, somehow mysteriously and inexplicably, nevertheless did not stand in the way of great quantitative results. This bourgeois cretin is unable to explain the efficiency

with which the Soviet Union has produced results of unexampled quality in the field of armaments, space and nuclear technology, gas distribution and off-shore drilling, etc. Presently, however, let us return to the question of how Lenin viewed the NEP.

The NEP and how Lenin viewed it

The turn from war communism to NEP was put into effect by the 10th Party Congress (March 1921) which at Lenin's prompting passed a resolution substituting a tax in kind for the surplus appropriation system. The tax in kind was to be much lighter than the assessments under the surplus-appropriation system. The total amount of tax was to be announced each year before the spring sowing and the dates of delivery to be strictly specified. All produce in excess of the tax was to be the farmer's who was to be at liberty to sell this surplus in the market. Lenin recognised that the freedom of trade would at first lead to a certain revival of capitalism; that it would be necessary to allow private trade and private manufacturers to open small businesses. But this, argued Lenin, was necessary to give the peasant an economic incentive to produce more and thus effect rapid improvement in agriculture. This in turn, he elaborated, would become the basis for the restoration of state-owned industries and the displacement of private capital. Having accumulated strength and resources, a powerful industry could be created as the economic foundation of socialism, which in turn could become the basis for a determined offensive against the remnants of capitalism. Such was Lenin's plan for the building of socialism - a plan involving a temporary retreat in order to be able to gain strength and advance with greater vigour in the near future in the direction of socialist construction.

From all the arguments advanced by Lenin on the question of the NEP (and from its subsequent development) three facts emerge clearly:

First that Lenin regarded the introduction of the NEP as a strategic retreat and, to a certain extent, a reversion to capitalism.

Secondly, he viewed this retreat as only temporary. It was for the purpose of strengthening the proletarian dictatorship by ensuring a durable alliance between the working class and the peasantry, which alliance in the prevailing conditions of devastation could only be guaranteed through the exchange of commodities in the market.

Thirdly, both these aspects - the retreat as well as its transient, temporary, nature - were part and parcel of Lenin's brilliantly worked out pro-

gramme for the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. Only elements alien, or hostile, to Marxism-Leninism emphasise one or the other of the above aspects, instead of considering them as an integral whole.

To the extent that the NEP was a retreat involving a certain revival of capitalism, it carried dangers. Lenin, far from minimising these dangers, brought them into the open daylight. Far from lauding capitalist property, trade and commerce, Lenin explained that the NEP had been forced on the Soviet government by the economic dislocation and near disappearance of the Soviet proletariat in the aftermath of the imperialist war, civil war and counter-revolution, notwithstanding the victory of the Soviet Republic. So, the NEP was an economic measure dictated by weakness, aimed not only at restoring the Soviet economy but also at the restoration of the proletariat.

This is how Lenin explained the NEP in the Autumn of 1921 in his report to the Second Congress of Political Education Departments:

"At the beginning of 1918 we expected a period in which peaceful construction would be possible. When the Brest peace was signed it seemed that danger had subsided for a time and that it would be possible to start peaceful construction. But we were mistaken, because in 1918 a real military danger overtook us ... and the outbreak of civil war, which dragged on until 1920. Partly owing to the war problems that overwhelmed us and partly owing to the desperate position in which the Republic found itself when the imperialist war ended - owing to these circumstances, and a number of others, we made the mistake of deciding to go over directly to communist production and distribution. We thought that under the surplus-food appropriation system the peasants would provide us with the required quantity of grain, which we could distribute among the factories and thus achieve communist production and distribution. ...

"That, unfortunately, is a fact. I say unfortunately, because brief experience convinced us that line was wrong, that it ran counter to what we had previously written about the transition from capitalism to socialism, namely, that it would be impossible to bypass the period of socialist accounting and control in approaching even the lower stage of communism. Ever since 1917, when the problem of taking power arose and the Bolsheviks explained it to the whole people, our theoretical literature has been definitely stressing the necessity for a prolonged, complex transition through socialist accounting and control from capitalist society (and the less developed it is the longer the transition will take)

to even one of the approaches to communist society" (V.I. Lenin, Collected Works Volume 33, pp 62-7).

"At that time, when in the heat of the Civil War we had to take the necessary steps in economic organisation, it seemed to have been forgotten. In substance, our New Economic Policy signifies that, having sustained severe defeat on this point, we have started a strategical retreat. We said in effect: 'Before we are completely routed, let us retreat and reorganise everything, but on a firmer basis ...

"The New Economic Policy means substituting a tax for the requisitioning of food; it means reverting to capitalism to a considerable extent - to what extent we do not know. Concessions to foreign capitalists (true, only very few have been accepted, especially when compared with the number we have offered) and leasing enterprises to private capitalists definitely mean restoring capitalism, and this is part and parcel of the New Economic Policy ...

"The issue in the present war is - who will win, who will first take advantage of the situation: the capitalist, whom we are allowing to come in by the door, and even by several doors (and by many doors we are not aware of, and which open without us, and in spite of us), or proletarian state power? ...

"On the other hand, if capitalism gains by it, industrial production will grow, and the proletariat will grow too. The capitalists will gain from our policy and will create an industrial proletariat, which in our country, owing to the war and to the desperate poverty and ruin, has become declassed, i.e., dislodged from its class groove, and has ceased to exist as a proletariat. The proletariat is the class which is engaged in the production of material values in large-scale capitalist industry. Since large-scale capitalist industry has been destroyed, since the factories are at a standstill, the proletariat has disappeared. It has sometimes figured in statistics, but it has not been held together economically.

"The restoration of capitalism would mean the restoration of a proletarian class engaged in the production of socially useful material values in big factories employing machinery..." (ibid. pp.62-66).

Lenin, without in any way mincing words, instead of glamorising capitalism, rightly characterises "anarchic capitalism and anarchic commodity exchange" as the "enemy in our midst", and starkly poses the question: "Who will gain the upper hand?" This is how he poses the question:

"The whole question is who will take the lead? We must face this issue squarely - who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organising first - in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on those gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and to create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the same." (ibid. p.66).

As can be seen from the above, Lenin makes no attempt to glorify the capitalist market or prettify capitalist trade and commerce. On the contrary, he characterises *"anarchic capitalism and anarchic commodity exchange"* as the *"enemy in our midst"*. Lenin never regarded the NEP as anything more than a strategic retreat, designed to give the Soviet regime a breathing space in which to gather strength for the next offensive of socialism.

The majority of the Party rallied round Lenin and supported the introduction of the NEP, recognising that at that time this was the only way of ensuring a durable economic alliance of the working class and the peasantry for the building of socialism. The NEP was a recognition by the Party that war communism had been an attempt to take the capitalist fort in town and country by a frontal assault; that in doing so the Party had gone too far ahead and ran the risk of being cut off from its base. *"In our economic offensive we ran too far ahead, we did not provide ourselves with an adequate base"*, said Lenin in his report to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. So, to secure its rear, the Party decided to make a temporary retreat.

At the time some oppositionists, the 'left' shouters, saw in the NEP nothing but a retreat and a renunciation of the gains of October. Others, the downright capitulators, the Shmelyovs of that time who did not believe in the possibility of building socialism in the USSR, demanded far-reaching concessions to private capital both home and foreign. It was the opposition to the NEP of these two groupings alien to Marxism and Leninism, which caused Lenin to advise that the Party be thoroughly cleansed *"of rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering communists, and of Mensheviks who have retained their 'facade' but who have remained Mensheviks at heart"*.

The correctness of the NEP was proved in the very first year of its introduction and Lenin was able to declare at the Eleventh Party Congress (March 1922):

"For a year we have been retreating. In the name of the Party we must now call a halt. The purpose pursued by the retreat has been achieved. This period is drawing, or has drawn, to a close. Now our purpose is different - to regroup our forces." (Lenin, Volume 33, p.283).

Let Shmelyov and his fellow admirers of capitalism note that it is none other than Lenin himself who, within a year of the introduction of the NEP (which he rightly regarded as a retreat), is calling for a halt, or if it pleases Mr Shmelyov, calling for *"the rejection of Lenin's New Economic Policy"*. And if the rejection of the NEP *"imposed severe difficulties on the building of socialism in the USSR"*, as is the unsubstantiated assertion of Mr Shmelyov, then Lenin must be held responsible for such a misfortune. But Mr Shmelyov has not got the courage - not as yet anyway - to say so. He would rather, in the manner of all *"rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering communists,"* fight against Leninism in the name of Lenin.

Once the NEP had served its purpose of restoring production to pre-First World War levels, establishing the bond between the town and the country and the restoration of the proletariat, the Soviet government brought to an end the NEP period and inaugurated that of planned industrialisation and collectivisation.

To return to Shmelyov's perception of the NEP, this is how he perceives its significance:

"A retreat of sorts it was, of course, but its enduring significance lies elsewhere ... It marked the transition to a system that would mobilise rather than suppress, all of the working people's creative energies - the transition from 'administrative socialism' to 'economic-accountability socialism'. Three practical ideas were central to Lenin's plan for putting the economy on a normal, healthy basis. First, commodity-money and market relations were to be developed. ... Second, economic-accountability trusts, voluntarily organised into associations (syndicates) were to be the economy's basic operating units. Third, cooperative property and cooperative relations were to be developed not merely in the countryside, but in urban areas as well - in industry, construction, retail trade and in what we now call consumer services". (p.2).

Thus, in contrast to Lenin, according to Shmelyov, the *"enduring significance"* of the NEP, which involved a partial revival of capitalism, is that *"marked the transition to a system that would mobilise rather than suppress, all of the working people's creative energies - the transition from 'administrative socialism' to 'economic accountability socialism'"*. The logical and ab-

surd conclusion, albeit unstated, is that only in the conditions of the revival and restoration of capitalism is it possible to build socialism! Only in the conditions of a market economy, as opposed to a centrally-planned socialist economy (beg-your-pardon, an 'administrative' or a 'command' economy), is it possible to *"mobilise rather than suppress all of the working people's creative energies."*

From the contempt with which Shmelyov treats the Soviet workers, accusing them of "sloth", "indolence", "drunkenness", "irresponsibility", "apathy", "lack of respect for honest work" - even as suffering "physical degradation", for no other reason than that they do not want to give up the fruits of full employment under socialism which they have enjoyed for over six decades, it is not difficult to see which "people" he has in mind, and whose "creative energies" will be mobilised rather than suppressed if the Shmelyovs in the USSR succeed in effecting the transition from "administrative socialism" to "economic-accountability socialism", i.e., from socialism to capitalism. These people are none other than the bourgeois intelligentsia in the USSR - the Shmelyovs, Makarovs, Aganbegyans and their counterparts in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Yeltsins, Abalkins and so on and so forth - who are the most ardent advocates of a market economy and who would benefit most from it. The working class of the USSR, knowing that it would lose enormously in a market economy, is naturally not very keen on its introduction.

The reactionary fairy tale concocted by Shmelyov does violence to reality, for the NEP produced in its wake not only the kulaks (rich peasants), but also insatiable profit-mongering traders known as Nepmen. The development of the NEP finally reached a point at which the Soviet government had either to give up the NEP or surrender to capitalist elements generated by it. The Soviet government quite correctly chose the former path and launched its programme of socialist construction with the first five-year plan and the collectivisation drive.

During the course of the implementation of the first and second five-year plans, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government were able to mobilise the creative energies of the Soviet people to such an extent that these plans were not merely fulfilled but overfulfilled in less than the planned five years for each plan. But listening to this bourgeois sniveller, Shmelyov, it would appear that the inauguration of the five-

year plans put an end for all time to the creative energies of the Soviet people.

This vile slander and bourgeois whining does not correspond with the historical reality of the late 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, during which the Soviet people, through feats of heroic socialist labour, broke out of their medieval integument and almost caught up with the most advanced capitalist countries in less than a decade and a half of socialist planning and construction. Had it not been for this truly miraculous speed of construction, thanks to central planning and collectivisation, the USSR would not have been able to lead successfully the fight against Hitlerite Germany. During the war the Soviet Union produced the best war planes, the best tanks, and the most advanced armaments - the material basis for which had been laid in the building of heavy industry, in particular the metallurgical and machine-building industries, during the five-year plans. It is precisely these developments in Soviet industry, which provided the material basis, along with the self-sacrificing heroism of the Soviet people, for the smashing of the Nazi war machine. This fact has been recognised the world over to such an extent that no one has hitherto dared to question it. But now come 'Soviet' bourgeois economists, who, motivated by a desire to restore capitalism, are obliged to denigrate the greatest achievements of socialism and paint the period of socialist construction in the darkest colours.

In early 1921, when the NEP was introduced, the Soviet economy was shattered. The gross output of agriculture was only one half of the pre-war output, that is, one half of the output of the poverty-stricken Russian countryside of Tsarist days. What is worse, there was a harvest failure in many of the provinces.

Matters were far worse on the industrial front. Output of large-scale industry was a mere one seventh of pre-war output. Most mills and factories were at a standstill; mines and collieries were wrecked and flooded. The condition of the iron and steel industry was the gravest of all. The total output of pig iron was only 116,300 tons - a mere 3% of the pre-war output. There was a shortage of fuel, and transport was in a state of dislocation. Stocks of metal and textiles were all but exhausted. There was an acute shortage of such basic necessities as bread, meat, fats, footwear, clothing, salt, matches, kerosene and soap.

People put up with such conditions of scarcity during the war. But now that the war was over, they were no longer prepared to do so. Discontent

began to surface among the peasantry. The fire of civil war had welded and healed the military and political alliance of the working class and the peasantry. The basis of this alliance was that while the peasantry received the protection of the Soviet government against the landlords and the kulaks, the workers received foodstuffs from the peasantry under the surplus-appropriation system.

With the war ending, this basis was no longer adequate. Now that there was no longer any danger of the landlords returning, the peasants began to express dissatisfaction with the surplus-appropriation system and to demand an adequate supply of goods. As Lenin put it, the whole system of war communism had come into collision with the interests of the peasantry. The spirit of discontent began to affect the working class as well. In the conditions of utter economic dislocation, with few factories and mills operating except spasmodically, the workers were reduced to doing odd jobs for a living, making cigarette lighters and engaging in petty bartering for food in the villages ('bag trading'). Hunger and weariness were causing discontent among the workers. The class basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat was being undermined. It was in these dire circumstances that Lenin and the Bolshevik party put into operation the NEP, even though it involved a partial return to capitalism.

In view of the foregoing, is it permissible to compare the USSR of today, which is the second most powerful economy in the world and in which the working class constitute a majority of the population, with that of 1921? Those who now demand, on the pretext of the slowing down of the rate of growth of the Soviet economy, a reversion to the methods of 1921 and the re-introduction of the NEP, are simply advocating the restoration of capitalism pure and simple. Calling it a 'regulated market economy' does not change matters one iota.

Chapter 4

LALKAR

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The Economics of Perestroika A complete departure from Marxism-Leninism Part III

Attempts at de-Collectivisation

While advocating the dismantling of the socialist planned economy and its replacement by a market economy in the field of industry, on the agricultural front Shmelyov's prescription is nothing short of de-collectivisation of Soviet agriculture and its replacement by small-scale individual farming.

"Collective and state farms", he says, "must have the right to sell their output freely to state and cooperative organisations and to consumers ... Personal auxiliary farming must be put fully on a par with collective farming in terms of both economic and social rights". (Shmelyov p.4).

Here Shmelyov is not only calling for personal and collective farming to be put on an equal basis, which would be a reactionary and backward enough step anyway, but also for the introduction of an "unrestricted right" by the collective and state farms "to sell their output freely to state and cooperative organisations and to consumers", which can only lead to unrestricted, boundless and all-embracing commodity production and capitalism in agriculture, albeit through a number of intermediary steps. All these measures advocated by the Shmelyovs, who are, sad to say, running the show and thanks to whom the Soviet economy is on the verge of collapse, are designed to undermine collective farms, the idea being that small commodity economy will surely - if slowly at first - lead to small farms, with their alleged enterprise and individual initiative, supplying abundantly to the Soviet economy. To even think that small farming can solve the food problems of the USSR with its population of 280 million is to indulge in reactionary day-

dreaming. NOWHERE in the world, in countries capitalist or socialist, has small farming solved the food problem. Shmelyov and his ilk need do no more than take a short trip to their next door neighbour, Poland, and see for themselves the wondrous consequences of small farming: in Poland, following the 1956 rebellion, collectivisation was abolished and small peasant farming restored. The result has been to produce perennial shortages of food, which are notorious enough not to have escaped even the blinkered vision of the Shmelyovs of our world. But these bourgeois economists don't give a damn about food shortages and the misery such shortages visit on ordinary working people. They are so passionately and single-mindedly engaged in the attempts at restoring capitalist relations of production in industry and agriculture that they are prepared to overlook such 'minor' inconveniences as the suffering bound to be caused to tens of millions of people consequent upon such restoration, with its resultant exploitation of the many by the few, unemployment, hunger, squalor and misery. On the contrary, they think it rather a good thing for the Soviet working class which, they claim, has degenerated because of the security of full employment. Continues Mr Shmelyov:

"We must finally decide once and for all what is most important to us: to have an abundance of food or to eternally indulge an assortment of irresponsible loudmouths and proponents of equality in poverty. We need to call stupidity, incompetence and active Stalinism by their proper names. We need to do whatever it takes to ensure an ample supply of foodstuffs, for without that the idea of activating the human factor will go nowhere" (ibid).

In ordinary language, the meaning of the above-quoted remarks boils down to the following:

First, only privatised market-oriented agriculture can ensure an abundant supply of food. Secondly, that the struggle of the proletariat to do away with exploitation, its struggle for equality through the abolition of classes, its struggle to traverse in the direction of the higher phase of communism by reducing disparity, is tantamount to a struggle for *"equality in poverty"*. And finally, anyone who disagrees with these two propositions is guilty of *"stupidity"*, *"incompetence"* and *"Stalinism"*! We know what motivates the bourgeois all over the world, not just the bourgeois intelligentsia in the USSR, when they lump together stupidity, incompetence and Stalinism; we know why the bourgeoisie and its hired ideologues the world over hurl with malicious glee such epithets at Joseph Stalin and accuse him of all sorts

of alleged crimes. We shall, however, resist the temptation of going into this question which, keeping to our promise in the very first article in the present series, we shall deal with last. One thing is clear though. When Mr Shmelyov talks of *"activating the human factor"* to *"ensure an ample supply of foodstuffs"*, he is advocating a return to the NEP days through the dismemberment and abolition of collective and state farms. He goes on to say that *"at one time the elimination of the kulaks was put forward as a motto"*, but, he laments, what was abolished was the peasantry. How can anyone, whatever his views, capitalist or communist, go along with such a stupid assertion? It is certainly true that the kulaks, - these *"bloodsuckers"*, to use Lenin's description of them - the rich peasants, were eliminated as a class. It is also true that by and large individual farming was reduced to an insignificant position and accounted for no more than one per cent of the sown area at the end of collectivisation in 1938. But how can one assert, as does Shmelyov, that the peasantry was abolished? The peasantry was collectivised and continues to exist very much as a class even today. Thus we are forced to the conclusion that when Shmelyov and his fellow capitalist restorationists lament the alleged elimination of the peasantry, they are only mourning the passing away of their much-beloved kulaks. No doubt they would describe the elimination of the kulaks as yet another instance of an attempt *"to circumvent the objective laws of economic life and to suppress established, age-old work incentives that has ultimately led to results opposite of those being sought,"* yet another example of *"incompetence"*, *"stupidity"* and *"Stalinism."* Of course, those who think that the abolition of kulaks as a class was an act of incompetence and stupidity would naturally go on to hurl this bouquet of abuse at Stalin, for his name, more than that of any other single individual, is associated with this unprecedentedly revolutionary world-historic process. Those who have not reconciled themselves to this process and want to go back to the good old days of exploitation, of rich kulaks and millions upon millions of poor and downtrodden peasants, to the miserable life in the Russian countryside so beautifully portrayed in the works of Tolstoy, have every reason to show extreme hostility to Joseph Stalin, one of the foremost architects of the victory of socialism in the USSR generally and in the Soviet countryside particularly. Shmelyov is one of those persons. That is why his prescription for ridding Soviet agriculture of its shortcomings - and there are some serious ones - and ensuring an abundant supply of foodstuffs, is a reversion to individual small farming, leading eventually to a wide differentiation among the peasantry and, guess what, the emergence of the kulak

class and its concomitant, the mass of downtrodden poor peasantry. For if capitalist commodity relations prevail and are given free rein, as is being demanded by the Shmelyovs in the USSR, no force on earth can stop the emergence of the kulak class, the gobbling up by the latter of the vast mass of the peasantry, and thus achieving the 'collectivisation' of agriculture on a capitalist basis. This is what has happened in the foremost capitalist countries. Since the United States is the model of the Shmelyovs of the USSR, the magnet to which they are inexorably attracted, we too shall take it as an example.

What has happened to the proud, independent, peasantry of mid- 19th century USA? Well, it has virtually disappeared, notwithstanding the individual initiative, enterprise and hard work that were doubtless its characteristics. It has been swallowed up by finance capital, by gargantuan agribusiness syndicates and cartels, by the giant chemical and high-tech industries engaged in the manufacture of fertilizers and pharmaceuticals. This is what Mr Robert K Landers, an authority on US agriculture, has to say on this score:

"Large and very large farms constitute less than 5 percent of all US farms, yet account for more than half of total gross farm income and for more than four-fifths of net income. Indeed, the very large farms (those with annual gross sales of \$500,000 or more), although only a bit more than 1 percent of all farms, account for one-third of gross farm income and more than three-fifths of net income". (Should Family Farms be Saved? Congressional Quarterly's Research Reports, Washington 1988, Vol 1, no 17 page 237.

Clear we think. If this is the end product desired by them it is only fair that Mr Shmelyov and his supporters should say so openly, instead of hiding behind the small farmer with his much vaunted enterprise and individual initiative. They should boldly bring into the broad light of day their programme of capitalist restoration instead of maintaining the pretence of criticising the "administrative-command" system. In any case, attacks on the so-called "administrative-command" economy, as we know only too well, are just a disguised, not to say dishonest, attempt to discredit the planned socialist economy and its achievements with the aim of reversing the process and reverting back to capitalism.

If Shmelyov wrote in a relatively guarded tone - though it was far less guarded than that of Gorbachev - that is because it was back in June 1987. In the intervening three and a half years, the process of dismantling the

planned socialist economy and introducing bourgeois norms has accelerated far beyond our imagination at the time. With each passing day, emboldened by the reactionary march backwards under *perestroika* and the anti-communist propaganda let loose by the one-sided policy of *glasnost*, which ties revolutionaries hand and foot and gags them but lets the neo-bourgeois and capitalist restorationists run berserk, not only the Shmelyovs among the intelligentsia but also their counterparts in the CPSU have become far more candid. If Shmelyov was a lone voice, if he had no support among a considerable section of the intelligentsia who occupy extremely important and high posts in the Soviet administration, and - last but not least - if he had no support among a not inconsiderable number of high functionaries of the CPSU, it would be futile to pay any attention to him and one could ignore him. Alas, this is not the case.

Gorbachev goes over to Shmelyov.

Gorbachev, who back in June 1987, while agreeing with Shmelyov's analysis, found it expedient to distance himself from the latter's solutions - this same Gorbachev went completely over to Shmelyov's prescriptions in his speech a year later (June 1988) to the 19th Party Conference, and following it, in his report to the central committee of the CPSU on 29 July 1988. It is very revealing what Gorbachev has to say on the food front and Soviet agriculture. To improve the situation in the area of food, Gorbachev says that "our greatest reserve lies in stopping losses, fully preserving harvests and livestock products, and securing their high-quality processing". He goes on to add: "This is the shortest way to improving food supplies in the immediate future. Resolving this issue will enable us to increase food stocks by at least 15 to 20 per cent. All this will require much less time and inputs than building up production. Investments in eliminating losses and produce processing are the most profitable and most effective ones. Our whole society must get to work on this problem." (July 29, 1990, Speech to the Central Committee of the CPSU).

So far so good. One would have thought that in the two and a half years that have elapsed since Gorbachev's July 1988 report, his administration would have been able to galvanise itself for the task and mobilise millions of collective farms for this extremely important task, particularly in view of the fact that the USSR spends close to a third of its scarce foreign hard currency resources in importing close to 40 million tonnes of food annually.

And what is more, to accomplish this task there is no need to "change economic relations in the village", no need to decollectivise agriculture. But it would appear that those who are at the helm of the ship of the Soviet state are not too bothered about eliminating these losses and colossal waste, that they are not interested in preserving harvests. This year, by all accounts, the USSR had a bumper harvest (and yet we are told that collectivisation has failed to deliver!), but it is not being collected. Can it be that the advocates of restoration of capitalism in the countryside are deliberately sabotaging the harvest collection in their drive to discredit, further than they have hitherto been able, Soviet collectivised agriculture?

Gorbachev and the Question of Collectivisation.

Let us for the present leave the neo-bourgeois 'Soviet' economists and deal with the platform of the Gorbachev leadership. Gorbachev's platform, at least to begin with, was typically opportunistic and eclectic, lacking completely in scientific content, theoretical clarity and ideological consistency and fidelity. In his *Perestroika*, published in 1987 in the USSR, we find contradictory pronouncements - so notoriously typical of him - on the question of agriculture. On the one hand, under the heading 'Lessons of History', there is the following glowing tribute to collectivised Soviet agriculture:

"Or take collectivization. I know how much fiction, speculation and malicious criticism of us go with this term, let alone the process itself. But even many of the objective students of this period of our history do not seem to be able to grasp the importance, need and inevitability of collectivization in our country.

"If we are to take a really truthful and scientific look at the circumstances of the time and the special features of the development of our society, Soviet society; if we do not close our eyes to the extreme backwardness of agricultural production, which had no hope of overcoming this backwardness if it remained small scale and fragmented; if, finally, we try to make a correct assessment of the actual results of collectivization, one simple conclusion is inescapable: collectivization was a great historic act, the most important social change since 1917." (p.40).

Having added the obligatory petty-bourgeois assertion that collectivisation proceeded "painfully, not without serious excesses and blunders in methods and pace", and without attempting, never mind providing the least substantiation of this assertion, Gorbachev continues:

"But further progress for our country would have been impossible without it. Collectivization provided a social basis for updating the agricultural sector of the economy and made it possible to introduce modern farming methods. It ensured productivity growth and an ultimate increase in output which we could not have obtained had the countryside been left untouched in its previous, virtually medieval, state. Furthermore, collectivization released considerable resources and many workers needed in other areas of development in our society, above all in industry.

"Collectivization changed, perhaps not easily and not immediately, the entire way of life of the peasantry, making it possible for them to become a modern, civilised class of society. If it had not been for collectivization, we could not today even think of producing grain in the amount of 200 million tons, not to mention 250 million tons, as are our plans for the near future. Yet, we have already surpassed the total grain output of the Common Market countries taken together, despite the fact that our population is smaller." (ibid.)

Reading the above-quoted remarks, we may be forgiven for drawing the following conclusions:

- (a) that collectivisation in the USSR was a much-needed inevitability;
- (b) that without collectivisation the USSR could not have overcome extreme backwardness of agricultural production;
- (c) that further progress of the USSR would have been impossible in the absence of collectivisation;
- (d) that increased output would have been impossible without collectivisation;
- (e) that collectivisation released considerable human and material resources without which the development of Soviet society in general, and of Soviet industry in particular, would have been impossible;
- (f) that only through collectivisation was it possible for the Soviet peasantry to become a modern, civilised class of society;
- (g) that but for collectivisation, the Soviet Union could not have been in a position to produce 200 million tons of grain, which she does today and which is greater than the total grain output of the EEC, let alone the planned 250 million tons in the near future; and finally
- (h) that collectivisation was a great historic act, the most important social change since 1917.

We wholeheartedly subscribe to this historical assessment of the collectivisation of agriculture in the USSR. There would be no dispute between Gorbachev and ourselves if he stopped there. But he does not. Here is the other side. On page 45 of his book Gorbachev denounces "*the neglect for the rich variety of human interests*" and the "*pronounced egalitarian tendencies*". On page 66 he says that many things "*are unusual in our country now,*" and among these unusual things he lists not only the closure of non-paying plants and factories and the introduction of joint ventures with foreign firms, but also "*wider cooperative activities*" and "*encouragement of individual enterprise in small-scale production and trade*" - thus making it clear that the solution to the problems confronting Soviet industry and agriculture lie through cooperatives and individual small-scale production, an absurd conclusion contradicted by the development of economic life under the conditions of capitalism and socialism. For only large-scale production, in industry and agriculture, is capable of supplying the products needed by society in abundance and at low cost. But Gorbachev, and his equally ignorant advisers in the field of economics, would have us believe otherwise. With this kind of muddled, not to say reactionary, thinking, it is not surprising that the Soviet economy is in the dire straits that it is in today. Equally, it is not surprising that when Gorbachev recently received the Nobel prize, an award given to him by the international bourgeoisie in recognition of his capitulation to imperialism in the field of foreign and domestic policy, Genady Gerasimov, the Soviet government spokesman, reminded journalists that the prize was not for Gorbachev's contribution to economics. "We must remember this was certainly not the Nobel Prize for economics", he said. But let us continue.

Having stated on page 96 that "*we believe that combining personal interests with socialism has still remained the fundamental problem*", he goes on to make the following significant (for its departure from socialism) statement:

"*Today, we have large collective farms and sovkhoses [state farms] in many agricultural areas. Large work teams, sections and complexes have been organised. They are somewhat divorced from the land, and this affects end results. Today, we must ensure a more solid and direct connection with the interests of the individual through collective, family and rental contracts within the framework of these collective and state farms. Then we will combine the advantages of a large collective economy with the individual's interests. This is exactly what we need. If we act in this way we can make impressive strides in solving the problems of foodstuffs within two or three years.*" (page 97).

Evidently, there is a decided shift here from large collective and state farms to family and rental contracts, and with it a shift away from reliance on socialist solidarity to individual acquisitiveness and private greed, for, according to Gorbachev, "*if personal interests are disregarded, nothing will come of the effort, and society will only stand to lose.*" (*ibid.*) And finally, "*it is evident from the example of collectives of contractual and family-run farms how our people have missed the proprietary role.*" (*ibid* page 98).

One has only to place these remarks of Gorbachev's with his earlier tribute to the collectivisation of Soviet agriculture to become convinced of the glaring contradiction between the two. With the passage of time, while the tribute to collectivisation has been pushed into oblivion, statement after statement has followed at a frenzied pace glorifying the advantages of small-scale production in industry and small farming. Earlier we were told that only through large-scale state and collective farms could the USSR have made the kind of world-historic achievements that it did make, including in the agricultural sector. Now - and this after more than six decades of collectivisation - we are told that the USSR can only solve its food problem through private cooperatives and small farming and that all these years "*our people have missed the proprietary role!*" Make any sense of it if you can, reader. Meanwhile, thanks to Gorbachev's new and bourgeois experiments in small farming, the food problem today is worse than it was in 1985 when he came to power - this notwithstanding his above promise in 1987 to solve the "*problem of food stuffs within two or three years*".

The Nineteenth Party Conference

The 19th Party Congress, held in June 1988, marks an important watershed in the unfolding saga of the Gorbachev administration's programme of discrediting the planned socialist economy and replacing it with a market economy. No more the attacks on bureaucracy and overcentralised management, though these still find a mention as cover for smuggling in bourgeois 'reforms'. We find in Gorbachev's speech the candid admission, for the first time, that his reforms were aimed not merely at improving management and administrative structures of state and collective farms, but at changing "*the relations of production on the farms*" - something far more fundamental and affecting the class structure in the Soviet countryside. Let Gorbachev speak:

"In short, comrades, the substance of the current agrarian policy is to change the relations of production on the farms. We must restore the economic balance between town and countryside, and release to the utmost the potential of collective and state farms by promoting diverse contractual and lease arrangements. We must overcome the estrangement between the farmer and the soil."

Back in 1987 we were told that, thanks to collectivisation, the Soviet Union was able to produce more grain (200 million tons) than all the countries of the EEC although the latter had a larger population than the former. This surely could not have been possible if, as is the assertion of Gorbachev, there had been an "estrangement between the farmer and the soil". We had always thought, along with every progressive throughout the world, that the October revolution, by abolishing landlordism and with it the gigantic tribute paid by the peasantry each year to the landlords in the form of ground rent - a tribute which truly alienated the farmer from the soil and impoverished him in the extreme - had put an end to the estrangement between the farmer and the soil. What is more, through collectivisation, in Gorbachev's own words, the October Revolution had made it possible for the Soviet peasantry "to become a modern, civilised class of society." But in June 1988 we hear from the same person, General Secretary Gorbachev, that the October Revolution and collectivisation had produced an estrangement between the soil and the farmer, an estrangement which could only be removed through various private ventures into small farming. Only an eclectic, a double dealer or an advocate of capitalist restoration can make the statement that the "potential of collective and state farms" can only be released through "promoting diverse contractual arrangements," when the fact is that one form undermines the other. Only a malicious bourgeois slanderer can make the statement that collectivisation produced an estrangement between the farmer and the soil.

The July 1988 Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Gorbachev's Report to it.

Gorbachev takes up this theme in earnest in his report to the Central Committee of the CPSU on 29 July 1988, in which he outlines measures to implement the decisions of the 19th Party Conference. Having made the remarks already cited above about the need to eliminate waste and preserve harvests, he goes on to ask "why capital outlays funnelled into agriculture, into

the agrarian sector have failed to pay off as they should, have been put to inefficient use and in many cases simply wasted?" Here is his answer:

The main reason, he says, is "that practical measures to enhance the material foundation of the countryside have not been backed up by corresponding work to change economic relations in the villages". (page 4 in the Supplement to *Moscow News*, No 33 (333), 1988). He goes on:

"Just look at what is being done by people working under family contracts and lease arrangements. Using the same and sometimes even worse facilities, they show incomparably better results."

"Only today I read in 'Selskaya Zhizn' an article about lease farmers in the Stavropol Territory. They work at the Balkovsky State Farm in the Georgiyevsky District. I know that farm. It has difficulty getting along and is always short of hands. Lease farming has made it possible to remedy matters. It turns out that it is even possible to do with fewer machines, yet the results are better. They are taking in crops they have never harvested before. The people's attitude to work is changing - and that is the main thing." (ibid.)

As if to leave no one in doubt, Gorbachev goes on to make the following stark pronouncement: "Doesn't this experience demonstrate that the key to success is in changing the people's attitude to work? This can be only achieved by drastically changing economic relations in the countryside. Our task is to restructure them in such a way as to make the farmer a true master on the land and to enable him to really apply all his energy, knowledge and aptitude on it." (ibid.)

Our understanding had been that the October Revolution and the subsequent collectivisation of agriculture had made the Soviet farmer "a true master on the land" and enabled him "to really apply all his energy, knowledge and aptitude on it". But according to the Gorbachev of July 1988 - as opposed to the Gorbachev of 1987 - this is not the case! Hitherto we had understood, and Gorbachev himself told us so in 1987, that large-scale mechanised state and collective farms had done wonders, made efficient use of machines and human resources, applied the latest achievements of science to agriculture, and released human resources for the development of industry; now, however, we are told by General Secretary Gorbachev, who is never at a loss to invoke the name and authority of Lenin (of which more anon), that small family farms under the contract and lease system are the way not only to solve the food problem but also of reducing the number of machines and personnel needed to do the job! "This means," he says,

"that the personnel problem is being solved as well" This does not make any economic sense to us. But then we have learnt not to expect anything of that sort from Gorbachev.

Gorbachev, in this report, calls for the adoption of a "special law" concerning leases, adding that these leases "should be of a long-term nature and granted for a period, say, of 25-30 and even 50 years. Generally speaking the question should be put as follows: nobody has the right to deny people the possibility of working on a lease contract basis." (ibid.)

Obviously, if the lease contract system were to catch on, with land leased for up to 50 years, the state becomes the nominal or fictional owner of the land while the leaseholder becomes the real owner. With the permission granted, as it has been for the first time since the end of the NEP, for hiring labour, the door is wide open for the break-up of state and collective farms, their replacement by private agriculture and the institution of exploitation of man by man in the Soviet countryside.

Commodity production and commodity circulation continued to exist in the USSR, as Stalin explained,¹ owing to the existence side by side of two forms of property. "...Whereas in industry we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective-farm ownership.... This fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear" (Stalin, *Economics Problems*, p 27).

Emphasising the necessity of moving in the direction of the elimination of all commodity production (and commodity circulation with it), Stalin adds: "It cannot therefore be denied that the disappearance of this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us" (ibid).

But, of course, not all commodity production is capitalist production. As Stalin said: "They are two different things. Capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production. Commodity production leads to capitalism only if there is private ownership of the means of production, if labour power

1 For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Chapter 11, 'The Economics of Class Struggle'.

appears in the market as a commodity which can be bought by the capitalist and exploited in the process of production, and if, consequently, the system of exploitation of wageworkers by capitalists exists in the country. Capitalist production begins when the means of production are concentrated in private hands, and when the workers are bereft of the means of production and are compelled to sell their labour power as a commodity. Without this there is no such thing as capitalist production" (ibid, pp 13-14).

Commodity production therefore could "serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism, bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and elimination of the system of exploitation" (ibid, p 14).

Thus it can be seen, with Stalin, commodity production in the economic conditions of his day had to be tolerated "for a certain period", and it was the endeavour of the CPSU and the Soviet Government to create the economic conditions for the disappearance of commodity production.

With Gorbachev (we shall speak of his predecessors later on in the Chapter 'Economics of Class Struggle'), it is the other way round. Not only must commodity production be expanded on an unprecedented scale, but economic conditions (such as the elimination of social ownership of the means of production and the institution of the system of wage labour and exploitation) must be created which lead this commodity production to capitalism.

Accelerated Attempts to Discredit Collectivisation and the Centrally-Planned Economy.

This theme, that of lease contracting, was further developed by Gorbachev in his speech, broadcast on Soviet television, of October 12, 1988, to a meeting between the members of the Central Committee and managers of state farms, collective farms and agro-industrial enterprises. The conference had been called to discuss the laws concerning the lease contracting of land, which were due to have been presented for approval in February 1989. Gorbachev's speech was understood by the press in the imperialist countries as marking the beginning of the end of collectivised and state agriculture in the USSR. Whether this bourgeois interpretation, hope and ex-

pectation, comes to be realised, only time will tell. One thing is certain though. And this is that the attempts to discredit the system of collective and state agriculture and centrally-planned socialist industry have increased in frequency and in virulence. Matters have reached such a point at the moment that the highest functionaries in the Soviet government no longer bother, apart from the ritual lip service to the alleged aim of strengthening socialism through the introduction of a market economy - an absurdity and a contradiction in terms which it would be hard to beat - to hide their platform and programme for the all-round restoration of capitalism in the USSR. In a remarkably candid interview given earlier this year by Dr Leonid Abalkin (notorious for his plans to Abalkanise the Soviet economy), head of the Soviet Commission for Economic Reform and a Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR, we find, *inter alia*, the following:

"Now a few words about some fundamental provisions of the reform and its concept.

"Firstly, the reform is a radical one. This is no face-lifting of a dilapidated building but a pulling down of the administrative-command system and its replacement with a qualitatively new model for the Socialist economy.

"Secondly, the economic reform can only be effective in conjunction with changes in the political sphere of life.

"Thirdly, the reform concerns the very foundation of the economic system.

"It is designed to renovate the entire totality of ownership relations."

(This interview appeared in the *Morning Star* of 11 May 1990 and was reproduced from *Socialism - Theory and Practice*).

As if to indicate that along with his zeal for restoration of capitalism in the USSR he has also acquired that indispensable tool of bourgeois public relations, to wit, bourgeois duplicity and dishonesty, Dr Abalkin adds:

"Fourthly for all its profundity and dramatic change, the reform aims not at replacing Socialism with any other system but at renovating it. A Socialist choice is the choice made by the people and it operates as a criterion for selecting forms and methods to be used in renovating economic life as a whole" (ibid.)

These remarks bring to mind the following characterisation of bourgeois socialism given by Marx and Engels 140 years ago:

"Bourgeois Socialism attains adequate expression when, and only when, it becomes a mere figure of speech.

"Free trade: for the benefit of the working class. Protective duties: for the benefit of the working class. Prison Reform: for the benefit of the working class. This is the last word and the only seriously meant word of bourgeois socialism.

"It is summed up in the phrase: the bourgeois is a bourgeois - for the benefit of the working class." (Manifesto of the Communist Party).

And Dr Abalkin, our bourgeois 'Soviet' economist, may add: the proposed restoration of capitalism in the USSR is only for the benefit of Socialism.

All the disputes now raging between Gorbachev and Yeltsin supporters concern merely the speed at which the market economy is to be introduced (in 500 days or a longer or shorter period of time), everyone among the restorationists being of one mind on the need "to pull down the administrative command system",

that is, to demolish the centrally-planned socialist economy and replace it with a market economy - with capitalism.

Realising the difficulties in the way of introducing the market economy, partly because of disputes among the capitalist-roaders of various hues and, more importantly, because of the scepticism and downright resistance of the Soviet working class, Abalkin makes this admission:

"As regards a nostalgic yearning for a return to the past, this is acquiring ever increasing numbers of supporters under the impact of the mounting difficulties". (ibid.)

And the difficulties have grown to such proportions that the very scoundrels, the top bourgeois economists, including the notorious Professor Shatalin, who helped Gorbachev produce his plans for bourgeois economic reforms and introducing a market economy, have, in a recent open letter, dissociated themselves from him.

Gorbachev's Personnel and Administrative Changes.

Although Gorbachev was the party secretary for agriculture, he has hardly any achievements in the agricultural field. On becoming the General Secretary of the Party in 1985, he made some administrative and personnel changes. In a fashion reminiscent of Khrushchev, who had moved the Ministry of Agriculture to the rural areas as a means of getting rid of opponents, Gorbachev, for reasons similarly factional, abolished the five key ministries

in the area of food and agriculture, viz, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Fruit and Vegetable Industry, the Ministry of Food Industry, the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry, and the Ministry of Rural Construction - and put them under an all-embracing agency, the State Committee for the Agro-Industrial complex. He also abolished the State Committee for Production and Servicing of Agriculture. All this was done in the name of fighting against bureaucracy and streamlining the administrative machinery with the alleged aim of facilitating and increasing food and other agricultural and dairy products. If changes in personnel and a shake-up of the administrative machine had been a solution, all these changes would have done the trick. But now we know that the change in personnel was motivated by factionalism and a desire to get rid of the staunchest supporters of collectivisation, just as the changes in personnel elsewhere were similarly inspired. Anyone who put up a fight in favour of the maintenance of the centrally-planned socialist economy was unceremoniously and summarily got rid of. Nikolai Baibakov, the chief of GOSPLAN, the planning agency, was removed in 1985; N Gluskov, a former head of GOSKOMPSEN, was removed in 1986 for opposing Gorbachev 'reforms'; N. Patolichev, the former head of the foreign trade department, was removed in 1985 for opposing any departure from the government's monopoly of foreign trade. (See Ed Hewett's *Reform of the Soviet Economy* Washington 1988, page 283).

As a matter of fact, these changes wrought by Gorbachev, far from solving the food problem, only exacerbated it. They were a failure just as were the much earlier Khrushchev reforms. Gorbachev was obliged to admit as much in his speech to the 19th Party Conference, that is, two and a half years after his so-called reforms. He said:

"Let me begin with the food problem, which is probably the most painful and acute problem in the life of our Society."

It is an admission he has had to make on several occasions since then. The food problem today is worse than it has ever been for more than 60 years. There are rumours, how well-founded we do not know, of a famine and an impending catastrophe this winter, while we witness today the shameful spectacle of the mighty Soviet Union and its proud people receiving food parcels from Germany and Scandinavian countries.

New Economic Mechanisms to Replace Old.

Earlier on, in the mid-80s, along with the administrative and political measures, the Gorbachev leadership had begun to replace old economic mechanisms with new. By the 19th Party Conference great emphasis was being placed on the following new economic mechanisms as instruments for increasing food production and reviving agriculture:

First, the institution and development of private cooperatives, which are a collection of individuals (not to be confused with a collective) who come together to cultivate land or establish a small business with a view to making a profit. The land is leased to the agricultural cooperatives by the state and much store is set on releasing individual initiative, enterprise and greed, with the hope of increasing food production. These private cooperatives, far from helping society tackle many problems, as Gorbachev had naively expected them to, have become a haven for rogues and thieves who are using the cooperatives "to legalise their illegal income and acquisitions in a dishonest way". Gorbachev described the situation in vivid terms in his 12 October 1988 speech, already referred to above, to the central committee conference on agriculture. Having stated that the cooperative movement was gaining strength in the country, he goes on to say:

"Not everything is going smoothly. It turned out that some of our cooperators were not among our honest people who are indeed ready to display initiative, quick-wittedness, economic independence, and enterprise, to help society tackle many questions which the large enterprises are not up to ... And it turned out that there were rogues among the cooperators, you know!"

"A kind of public has turned up which, in point of fact, has obtained, in the form of the cooperative, an opportunity to legalise its illegal income and acquisitions in a dishonest way. And now it almost seems that they are going to flourish ... do not think that we do not see it and do not know about it. We do."

He adds the innocent assurance: *"But we are not panicking ... we must find economic levers, to influence this type of phenomena."*

One cannot but be awed by the economic and political nonsense that permeates the above-quoted remarks of Gorbachev. First, he expects the highest sense of civic responsibility and public spiritedness from those who have joined together for the sole purpose of making a profit. He lets loose

on Soviet society the forces of greed and private profit and then expects these forces to help him solve the problems of socialism! Furthermore, he expects small private cooperatives to tackle problems of production "*which the large enterprises are perhaps not up to*" - an expectation which is contradicted by the history of development of agriculture and industry in all countries - capitalist and socialist alike.

Secondly, the family farm (*Zveno*). Family and other small groups may now lease land from the state for up to 50 years. This step backward is being taken in the hope of raising agricultural productivity through the intensification of labour of that very section of the population which is already the victim of overwork. What is more, this method of raising productivity contradicts the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, which place reliance on modern machinery and the latest achievements of science and technology as a means of saving labour and boosting productivity.

Thirdly, contract brigade. These are usually larger than the second, possibly composed of several families. Again, these will farm land rented from the state.

Reliance on greed and small-scale production.

What is common to all the above new mechanisms is, first, emphasis on private initiative, personal profit and greed rather than socialist solidarity as an instrument for stimulating production; secondly, there is the reliance on small units, in industry and agriculture, as a means of increasing productivity of labour rather than the application of science and technology and labour-saving devices to large-scale production. This new emphasis on private profit and small-scale production is a most reactionary and retrogressive development fraught with the most fearful consequences for the Soviet economy and the future of socialism.

Leninism is not the Ideological Source of Gorbachev's Perestroika.

In his book *Perestroika*, Gorbachev makes the assertion that the ideological source of his *perestroika* was none other than Lenin. He says:

"The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity. His very image is an undying example of lofty moral strength, all-round spiritual culture and selfless devotion to the cause of the people and to

socialism. Lenin lives on in the minds and hearts of millions of people ... an interest in Lenin's legacy and a thirst to know him more extensively in the original grew as negative phenomena in society accumulated.

"Turning to Lenin has greatly stimulated the Party and society in their search to find explanations and answers to the questions that have arisen ..."

And again: "We have always learned, and continue to learn, from Lenin's creative approach to the theory and practice of socialist construction. We are using his scientific methods and mastering his art of analysing concrete situations.

"As perestroika continues, we again and again study Lenin's works, especially his last." (p. 45).

Why the last three words - "*especially the last*"? Surely Leninism is not divisible into different articles, works and compartments? It is an indivisible truly revolutionary doctrine, without the guidance of which practice must grope in the dark. But we know why Gorbachev puts such a premium on the last pronouncements of Lenin, which are concerned with the introduction of the NEP and the cooperatives. These pronouncements, which are so replete with brilliantly revolutionary ideas on the building of socialism in the USSR, on advances through necessary retreats, have been so distorted beyond recognition by Gorbachev and his neo-bourgeois acolytes for their own sordid purposes as to be unrecognisable. Because Lenin advocated the development of cooperatives as a means of strengthening socialism in the conditions of those days, private cooperatives must be developed today! This is the mode of reasoning followed by Gorbachev and his ilk in their drive to introduce a market economy by pulling down - by abolishing - the centrally-planned socialist industry and collectivised agriculture. And yet, these people have the cheek to talk about "*Lenin and his ideals of socialism*" being an "*inexhaustible source of creative thought*" for them.

Lenin's views on collectivisation.

For our part, we too, in presenting a critique of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, continue to turn to Lenin who remains, now as in the past, for us a truly "*inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought*" and "*theoretical wealth*." Before closing this already long article, we wish to state very briefly Lenin's views on the importance of the collectivisation of agriculture in connection with the question of building the material foundation of socialism in the countryside. From these pronouncements it will become clear that the fren-

zied howls of the bourgeoisie of all countries, and of their agents in the working-class movement - the Trotskyites, the revisionists, the social-democrats, and reformists and reactionaries of all colours and shades - against collectivisation of agriculture in the USSR are nothing but a disguised - in some cases open - defence of capitalism, or, of its restoration. Here, then, are Lenin's views on this question.

The General Importance of Collectivisation.

Firstly, collectivisation is of tremendous significance from the point of view of the peasantry, for small scale peasant-farming inevitably leads to the ruin, destitution and pauperisation of the overwhelming majority of the peasant population. Here are a few pronouncements of Lenin on this score:

Lenin says: *"There is no escape from poverty for the small farm."*

Lenin says: *"The small-farming system under commodity production cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the masses."*

Lenin says: *"If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin."*

Lenin says: *"Only with the help of common, artel, cooperative labour can we escape from the impasse into which imperialist war has landed us."*

And finally, Lenin says: *"We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms. Otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself."*

(2) Secondly, only through the medium of collectivisation could the working class, which held state power, secure the durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry; only through collectivisation could the working class effectively maintain its leadership of the main mass of the peasantry in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry."

(3) Thirdly, as long as small-scale peasant farming lasted, the danger of restoration of capitalism presented itself as the most real of all dangers, for the *"Soviet regime could not for long continue to rest upon two opposite foun-*

dations: on large-scale socialist industry, which destroys the capitalist elements, and on small, individual peasant farming, which engenders capitalist elements." (Stalin, Collected Works Vol 13 p. 176).

Here is what Lenin has to say on this account:

"As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve final victory."

And further: *"Small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale."*

(4) Fourthly, and lastly, the collective farms are the medium best suited to remoulding the individualist peasantry in the spirit of collectivism, in the spirit of socialism, thereby bringing it closer to the working class; they are the only medium through which the bond between the working class and the peasantry can be strengthened in such a way as to bring the peasantry closer to the working class and thus pave the way for the elimination and abolition of classes. And as Stalin said: *"Whoever does not realise this, or refuses to recognise it, is not a Marxist, not a Leninist, but a 'peasant philosopher', who looks backward instead of forward."* (Collected Works, Vol. 11 p.222).

And why are collective farms the medium most suited to remoulding the peasantry in a collectivist spirit; why are they the medium that paves the way for the abolition of classes? The answer lies in the fact that they establish between the working class and the peasantry a bond which is based on metal, on new technical equipment and on collective labour; and it precisely

such a bond that is required to remould the small tiller. Here is what Comrade Lenin has to say in this context:

"The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity."

Such is the Leninist plan for remoulding the peasantry, for bringing it closer to the working class, and for creating the necessary conditions for the elimination of all classes. This Leninist plan is completely opposed to the silly little reactionary utopias that one hears so often put by 'socialists' who would rather build 'socialism' in the minds of the people without constructing a material base for it. Lenin's plan, on the other hand, shows the only way of remoulding the peasantry, namely, by creating the material conditions necessary for such remoulding. According to Lenin, socialism cannot be built just in the minds of the people, it has to have a material basis to it. It is precisely by ignoring this revolutionary teaching of Lenin's that some 'socialists' are able to criticise collectivisation and industrialisation in the USSR.

The above, then, briefly, is the significance of collectivisation. It can now be clearly seen that those who are opposed to the collectivisation of agriculture are the enemies of the peasantry, enemies of the working class and enemies of socialism and communism.

Equally, it can now be clearly seen that a deep chasm separates this Leninist plan from the reactionary programme put forward by Gorbachev and his supporters.

Nikolai Bukharin opposed collectivisation tooth and nail, his slogan to the *kulaks* was 'get rich', and he assured the Party that the *kulaks* would grow into socialism automatically, without collectivisation. Bukharin's policy was decisively rejected by the Party. Now that the Gorbachev administration wants to break up the collectives and state farms, it is hardly to be surprised at that Bukharin should have been rehabilitated, as he was by Gorbachev in his speech to mark the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution in November 1987 - a topic to which we shall return on another occasion.

Chapter 5

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Glasnost -

A complete departure from Marxism-Leninism

The previous three articles on *Perestroika* were on the question of the economics of *Perestroika*. In these articles it was shown that the economics of *Perestroika* sought to replace the centrally planned socialist economy by a bourgeois market economy. Although much more could have been written on it, enough has been said to reveal the essentials of this, the latest, reactionary plan to restore capitalism in the USSR - the first genuine state of the working class which attracted to itself and inspired revolutionary and toiling masses everywhere.

The present article and the one following it (space will not permit publication in a single issue) are devoted to *Glasnost*, which in the political field performs the same reactionary role as is performed by *Perestroika* in the economic sphere.

Meaning of Glasnost

This innocent-sounding term *glasnost*, which literally means 'openness' in discussion and public affairs, embraces the entire process of bourgeoisification and restoration of capitalism ('democratisation' if you please!) initiated by the Gorbachev clique ever since the latter's accession to the hitherto prestigious position of General Secretary of the CPSU. In the sphere of ideology and politics *glasnost* performs the same function as is being performed by the policy of *perestroika* in the sphere of economics. Just as the economics of *perestroika*, as we have demonstrated in previous articles, is aimed at restoring capitalist relations of production by destroying the centrally-planned socialist economy of the USSR, likewise *glasnost* is aimed at destroying the science of Marxism-Leninism in the political life and institutions of the USSR and replacing it by norms peculiar to bourgeois democracy. That this is the real meaning and content of *glasnost*, as

opposed to its alleged openness, we shall substantiate in the course of what follows. We shall see that *glasnost* is not merely concerned with such silly little things as "everything which is not prohibited by law is allowed" (Gorbachev, *Perestroika* p. 108), or "it is especially important to guarantee the independence of judges" (*ibid.* p. 109), or "It would be worthwhile to designate dates on which the government would reply to questions from deputies and to expand the practice of deputies' inquiries" (*Report to the 19th Party Conference*, p. 56), but with far more fundamental questions such as the role of the party, the relationship of the party to the soviets, a multi-party system, the trade unions, youth and the mass media, the educational system and the arts, and last though not least, the national question. In the name of *glasnost* - this so-called openness and democratisation - a veritable flood of extremely filthy and most reactionary propaganda has been let loose, which aims to sully and malign all that was truly noble, heroic and exalted in Soviet life and history, which aims to belittle Soviet feats in the field of socialist industrialisation and collectivisation, its legendary victories against the onslaught of Hitlerite Nazism, and above all the USSR's self-sacrificing and unstinting internationalist support to the anti-imperialist liberation and proletarian movements the world over. Furthermore, it even questions the world-historic importance of the October Revolution itself, Gorbachev's assurances to the contrary notwithstanding. But, before dealing with all these aspects of this reactionary policy that goes under the deceptive title of *glasnost* ('openness' or 'democratisation'), let us turn to its author, Gorbachev, to find out the reasons behind this policy as well as the meaning given to it by him. With a slippery and eclectic character such as Gorbachev, we have to perfect the art of reading between the lines to get at the truth. We also have to remember that each sentence eulogising Lenin or the achievements of socialism is with Gorbachev merely a prelude to a most determined, if underhand, assault on the tenets of Leninism and the achievements of socialism. Be that as it may, let us turn to Gorbachev, the execrable author of *glasnost*.

Why Glasnost?

Gorbachev characterises "*democratisation [glasnost] as the main motive power of perestroika*" (*Perestroika* p. 63). He continues:

"The main idea of the January [1987] Plenary Meeting [of the Central Committee of the CPSU] as regards ways of accomplishing the tasks of per-

estroika - and protecting society from a repetition of the errors of the past - was the development of democracy. It is the principal guarantee of the irreversibility of perestroika. The more socialist democracy there is, the more socialism we will have. This is our firm conviction, and we will not abandon it. We will promote democracy in the economy, in politics and within the Party itself. The creativity of the masses is the decisive force in perestroika. There is no other, more powerful force." (*ibid.* - our emphasis).

Well, we already know only too well the kind of democracy that has been promoted in the economy and we know very well how this promotion of democracy has wreaked havoc on the mechanism of central planning and brought the Soviet socialist economy close to a collapse. If the promotion of democracy in the economy through *perestroika* is any guide, we can well imagine the disastrous consequences of *glasnost* in the sphere of politics, ideology and the Party itself.

Gorbachev asserts that "*when we seek the roots of today's difficulties and problems we do this in order to comprehend their origin and to draw lessons for present-day life from events that go deep into the 1930s.*" (*ibid.* p.43).

And further:

"The most important thing now for us in the past history is that through comprehension of it we come to perceive the origins of perestroika." (*ibid.*)

The question may be asked: what is most significant about the "*events that go deep into the 1930s*" as regards the USSR? The answer surely is this: the building of mighty socialist industry, the collectivisation of the scattered peasantry and thus the laying down of the material and spiritual basis for the building of socialism in the Soviet countryside, and the crushing of internal and external plots against the USSR. Equally, we may ask: what is the significance of *perestroika* initiated by the Gorbachev leadership in 1985? The answer unquestionably is that it signifies nothing less than an attempt to wreck the centrally-planned socialist economy in the USSR and replace it with a capitalist economy - a market economy, if you please. In view of the above, if the roots and difficulties of present-day problems in the USSR lie in events "*that go deep into the 1930s*", as is the assertion of Gorbachev, and if the origins of *perestroika* are to be sought in those events, Gorbachev's conclusion, his prescription, albeit unstated for rotten diplomatic reasons, for solving the present-day difficulties of the Soviet Union can only be to undo all the heroic achievements of socialism in the 1930s!! The practice of the last six years has furnished ample proof that this is precisely the content

of *perestroika*, and *glasnost* designed to help the process of undoing the achievements of socialism and the restoration of capitalism by creating public opinion in favour of bourgeois democracy and through negation of the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist ideology. For Gorbachev understands extremely well that without creating public opinion and rousing public sentiment against the planned socialist economy, without maligning the latter and blaming all sorts of real and imaginary ills on it, his plans for a market economy cannot be pushed through, for the Soviet people, brought up for over six long decades in the conditions of socialist security and socialist solidarity, would not accept such plans.

Gorbachev notes the earlier attempts at 'reforms' - notably those of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods. "*A major landmark in our history*", he says, "*was the 20th CPSU Congress. It made a great contribution to the theory and practice of socialist construction.*" (*ibid.* p. 43).

And further:

"The decisions taken by the [20th] Congress helped through major political, economic, social and ideological measures. But the possibilities that emerged were not used to the full. The explanation is the subjectivist methods adopted by the leadership under Khrushchev." (*ibid.*)

Equally, says Gorbachev, the economic reforms of 1964-65, after "*having produced a substantial though temporary effect*," simply "*petered out*" because of the "*atmosphere of complacency and the interrupted natural process of leadership change [which] gave rise to stagnation and retardation in the country ...*" (*ibid.* pp. 43-44)

Gorbachev concludes that the earlier attempts at 'reform', that is, at the restoration of capitalist norms (begun by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress and carried on with some modifications under Brezhnev and Kosygin) petered out and were unsuccessful because they were unaccompanied by *glasnost* (democratisation) - a code word for the smuggling in of bourgeois ideology in place of Marxism-Leninism and of liberal-bourgeois democracy in place of proletarian socialist democracy. Hence his insistence "*on the active participation of the widest sections of the population in the implementation of the reforms planned; that is, on democratisation and again democratisation.*" (*ibid.*)

Gorbachev underlines this same point in his June 1987 report to a plenum of the central committee:

"Our experience demonstrates," he says, that "*we will not be able to cope with the tasks of restructuring if we fail to pursue the policy of democratisation firmly and consistently*". (p. 30)

In the same report, he notes that "*An offensive is in progress against bureaucracy. Bossy, pressure management is gradually being overcome.*"

He refers to these methods as the "*command-and-administrative forms*" which are to be replaced by "*economic methods*". In the light of our previous articles we know only too well that the former term is a euphemism for the centrally-planned socialist economy and the latter for a market economy. Thus, in the coded language of the times, Gorbachev is saying as clearly as possible in the circumstances that *perestroika* and *glasnost* were aimed at demolishing the mechanisms of the socialist economy and putting in their place the mechanisms of a capitalist economy. In other words, the essence of *perestroika* is nothing short of an attempt at the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

Referring to the June 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU central committee, which adopted "*Fundamentals of Radical Restructuring of Economic Management*," Gorbachev says:

"Perhaps this is the most important and most radical programme for economic reform our country has had since Lenin introduced his New Economic Policy in 1921. The present economic reform envisages that the emphasis will be shifted from primarily administrative to primarily economic management methods at every level, and calls for extensive democratisation of management, and the overall activation of human factor" (*Perestroika* p. 33)

The reference to the New Economic Policy (NEP) is very significant, for to Gorbachev and his fellow neo-bourgeois reformists no other model of Soviet economic development has any importance. They completely ignore, or worse still lament, the heroic feats of socialist construction during the 1930s, while constantly endeavouring to revert to the days of the NEP, which, to repeat, was a temporary retreat into, and a partial restoration of, capitalist norms forced on the Soviet state by war exhaustion and imperialist encirclement. As if to leave no one in doubt, Gorbachev continues:

"The reform is based on dramatically increased independence of enterprises and associations, their transition to full self-accounting and self-financing ... A collective's profits will be directly proportionate to its efficiency" (*ibid.*)

"The aim of this reform is to ensure - within the next two or three years - the transition from an excessively centralised management system relying on orders, to a democratic one ..."

We already know the results of this policy. The central planning mechanism has been wrecked to such an extent that the Soviet Union cannot even handle the transportation of the food parcels which, thanks to the policy of *perestroika* and *glasnost* and to the eternal shame of the proud Soviet people, are being sent with such a fanfare of publicity by western imperialism and even poor countries such as India.

Reviving Leninism or introducing capitalism?

On page 66 of his book Gorbachev says:

"In politics and ideology we are seeking to revive the living spirit of Leninism. Many decades of being mesmerised by dogma ... have had their effect. Today we want to inject a genuinely creative spirit into our theoretical work. This is difficult, but it must be done. Creative thought seems to be consolidating.

"I am pleased that there's a growing understanding, both within the Party and in society as a whole, that we have started an unprecedented political, economic, social and ideological endeavour. If we are to implement everything we have planned, we must also carry out unprecedented political, economic, social and ideological work in both the internal and external spheres ..." (Perestroika)

But what does all this talk about reviving "the living spirit of Leninism," the shedding of the habit of "being mesmerised by dogma," injecting "a genuinely creative spirit into our theoretical work," amount to? How is "creative thought" being consolidated? How is the Gorbachev administration carrying out this "unprecedented political, economic, social and ideological work in both the internal and external spheres"?

We leave aside here the external sphere, which we dealt with in the very first article (March-April 1990 issue of *Lalkar*).

We know the results of the unprecedented political and ideological work carried out by the Gorbachev leadership in the external spheres, where the one-sided de-ideologisation of international relations by the USSR, with its thesis of an integral and interdependent world of modified contradictions, in which the exploiters and the exploited busy themselves with the task of

averting the rupture of historically-formed economic relations, has led to its near-total capitulation to imperialism. The current Gulf crisis is only one, but a most significant, example and proof of this alleged revival of "the living spirit of Leninism"! German unification under NATO is another. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the anti-national South Korean fascist clique of Ro Tae Woe is a third.

As to the meaning of the "creative thought" that appears to be "consolidating" internally, the nature and content of this "unprecedented political, economic, social and ideological endeavour," Gorbachev gives us the following picture in the very next paragraph:

"Many things are unusual in our country now: ... multiple candidates for elections to Soviets in some districts; joint ventures with foreign firms; self-financed factories and plants, state and collective farms; ... wider cooperative activities; encouragement of individual enterprise in small-scale production and trade; and closure of non-paying plants and factories operating at a loss; and research institutes and higher educational establishments working inefficiently, a press that is more incisive, taking up 'taboos', printing a rich variety of public points of view, and conducting an open polemic on all vital issues concerning our progress and perestroika. All this is natural and necessary," adding almost by way of an implicit acknowledgement of the resistance by sections of the Party and the public to this integral and all-embracing programme aimed at the bourgeoisification of the USSR, "although all these things do not come easily, nor are they understood easily both among the public at large and among Party members." (pp. 66-67).

We are aware of the economic content of the above unprecedented endeavour, with which we dealt in previous issues. In this article we wish to emphasise the ideological - the *glasnost* or 'democratisation' side of this endeavour. The Soviet press indeed has dealt with 'taboos', that is, the tenets of Marxism-Leninism in an attempt to annihilate them; it has published a vast quantity of filth and downright pornographic material; it has taken up, with a zeal worthy of a better cause, the task of belittling the world-historic achievements of socialism in the USSR and the world-historic significance of the Great October Revolution itself; it has published a large quantity of material glorifying the achievements, real and imagined, of modern-day capitalism, i.e., imperialism. If it pleases Gorbachev and his admirers at home and abroad to describe this anti-Leninist and anti-communist filth as an "incisive" treatment of "a rich variety of public points of view," then so be it.

For our part, we regard it as a vile attempt to bury the basic tenets of Leninism and replace them by bourgeois commonplaces - and all this in the name of reviving "the living spirit of Leninism"!!

The Soviet media and Glasnost.

Gorbachev recognises the service rendered by the mass media in helping him with *perestroika* - the economic programme for restoring capitalist relations of production in the USSR.

"When beginning with the restructuring process, the CPSU Central Committee relied on two powerful real forces - the Party committees and the mass media. I can say that the Party might not have reached the present level of discussion about the entire package of perestroika issues - and the process of perestroika is very vast, diversified and contradictory - if the mass media had not joined it actively, and in an appropriate manner, immediately after the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee." (*ibid.* p. 76 - our emphasis).

In other words, as soon as Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Party, he freed the Soviet press and the media from Party control and let loose on the Soviet people a legion of neo-bourgeois reformists and haters of communism - the Shmelyovs, the Makarovs, the Shatalins, the Abalkins, the Aganbegyans, the Petrakovs, etc. - who flooded the Soviet press with articles maligning socialism, belittling its achievements, falsifying Soviet history, propagating the virtues of capitalism and prettifying it in every possible way, singing praises to the virtues of free-market economy and its necessary concomitants such as unemployment, closing down of all uneconomic establishments including those vital to the Soviet national economy and survival, and knocking down at every opportunity the centrally-planned economy of the USSR - all 'taboos' hitherto - and bombarding the Soviet population with their "rich" (pardon the pun) bourgeois points of view. This despicable gentry, with the connivance and encouragement of Gorbachev, had a field day while the revolutionaries, the so-called conservatives, bound by Party discipline, had to fight against such filth with their hands tied behind their backs. The Party was thus willy-nilly dragged by the nose into *perestroika* through the back door of *glasnost* in which the neo-bourgeois intelligentsia set the agenda and formulated the rules. And anyone who opposed them was simply sought to be silenced with accusations of being 'stupid', 'conservative', or worse still in their terminology, a 'Stalinist'.

Attempt at demoralising the Soviet people.

Thus the power of the mass media was used in an attempt to silence, isolate and neutralise the opposition to *perestroika* within the Party and to convert the public into supporting the bourgeois restructuring envisaged under *perestroika*. Although the attempt did not completely succeed, it did end up by confusing large sections of the population and demoralising them, something which the Soviet people have not known since the October Revolution. One of the purposes of the so-called democratisation under *glasnost* has been to cause the working class in the USSR, and elsewhere for that matter, to lose faith in its ability to build a strong socialist society and move forward in the direction of the realisation of the higher stage of communism, in which the formula "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" will be put into operation. A demoralised working class cannot build such a society; a demoralised working class can only, if reluctantly, get reconciled to life in the conditions of capitalism. The neo-bourgeois intelligentsia in the USSR are engaged in a disgraceful and despicable attempt to convince the working class in the USSR, and elsewhere, of the unworkability of socialism and that capitalism is eternal.

In the concluding passages of his report to the 14th Party Congress (Dec. 18-31, 1925), Joseph Stalin had this to say in connection with the work of socialist construction being done in the USSR:

"... whatever the case may be, we have achieved one thing that cannot possibly be taken from us, namely, that by our extensive constructive work, by our Bolshevik assault on the economic front, we have shown the whole world that the workers, after capturing power, are not only able to beat capitalism, not only to destroy, but also to build the new society, to build socialism. That achievement, the fact that we have made this truth obvious, nobody can take from us. That is the biggest and the most difficult of all our achievements up to now. For we have shown to the working class of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East that the workers, who throughout history were able only to work for masters, while the masters governed, that these workers, after capturing power, have proved capable of governing a great country, of building socialism under the most difficult conditions." (J.V. Stalin, *Collected Works* Vol. 7 p. 359).

In a clear reference to Trotskyist defeatists and faint-hearts who believed in the impossibility of building socialism in the USSR in the absence

of a victorious proletarian revolution in "the major European countries," Stalin continues:

"What is needed to enable the proletarians of the West to win? First of all, confidence in their own strength, the consciousness that the working class can do without the bourgeoisie, that the working class is capable not only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, of building socialism. The entire work of Social-Democracy consists in imbuing the workers with scepticism, with distrust in their own strength, with disbelief in the possibility of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie by force. The significance of all our work, all our construction, lies in that this work and this construction convince the working class in the capitalist countries that it can do without the bourgeoisie and can build the new society by its own efforts." (*ibid.* p. 360).

And this was at the end of 1925 when the work of socialist construction had only just begun, that is, before the truly Gargantuan and earth-shaking achievements of socialist construction in the fifteen years following 1925. And it is this confidence of the working class, born out of the successful struggle for socialist construction in the USSR and the subsequent smashing of the Nazi war machine by the Red Army, which the neo-bourgeois and reformist intelligentsia in the USSR are busy eroding while infecting the working class with Social-Democratic scepticism, "with distrust in their own strength, with disbelief in the possibility of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie" on a world scale. For without smashing this confidence of the Soviet working class in the bright future of socialism and communism, the bourgeois intelligentsia can never hope to realise successfully their programme of capitalist restoration envisaged under *perestroika*. Herein lies the significance of *glasnost*, its chief function being to prepare the ideological and political ground for the burial of Marxism-Leninism and its replacement by the ideology of the free market, that is, capitalism. In this context, Gorbachev is quite right in making the assertion that "the Party might not have reached the present level of discussion about the entire package of *perestroika* if the mass media had not joined it actively, and in an appropriate manner, immediately after the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee." We express the hope and the conviction that Gorbachev and his neo-bourgeois fellow travellers will be no more successful in destroying the confidence of the working class in its own strength than were the Trotskyist snivellers of yore.

Opposition to Perestroika within and outside the Party

Although Gorbachev has repeatedly claimed the Soviet people's "unreserved and passionate support for *perestroika*" (*Perestroika* p. 72), it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet people do not support his plans. The only people who are firmly behind his plans for the restoration of capitalism are the neo-bourgeois intelligentsia. And here, for once, Gorbachev is right when he claims that "the [bourgeois] intelligentsia has enthusiastically supported the restructuring" (*ibid.* p.80). As to the rest, Gorbachev has been obliged from time to time to admit the existence of strong opposition to his economic programme. Just after the much-trumpeted 19th Party conference, Gorbachev had this to say in his report to the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU held on July 29, 1988:

"The [19th] Conference has also confirmed another thing: there does exist resistance from the inertial, Conservative forces which would like to soft-pedal the reform, using the slightest excuse, the slightest hitches and miscalculations that arise on the way. I think we can agree with the proposal of the delegates that those who stand in the way of the reform be removed from their high posts" (page 6 of a Supplement to the *Moscow News* number 33 (3333) 1988).

This is the real essence of *glasnost*, of democratisation. Genuine communists, who support the centrally-planned socialist economy and resist the introduction of a capitalist, market economy must be removed! They must not be allowed to express themselves and must be made ineffective! And this from a man who tells us "we need *glasnost* as we need the air" (*Perestroika* p. 78), and "In my opinion, any honest, open talk, even if it arouses doubts, should be welcomed." (*ibid.* p.79) Obviously the only honest talk which is welcomed by the Gorbachev camp is that which casts doubt on the strength and ability of socialism to solve the problems facing Soviet society.

The 19th Party Conference: an anti-communist jamboree

The 19th Party Conference was in more than one way a rigged affair. Lenin founded the Bolshevik Party as a vanguard of the proletariat in the latter's struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and achieve its own social emancipation by putting an end to exploitation of man by man. As such the social composition of the Party had to, as it always did, reflect this ideological stance. The Party leadership, both before and after the Revolution,

made sure that the membership of the Party was recruited primarily from the ranks of the working class, the rural proletariat, the peasantry and various disadvantaged sections of the population, all of whom could be relied upon to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat as the apple of their eye. Every previous Congress, including the 27th (held in 1985) reflected the predominance of the workers. Obviously this state of affairs did not suit Gorbachev and his acolytes, for it is hardly conducive to bourgeois restructuring envisaged under *perestroika*. So, just before the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev made a speech to a gathering of Party leaders and editors. In this speech he declared ominously:

"There must be no more quotas, as we had in the past - so many workers and peasants, so many women and so forth." (*New York Times*, 11 May 1988, from a TASS dispatch of 10 May). He went on to add:

"The principal political imperative is to elect supporters of *perestroika*."

This is the essence of Gorbachev's *glasnost*, this so-called democratisation, over which the bourgeois of all countries wax eloquent. It amounts to stuffing the Party Conference with bourgeois reformists at the expense of the communists representing the interests of the working class, the peasantry, the nationalities, etc. - even going to the length of excluding from the highest Party gathering those who are opposed to *perestroika*. Thus *glasnost* and democratisation are only for the supporters of bourgeois restructuring.

Perceiving sizable opposition to *perestroika*, both within and outside of the Party, and being frightened of it, ten bourgeois intellectuals led by the late and unlamented physicist and monarchist, Andrei Sakharov, wrote an open letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU requesting that the Party Conference be postponed. Having made ritual references to democracy, they went on to urge that Party delegates to this Conference be strictly chosen on the basis of their attitude to *perestroika*! In other words, lack of support for *perestroika* was to constitute a disqualification for being a delegate at the very Conference which was to discuss and take decisions in connection with *perestroika*!

But, fixed though it was, the 19th Party Conference was not all smooth sailing for Gorbachev and his fellow bourgeois reformists. A significant minority of the delegates, workers as well as revolutionary intellectuals, had some sharp things to say about the twin reactionary policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. A factory worker from the Urals said:

"Workers are asking plainly: where is the *perestroika*? For example, in the shops the situation with foodstuffs is the same as it was, and now coupons have been brought in for sugar. There used to be no meat, and there is none now. Manufactured goods have disappeared somewhere altogether."

The well-known writer, Yuri Bondarev, protested against the filth appearing in Soviet literary journals in the name of *glasnost*. He said such material had a "negative effect on young people and had as its main postulate: let all the weeds flourish and all the evil forces compete ... We are betraying our young people with anarchic chatter, cheap sensations and so on. Through the Press, we give them not the truth, bitter though it may be, but a succession of disappointments flavoured with cynicism..."

"Our extremist criticism, with its despotism, lack of culture, love of power and cynicism in the assessment of phenomena, seems to be above and ahead of the interests of socialist progress. It seeks to confer on itself the new title of *perestroika*'s clerk of the works."

Unfortunately, we are obliged to quote snippets from the bourgeois press, for we do not get proper reporting of that which is said by the opponents of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Neither the Soviet nor the Western media give it proper, never mind full, coverage. The opponents of Gorbachev restructuring are the victims of the conspiracy of silence which is the essence of *glasnost*. The imperialist media in the west have every material interest in cooperating with this conspiracy. But truth will out in the end.

Removing opponents of Perestroika in the name of democratisation!

After the 19th Party Congress, Gorbachev intensified the process, already under way, of removing from positions of power those opposed to *perestroika* and replacing them with nonentities whose chief qualification was their whole-hearted support for the bourgeois restructuring under *perestroika*. Gorbachev himself assumed the Presidency in September 1988, when he replaced the late Andrei Gromyko as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Gromyko and three others were ousted from the Politburo, these being replaced by Gorbachev nominees. Vadim Medvedev became a Party Secretary and replaced Yegor Ligachev as head of the commission on ideology, the latter being shunted off to head the commission on agriculture to oversee the implementation of unpleasant measures aimed at de-collectivisation, which he opposes. Anatoly Dobrynin, the former Soviet ambassa-

dor to the US and an advisor to Gorbachev on foreign policy, was replaced by Aleksandr Yakovlev. Anatoly Lukyanov, another Gorbachev protege, was also brought into the Politburo, as was Aleksandra Biryakova.

Hiding their programme of capitalist restoration

Even, however, the very wide-scale purge of the Party leadership by Gorbachev and his associates has not ensured the success of his restructuring programme, which involves the restoration of capitalism on a full scale. True to the principles of *glasnost*, the 'democratic' Gorbachev clique has for long sought to hide the real object of the reforms under *perestroika*. To begin with, the Soviet people were told that the object of the reforms was to strengthen socialism and renew it, to get rid of the alleged bureaucratic over-centralisation, and by so doing increase the productivity of labour, to ensure an increased supply of food and other consumer goods by the application of advanced scientific and technical methods and machinery - by re-tooling and reequipping Soviet industry and agriculture. A little later, the Soviet people were told that it was essential to introduce private enterprise and cooperatives, but only on a limited scale, while assuring them, again and again, that socialism and socialist planning were not being got rid of. Only in the middle of June 1990 did Gorbachev reveal the whole truth and the essence of *perestroika*. In a speech to Communist Party leaders, he said that there was no alternative to the adoption of a market economy. "*There is no returning to the command-and-administrative system,*" he said. "*Let us tell the people the whole truth about this system at last.*" (*Newsweek* 25 June 1990). This long-due admission was made at last.

No longer do his advisers speak in terms of strengthening socialism and renewing it. Nikolai Petrakov and Stanislav Shatalin, two key economic advisers to Gorbachev, have openly called for the creation of the conditions for competition - the soul of the market. To achieve this, they have called for the "*privatisation of state industries, abolition of industrial ministries, emergency cuts in government spending, reducing state investment, making the central bank independent of government and putting all other banks on a commercial basis.*" (*ibid.*) In addition they are calling for a drastic cut in subsidies on food and other basic items; the closure of unprofitable industries and plants, with the resultant unemployment; de-collectivisation of agriculture; convertibility of the ruble, and so on and so forth.

No third way

Gorbachev for his part appears to want, if one can at all find out what he really wants, a third way between the centrally-planned socialist economy and capitalism, which he terms "*a socialist market economy.*" But there is no third way. He cannot have a market economy without the essential prerequisites of such an economy, namely, private property and the right to hire and exploit labour - without these elements Gorbachev's vision of a third way, to use the apt description of Richard Ericson, an expert on the Soviet economy at Columbia University, "*is like a unicorn, beautiful to look at but we know it doesn't exist.*" (*ibid.*) The *Newsweek* reporters of these remarks add, apropos the rejection by the Soviet Parliament in June 1990 of the planned rises in the price of bread: "*In that context, last week's debacle over bread prices is hardly surprising. If your destination is imaginary, who is to say you've made a wrong turn?*" This is not the point. Gorbachev's destination is not imaginary. He wants a market economy (calling it "*a socialist market economy*", as he insists on doing, in no way changes matters), but he shrinks from adopting all the measures called for by his bourgeois economic advisers **all at once**. He is rightly fearful of the reactions of the Soviet people, who have been brought up in conditions of socialism for seven decades. He has no dearth of advisers, in the East or the West, who daily inform him on the steps to be taken for introducing a market economy. *Newsweek* of 25 June 1990 on page 16 offers this advice:

"If they wish to introduce free-market mechanisms, Gorbachev and his fellow reformers in the Kremlin must replace the five-year plans of Stalinist orthodoxy with the precepts of classical capitalism. The Soviet leadership must convince the country to put aside the egalitarianism of Karl Marx and his 19th-century utopian dreams and embrace the quiet pragmatism of the 18th-century Scotsman Adam Smith, the champion of enlightened self-interest."

Chapter 6

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Glasnost - a complete departure from Marxism-Leninism, Part II

In Part I of 'GLASNOST', we stated that *Glasnost* performs in the political field the same reactionary role as is performed by *Perestroika* in the economic sphere; that its aim was to convince the Soviet people of the desirability of substituting a market economy for the hitherto existing centrally planned socialist economy. We continue:

How to convince the Soviet people?

This is easier said than done. Gorbachev has a major problem on his hands. He has to convince the Soviet people at large of the wisdom of going over to a market economy, with all its fearful consequences.

The writers of *Newsweek* realise this problem, for they go on to conclude:

"Finally and fundamentally, if the Soviet economy is to take its place in the modern [read capitalist, since for the capitalist nothing is modern if it is not capitalist] world, the attitudes of the people must change along with their economic mechanisms. The population 'must realise that society benefits when somebody comes up with a good idea that benefits all of society - and lets him get rich from it,' says Todd Buchholz of the White House Economic Task Force. Free enterprise will not take root in thoroughly egalitarian soil, and the Soviet people must learn to curb their suspicion of those who prosper." (ibid.)

Through the dishonest and deceitful policy that goes in the name of *glasnost* or democratisation, the Gorbachev leadership has done all it can to persuade the Soviet people as to the wonders of a market economy, but without great success. It has dismantled the central planning mechanisms, but the market economy is not in place. After six years of *perestroika* and

glasnost the Soviet economy is in a worse state that it has ever been since the early 1920s (of this more anon). In mid-November 1990 the Soviet parliament refused to proceed with further measures of 'economic reform', that is bourgeois restoration, on the grounds that they are pointless. On the other hand the mutinous Russian legislature on Wednesday 14 November 1990 simply countermanded a central government decree raising the prices of luxury goods, on the ground that the USSR's biggest republic had not been consulted. Thus, not only are the bourgeois reformists not able to secure the agreement of the Soviet people for bourgeois restoration, they cannot even agree among themselves. The Soviet parliament has, at the end of 1990, passed the buck to Gorbachev by giving him the power to not only rule by decree but also to introduce his bourgeois restorationist economic measures by decree, thus revealing the thoroughly undemocratic essence of *glasnost* which was always designed to bypass the CPSU and the latter's democratic centralism.

Bypassing the Party and creating rival centres of power

When Gorbachev found that he could not easily overcome the resistance to his reactionary policies unleashed under *perestroika*, he called the 19th Party conference, which was rigged through and through, to lay the basis not only for accelerating the pace of bourgeois restoration but also for bypassing the CPSU by creating rival centres of power. This rigged conference, greeted with such glee at the time, not only by the enemies of communism but also by some self-professed Leninists, in the economic sphere approved measures involving decimation of state planning, introduction of complete operational autonomy (*khozraschot*) and self-financing in enterprises and plants, legalisation of private cooperatives, acceleration of the conversion to wholesale trading in the means of production, introduction of measures (such as leasing of land) to de-collectivise agriculture, greater material incentives and increased wage differentials, privatisation of housing, price 'reform' involving huge increases in the prices of basic food products such as bread, milk and meat, and permission to enterprises to have direct and extensive access to foreign markets, and to establish economic ties and joint ventures.

In the political sphere, the decisions of the conference were just as reactionary as in the economic. The conference had been called, not to enhance democratisation as was believed by lots of well-meaning simpletons at the

time, but actually to suppress inner-party debate and opposition to bourgeois restructuring. After three years there was little to the credit of *perestroika*, thanks to the opposition within the CPSU. In his closing speech, Gorbachev said that "*bureaucratism* [his description of opposition to his reactionary policy] *still resists, shows its teeth ... and puts spokes in the wheels*" (p.19). He argued that earlier economic reforms, particularly those of the mid-50s undertaken by Khrushchev, had failed because they were unaccompanied by corresponding changes in the political sphere, by what he termed a fundamental democratisation of the political system. Thus, to make *perestroika* irreversible, the political system itself had to be overhauled, it had to be, in his deceptive terminology, 'democratised'. Fundamental changes in the state, government and Party apparatus, including changes in the relationship between the CPSU and the Soviet state had to be undertaken. There had to be a clear demarcation between Party and state functions. The most urgent task, he maintained, was to revive the complete authority of the Soviets of People's Deputies, adding that "*half measures won't do*" (p.8).

Thus came into being the restructured USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the supreme government body, which in turn was to elect a smaller Supreme Soviet - to act as a standing legislative and administrative body - and a President of the Supreme Soviet. The elections to this parliament, held in the conditions of economic chaos, demoralisation and ceaseless - not to say unwarranted - attacks on the CPSU and the so-called conservatives, thanks to the counter-revolutionary twin policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, produced a body full of bourgeois sentiment and which could not by any standard be called proletarian. With the election of Gorbachev as the Executive President, the stage was set for Gorbachev to say goodbye to the CPSU. We have dealt with the reasons in a previous article¹ as to why Gorbachev thought it politic to stay at the head of the Party that he has done so much to undermine and subvert. Not without reason did the bourgeois *Guardian* make the following remark:

1 See The 28th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, LALKAR Aug-Sept 1990, reproduced in Appendix 1.

"Gorbachev's tragic paradox is that, while trying valiantly to make the Communist Party safe for the Soviet Union, he has had more success in making the Soviet Union safe for other parties." (13 July 1990).

Constantly, in the name and under the cover of 'democratisation', it has been Gorbachev's endeavour to subvert the one and the only force capable of defending the positions of socialism and safeguarding the interests of the Soviet working class and broad masses, namely, the CPSU. If the creation of rival centres of power and the severing of the CPSU from the Soviet state and government has been part of this strategy, the freedom of anti-communist factions within the CPSU and the creation of anti-communist bourgeois - even nationalist and monarchist - parties, who regularly parade with pre-revolutionary flags these days in Soviet cities, is another. At a meeting in Moscow of the CPSU leadership, held in February 1990 to discuss the removal of Article Six of the 1936 Constitution, which enshrined the leading role of the Communist Party, Gorbachev justified the renegade step of introducing a multi-party system in the name of democratisation in the following words:

"The extensive democratisation currently under way in our society is being accompanied by mounting political pluralism.

"Various social and political organisations and movements emerge.

"This process may lead at a certain stage to the establishment of parties.

"The CPSU is prepared to act with due account for these new circumstances, co-operate and conduct a dialogue with all organisations committed to the Soviet constitution and the social system endorsed in this constitution."

At this meeting, angered by the counter-revolutionary subversion caused by *perestroika* and *glasnost*, with their constant encouragement of forces openly calling for the restoration of capitalism and overthrow of socialism, and angered too by the complacent and rosy portrayal of the situation by Gorbachev, many delegates, not surprisingly, hit back. Here are a few examples. Vladimir Brovikov, the USSR's ambassador to Poland, said:

"There are many eulogies to *perestroika*, criticism of bygone days and generous promises for the future. But, in actual fact, there is no assessment of mistakes made during the period of *perestroika*."

Boris Gidespov, head of the Leningrad regional party committee, complained about the increasing destabilisation of the economic and political situation, saying:

"Local soviets have neither legal nor actual power. The party is being methodically removed from guidance and no political assessment is given to the laws taken by the Supreme Soviet."

Vitaly Shabanov, a worker from the Volga city of Saratov and a member of the central auditing commission of the CPSU, expressed alarm over the fate of the Communist Party under *perestroika*, pointing to increasing attacks on its ideological and organisational foundations. He hit the nail on the head with these words:

"Some scholars, together with informals, all manner of nationalists and shadow economy dealers are pushing the country onto the road of bourgeois reformism, the restoration of private ownership, political anarchy, and undermining the party's cohesion as the vanguard organised detachment of workers."

Democracy and Marxism-Leninism

Gorbachev's ideas concerning democratisation (*glasnost*) have nothing in common with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism on this very important question. To Marx and Lenin, the slogan of democracy has a meaning only if it is a part and parcel of the proletariat's struggle for the abolition of classes. Here is what Lenin says in his remarkable work, *State and Revolution*, on this score:

"Democracy means equality. The great significance of the proletariat's struggle for equality and of equality as a slogan will be clear if we correctly interpret it as meaning the abolition of classes," (*Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1970, p. 118*).

Unlike Gorbachev, Lenin refuses to confine himself to the political form of democracy: he goes beyond the political form to its class significance. Lenin's treatment of the subject is of great importance to us in our polemic against Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Continues Lenin:

"But democracy means only formal equality. And as soon as equality is achieved for all members of society in relation to ownership of the means of production, that is, equality of labour and wages, humanity will inevitably be confronted with the question of advancing further, from formal equality to actual equality, i.e., to the operation of the rule, 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs'" (*ibid.*)

Following Marx, to Lenin the formula 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work' is a bourgeois standard, characteristic

of the lower stage of communism (commonly called 'socialism'), whereby products are divided according to the amount of labour performed. This bourgeois standard, this formal equality does not remove the defects of distribution, for:

"The mere conversion of the means of production into the common property of the whole of society (commonly called 'socialism') does not remove the defects of distribution and the inequality of 'bourgeois right', which continues to prevail so long as products are divided 'according to the amount of labour performed'". (ibid. p.111).

In the first phase of communist society, 'bourgeois right' is not abolished in its entirety, but in part. The means of production are no longer the private property of individuals at this stage. *"To that extent - and to that extent alone - 'bourgeois right' disappears."* (ibid. p.112). But it continues to exist *"in the capacity of regulator in the distribution of products and the allotment of labour among the members of society... But this is not yet communism, and it does not yet abolish 'bourgeois right', which gives unequal individuals, in return for unequal amounts of labour, equal amounts of products."* (ibid.)

At this stage of development it is impossible to do without this bourgeois right, for, as Marx says:

"What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society: which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." (Critique of the Gotha Programme).

Lenin comments that the *"great significance of Marx's explanation is that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the theory of development, and regards communism as something which develops out of capitalism. Instead of scholastically invented, 'concocted' definitions and fruitless disputes about words (what is Socialism, what is Communism?), Marx gives an analysis of what might be called the stages of the economic ripeness of communism.*

In its first phase, or first stage, communism cannot as yet be fully ripe economically and entirely free from traditions or traces of capitalism. Hence the interesting phenomenon that communism in its first phase retains 'the narrow horizon of bourgeois right'. Of course, bourgeois right in regard to the distribution of articles of consumption inevitably presumes the existence of the bour-

geois state, for right is nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing the observance of the standards of right.

"It follows that under communism there remains for a time not only bourgeois right, but even the bourgeois state - without the bourgeoisie!" (ibid. pp 117-118).

Adds Lenin: *"This may sound like a paradox or simply a dialectical conundrum, of which Marxism is often accused by people who do not take the slightest trouble to study its extraordinarily profound content.*

"But as a matter of fact, remnants of the old surviving in the new confront us in life at every step, both in nature and in society. And Marx did not arbitrarily insert a scrap of 'bourgeois' right into Communism, but indicated what is economically and politically inevitable in a society emerging out of the womb of capitalism." (ibid. p.118).

As can be seen, to Lenin, as to Marx, this bourgeois standard, this formal equality, which does not do away with the defects of distribution, is only a transitional, if necessary and unavoidable, stage in humanity's progress towards the higher stage of communism, which is characterised by the formula 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.' But such a stage won't arise spontaneously, of itself, as it were. It has to be worked for, and can only be reached when the productive forces have reached such levels of development as are capable of supplying an abundance of material products for everyone. Hence the importance that has always been attached by the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party, in the USSR and in other socialist countries, to rapid industrialisation and the application of up-to-date techniques and scientific methods in production. Marx's communism, unlike pre-Marxian communism, is based on abundance and not on the equal distribution of poverty, as is often alleged by its ignorant opponents. As socialist society develops its productive forces more and more, it creates the material conditions for dispensing, albeit in steps, with the first formula, typical of the lower stage of communism, and replacing it with the one which is characteristic of its higher stage, for, as Lenin says: *"humanity will inevitably be confronted with the question of advancing further."*

And when will such a stage be reached? When will the narrow horizon of 'bourgeois right' be crossed entirely? Marx gives the following answer to this question:

"In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly - only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners; 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'" (ibid.)

With Gorbachev, however, things are very different:

"The policy restructuring", he says, "puts everything in its place. We are fully restoring the principle of socialism: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work', and we seek to affirm social justice for all, equal rights for all, one law for all ..." (Perestroika p. 31).

He regards the above formula as "socialism's basic principle" and, coupled with his frequent fulminations against "wage levelling", gives the misleading impression that Soviet society has somehow already put into effect the formula typical of the higher stage of communism, and, horror of horrors, in violation of "socialism's basic principle." This is far from true. Wage differentials in the USSR need to be narrowed, not widened further still. The attacks by Gorbachev and his ignorant economic whiz kids, who have landed the Soviet economy in a ditch, against the alleged wage levelling and egalitarianism in the USSR are no more than a groundless defence of the privileges of the 'experts' and upper layers of managerial and governmental staff. Since there is no wage levelling, no egalitarianism in the USSR, nor can there be at the present stage, Gorbachev's and his perestroika-glasnost mongering intelligentsia's attacks on this non-existent egalitarianism can only be a device to divert the attention of the working class from the measures underway - which are bound to increase the already unwarranted differentials. Thus we see that what Marx and Lenin regarded as a defect, unavoidable in the lower stage of communism, is sought to be elevated into a tablet of Moses - an ossified "basic principle" - and this more than 70 years after the October Revolution and more than 60 years of socialist construction!

Instead of working in the direction of abolishing this defect, the Gorbachev leadership is, under perestroika and glasnost, planning to take Soviet society back to the dark days of private property in the means of produc-

tion. In other words, it is planning to restore the other bourgeois right abolished by the October Revolution.

Economic basis of democracy and the withering away of the state.

The question of democracy is intimately connected with that of the state. Since this issue is of such theoretical and practical importance, we take this opportunity of going into it a little further here. Anyone interested in exploring this question in far greater depth would be well advised to turn to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Lenin's *State and Revolution*. Marx wrote his work after the Unity Congress (held at the end of May 1875 in the German town of Gotha) between the Lassalleans and the Eisenachers - the latter being the followers of Marx and Engels - the two factions of German Social-Democracy. In the programme agreed at this conference, the Eisenachers, in their enthusiasm for unity, made many concessions to Lassalle's opportunist conceptions on many important questions, including the question of the distribution of the social product in society. When Marx received a copy of the Gotha Programme, which was after this programme had been adopted at the above Unity Congress, he was so angered by its opportunist formulations that he decided immediately to write a critique of it. But the significance of this remarkable work goes far beyond its polemical aspect. In this pamphlet, full of genius, Marx gives the fullest exposition and the analysis of the connection between the development of communism and the withering away of the state.

"The whole theory of Marx is the application of the theory of development - in its most consistent, complete, considered and pithy form - to modern capitalism. Naturally, Marx was faced with the problem of applying this theory both to the forthcoming collapse of capitalism and the future development of future communism." (Lenin, *ibid.* p.100).

Having ridiculed all talk about a "people's state", as incorporated in the Gotha Programme, Marx goes on to answer the question of the future development of future communism on the basis of the fact that it has its origin in capitalism, that it develops historically from capitalism, that it is the result of the action of a social force to which capitalism gave birth." (*ibid.* p. 101).

Marx goes on to say that the whole theory of development, science as a whole, has established with "complete exactitude" that "historically, there must undoubtedly be a special stage or a special phase of transition from capitalism to communism." (*ibid.* p. 102).

"Between capitalist and communist society," says Marx, "lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."

Marx's conclusion is based on a scientific analysis of capitalist society, the role played by the proletariat in such a society, and "on the irreconcilability of the antagonistic interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." (*ibid.* p. 103).

Marx is saying that it is impossible for society to effect the transition to a communist society, towards which it is developing, without a "political transition period," during which the state can only be the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

The question arises: what is the relationship of this dictatorship to democracy?

Under capitalism, there is democracy in a democratic republic. "But," says Lenin, "that is the democracy of capitalist society. If we look more closely into the machinery of capitalist democracy ... in the technique of the representative institutions, in the actual obstacles to the right of assembly (public building are not for beggars!), in the purely capitalist organisation of the daily press, etc., etc. - we shall see restriction after restriction upon democracy. These restrictions, exceptions, exclusions, obstacles ... squeeze out the poor from politics, from active participation in democracy" (*ibid.* pp. 104-105).

But from this capitalist democracy, forward development does not proceed "simply, directly and smoothly towards 'greater and greater democracy', as the liberal professors and petty-bourgeois opportunists would have us believe." (*ibid.*)

Continues Lenin: "No, forward development, i.e., towards communism, proceeds through the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the resistance of the capitalist exploiters cannot be broken by anyone else or in any other way.

"And the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot result merely in an expansion of democracy. Simultaneously with an immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the moneybags, the dictatorship of the proletariat imposes a series of restrictions on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must sup-

press them in order to free humanity from wage slavery, their resistance must be crushed by force; it is clear that where there is suppression, where there is violence, there is no freedom and no democracy." (*ibid.*)

Thus the dictatorship of the proletariat brings in its train a tremendous extension of democracy - democracy for the overwhelming majority of the people - as well as suppression by force and exclusion from democracy of the exploiting and oppressing classes. Such, then, is the nature of the change undergone by democracy during the transition from capitalism to communism.

Engels, in his letter to Bebel, expressed himself on this issue in the following splendid terms:

"So long as the proletariat uses the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist." (K. Marx and F. Engels *Selected Works*, English edition, Moscow 1951, Vol II pp. 38-39).

Only in a classless communist society will it become possible to speak of freedom. Only in such a society will be realised "a truly complete democracy, democracy without any exceptions whatever." (Lenin, *State and Revolution* p.106).

Thus under capitalism democracy is for the minority, for the propertied classes; it is false, wretched and curtailed. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition from capitalism to communism, for the first time not only brings democracy to the majority but also suppression of the minority - the exploiting classes. Communism alone is capable of bringing complete democracy without any exception whatever.

Under capitalism, since the state exists as an instrument in the hands of the exploiting minority for the forcible suppression of the exploited majority, it is a state in the proper sense of the word, for, to be successful, such an undertaking "calls for the utmost ferocity and savagery in the work of suppressing, it calls for seas of blood through which mankind has to wade ... " (*ibid.* p.107).

During the transition from capitalism to communism, a special machine for suppression - the state - is still necessary, but this transitional state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, "is no longer a state in the proper sense of the word; for the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the majority of wage slaves of yesterday is comparatively ... easy" (*ibid.*).

"Lastly, only Communism makes the state absolutely unnecessary, for there is *nobody* to be suppressed - 'nobody' in the sense of a *class*, in the sense of a systematic struggle against a definite section of the population." (ibid. p. 108).

Of the above gems on democracy, so brilliantly formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and the relationship of the dictatorship of the proletariat to democracy, there is not a word - not an iota - in Gorbachev's pronouncements on democratisation, which are in the tradition of professorial liberalism and petty-bourgeois opportunism. Gorbachev's treatment of this question is dead, static and non-dialectical, full of commonplaces and bourgeois twaddle of the most ordinary kind.

Moreover, Gorbachev's desire for a reversion to small-scale farming, by replacing state and collectivised farming, far from bringing greater democracy, never mind solving the food problem, would only make for the total subordination of the peasantry to executive authority and furnish "a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy".

In his remarkably brilliant pamphlet, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', written almost 139 years ago, Karl Marx made some truly penetrating observations on the small-holding peasantry. These observations, with all the changes in technology and communications effected since then, and notwithstanding the long time span between now the when they were made, are still valid on the question of the relationship of democracy and the small-holding peasantry.

"The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse.

"...Their field of production, the small holding, admits of no division of labour in its cultivation, no application of science and, therefore, no diversity of development, no variety of talent, no wealth of social relationships. ... Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. Insofar as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not form a class. They are consequently incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot

represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes and sends them rain and sunshine from above. The political influence of the small-holding peasants, therefore, finds its final expression the executive power subordinating society to itself" (pp 105-106, Progress Publishers, Moscow).

"... By its very nature, small-holding property forms a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy" (p 110, ibid).

In the next chapter we shall deal with historical questions, which is only a euphemism for the Stalin Question.

Chapter 7

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Historical Questions - A re-assessment of the past Part I

In the last (March-April) issue of *Lalkar*, we concluded our brief critique of Gorbachev's *glasnost* with the argument that the Gorbachev reforms - with their reversion to small-scale farming, by replacing state and collectivist farming, in the field of agriculture, and the wholesale vandalism of the centrally-planned socialist industry - far from bringing greater democracy, let alone solving the economic problems facing the USSR, would only make for the total subordination of the Soviet people to executive authority and furnish "a suitable basis for an all-powerful and innumerable bureaucracy." We now turn, as per our promise in the very first article in this series, to historical question, a re-assessment of the past. Although a historical appraisal of the history of the USSR involves more than an assessment of the role of one single individual, nevertheless, thanks to the openly capitalist as well as the disguised capitalist - the revisionists and Trotskyists being the most prominent among the latter - denigrators of the achievements of socialism in the USSR, the term 'historical questions' has become a euphemism for a historical (very often hysterical) analysis of the role of Joseph Stalin, the foremost representative of Bolshevism after the death of V.I. Lenin, and the architect of the earth-shaking victories of the USSR in the economic, political, cultural, diplomatic and military fields. In view of this, we are forced to join this debate and concentrate our attention on this one individual, albeit a very great one, for what is at issue is not the honour, integrity, steadfastness, and fidelity to the science of Marxism-Leninism, of a single individual, but the very strength and historical inevitability of socialism and communism.

Before 1956, criticisms of, attacks upon J.V. Stalin came from either the openly imperialist agents and ideologues, such as Robert Conquest, or from the renegades within the working-class movement, the Trotskyites and So-

cial Democrats of various hues - and nobody took them seriously. But in that year, at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU(B), Khrushchev, finally throwing off his Bolshevik mask and revealing his true revisionist essence, launched into a vicious attack on what he termed Stalin's personality cult. Two brief comments about Khrushchev's attack on Stalin need to be made. First, in the duplicitous and dishonest manner typical of revisionists and other capitalist-roaders all over the world, the Khrushchevites never had the courage to release this report in the USSR, so fearful were they of the Soviet people's hostility to anyone attempting to belittle the role of Stalin. Instead they released it abroad through their contacts representing the imperialist press agencies in Moscow. The Soviet citizens, to their bewilderment, were in turn bombarded with an anti-socialist and anti-Stalin diatribe, which has continued ceaselessly to this day, by the imperialist broadcasting media. This division of labour between the revisionists in the USSR and imperialism has continued unabated and has, since the accession of Gorbachev to power, reached a new qualitative high. Secondly, in 1956 Khrushchev did not feel strong enough to denounce and negate the achievements of socialism. Instead he and his followers had to sing its praises, while instituting, slowly but surely, economic reforms which, departing from socialism, increasingly put emphasis on measures of a capitalistic nature in the management of the economy - decentralisation and loosening of the economic planning mechanism; reform of price formation and the transfer of enterprises to cost accounting; greater incentives and the introduction of self-management principles. All these measures, introduced over the past three and a half decades, have led to the present qualitatively new situation in which the USSR, according to no less a person than its Finance Minister, is on the verge of an economic catastrophe.

When Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, he faced a stark choice: either to reverse the rot caused by a series of measures of capitalistic nature by reverting to a faithful and all-round adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in all spheres of Soviet life - economic, ideological and cultural - or to accelerate along the road which ultimately leads to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. It is sad to have to admit, but it would be a sin to hide the truth, that Gorbachev opted decisively (if the word 'decisive' can ever be used in connection with Gorbachev) to go along the latter path - the path of the introduction of a market economy, which is only another name for the restoration of the capitalist system of production, distribution and exchange. But, like Khrushchev,

Gorbachev encountered a formidable obstacle to his restorationist schemes, namely, the hostility of the Soviet people to a market economy and their faith in, and commitment to, a centrally-planned socialist economy, free from hunger, unemployment, insecurity, and exploitation of man by man. In such a situation, any economic restructuring (*perestroika*) in the capitalist direction had to be accompanied by an onslaught against the values, the ideology, and the gigantic achievements of socialism and against the science of Marxism-Leninism. An open and direct attack on Marxism-Leninism, however, carried great dangers; anyone indulging in such an exercise could easily be swept off by mass indignation and anger. This being the case, what better than to attack the fundamentals and foundations of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism, under the guise of attacking "the cult of Personality", "the administrative and command system", the excessive centralism", etc. There is a German saying, which Lenin was very fond of repeating, which goes like this: I hit the sack but the blows are intended for the ass. From Khrushchev to Gorbachev, the revisionists have done much to malign Joseph Stalin, but their calumnies are really aimed at Marxism-Leninism and the earth-shattering gains of socialism. It is only in this context that one can really understand the vituperation, the wrath, the vitriol, the invective, with which the imperialist bourgeoisie and its ideological representatives within the working class - the revisionists, Trotskyists and other Social-Democratic tendencies - inveigh against Stalin. If forty years after his death imperialism and its agents find it necessary to annihilate the man for the thousandth time, it surely must be the case that the achievements associated with his name still constitute an insuperable barrier to their restorationist schemes. His name, therefore, continues to haunt them and disturb their sleep.

With this, we turn to the latest knight in armour, Gorbachev, who has taken up the task of annihilating Stalin. Like Don Quixote, we discover, he too is tilting at windmills. He is at sixes and sevens. He is as much at sea in demolishing Stalin as he is at home in messing up the Soviet economy. He sets out to negate Stalin and the achievements of the Soviet Union during the three decades that Stalin led the CPSU(B), but ends up by endorsing these achievements and paying, albeit unwittingly, tribute to Stalin in the most glowing terms.

If one looks at the foremost Soviet achievements with which Stalin's leadership is inextricably linked, one has to include among these the following: leading the CPSU(B)'s struggle for the successful -

- (a) collectivisation of agriculture;
- (b) industrialisation of the USSR under the five-year plans on the firm basis of centralised socialist planning;
- (c) defence of the USSR in the teeth of treacherous schemes of Western imperialism and the defeat of Nazi Germany;
- (d) creation of a cultured life for the soviet people; and
- (e) defeat of the right (Bukharinite) and 'left' (Trotskyite) deviations in the Party.

What has Gorbachev to say on any of these achievements? In his book *Perestroika*, there are only two references to Stalin by name - and those too for the purpose of denouncing him for his alleged personality cult and for alleged violations of socialist legality (of which more anon). Otherwise, shunning the name of Stalin as the devil shuns holy water, Gorbachev sings praises to the achievements of socialism during the period under consideration as though these achievements had nothing to do with the leadership of the Party, and in particular its General Secretary, Joseph Stalin. Under the title *Lesson of History*, this is what Gorbachev has to say:

"It is true to say that post-revolutionary development underwent difficult stages, largely due to the rude meddling of imperialist forces in our internal affairs; policy mistakes and miscalculations also occurred. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union progressed, and a society has been created in which people have confidence in their future. And if truth is the guide, any objective observer must admit that Soviet history is in general a history of indisputable progress, despite all the losses, setbacks and failures. We advanced in the absence of roads, literally and figuratively ... we stubbornly marched on and never thought of retreating, of giving up the ground we had gained, or of questioning our socialist choice." (p. 38).

"Completing ambitious tasks within a short period of time," says Gorbachev, could not be "as smooth as the sidewalk of Nevsky Prospect." And he continues:

"Take, for example, industrialisation. In what conditions did we accomplish it? The Civil War and intervention by fourteen foreign powers had left the country completely devastated. There was an economic blockade and a 'cordon sanitaire.' No accumulations, no colonies; on the contrary, it was essential to use the money available for improving the national hinterlands that had been oppressed under tsarism. In order to save the revolutionary gains, we

had to build - and quickly - a national industrial base with our internal resources, holding down consumption and reducing it to a minimum ..." (ibid. p.38-39).

As if by way of a cruel, if unintentioned, contrast with the confusion, despair, despondency and hopelessness wrought by his reactionary plans, which go under the twin names of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, Gorbachev depicts the mass enthusiasm and the heroic feats of labour that characterised and accompanied the building of socialism in the Soviet Union in these terms:

"In effect, we had to build up industry, especially heavy industry and the power and machine-building industries, from scratch. And we set out boldly to accomplish this task. The viability of the Party's plans, which the masses understood and accepted, and of the slogans and projects permeated with the ideological energy of our revolution manifested itself in the enthusiasm with which millions of Soviet people joined in the efforts to build up national industry. And that enthusiasm astounded the world. Under incredibly trying conditions, often far away from their homes, usually without any machinery, and half-fed, they worked wonders, so to say, out of nothing, from scratch. They drew inspiration from the fact that their was a great and historic cause. Although not very literate, they realised what a grand and unique job they were doing. That was truly a great feat in the name of their motherland's future and a demonstration of the people's loyalty to the free choice which they had made in 1917." (ibid. p.39).

'Forgetting' to say that Joseph Stalin was the foremost among these fathers and grandfathers, Gorbachev adds:

"Our fathers and grandfathers overcame everything that befell them and made a crucial contribution to the development and consolidation of our society at a time when its entire future had to be decided." (ibid).

Many critics, including some 'socialist' snivellers, have often criticised the Soviet leadership, especially Stalin, for the fast tempo of industrialisation. Stalin, on innumerable occasions, refuted this criticism by emphasising that rapid industrialisation was dictated not only by the needs of the victory of socialism in the USSR but also by the external threat posed by imperialism in the conditions where the USSR was the only socialist country. A non-industrialised, or a semi-industrialised, and therefore weak, Soviet Union would be no match in the face of a determined imperialist onslaught of the type she eventually came to face when, in June 1941, the Nazi beasts

unleashed their war of aggression against the USSR with the desire of exterminating socialism and subjugating this vast country. Contrasting the technical and industrial backwardness of the USSR with the advanced technology and industry of the leading capitalist countries, Stalin posed the questions thus:

"And so we find that, on the one hand, we in our country have the most advanced system, the Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of socialism in our country so long as this contradiction exists?" (Industrialisation and the Right Deviation, J Stalin Collected Works, Vol 11 pp.257-8).

And: *"In order to secure the final victory of socialism in our country, we must also [in addition to having the most advanced political system - Lalkar] overtake and outstrip these [advanced capitalist countries - Lalkar] countries technically and economically. Either we do this, or we shall be forced to the wall." (ibid. p.258).*

He goes on to add:

"The question of a fast rate of development of industry would not face us so acutely if we were not the ONLY country but ONE OF THE COUNTRIES of the dictatorship of the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries as well, Germany and France, say." (ibid. p.261).

Stalin poses the question: *"Is it not possible to conduct the work in a more 'restful' atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of industrial development that we have adopted due to the restless character of the members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars?"*

He answers this question thus:

"Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau and the Council of People's Commissars are calm and sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded the external and internal situation, we could, of course, conduct the work at a lower speed. But the point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding situation as our starting-point it has to be admitted that it is precisely this situation that dictates a fast rate of development of our industry." (ibid. pp.256-7).

Although, as is characteristic of him, Gorbachev, while discussing industrialisation and collectivisation, leaves out of consideration such important questions as the struggle between capitalism and socialism both internally (within the USSR) and externally (in her relations with the surrounding imperialist countries), concentrating merely on increases in production and productivity and safeguarding the country against foreign threats, he nevertheless appears to be in agreement with Stalin on the question of the rapid rate of industrialisation in the USSR at the time under review:

"Industrialisation in the twenties and thirties really was a very hard trial. But let's now, with hindsight, try to answer the question: 'Was it necessary? Could such a vast country as ours have lived in the twentieth century without being an industrially developed state? There was another reason that also very soon made it clear that we had no option but to step up industrialisation. As early as 1933 the threat of fascism began to grow swiftly. And where would the world now be if the Soviet Union had not blocked the road for Hitler's war machine? Our people routed fascism with the might created by them in the twenties and thirties. Had there been no industrialisation, we would have been unarmed before fascism.

"But we did not find ourselves under the caterpillars of fascism. The whole of Europe had been unable to stop Hitler, but we smashed him. We defeated fascism not only due to the heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers, but also due to our better steel, better tanks and better planes. And all this was forged during our Soviet period." (Perestroika, pp. 39-40).

Collectivisation.

As to collectivisation, its significance lies not only in the fact that it put an end to low productivity and poverty in the countryside, but also in that it eliminated the most numerous class of exploiters in the USSR, the kulak class, the mainstay of capitalist restoration, and transformed the most numerous labouring class in the USSR, the peasant class, from the path of individual farming, which breeds capitalism, to the path of collective, socialist farming. Gorbachev, naturally, ignores this aspect, this world-historic significance of collectivisation. We already know why, for he wants to revert to this kind of farming by way of a solution to the current food problem of the Soviet Union. That is why he and his bank of economic advisers are so keen on the New Economic Policy and the previously-defeated and discredited figures, such as Nikolai Bukharin of Moscow Trials notoriety (of

which more later on). Notwithstanding all this, Gorbachev pays the following tribute, which, for all his carping and snivelling about "serious excesses and blunders in methods and pace" and the "methods and forms" not always according with "socialist principles," is a glowing testimony to the success and significance of collectivisation:

"Or take collectivisation. I know how much fiction, speculation and malicious criticism of us go with this term, let alone the process itself. But even many of the objective students of this period of our history do not seem to be able to grasp the importance, need and inevitability of collectivisation in our country.

"If we are to take a really truthful and scientific look at the circumstances of the time and the special features of the development of our society, Soviet society; if we do not close our eyes to the extreme backwardness of agricultural production, which had no hope of overcoming this backwardness if it remained small scale and fragmented; if, finally, we try to make a correct assessment of the actual results of collectivisation, one simple conclusion is inescapable: collectivisation was a great historic act, the most important social change since 1917. Yes, it proceeded painfully, not without serious excesses and blunders in methods and pace. But further progress for our country would have been impossible without it. Collectivisation provided a social basis for updating the agricultural sector of the economy and made it possible to introduce modern farming methods. It ensured productivity growth and an ultimate increase in output which we could not have obtained had the countryside been left untouched in its previous, virtually medieval, state. Furthermore, collectivisation released considerable resources and many workers needed in other areas of development in our society, above all in industry.

"Collectivisation changed, perhaps not easily and not immediately, the entire way of life of the peasantry, making it possible for them to become a modern, civilised class of society. If it had not been for collectivisation, we could not today even think of producing grain in the amount of 200 million tons, not to mention 250 million tons, as are our plans for the near future. Yet, we have already surpassed the total grain output of the Common Market countries taken together, despite the fact that our population is smaller.

"However, it is true that we still face shortages of many foodstuffs, especially livestock products. But without collectivisation we would not now be producing as much per capita as we do, satisfying for the most part our vital requirements. And, of particular importance, the possibility of hunger and

undernourishment has been eliminated forever in our country. And this had been the scourge of Russia for centuries. In terms of a calorie-rich diet, the Soviet Union definitely ranks among the developed nations. And the main point is that thanks to collectivisation and its over-fifty-year-old history, we have gained the potential to raise, in the course of the restructuring, the entire farming sector to a qualitatively new level." (ibid pp.40-41).

It is impossible to believe that the author of the above-quoted remarks is the very man who, among others, wants to de-collectivise Soviet agriculture as a means of growth, increase in agricultural productivity and a solution to the food problems of the Soviet Union. No wonder his plans have come unstuck, running as they do counter to all historical development.

Astonishingly fast rehabilitation after war.

Gorbachev refers to the awful devastation inflicted on the Soviet Union by the savage Nazi war machine during the Second World War, which left in ruins such centres of culture and industry as the cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Sevastopol, Smolensk, Briansk, Novgorod, Rostov, Kharkov, Orel, Kursk, Voronezh, and many others - with their monuments of culture, picture galleries and palaces, libraries and cathedrals, plundered or destroyed. He then goes on to pay this tribute to the speed and the energy with which the USSR was able to rehabilitate herself and resume the progress of economic construction so badly interrupted by the war:

"In the West they said at that time that Russia would not be able to rise even in a hundred years, that it was out of international politics for a long time ahead because it would focus on healing its wounds somehow. And today they say, some with admiration and others with open hostility, that we are a superpower! We revived and lifted the country on our own, through our own efforts, putting to use the immense potentialities of the socialist system." (ibid. p.41).

And with the following lines, Gorbachev captures the youthful joy, the unprecedented energy and an unrivalled sense of pride with which the builders of a new life, the Soviet people, under the banner of Marxism-Leninism and the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, performed their heroic feats of labour and built their socialist motherland from scratch into a mighty force that went on shortly thereafter to smash to smithereens the Nazi war machine:

"And we cannot but mention one more aspect of the matter which is frequently ignored or hushed up in the West, but without which it is simply impossible to understand us, Soviet people; along with the economic and social achievements, there was also a new life, there was the enthusiasm of the builders of a new world, an inspiration from things new and unusual, a keen feeling of pride that we alone, unassisted and not for the first time, were raising the country on our shoulders. People thirsted for knowledge and culture and mastered them. They rejoiced at life, reared their children, and did their day-to-day chores. All this we did in an entirely new atmosphere which differed greatly from what had been before the Revolution, in an atmosphere of ease, equality and immense opportunities for the working people. We know very well what we received from socialism. In short, people lived and worked creatively at all stages of the peaceful development of our country. Letters which I receive from my compatriots say proudly: sure, we were poorer than others, but our life was more full-blooded and interesting." (ibid. pp.41-42).

What a contrast between the picture painted above and the present-day situation in which the Soviet people find themselves, thanks to the reactionary restorationist policies let loose on the Soviet people by Gorbachev through his *perestroika* and *glasnost*. Now, instead of hope there is pessimism, despair and hopelessness; instead of ideological clarity there is confusion; instead of pride in their achievements, there is increasing nihilism which denounces everything that is truly great in Soviet history; instead of thirst for knowledge and culture in their highest form there is a keenness for everything that is most decadent and pornographic in the capitalist world; instead of an atmosphere of ease, equality, socialist solidarity and immense opportunities for working people there is now an all-pervading atmosphere of anxiety, increasing inequality, bourgeois individualism and lack of opportunities for the working people - all this as a result of the wrecking and vandalism of the centrally-planned socialist economy by the capitalist reforms under Gorbachev's restructuring.

For the first time since the mid-twenties of the present century, the threat of unemployment on a vast scale confronts the Soviet working people as a probability in the near future. The capitalist nature of the reforms which the Gorbachev leadership and the neo-bourgeois intelligentsia are introducing is threatening the position of the working class to such an extent that the latter are increasingly resorting to the weapon of strikes to press their demands. The miners' strike of July 1989 and the current miners'

strikes are a most significant development and an expression of the discontent of the working class with Gorbachev's economic restructuring.

In the past, the Soviet working class did not resort to strikes because it understood the futility of striking against itself; it put up with tremendous hardships, not because of fear of Stalin as the imperialists and Trotskyist snivellers would have us believe, but because it was engaged in building a new life, a new world, for itself, and proudly so. But the bourgeois reforms are threatening the security and stability of the working class and forcing it to strike against bad working conditions, an erosion of living standards, steep increases in the prices of basic necessities of life (food, transport, electricity and housing), widening differentials in the income of the workers and the neo-bourgeois intelligentsia and the black marketeers unleashed through private co-operatives by the Gorbachev reforms, scarcity of basic goods, and the threat of unemployment.

In 1989 just over 7 million man-days were lost through strikes in the USSR, For the whole of 1990 they amounted to 10 million man-days, out of which a colossal 9 million were lost in January/February alone. March 1991 has already cost over 1 million (1,169,000) man-days, and the figure for April, not known yet, promises to be worse still. When the present coal strike is over, we shall know the exact amount of the loss.

Industrial and agricultural output are both down. In the first quarter of 1991, GNP sank by 8%, productivity by 9% and foreign trade by 30%. Such is the contribution of the Gorbachev leadership to the 'development' of Soviet society. The reforms instituted by his administration have set back the development of Soviet society by at least a decade.

Increasingly these strikes are being utilised by demagogues, who use the anger of the working class for advancing and accelerating the introduction of capitalism - a market economy if you please. And this is bound to happen when, after six years of the bourgeois filth published in the Soviet press, the institution of the semi-bourgeois Congress of Deputies as a means of pushing the Party into the sidelines, the CPSU has been downgraded and brought into disrepute to the point of emasculation. Never was the prestige of the CPSU, and of its General Secretary, so low as it is today. Even an ordinary member of the Bolshevik Party in the 'teens, twenties, thirties, forties and fifties, enjoyed greater respect and authority among Soviet people than does Gorbachev today, with ever-increasing calls for his resignation. The CPSU no longer leads, it trails behind the noisy reformists who talk a lot of

nonsense and who, be it said to their disgrace, have wrecked the Soviet economy.

Towards the end of his review of past Soviet history, Gorbachev gives us this assurance:

"Fourteen out of fifteen citizens living in the USSR today were born after the Revolution. And we are still being urged to give up socialism. Why should the Soviet people, who have grown and gained in strength under socialism, abandon that system? We will spare no effort to develop and strengthen socialism. I think that a minimum of the new system's potential has been tapped so far.

"This is why we find strange those proposals - some even sincere - to alter our social system and turn to methods and forms typical of a different social set-up. People who make such suggestions do not realise that this is just impossible even if there were someone wishing to turn the Soviet Union to capitalism. Just think: how can we agree that 1917 was a mistake and all the seventy years of our life, work, effort and battles were also a complete mistake, that we were going in the 'wrong direction'? No, a strict and impartial view of the facts of history suggests only one conclusion: it is the socialist option that has brought formerly backward Russia to the 'right place' - the place the Soviet Union now occupies in human progress.

"We have no reason to speak about the October Revolution and socialism in a low voice, as though ashamed of them. Our successes are immense and indisputable." (ibid. p.42).

Reading the above remarks, one would have thought socialism was safe in the hands of a person who wrote these lines. But alas! This is not so. The same man who says in these remarks that the Soviet people have "grown and gained strength under socialism", that the "minimum of the new system's potential has been tapped so far," that it is "impossible ...to turn the Soviet Union to capitalism," now tells us that there is no other option but to go over to a market economy, to wit, capitalism, in order to strengthen 'socialism'!! Although he tells us above that "we have no reason to speak about the October revolution and socialism in a low voice, as though ashamed of them," yet it is under his leadership that the Soviet press and other media have spewed out the most venomous anti-communist filth aimed at maligning the October revolution and the gains of socialism. Only under his leadership could anti-communist diehards dare to topple Lenin's statues or march past his statues calling him a fascist, organise anti-party and monarchist rallies

on May Day and call for the cancellation of the celebrations connected with the anniversary of the Great October Revolution.

Having written the above glowing tribute to the October revolution and the gains of socialism, Gorbachev says: "But [as Lenin would have said, this is Schedrin's 'but'] we see the past in its entirety and complexity. Our achievements do not prevent us from seeing ... our errors and omissions."

He then goes on to say that the "roots of today's difficulties" have their origin in "events that go deep into the 1930s".

Whereas we were told earlier that the Soviet people made gigantic economic, social and cultural strides during this period, that they thirsted for knowledge and culture and mastered them, that they worked creatively and productively at all the stages of the peaceful development of the USSR, a mere couple of paragraphs later the same writer tells us that during this period the Soviet people were only storing up trouble for the future, Augean stables to be cleared up by our present-day Hercules, that is, Gorbachev.

To do away with, according to Gorbachev, "the dogmatisation of social consciousness and theory" - this "legacy of the past", the 20th Party Congress, he says, "made a great contribution to the theory and practice of socialist construction. During and after, a great attempt was made to turn the helm in the country's advance, to impart an impulse to liberation from the negative aspects of socio-political life engendered by the Stalin personality cult." (ibid. p.43).

Apart from this, there is only one other reference to Stalin - also for the purpose of denigrating him - to which we shall turn shortly.

Although, says Gorbachev, the decisions of the 20th Party Congress "helped through major political, social and ideological measures," the possibilities emerging from the Congress were not used to the full. "The explanation is the subjectivist methods adopted by the leadership under Khrushchev." (ibid). As though writing his own epitaph, Gorbachev adds casually: "Economic management was dominated by improvisation. That leadership's wilful and changing ideas and actions kept society and the Party in a fever. Ambitious and unfounded promises and predictions again produced a gap between words and deeds." (ibid.).

We are not given a clue by Gorbachev as to the nature of the economic, social and ideological measures pushed through at the 20th Party Congress, let alone how they made "a great contribution to the theory and practice of so-

cialist construction." How was it possible, we may be forgiven for asking, that a subjectivist leadership could indeed make a "great contribution to the theory and practice of socialist construction"? Is it not strange that a leadership, the hallmark of whose economic management is dominated by "improvisation," nevertheless is credited with having made this great contribution, having achieved which, thanks to its subjectivism, it is sacked at the October 1964 Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee. Enter Brezhnev and Kosygin, whose measures, "having produced a substantial though temporary effect, ... petered out." (*ibid* p.44).

"The atmosphere of complacency and the interrupted natural process of leadership change gave rise to stagnation and retardation in the country." (*ibid*).

This is what Gorbachev passes off as analysis of the problems of the Soviet Union! Six decades of Soviet history and development are dismissed in a couple of short paragraphs. If the Soviet people made great strides in socialist construction, that has nothing to do with the quality of the leadership; any shortcomings, real or imagined, irrespective of the date or the cause of their origin, can always be laid at the doorstep of Stalin, that icon of revisionist and Trotskyist demonology. Where that would not do, there is always the great subjectivist Khrushchev, with his "great contribution" to the theory and practice of socialism to blame, or better still, Brezhnev, who, if Gorbachev is to be believed, invented stagnation. Notwithstanding his praise in words for the achievements of socialist construction, after reading Gorbachev one is left with a feeling that the Soviet Union has no history, that apart from Lenin only Gorbachev is worthy of a mention in it, that the rest of it can be dismissed and summarised as personality cult, subjectivism and stagnation. This is not science but sorcery. Let us have some modesty, Cde Gorbachev!

The second, and the only other reference, to Stalin in his entire book of 310 pages is this:

However, mention should be made of the period which we call the personality cult period. It has affected our laws and their orientation and, especially, their observance. The emphasis on strict centralisation, administration by injunction, and the existence of a great number of administrative institutions and restrictions belittled the role of law. At some stage this led to arbitrary rule and the reign of lawlessness which had nothing to do with the principles of socialism or the provisions of the 1936 Constitution. Stalin and his close associates

are responsible for those methods of governing the country. Any attempts to justify that lawlessness by political needs, international tension or alleged exacerbation of class struggle in the country are wrong. Violations of law had tragic consequences which we still cannot forget or forgive. The 20th Party Congress made a very harsh assessment of that period." (Perestroika, pp.106-7).

The above paragraph appears under the heading *Observance of Law - An Indisputable Element in Democratisation*. We already know from the previous two articles on *glasnost*, the bourgeois essence of Gorbachev's democratisation, which has been used to malign socialism and its gains - even the Great October Revolution itself - and by which the neo-bourgeois intelligentsia have been given a free rein to question the fundamentals of the science of Marxism-Leninism. Under *perestroika*, capitalist elements, now that central planning has been wrecked, have amassed huge amounts of wealth and are busy amassing even more, not only through 'honest' trading but also through the black market. They are running protection rackets, indulging in drug trafficking and prostitution, and yet they appear to be beyond the law. Yes, we happily admit that in the period, "which we call the personality cult period," such things could never have been tolerated. The long arm of the dictatorship of the proletariat - the very concept of which was laid to rest by Khrushchev the subjectivist at the 20th Party Congress and, presumably according to Gorbachev, this being one of his great contributions to the theory and practice of socialist construction - would have reached these anti-social and anti-communist elements. Yes, no editor of a Soviet newspaper would have been allowed to turn his paper into an anti-communist and pornographic rag; nobody would have dared march past Lenin's statue calling him a fascist, let alone have the audacity to pull it down; no one would have been allowed to run private co-ops and amass huge wealth and inflict misery and scarcity on the Soviet citizens; nobody would have been allowed to de-collectivise agriculture or propagate unemployment as a solution to the problems of the USSR. Anyone who dared do what Gorbachev and his acolytes have been engaged in under his *perestroika*, would have rightly stood trial for wrecking and vandalisation of the Soviet economy and would doubtless have been found guilty. Is it to be surprised at, then, that Gorbachev feels such an affinity for Nikolai Bukharin? During the time, "which we call the personality cult period," there would have been the strict observance and strict enforcement of proletarian law, which makes Gorbachev and his fellow democrats distinctly unhappy

(because his *glasnost*, his democratisation, is diametrically the opposite, serving as it does the interests of the neo- bourgeoisie) about the proletarian legality which prevailed during the so-called personality cult period. This was at the time understood and supported by tens upon tens of millions of Soviet workers, collective and state farmers. They understood that the Party and the Soviet state leadership had their interests at heart, that it was inextricably and closely connected with the masses of people, of whose aspirations and interests it was truly representative. That is why the vast masses of Soviet people responded to the calls and the slogans of the Party with such enthusiasm, joy and pride, of which Gorbachev himself has spoken so eloquently. It is inconceivable that a repressed, and therefore sullen, population would have performed such miraculous feats of construction as the Soviet people did during the period under discussion; is inconceivable that a repressed, and therefore sullen, population would have answered the Party's calls with "enthusiasm" and "pride" and "in an atmosphere of ease, equality and immense opportunities for working people," as did the Soviet people and of which Gorbachev himself speaks so well and so correctly.

Gorbachev offers no proof for his allegation, obviously being of the view that mere assertion is proof. Thus his book *Perestroika* does not offer us any historical analysis, let alone a balanced and unbiased one, of Soviet history, in particular of the period during which Stalin was at the helm of the CPSU, and during which period the USSR made the most spectacular achievements - economic, political, cultural, diplomatic and military - and established itself as a mighty socialist state by smashing all internal and external capitalist enemies. For a slightly better treatment of the subject, for a slightly less biased view of this period, we have to turn to *October Revolution and Perestroika: the Revolution Continues* (a report by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Festive Meeting on the 70th Anniversary of the Great October Revolution held in Moscow on 2 Nov 1987, referred to hereafter as the 87 Report). Here we find him saying:

"There is now much discussion about the role of Stalin in our history. His was an extremely contradictory personality. To remain faithful to historical truth, we have to see both Stalin's incontestable contribution to the struggle for socialism, to the defence of its gains, the gross political errors, and the abuses committed by him and by those around him, for which our people paid a heavy price and which had grave consequences for the life of our society." (p.20).

On the positive side the 87 Report endorses the ideological struggle conducted by Stalin against the 'left' (Trotskyist) and right (Bukharinite) deviations in the CPSU:

"The Party's leading nucleus headed by Joseph Stalin had safeguarded Leninism in an ideological struggle" (*ibid.* p.15).

Trotsky, says the report, "always vacillated and cheated," and "negated the possibility of building socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement." (*ibid.*)

Bukharin and his followers, says the report, also took a mistaken stand and they "soon admitted their mistakes," and further that "his [Bukharin's] theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve." (*ibid.* p.16).

As to the negative side of Stalin, in his 87 Report, Gorbachev emphasises three areas. First that Stalin made an incorrect assessment of the role of the middle peasantry and the great suffering during collectivisation consequent upon this incorrect estimation. Notwithstanding all this, Gorbachev's verdict on collectivisation is: " ... if we assess the significance of collectivisation as a whole in consolidating socialism in the countryside, it was in the final analysis a transformation of fundamental importance." (*ibid.* p.19).

The second allegation made by Gorbachev against Stalin in the 87 Report is that Stalin weakened the Soviet army by having arrested, tried and executed a number of the top commanders. Nevertheless, he goes on to assess Stalin's contribution to the Soviet victory in the Second World War in the following laudatory terms: "A factor in the achievement of victory was the tremendous political will, purposefulness and persistence, ability to organise and discipline people, displayed in the war years by Joseph Stalin." (*ibid.* p.25).

The third aspect of Stalin's negative role, alleges the 87 Report, was the suppression of all dissent and the liquidation of apparently loyal party leaders. Continues the Report:

"It is sometimes said that Stalin did not know of many instances of lawlessness. Documents at our disposal show that this is not so. The guilt of Stalin and his immediate entourage before the Party and the people for the wholesale repressive measures and acts of lawlessness is enormous and unforgivable. This is a lesson for all generations ..." (*ibid.* pp. 21-22).

In a self-annihilatory manner, so characteristic of Gorbachev, and contradicting the earlier correct statement on page 15 that "*the party's leading nucleus headed by Joseph Stalin had safeguarded Leninism in the ideological struggle*," the report, almost casually, goes on to say that "*contrary to the assertions of our ideological opponents the Stalin personality cult was certainly not inevitable. It was alien to the nature of socialism, represented a departure from its fundamental principles, and, therefore, has no justification.*" (ibid. p.21).

If we take together Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and the 87 Report, and the remarks and observations in these two documents on the assessment of the past, in particular his observations on Stalin, we cannot but come to the following amazing and incomprehensible, not to say crazy, conclusion: Here is this alleged demon, Joseph Stalin, possessed of great evil and a warped personality, who, because of his personality cult, while being completely "*alien to the nature of socialism*" and representing "*a departure from its fundamental principles*," nevertheless led "*the Party's leading nucleus*" and "*safeguarded Leninism in the ideological struggle*."! That this same Joseph Stalin decapitated the Red Army and yet "*a factor in the achievement of victory was the tremendous political will, purposefulness and persistence, ability to organise and discipline people, displayed in the war years by Joseph Stalin*"! That, yet again, Joseph Stalin did not correctly understand the role of the middle peasantry (a fine Leninist indeed! He does not apparently understand the role of the middle peasantry and still manages to lead the Party's leading nucleus in safeguarding Leninism!!) and yet managed to lead the successful struggle for collectivisation, which "*consolidated socialism in the countryside*" and which was "*in the final analysis a transformation of fundamental importance ...*" That, furthermore, Joseph Stalin was guilty of "*wholesale repressive measures and acts of lawlessness*," yet a spirit of "*enthusiasm*," and "*keen sense of pride*," permeated the vast masses of the Soviet people, who, being the inspired builders of a new world, rejoiced at each achievement and built socialism "*in an atmosphere of ease, equality and immense opportunities for working people*" (our emphasis)!! And, finally, that Joseph Stalin committed "*gross political errors*" and "*abuses*," and yet "*the viability of the Party's plans, which the masses understood and accepted, and of the slogans and projects permeated with the ideological energy of our revolution manifested itself in the enthusiasm with which millions of Soviet people joined in the efforts to build up national industry*" - an enthusiasm that "*astounded the world.*"

The three specific allegations levelled by Gorbachev against Stalin, and listed above, have no basis in reality. Space does not allow us to deal with these in this article. We shall return to an examination of the same in the next issue. In particular, we shall examine the question of Stalin's understanding of, and attitude towards, the middle peasantry. In connection with the question of the peasantry, we shall endeavour, inter alia, to reveal the secret of Gorbachev's weakness for Bukharin and the class and ideological basis for this affinity.

Chapter 8

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Historical Questions - A reassessment of the past Part II Stalin and the Role of the Peasantry

In the last issue (May-June) of *Lalkar*, we promised to deal with the three specific allegations levelled by Gorbachev against Stalin, these allegations being: First, that Stalin made an incorrect assessment of the role of the peasantry, in particular that of the middle peasantry, consequent upon which, it is alleged, great suffering was caused during collectivisation. Second, that Stalin weakened the Red Army by causing the arrest, trial and execution of top commanders. And finally that he suppressed all dissent and was instrumental in the liquidation of apparently loyal party leaders. We concluded our last article with the remark that these "three specific allegations levelled by Gorbachev ... have no basis in reality. We shall return to an examination of the same in the next issue. In particular, we shall examine the question of Stalin's understanding of, and attitude towards, the middle peasantry. In connection with the question of the peasantry, we shall endeavour, *inter alia*, to reveal the secret of Gorbachev's weakness for Bukharin and ideological basis for this affinity." By way of continuation, and in fulfilment of this promise we have given, we return to the subject.

Space will not permit the treatment of all these three allegations. We therefore confine ourselves in this issue to the peasant question, and will return to the other two in the next issue.

Stalin and the peasantry.

Stalin was doubly fortunate in that not only did he have in Lenin such a giant of a teacher, but also, unlike the puffed up Trotskyite 'Left' and Bukharinite Right deviators, he was modest enough to acknowledge this

fact and to follow faithfully the course charted by Lenin. This is not to deny Stalin's original, and very great contribution, to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory, and even more important to its practice, but merely to stress that Stalin was never possessed of a desire to reinvent the wheel or to discover a new America.

When it comes to the peasant question, even a dilettante in the science of Marxism-Leninism in general, and the history of the Russian revolution in particular, cannot but be aware of the Bolshevik Party's three fundamental slogans on the question of the peasantry. These slogans had been worked out with great care and scientific accuracy by the undisputed leader of the Bolshevik Party and inspirer of the October Revolution, namely, V.I. Lenin, who, in working out the slogans on the peasant question, as indeed on any other question, never for a moment lost sight of the fact that "*the main question of every revolution is the question of state power*". (Lenin, *Collected Works* Russian edition, Vol XXI p. 142). *In the hands of which class, or which classes, is power concentrated; which class, or which classes, must take power - such is 'the main question of every revolution.'*" (J.V. Stalin, *Collected Works* Volume 9 p.207).

Continues Stalin:

"The Party's fundamental strategic slogans, which retain their validity during the whole period of any particular stage of the revolution, cannot be called fundamental slogans if they are not wholly and entirely based on this cardinal thesis of Lenin's. Fundamental slogans are correct slogans only if they are based on a Marxian analysis of class forces, if they indicate the correct plan of disposition of the revolutionary forces on the front of the class struggle, if they help to bring the masses up to the front of the struggle for the victory of the revolution, to the front of the struggle for the seizure of power by the new class, if they help the Party to form a large and powerful political army from among the broad masses of the people, which is essential for the fulfilment of this task." (ibid.)

What were these fundamental strategic slogans, corresponding to different stages of the revolution, on the peasant question?

Slogan number one: "*Together with the whole of the peasantry, against the tsar and the landlords, with the bourgeoisie neutralised, for the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.*" - this was the fundamental slogan during the first stage of the Russian Revolution. This is how Lenin formulated the

Party's slogan in the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution:

"The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie." (Lenin, *Two Tactics of Social Democracy*).

Slogan number two: "*Together with the poor peasantry, against capitalism in town and country, with the middle peasantry neutralised, for the power of the proletariat.*" This was the fundamental slogan during the second stage of the revolution. This is how Lenin formulated the Party's slogan in the period of preparation for the proletarian socialist revolution:

"The proletariat must accomplish the Socialist revolution by allying to itself the mass of semi-proletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie." (ibid.).

Explaining to Yan-Sky, and emphasising the "profound difference" between the above two strategic slogans, Stalin remarks: "*As you see, Lenin repeatedly emphasised the profound difference between the first strategic slogan, the slogan of the period of preparation for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and the second strategic slogan, the slogan of the period of preparation for the October Revolution. The first slogan was: together with the whole of the peasantry against the autocracy; the second slogan: together with the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie."* (ibid., p.218, Stalin's emphasis).

Slogan number three: "*While relying on the poor peasants and establishing a durable alliance with the middle peasants, march forward towards Socialist construction!*" This was the fundamental slogan of the Bolshevik Party as from the early part of 1919, that is, from the period connected with the commencement of socialist construction. This is how Lenin expressed himself on this question in March 1919, at the opening of the Eighth Congress of the Party:

"The best representatives of Socialism of the old days - when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically and ideologically - spoke of neutralising the peasantry, i.e., of turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum, which, if it did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least would not hinder it, would remain neutral and would not take the side of our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem is perfectly clear to us. But it is not enough. We have entered a phase of Socialist con-

struction in which we must draw up concrete and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested by the experience of our work in the rural districts, by which we must be guided in order to achieve a stable alliance with the middle peasantry." (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol 29 p. 144).

Correcting Yan-sky, who mistakenly believed that the Bolshevik Party "adopted the policy of neutralising the middle peasant, not in the period of preparation for October and during October, but after October, and particularly after 1918, when the Committees of Poor Peasants were abolished, Stalin goes on to say:

"That is entirely wrong, Comrade Yan-sky. On the contrary, the policy of neutralising the middle peasant did not begin, but ended when the Committees of Poor Peasants were abolished, after 1918. The policy of neutralising the middle peasant was abandoned (and not introduced) ... after 1918." (J.V. Stalin, ibid p.219 - emphasis as in the original).

And further:

"The middle peasant snivelled and vacillated between revolution and counter-revolution as long as the bourgeoisie was being overthrown and as long as the Soviet power was not consolidated; therefore it was necessary to neutralise him. The middle peasant began to turn towards us when he began to realise that the bourgeoisie had been overthrown 'for good', that Soviet power was being consolidated, that the kulak was being overcome and that the Red Army was beginning to achieve victory on the fronts of the Civil War. And it was precisely after such a change that the third strategic slogan of the Party, announced by Lenin at the Eighth Party Congress, became possible, namely: while relying on the poor peasants and establishing durable alliance with the middle peasants, march forward towards socialist construction!" (ibid. p.220).

These, then, were the Bolshevik Party's three fundamental strategic slogans on the peasant question, by implementing which slogans the Bolshevik Party successfully approached the February 1917 bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then successfully marched towards October and finally triumphantly constructed socialism in town and country - in industry and agriculture. The correctness of these (above) slogans has been eloquently confirmed by the march of events. Only with the help, and implementation, of these correct slogans, based on a correct Marxist analysis of class forces, was it possible for the Bolshevik Party to bring the masses "to the front of struggle for the victory of the revolution" and to form "a large powerful political army from among the broad masses of the people" for the fulfilment of the

historic tasks of overthrowing tsarist autocracy, establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, and marching triumphantly to the construction of socialism. To confirm that these slogans were known to, and, more importantly, fully understood by, Joseph Stalin, all that Gorbachev has to do is to get hold of Volume 9 of Stalin's *Collected Works* and read the seventeen pages which comprise the article *The Party's Three Fundamental Slogans on the Peasant Question, Reply to Yan-sky*. Stalin's writings are littered with references to the Bolshevik Party's stance on the peasant question. We have chosen this particular article because in it Stalin, in his inimitable style, disposes of a very difficult and complicated topic in a manner which is succinct and yet comprehensive. Although Stalin's writings have long been suppressed by the revisionist rulers of the USSR (and Gorbachev's *glasnost* has not made any change in this regard) one must presume that these writings are still in Soviet archives and there ought not to be any difficulty in Gorbachev having access to them. More importantly, although the first two slogans on the peasant question were put into effect during the lifetime of Lenin, the third slogan, that of durable alliance with the middle peasantry, although announced by Lenin in March 1919, was by and large put into effect, was implemented, under Stalin's leadership. And had Stalin got it wrong, far from leading the struggle for the successful building of socialism in the countryside, he would have brought Soviet power to a virtual collapse. Anyone who has made even a casual study of the struggle waged by the Bolshevik Party, under the leadership of Stalin (after the death of Lenin in January 1924) against the 'Left' Trotskyist-Zinovievite and Right Bukharinite deviations cannot but be convinced of the correctness of the Leninist line of the Bolshevik Party. In the interests of those readers who have no knowledge of this controversy, and in order to refute Gorbachev's groundless first allegation, we shall briefly delve into this controversy.

Two deviations from the Party's Leninist line on Collectivisation.

First Deviation - The 'left' (Trotskyist) deviation.

Briefly, the 'left' (Trotskyist) deviation can be summed up as follows: it saw the ENTIRE peasantry as nothing but an instrument for the restoration of capitalism; it looked upon the basic mass of the peasantry as a reactionary mass which could not be relied upon, and, therefore, advocated, not an alliance with this basic mass, but a "discord" with it; and above all, it believed in the impossibility of successfully building socialism in one country taken

separately. All this explains the adventurism characteristic of the policies advocated by the Trotskyists. And this adventurism alone explains why Trotsky and Zinoviev tried to force on the Party full-scale collectivisation at the 14th Congress (December 1925) of the Party. The Party had little difficulty in rejecting this piece of Trotskyist adventurism, for reasons to be made clear shortly.

Since the rejection of this policy of adventurism, the Trotskyists spread the legend that collectivisation was undertaken too late, that the Party and Stalin did not realise the bestial nature of the kulak until the latter attempted in 1928 to threaten the very existence of the Soviet regime by refusing to sell grain to the Soviet state and thus presenting the towns and the Red Army with the spectre of starvation and famine. This accusation is baseless, founded as it is upon the substitution of wishful thinking for actual reality, which is typical of Trotskyism. We shall not waste time on refuting the assertion that the Party did not understand the bestial nature of the kulaks. We shall merely direct the reader to Lenin's writings in which he refers to the kulaks as "most bestial, brutal and savage exploiters" and as "bloodsuckers," "spiders," "leeches" and "vampires". *And all this was known to Stalin, for he, unlike the pompous Trotskyists and Bukharinites, knew AND understood each of Lenin's writings, and more importantly, spent all his life safeguarding Leninism and putting it into practice.*

The question, therefore, arises: in view of such enormous significance of collectivisation and of the necessity of eliminating the kulaks as a class, why was collectivisation not embarked upon earlier and why were the kulaks not eliminated earlier than they actually were? Why did the Bolshevik Party, as far back as the Eighth Party Congress proclaim the policy of RESTRICTING the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, rather than proclaim a policy of elimination of the kulaks as a class? Why did the Party reject the Trotskyist demand for elimination of the kulaks in 1926? the answer lies in the fact that had the Party undertaken an offensive against the kulaks without preparing the necessary conditions for the successful outcome of this offensive, then such an offensive would have proved to be the most reckless adventurism and would certainly have failed. And failure would have meant the strengthening of the kulaks. An offensive against the kulaks at an earlier time, say 1926-27, would certainly have failed, because at that time there did not exist in the Soviet countryside a wide network of state farms and collective farms which could furnish the basis for a determined struggle against the kulaks, because at that time the Soviet state was unable to replace the

capitalist kulak production by the socialist production of state farms and collective farms. Here is what Comrade Stalin says on the point under consideration:

"In 1926-1927, The Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party the policy of an immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party did not embark on that dangerous adventure, for it knew that serious people cannot afford to play at an offensive. An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It should not be confused with declamations against the kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of pinpricks against the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would be mere declamation, pin-pricks, phrasemongering, anything but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that we must prepare for it and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent them from rising to their feet again. That is what we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken such an offensive some five years or three years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not.

"Indeed, in 1927 the kulaks produced over 600,000,000 poods of grain, about 130,000,000 poods of which they marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much did our collective farms and state farms produce at that time? About 80,000,000 poods, of which about 35,000,000 poods were sent to the market (marketable grain). Judge for yourselves, could we at that time have REPLACED the kulak output and kulak marketable grain by the output and marketable grain of our collective farms and state farms? Obviously, we could not.

"What would it have meant to launch a determined offensive against the kulaks under such conditions? It would have meant certain failure, strengthening the position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That is why we could not and should not have undertaken a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time, in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition." (Collected Works, Vol.12 pp.174-5).

This then explains why the kulaks, why these "bloodsuckers", these "spiders" these "leeches", and these "vampires" were tolerated and why the Party pursued the policy of RESTRICTING their exploiting tendencies rather than that of their outright elimination. This then explains why the Party at its Eighth Congress adopted the policy of RESTRICTING the ex-

plotting tendencies of the kulaks, why this policy was again announced at the Eleventh Party Congress at the time of the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), why this policy was confirmed by the Fifteenth Congress of the Party, and why the Party pursued this line right up to the summer of 1929.

As Comrade Stalin correctly remarked: *"the proclamation of a slogan is not enough to cause the peasantry to turn en masse towards socialism."*

The Trotskyist recipe for disaster through "discord" with the peasantry versus the Leninist formula for building socialism through a "stable alliance" with the main mass of the peasantry.

If the 'left' (Trotskyist) deviation had gained ascendancy in the Party, the result would have been the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. For what the Trotskyists were advocating amounted to no less than a declaration of civil war against the main mass of the peasantry, namely, the middle peasantry (60% of peasants being middle peasants at that time). The declaration of such a civil war against the middle peasantry would have meant the bringing of the Soviet regime into a "hostile collision" with the main mass of the peasantry. And such a "hostile collision" could not but represent a most serious danger to the very existence of the Soviet regime. Small wonder that the Party rejected such an adventurist 'policy' advocated by Trotskyism.

Anyone who is in the least acquainted with Trotskyism would not be surprised by Trotskyism's advocacy of the above adventurist policy towards the main mass of the peasantry. Such an adventurist policy is the direct outcome of Trotsky's notorious theory of 'permanent revolution', which denies the revolutionary role of the peasantry and which claims that it is impossible to build socialism in a single country; according to this theory of 'permanent revolution' it is impossible for the working class to lead the main mass of the peasantry into the channel of socialist construction. Here are of few pronouncements of Trotsky on the matter in hand:

"The contradictions in the position of a workers' government in a backward country with an overwhelming peasant population can be solved only on an international scale in the arena of the world proletarian revolution" (Preface to Trotsky's book *The Year 1905*), and

"Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant." (*Our Revolution*), and

"It would be hopeless to think ... that, for example, a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a Conservative Europe." (*Works* Vol III pt. 1, p.90).

Is it surprising then that Trotsky, who, flying in the face of all reality, so stubbornly held on to the above reactionary views, should have advocated a policy that would, if put into practice, have turned into reality his reactionary fantasia? Had Trotsky's line been followed, the working class of Russia would doubtless have been unable to maintain itself in power.

Zinoviev, Trotsky's ally in opposing the Party's Leninist line on the peasant question, also did not believe in an alliance between the working class and the middle peasantry; instead he, departing from Leninism, advocated the neutralisation of the middle peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Here is what Zinoviev, who at the time was the chairman of the Comintern, wrote on this score in the *Pravda* of 18 January 1925:

"There are a number of tasks which are ABSOLUTELY COMMON TO ALL THE PARTIES OF THE COMINTERN. Such, for example, are ... the proper approach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agricultural population of the whole world, which can and must be won over by us and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural proletariat, the semi-proletarians - the small-holder peasants - and the small peasantry who do not hire labour). There is another stratum of the peasantry (the middle peasants) which must be at least NEUTRALISED BY US." (quoted according to Stalin, *Collected Works* Vol 7, pp. 381-2).

The Trotskyist opposition's chief economist, Preobrazhensky, even went so far as to declare the peasantry a "colony" for socialist industry, as an object to be exploited to the utmost.

Smirnov, another leader of the opposition, openly advocated "discord" with the middle peasants:

"We say that our state budget must be revised in such a way that the greater part of this five thousand million budget should flow into industry, for IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR US TO PUT UP WITH DISCORD WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANTS THAN TO INVITE CERTAIN DOOM" (Smirnov, speech delivered at the Rogzhsko-Simonovsky District Party Conference, 1927, quoted according to Stalin, *Collected Works* Vol 10, p.262).

One has only to compare the above-quoted pronouncements of the Trotskyist opposition with the following passages from Comrade Lenin's writings to realise what a deep chasm divides Trotskyism from Leninism.

Whereas according to Trotskyism "Without direct state support from the European proletariat, the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in power ...", let alone build socialism, according to Leninism:

"Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)" (V.I. Lenin, *Outline of the Pamphlet THE TAX IN KIND*, *Collected Works* Vol 32 pages 302-3).

Whereas Trotskyism advocated "discord with the middle peasants" as the best method of avoiding "certain doom", Leninism, on the contrary, advocates an alliance with the basic mass of the peasantry as the only means of ensuring the leading role of the proletariat and the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"... the supreme principle," said Lenin, "of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat may retain its leading role and state power." (*Report on the Tactics of the RCP(B)*, delivered at the Third Congress of the Comintern, 5 July, 1921, *Collected Works* Vol 32 p. 466).

Thus it is clear that according to Leninism, it is impossible to build socialism successfully without "a stable alliance with the middle peasants" (*Lenin, opening speech at the 8th Congress of the RCP(B)*, 18 March, 1919, *Collected Works* Vol 29, p.125).

According to Trotskyism, however, "discord with the middle peasants" is the only means of avoiding "certain doom" (Smirnov, see above).

And it must not be forgotten that then, in 1927, the middle peasantry constituted 60% of the entire peasantry. A discord with the middle peasantry would, therefore, have meant driving it into the arms of the kulaks, strengthening the latter and isolating the poor peasants; in other words, a discord of the nature advocated by Trotskyism would have meant the starting of a civil war in the countryside and weakening the Soviet rule in the countryside most dangerously. Such is the logic of Trotskyism - its intentions notwithstanding. Here is how Comrade Stalin described the discrepancy between the opposition's desires (its good intentions) and the

inevitable disastrous results of its policy of discord with the middle peasantry.

"I am far from accusing the opposition of deliberately striving for all these misfortunes. It is not, however, a matter of what the opposition desires and is striving for, but of the results that must inevitably follow from the opposition's policy of discord with the middle peasantry.

"The same thing is happening to the opposition here as happened with the bear in Krylov's fable The Hermit and the Bear. (Laughter). It goes without saying that the bear's intention in smashing the head of his friend the Hermit with a lump of rock was to deliver him from the importunate fly. The bear was prompted by the friendliest motives. Nevertheless, the bear's friendly motives led to an action that was far from friendly, and for which the hermit paid with his life. Of course, the opposition wishes the revolution nothing but good. But to achieve this it proposes such means as would result in the utter defeat of the revolution, in the utter defeat of the working class and the peasantry, in the disruption of all our work of construction.

The opposition's 'platform' is a platform for the rupture of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, a platform for the disruption of all our work of construction, a platform for the disruption of the work of industrialisation." (*Collected Works*, Vol 10 0. 265).

The year 1929 and the turn of the peasantry towards collectivisation.

By the second half of 1929, however, the picture had changed drastically, and there were present all the pre-requisites for a determined offensive against the kulaks and for their elimination as a class. What were these pre-requisites? These were the following:

FIRST: the state farms and the collective farms had been developed to a degree that they were able to replace kulak farming as regards the latter's marketable output. In 1929 the collective farms alone produced 29,100,000 centners of grain, of which 12,700,000 centners was marketable gain. Explaining why it was not possible to strike at the kulaks in 1927, and why an offensive against the kulaks had become a reality in 1929, this is how Comrade Stalin characterised the changes that had taken place since 1927, which made it possible for the Party to undertake a real Leninist offensive against the kulaks as opposed to Trotskyist declamations and phrasemongering against the kulak:

"But today? What is the position now? Today, we have an adequate material base for us to strike at the kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class, and to REPLACE their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 the grain produced on the collective farms and state farms has amounted to not less than 400,000,000 poods (200,000,000 poods less than the gross output of the kulak farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective farms and state farms have supplied more than 130,000,000 poods of marketable grain (i.e., more than the kulaks in 1927). Lastly you know that in 1930 the gross output of the collective farms and state farms will amount to not less than 900,000,000 poods of grain (i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), and their output of marketable grain will be not less than 400,000,000 poods (i.e., incomparably more than the kulaks supplied in 1927).

"That is how matters stand with us now, comrades.

"There you have the change that has taken place in the economy of our country.

"Now, as you see, we have the material base which enables us to REPLACE the kulak output by the output of the collective farms and state farms. It is for this very reason that our determined offensive against the kulaks is now meeting with undeniable success.

"That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive and not mere futile declamations against the kulaks.

"That is why we have recently passed from the policy of RESTRICTING the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS." (Collected Works, Vol. 12, pp. 175-6).

SECOND, the Soviet state and industry was now in a position to help the collective farm movement through credit facilities and the supply of machines and tractors. In 1927-28, the Soviet government assigned 76,000,000 roubles for financing collective farms; in 1928-29 - 170,000 roubles, and in 1929-30 - 473,000,000 roubles were assigned. In addition 65,000,000 roubles were assigned during the same period for the collectivisation fund. Privileges were accorded to collective farms which increased their resources by 200,000,000 roubles. For use on collective-farm fields, the state supplied not less than 30,000 tractors with a total of 400,000 horse power, not taking into account the 7,000 tractors of the Tractor Centres which served the collective farms, and the assistance by way of tractors rendered by the state

farms to the collective farms. In 1929-30 the collective farms were granted seed loans and seed assistance to the amount of 10,000,000 centners of grain (61 million poods). Lastly, the collective farms were greatly helped by the direct organisational assistance given them in the setting up of more than 7,000 machine and tractor stations.

The result of all these measures was a forty-fold increase in the crop area of collective farms in three years, and a fifty-fold increase in the grain output of the collective farms (with an increase in its marketable part of more than forty-fold) during the same three years, i.e., 1927-29.

THIRD, the turn of the peasantry towards socialism, towards collectivisation. This turn did not arise all of a sudden in an accidental or spontaneous way; it had to be prepared for in a scientific manner and through hard struggle over a number of years, in which the Party led the people in clearing one obstacle after another from the path leading to collectivisation. Here is how Comrade Stalin described the process of development on the basis of which arose in the latter half of 1929 the mighty mass collective-farm movement of millions of poor and middle peasants:

"The turn of the peasantry towards collectivisation did not begin all at once. Moreover, it could not begin all at once. True, the Party proclaimed the slogan of collectivisation already at the Fifteenth Congress; but the proclamation of a slogan is not enough to cause the peasantry to turn en masse towards socialism. At least one more circumstance is needed for this, namely, that the masses of the peasantry themselves should be convinced that the slogan proclaimed is a correct one and that they should accept it as their own. Therefore, this turn was prepared gradually.

"It was prepared by the whole course of our development, by the whole course of development of our industry and above all by the development of the industry that supplies machines and tractors for agriculture. It was prepared by the policy of resolutely fighting the kulaks and by the course of our grain procurements in the new forms that they assumed in 1928 and 1929, which placed kulak farming under the control of the poor-and middle-peasant masses. It was prepared by the development of the agricultural co-operatives, which train the individualist peasant in collective methods. It was prepared by the network of collective farms, in which the peasantry verified the advantages of collective forms of farming over individual farming. Lastly, it was prepared by the network of state farms, spread over the whole of the USSR, and equipped with

modern machines, which enabled the peasants to convince themselves of the potency and superiority of modern machines.

"It would be a mistake to regard our state farms only as sources of grain supplies. Actually, the state farms, with their modern machines, with the assistance they render the peasants in their vicinity, and the unprecedented scope of their farming, were the leading force that facilitated the turn of the peasant masses and brought them on to the path of collectivisation.

"There you have the basis on which arose that mass collective-farm movement of millions of poor and middle peasants which began in the latter half of 1929, and which ushered in a period of great change in the life of our country." (Collected Works Vol. 12, pp. 288-89, Report to the 16th Congress).

From the foregoing it is perfectly clear that the Bolshevik Party's policy on collectivisation was a Leninist policy and the only correct policy. It is equally clear that the policy advocated by Trotskyism was fraught with the most dangerous and desperate adventurism, and, had this policy been put into practice, the result would have been certain doom. We can now say that the Bolshevik Party was a thousand times right in rejecting the Trotskyist demands for striking at the kulaks in 1926-27; also the Party was a thousand times right in 1929, having already prepared the necessary basis, in launching an offensive against the kulaks; the party was perfectly justified in 1929 in passing from the policy, followed hitherto, of RESTRICTING the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of ELIMINATING THE KULAKS AS A CLASS.

The elimination of the kulaks as a class was not simply an administrative affair, as the Trotskyists thought; it was a matter of supreme economic importance. The class of kulaks could not be wished away with a Trotskyist decree, it could only be eliminated by taking concrete economic measures (of the type outlined earlier above) and preparing the necessary economic and political conditions. As Comrade Stalin says:

"Those comrades are wrong who think that it is possible and necessary to put an end to the kulaks by means of administrative measures, through the GPU: give an order, affix a seal, and that settles it. That is an easy way, but it is far from being effective. The kulak must be defeated by means of economic measures and in conformity with Soviet law. Soviet law, however, is not a mere phrase. This does not, of course, preclude the taking of certain administrative measures against the kulaks. But administrative measures must not take the place of economic measures." (Collected Works, Vol 10 p. 319).

What is more, the time for launching an all-out offensive against the kulaks had to be right; any mistake on this score meant playing at an offensive against the kulaks, meant risking the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat. One of the chief characteristics of Leninist leadership, of Bolshevik tactics, is to choose the correct time and the proper ground for launching an offensive against the enemies of socialism. To put this in the apt language of Comrade Stalin:

"The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless of whether the masses are ready to support this or that step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists in being able to choose the time and place and to take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate fire on the front where the maximum results are to be attained most quickly." (Collected Works Vol.11 p. 55).

When the Party had, however, already passed from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, Trotsky, who, as we have seen, had advocated de-kulakisation as early as the period immediately following the 14th Congress (1926-27), demanded the abandonment of the Party's policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. In his *Open letter to the members of the CPSU*, 23 March, 1930, Trotsky demanded that the Party should:

"Bring the collective farms into line with their real sources of support";

"... abandon the policy of 'de-kulakisation'"

"... hold the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks in check for a long number of years."

And that:

"The guiding principle in relation to the kulaks must be an iron 'contract system'" [under which the kulaks were to supply the state with a certain quantity of their produce at fixed prices].

This is characteristic Trotskyism; Trotskyism with its truly absurd, anti-dialectical and reactionary content - de-kulakisation in 1926 and abandonment of the policy of de-kulakisation in 1930!

As if this absurdity were not good enough, Trotsky supplemented it by a new edition, as it were, in 1933. In 1933, when collectivisation in the main had already been achieved, Trotsky in the issues of his *Bulletin* demanded the dissolution of the state farms, on the grounds that they did not pay; the

dissolution of the majority of the collective farms, on the grounds they were fictitious; the abandonment of the policy of eliminating the kulaks. And in the field of industry, Trotsky demanded a reversion to the policy of concessions and the leasing to concessionaires of a number of Soviet industrial enterprises on the grounds that they did not pay.

Comrade Stalin was perfectly justified in characterising this Trotskyist programme as counter-revolutionary and as one of restoration of capitalism:

"There you have the programme of these contemptible cowards and capitulators - their counter-revolutionary programme of restoring capitalism in the USSR!" (Vol. 13 p.370).

This is how the 'Left' Trotsky unmasked himself and revealed his true Rightness for all to see.

Having dealt with the 'Left' opportunist deviation above, let us now turn to Right opportunist deviation from the Leninist line of the Party.

The Right opportunist [Bukharinite] deviation

Whereas the 'Left' (Trotskyist) opportunists overestimated the strength of capitalism, did not believe in the possibility of the USSR successfully building socialism by its own efforts - without the aid of victorious revolution in Western Europe, and did not, therefore, favour even the idea of an alliance with the basic mass of the peasantry, the Right (Bukharinite) opportunists went to the other extreme, in that they underestimated the strength of capitalism, declared themselves in favour of any kind of alliance with the entire peasantry including the kulaks, and, disregarding the mechanics of class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, proclaimed that the kulaks will automatically "grow into Socialism". (Bukharin: *The Path to Socialism*). Bukharin's group maintained that with the advance of socialism and the development of socialist forms of economy, the class struggle would subside. This Right opportunist theory advocated by Bukharin's group presented a most serious danger to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Its harm lay " ... in the fact that it lulls the working class to sleep, undermines the mobilised preparedness of the revolutionary forces of our country, demobilises the working class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist elements against the Soviet government." (Stalin, *Collected Works* Vol 12 p.41).

And so it did. By the beginning of 1928, the kulaks, realising that the NEP, far from leading to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR as they had expected and hoped for, was, on the contrary, leading to the weakening and the rout of capitalist elements in the countryside and to the consolidation of socialism, began organised resistance to the Soviet regime. From 1928, this resistance assumed most acute forms. The resistance of the kulaks was a most eloquent proof of (a) the fact that the socialist offensive against the capitalist elements was proceeding full steam ahead and according to plan; that the kulaks were, therefore, feeling the pinch, and had either to decide to resist desperately or to retire from the scene voluntarily, and (b) the fact that the capitalist elements had no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily. Comrade Stalin was absolutely right when, countering Bukharin's Right opportunist fairy-tales regarding the subsidence of class struggle, he expressed himself in the following never-to-be-forgotten words:

"It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for our advance, that then we shall again advance and they will again retreat until 'unexpectedly' all the social groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, both workers and capitalists, find themselves 'suddenly' and 'imperceptibly', without struggle or commotion, in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.

"It never has been and never will be the case that a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without attempting to organise resistance. It never has been and never will be the case that the working class could advance towards socialism in a class society without struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements to resist the advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle.

"That is why the working class must not be lulled with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary role." (*Collected Works* Vol 11 p.180).

Notwithstanding Bukharin's silly little fables regarding the subsidence of the class struggle and the miracle of kulaks "growing into socialism", the latter (the kulaks) began serious organised resistance to the Soviet government. And who but Bukharin and his group should come up in the Party to defend the kulak interests? The Bukharinites represented the decay of kulak farming as a decay of agriculture in the USSR. They demanded the

slowing down of the rate of industrial development, relaxation of the monopoly of foreign trade, relegation of collectivisation to the background, and all-round concessions to the capitalist elements.

The first serious attack from the kulaks came at the time of the grain procurement crisis of January 1928. The kulaks refused to sell grain to the Soviet state; the Soviet government found itself with a grain deficit of 130 million poods. In the absence of any reserves, the Soviet government could not but resort to emergency measures, such as the application of Article 107 of the Criminal Code, which had the effect, in the case of the kulaks refusing to sell grain, of the latter's grain being confiscated. The application of emergency measures, which, despite individual distortions here and there, were a great success and had the desired effect of procuring from the kulaks the necessary supplies of grain required by the state, enraged the Bukharinites. Under the guise of combating "excesses", the Bukharinites were in fact engaged in combating the Party's correct policy and in the defence of the kulaks. Here is how Comrade Stalin exposed this fraudulent opportunist trick of the Bukharinites:

"The most fashionable word just now among Bukharin's group is the word 'excesses' in grain procurements. That word is the most current commodity among them, since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When they want to mask their own line they usually say: we, of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to bear upon the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses which are being committed in this sphere and which hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate stories of the 'horrors' of these excesses; they read letters from 'peasants', panic-stricken letters from comrades, such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy of bringing pressure to bear on the kulaks must be abandoned.

"How do you like that? BECAUSE excesses are committed in carrying out a correct policy, THAT CORRECT POLICY, it seems, MUST BE ABANDONED. That is the usual trick of the opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed in carrying out a correct line, abolish that line and replace it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the supporters of Bukharin's group very carefully hush up the fact that there is another kind of excesses, more dangerous and more harmful - namely, excesses in the direction of merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation to the well-to-do strata of the rural population, in the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviators.

"Of course, we are all opposed to these excesses. None of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to hurt the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can be no doubt about it. But we are most emphatically opposed to the chatter about excesses, in which Bukharin's group so zealously indulges, being used to scuttle the revolutionary policy of our Party and replace it by the opportunist policy of Bukharin's group. No, that trick of theirs won't work.

"Point out at least one political measure taken by the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that we must combat excesses. But can one ON THESE GROUNDS decry the line itself, which is the only correct line?"

"Take a measure like the introduction of the seven-hour day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in the recent period. Who does not know that this measure, which by its nature is a profoundly revolutionary one, is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a most objectionable kind? does that mean we ought to abandon the policy of introducing the 7-hour day?"

"Do the supporters of the Bukharin opposition understand what a mess they are getting into in playing up the excesses committed during the grain-procurement campaign?" (Collected Works, Vol.12 pp.96-97).

In defence of the kulak interests, Bukharin's group went as far as accusing the Party of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation towards the peasantry. It scarcely needs proof that Bukharin's group borrowed this weapon against the Party from the arsenal of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

"In the history of our Party I cannot recall any other instance of the Party being accused of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation. That weapon against the Party was not borrowed from the arsenal of Marxists. Where, then, was it borrowed from? From the arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. When the Cadets wish to sow dissension between the working class and the peasantry, they usually say: You, Messieurs the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry about the 'tribute', he is singing to the tune of Messieurs the Milyukovs, and is following in the wake of the enemies of the people." (Vol.12 p. 59).

Bukharin's group was opposed to the fight against the kulaks; it was in favour of an alliance of the working class with the ENTIRE peasantry, including the kulaks. The Party, however, was most emphatically opposed to such an alliance.

"No, comrades, such an alliance [of the type advocated by Bukharin and his group] we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when the power of the working class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist in nature, comrades. (Laughter and applause). Our policy is a class policy." (Collected Works, Vol 11 p. 52).

Leninism certainly stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, but, according to Leninism, the whole purpose of the alliance of the working class with the basic mass of the peasantry is to ensure the leading role of the working class, to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, and to create the necessary conditions - material and spiritual (cultural) - which facilitate the abolition of the classes. In brief, Leninism stands for a stable alliance with the main mass of the peasantry (kulaks EXCLUDED), with the ultimate aim of abolishing classes; Leninism does not stand for just any kind of alliance. Here is how Comrade Lenin expressed himself on the subject:

"Agreement between the working class and the peasantry may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in mind that, from the point of view of the working class, agreement is permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures aimed at the abolition of classes, then the formula of agreement between the working class and the peasantry remains, of course, a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet regime and all the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe." (Collected Works).

And further:

"At present," says Lenin, "the proletariat holds power and guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the peasantry mean? It means, in the first place, pursuing a course towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. If we wandered away from this radical and main course we should cease to be Socialists and should find ourselves in the camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies of the proletariat."

The alliance with the peasantry advocated by Bukharin, however, meant an alliance not only with the middle peasantry but also with the kulaks. It scarcely needs proof that such an alliance, far from securing the leading role of the proletariat, strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat, and facilitating the abolition of classes, would have led to the negation of the leading role of the proletariat, the weakening of its dictatorship, and the perpetuation of classes, for only an alliance with the middle peasantry, which is at the same time an alliance against the kulaks - only such an alliance can pave the way in the direction of the abolition of classes. Classes can only be abolished through class struggle against the exploiters - against the kulaks and other capitalist elements - and not through an alliance with the latter.

It scarcely needs proof that Bukharin's Right opportunist group with its opportunist policies had to be defeated. Without its defeat, there would have been a sure restoration of capitalism in the USSR in the early 1930s. It must be said to the credit, glory and honour of the Bolshevik Party and its leader at the time, Comrade Stalin, that the Right opportunists of Bukharin's group were just as assuredly routed as those of the 'Left' opportunist Trotsky-Zinoviev group. The defeated groups joined forces subsequently (just as they had done previously) in opposition to the Party, thus demonstrating their anti-Leninist and Right-reactionary essence. There was no difference between the two except of form of platform. The truth remains that the programme of the 'Lefts' led just as much as that of the Rights in the direction of restoration of capitalism. It is in this sense and because of this that Marxist-Leninists have always maintained that 'Lefts' too are in fact Rights. Here is how Comrade Stalin characterised the Right (Bukharinite) and 'Left' (Trotskyite) opportunists, bringing out what was common to both, namely, their respective platforms for the restoration of capitalism, albeit through different routes:-

"Where does the danger of the RIGHT, frankly opportunist, deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it UNDERESTIMATES the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism: it does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions for the capitalist elements in town and country, demanding that the question of collective farms and state farms be

relegated to the background, demanding that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc.

"There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat and increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in our country.

"Where does the danger of the 'LEFT' (Trotskyist) deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it OVERESTIMATES the strength of our enemies, the strength of capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter about Thermidor tendencies in our Party.

"From the words of Lenin that 'as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism', the 'Left' deviation draws the false conclusion that it is impossible to build socialism in the USSR at all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that the idea of an alliance between the working class and the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR must fall or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a split with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the USSR must be regarded as doomed.

"Hence the adventurism in the policy of the 'Left' deviation. Hence its 'superhuman' leaps in the sphere of policy.

"There is no doubt that the triumph of the 'Left' deviation in our Party would lead to the working class being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the working class being separated from the rest of the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the proletariat and to facilitating the conditions for the restoration of capitalism.

"You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the 'Left' and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist line, the Right and the 'Left', lead to the same result, although from different directions." (Collected Works, Vol 11 pp. 240-1).

The only difference is that the 'Lefts' (Trotskyites) use ultra- 'Left' phrases, which incidentally explains

"... why the 'Lefts' sometimes succeed in luring a part of the workers over to their side with the help of high-sounding 'Left' phrases and by posing as the most determined opponents of the Rights, although all the world knows that they, the 'Lefts', have the same social roots as the Rights, and that they not infrequently join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order to fight the Leninist line." (Stalin, *Collected Works* vol 11 p. 291).

Before proceeding further, it may be said in passing that most of the criticisms levelled by the ordinary bourgeois at the Bolshevik Party's Leninist line on collectivisation are based on the platforms and line of argumentation of the bourgeois socialists within the Bolshevik Party, namely, the 'Left' (Trotskyist) opportunists and the Right (Bukharinite) deviators. Nor could it be otherwise, for the platforms of the 'Left' and Right opportunists were platforms of capitalist restoration, albeit in a disguised form and couched in even Marxian terminology. Hence the concurrence in the views of the ordinary bourgeois on the one hand, and 'socialist' opportunists such as the Trotskyists and Bukharinites on the other hand; hence the sympathy of the ordinary bourgeois for the representative of the interests of his class (the bourgeois class) in the communist movement, namely, the socialist opportunist; hence the anti-Stalinism and pro-Trotskyism (and pro-Bukharinism) of the ordinary bourgeois. The bourgeois does not mind what terminology is used; he does not object to the use of even Marxian terminology as long as it is used in the defence and preservation of capitalism rather than for its revolutionary overthrow. In fact under certain circumstances the only way to serve capitalism is through the use of Marxian phrases, for only such phrases can deceive the workers. How could the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, for example, openly demand the restoration of capitalism in the USSR when the working class was in power? They would have had to utter only one sentence openly for them to be flung out of every workers' organisation, let alone the vanguard Party of the proletariat, for them to be completely despised by every class-conscious worker. So they were obliged to present their programmes for capitalist restoration in the name of the working class and of Marxism. Herein lies their service to the bourgeoisie; and herein lies also their treachery to the working class and communist movement. It was precisely this treachery to the working class, their resort to wrecking, sabotage, terror and murder, not to speak of their agreements with fascist and imperialist powers, which brought them face to face with proletarian justice in the Moscow trials in the late 1930s.

The use of force and collectivisation

Trotskyists, revisionists, as well as the bourgeois of the ordinary type have levelled the allegation that Stalin

collectivised the peasantry against the wishes of the majority of the peasantry and moreover by force. This allegation, based on ignorance, has through sheer repetition acquired the force of a public prejudice. Since this accusation has long been mouthed by the Soviet revisionist leadership since the 20th Party Congress, it has come to be believed even by people who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. As is clear from what has been said above, only incorrigible bureaucrats can believe that collectivisation in the USSR was, or could have been, achieved by force; only people who regard collectivisation as an administrative bureaucratic affair, rather than as an economic measure of the utmost importance, can regard collectivisation in the USSR in this light. If collectivisation could be achieved by a "sergeant Prishibeyev" armed with a Trotskyist departmental decree to collectivise, then indeed there would have been every reason to collectivise in 1926, as demanded by Trotsky and Zinoviev, or even much earlier during Lenin's lifetime. In that case we would be obliged to admit that the Trotskyists were right in demanding collectivisation in 1926 whereas the Leninists were wrong in rejecting this demand. In demanding collectivisation in 1926, the Trotskyists obviously believed that such a measure could be achieved with a scrap of paper and the Prussian sergeant's stick. If the Party had been foolish enough to regard collectivisation in this light and put these methods into effect, the result would have been, as explained earlier, a "hostile collision" between the working class which was in power, and the basic mass of the peasantry, without an alliance with which the working class could not hope to stay in power for long; the effect would have been a civil war and certain doom for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Party, however, regarded collectivisation as an economic measure which could not be achieved without creating the necessary economic pre-requisites. To re-iterate, by the second half of 1929, all these pre-requisites having been realised, the Party moved in earnest in the direction of collectivisation with the enthusiastic support of the overwhelming mass of the peasantry. Successes in collectivisation were achieved precisely because of its voluntary character; the moment compulsion came on the scene, collective farms began to melt away and a section of the peasants who, to quote Stalin,

"only yesterday had the greatest confidence in the collective farms, began to turn away from them." (*Reply to Collective Farm Comrades*, Vol. 12 p.210).

None of this is meant to say that there were no distortions of the Party's policy in individual cases by over-zealous Party functionaries and all sorts of 'Left' distorters. In particular there were: (a) violations of the principle regarding the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement - a violation which had the effect of causing collective farms to melt away; (b) violations of the principle which demanded that the diversity of conditions in the USSR be taken into account; and (c) violations of the principle which defined the ARTEL FORM of the collective-farm movement as the MAIN LINK IN THE COLLECTIVE-FARM SYSTEM - attempts were made to skip this stage and pass over straight to the commune system.

Had these violations not been removed and distortions corrected, there would have been no successes in the field of collectivisation. The Central Committee of the Party, headed by Stalin, took urgent and timely measures to root out these violations and distortions. On 2 March, 1930, Stalin's article *Dizzy with Success*, was published in *Pravda*, in which he analysed the root causes of the distortions in the collective-farm movement and denounced attempts at collectivisation through coercion and use of force. Here are a few quotations from this very important article:

"The successes of the collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement and on taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the USSR. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry." (Stalin, *Collected Works* Vol. 12 p. 199).

And:

"What can there be in common between this Sergeant Prishibeyev 'policy' and the Party's policy of relying on the voluntary principle and of taking local peculiarities into account in collective-farm development? Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common between them." (*ibid.* p.201).

And further still:

"Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy threats against the peasants? Nobody, except our enemies!" (*ibid.*)

Stalin denounced the attempt to replace preparatory work for the organisation of collective farms by *"bureaucratic decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper resolutions on the growth of collective farms which have as yet no reality, but whose 'existence' is proclaimed in a heap of boastful resolutions"*. (*ibid*).

A month later, on 3 April 1930, Stalin published in *Pravda* yet another article on the same subject entitled *Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades*. In reply to the question: 'What is the ROOT of the errors in the peasant question?', Stalin gives the following answer:

"A wrong approach to the middle peasant. Resort to coercion in economic relations with the middle peasant.

"It has been forgotten that coercion, which is necessary and useful in the fight against our class enemies, is impermissible and disastrous when applied to the middle peasant, who is our ally.

"It has been forgotten that cavalry charges, which are necessary and useful for accomplishing tasks of a military character, are unsuitable and disastrous for accomplishing the tasks of collective-farm development, which, moreover, is being organised in alliance with the middle peasant." (*Collected Works*, Vol 12, pp.208-9).

Thus it can be seen that notwithstanding a few local distortions - which were swiftly got rid of by the Party - the Party's line on collectivisation was correct; by the application of this correct Leninist policy the main mass of the peasantry were drawn into the channel of socialist construction. The Party's policy carried the day because the Party waged a consistent and principled struggle against both the 'Left' (Trotskyist) and the Right (Bukharinite) deviations, because the Party waged a ruthless struggle against those who tried to run ahead (Trotskyists) as well as those who dragged their feet (Bukharinites). Herein lies the secret of the success of the Party's policy on collectivisation as on other issues.

Surely, Gorbachev must have had the Bolshevik Party's principled and uncompromising struggle, described above, in mind when he stated in his 1987 Report:

"The Party's leading nucleus headed by Joseph Stalin safeguarded Leninism in an ideological struggle."

In view of all that has been said above, Gorbachev's allegation that Stalin made an incorrect assessment of the role of the middle peasantry must be

pronounced completely unfounded and motivated by his present preoccupation to de-collectivise Soviet agriculture and to introduce a market, i.e., capitalist economy.

Chapter 9

LALKAR

September/October

1991

Historical Questions -

A re-assessment of the Past

Part III

Stalin and the 'Decapitation' of the Party and the Red Army.

In the last issue (July/August) we demolished the allegation that Stalin did not understand the role of the peasantry. In this issue we return to the other two allegations, namely, that Stalin, through the Moscow trials, decapitated the Party and the Red Army.

'Weakening' the Red Army and the liquidation of 'loyal' leaders.

As to the second and third allegations, weakening the Soviet army and the liquidation of apparently loyal Party leaders, these are best taken together, inextricably intertwined as they are with each other. It is neither possible, nor desirable, to give, in the form of newspaper articles, a detailed account and explanation of the Moscow trials. It is not possible, for such an account requires, at the very least, a pamphlet of more than 100 pages; it is not desirable for the reason that the writer of the present series produced such a pamphlet long ago, which will be incorporated in a book shortly to be published. In view of this, what appears below is no more than a very brief sketch.

On December 1, 1934, Sergei Kirov, Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet and one of the most loved leaders of the Bolshevik Party, a very close comrade-in-arms of Stalin, who had successfully routed the anti-Party Kamenev-Zinoviev opposition in Leningrad, was murdered in the Smolny Institute. The assassin, Leonid Nikolayev, was tried by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. He testified:

"When I shot Kirov, I reasoned as follows: our shot must be a signal for an explosion, a revolt within the country against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and against the Soviet Government."

Nikolayev was sentenced to be shot. He never disclosed that Kamenev, Zinoviev and other leaders of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre had been directly involved in the conspiracy to murder Kirov. But the Soviet government had its suspicions and appointed a special investigator, N.I. Yezhkov, a member of the Central Committee and head of the Control Commission, to probe into the Leningrad murder. Two weeks following Nikolayev's trial, Zinoviev, Kamenev and many of their associates faced a Leningrad court on a charge of complicity in the murder of Kirov. During the trial, Zinoviev and Kamenev admitted nothing that was not known to the authorities, feigning remorse that their political oppositionist activities had created a climate conducive to anti-Soviet activities. While accepting "moral responsibility" for Kirov's murder, they denied any foreknowledge of the plot.

"I am accustomed to feel that I am a leader," said Zinoviev, "and it goes without saying that I should have known everything ... This outrageous murder has thrown such an ominous light upon the whole previous anti-Party struggle, that I recognise that the Party is absolutely right in speaking of the political responsibility of the former anti-Party Zinoviev group for the murder committed."

Kamenev struck a similar note and the ruse succeeded. It could not be established that they had been directly involved in the plot to murder Kirov; instead they were found guilty of anti-Soviet activities. Zinoviev received ten years prison sentence and Kamenev five years.

Subsequent investigations brought to light the direct involvement of Kamenev, Zinoviev and their associates in the plot to kill Kirov and they were brought yet again to trial in the first of the Moscow trials and found guilty. These investigations unearthed further facts leading to the second and the third Moscow trials as well as the trial of the eight generals of the Red Army, including that of Marshall Tukhachevsky. In the first of these trials, in August 1936, sixteen persons, including Kamenev and Zinoviev, were charged. In the second trial, which took place in January 1937, seventeen people, including Pyatakov (vice-commissar of heavy industry), Sokolnikov (Assistant People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs) and Radek, was brought before the court. The trial of the generals took place on the 11th of June in camera because of its secret military implications, but all the other

trials were in open court before the national and international press and media. The last of these trials was held in March 1938 and was the most significant of all. In it, 21 persons faced the court. These included Nicolai Bukharin, Rykov (former Prime Minister), Henry Yagoda (former head of the OGPU), Krestinsky (former Soviet Ambassador in Berlin and People's Commissar of Finance and Secretary of the Central committee of the CPSU), Rakovsky (former Soviet Ambassador in London and Paris), Rosengoltz (People's Commissar of Foreign Trade) and Chernov (People's Commissar of Agriculture).

The investigations, over a period of three years, unearthed a widespread and complex underground organisation, connected to the exiled Trotsky (and through him with the fascist powers), and committed to an elaborate and carefully worked-out programme of terrorism and assassination of Soviet leaders, acts of sabotage aimed at disrupting industry and transport alike.

In the Moscow trials a number of prominent Trotskyites and Rights admitted to committing treasonable crimes against the Soviet state as well as committing, attempting and planning, individual terror against the foremost leaders of the Soviet Union; they pleaded guilty to the charge of organising and carrying out sabotage in industry, to the charge of carrying out diversionist and wrecking activities. Above all, they pleaded guilty to the charge of organising, in collaboration with certain imperialist powers and reactionary elements in Russia, for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. This is something that is not easily understood by a large number of people in general, and by the intelligentsia in particular. How is it possible, they argue, for people who were prominent members of the CPSU(B) to want and to take actual steps for the restoration of capitalism? We are not suggesting that one evening Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, Bukharin and the others accused at these trials went to bed as Marxist-Leninists and the next morning, on waking up, they suddenly found themselves gripped by the irresistible desire to restore capitalism in the USSR. No, nothing of the kind is being suggested. Things do not happen in this way. What is being suggested is that it was the very logic of the Trotskyist and Rightist positions on the question of the possibility of building socialism in a single country, and in a backward one at that, the very logic of the development of struggle that actually led the accused at these trials, the Trotskyites and Rights, into a position where they did become, and could not but become, tools and puppets of fascism.

Whatever the complexion of the Trotskyist and Rightist opposition in the Soviet Union, whatever the shades of opinion represented within it, there was one thing that united all its members, namely, they all believed that it was impossible to build socialism in the USSR. Trotsky, much earlier than other members of the opposition, put forward this view in his notorious 'theory of permanent revolution'. This theory of Trotsky's was based on an erroneous understanding of the role of the peasantry and the uneven development of capitalism. From the hopelessness and pessimism, the chief characteristics of this theory, from the reactionary ideas contained in this theory, Trotsky never departed. He repeated this "absurdly left" theory again and again.

After the Fourteenth Party Conference had emphatically declared itself in favour of building socialism in the USSR, the sceptics like Kamenev and Zinoviev went over to the Trotskyist position of the impossibility of building socialism in the USSR. Later on, unable to face the problems of the revolution and scared by the resistance of the kulaks to collectivisation, the Bukharinites also deserted the standpoint of the Bolshevik Party and adopted the Trotskyist position of defeatism and surrender in the face of difficulties raised by the resistance of the kulaks to collectivisation. In addition they put forward the non-Marxist theory that kulaks will grow into socialism, failing to understand the mechanics of class struggle under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

To begin with the opposition was no more than an opposition; it was an opposition because it found itself in opposition to the policy of the Party, because it did not agree with the policy of the Party, which policy stood for the building of socialism. The opposition, with its incorrect policy, was at this time only a tendency within the working-class movement - an anti-Leninist tendency, but a tendency nevertheless. Failing to correct its own erroneous policy, the opposition sought to change the correct policy of the Party. Unable to get the support of the working class for its policy which, subjective desires and wishes of its adherents notwithstanding, stood for the restoration of capitalism, the opposition was left with only two courses of action open to it. One, it could discard its erroneous theory, admit its bankruptcy, and wholeheartedly, like the rest of the membership of the Party, devote itself to the building of socialism. Two, it could turn for help to all those who wanted the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, i.e., the Mensheviks, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the kulaks, the Ukrainian and

other nationalists, and above all, the bourgeoisie of various imperialist countries. The opposition chose the latter alternative.

Finding it impossible to secure the support of the Soviet proletariat for its own policy, without which support a change in the policy and leadership of the Party and of the Soviet government was impossible, the opposition went over to the position of individual terror against the leaders of the Party and government, to wrecking and sabotage, with a view to overthrowing the Soviet government. Finding their own forces insufficient, the oppositionists joined hands with the internal reactionaries - the Mensheviks, kulaks, nationalists and bourgeois experts. And finally, when the internal forces proved inadequate, the opposition was left with only one option, namely, that of concluding an alliance with imperialist powers, which is what it proceeded to do. It entered into alliances with the German and Japanese fascists for the purpose of overthrowing the Soviet government and for restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union. And with this passing over to the methods of individual terror, wrecking, sabotage, and alliances with fascism, Trotskyism ceased to be just an opposition, it ceased to be just an erroneous and anti-Leninist tendency within the working-class movement. It became a band of wreckers and diversionists. It became an advance detachment of the bourgeoisie. The evidence presented at the Moscow trials and the testimony of the accused proves beyond a shadow of doubt the correctness of this statement.

The theoretical evolution of Trotskyism starts with Trotsky's opposition to the building of the Bolshevik Party. His opposition to Lenin on the question of building a proletarian party is only a prelude to this opposition to Lenin in the matter of theory. Trotsky opposes Lenin's analysis of the nature of the Russian revolution. Trotsky comes up with his theory of 'permanent revolution', which is a negation of Lenin's theory of proletarian revolution and his theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this theory of his, Trotsky assigns to the peasantry only a counter-revolutionary role. Of course, says Trotsky, a spontaneous uprising of the peasantry might help the workers' government to come to power, but the workers' government could not sustain itself in power, faced as it would be with the opposition of the peasantry, unless the Russian revolution was followed by revolution in the advanced capitalist countries of Europe. Trotsky, therefore, reached the conclusion that socialism could not be built in Russia unless the European revolution came to the assistance of the Russian revolution. Trotskyism in action (as disclosed in the Moscow trials) proves

that individual terror, sabotage, diversionist and wrecking activities, and treasonable alliances with fascism are in no wise incompatible with the stance of Trotskyism. On the contrary, they are a logical culmination of the development of Trotskyism - a logical culmination of its counter-revolutionary struggle against revolutionary Leninism, and against the Leninist policy of the Bolshevik Party which stood for the building of socialism in the USSR. With its policy of opposition to the building of socialism, Trotskyism ended up, and could not but end up, in the camp of fascism.

Not being in a position even to publish their programme to the working class, let alone rally the support of the working class around such a programme, the Trotskyites and Rights were left with the following alternatives in order to secure a change in the leadership of the CPSU(B) and of the Soviet government:

(a) use of individual terror against the most prominent representative leaders of the Party and government - removing leaders by assassination;

(b) removal of the Party and government leadership by military coup d'etat, which coup d'etat may be planned to coincide with foreign aggression against the Soviet Union, or, if foreign aggression is late in coming, it may take place in peacetime;

(c) use of wrecking and sabotage to undermine Soviet industry, particularly the defence industry;

(d) reliance on foreign imperialist powers, and on foreign aggression against the USSR, in order to overthrow the Soviet government.

These were the charming methods that the counter-revolutionary Trotskyites and Rights, divorced from the working class and toiling millions upon millions of people, were left with.

As to the irreconcilability of Marxism with terrorism, the accused Reinhold provided the following answer at his trial:

"In 1932, Zinoviev, in Kamenev's apartment, in the presence of a number of members of the United Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre, argued in favour of resorting to terror as follows: although terror is incompatible with Marxism, at the present moment these considerations must be abandoned. There are no other methods available of fighting the leaders of the Party and the government at the present time. Stalin combines in him all the strength and firmness of the Party leadership. Therefore Stalin must be put out of the way in the first place." (Trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre).

As Vyshinsky (the public prosecutor) said:

"Here you have a reply, frankly cynical, insolent, but absolutely logical." (ibid.)

The terrorist activities of the Rights and Trotskyites were by no means confined to the murder of Kirov. In this connection, Yagoda, the head of OGPU until 1936, testified as follows:

"In 1934, in the summer, Yenukidze informed me that the Centre of the 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' had adopted a decision to organise the assassination of Kirov ... Thus I declare categorically that the murder of Kirov was carried out on the instructions of the Centre of the 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'. It was also on the decision of this Centre that terrorist acts were committed against Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky and Gorky. What was the situation here? Even before Kirov was assassinated, Gorky's son Maxim died. I have already stated before the Court that I admit my part in causing Max's sickness." (Trial of Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, March 1938, pp.572-3).

Sabotage and wrecking

Sabotage and wrecking activities were carried on in several sectors of the economy - both agricultural and industrial - with the aim of undermining the economic might and defence capability of the USSR. Boguslavsky, one of the accused at the same trial as Pyatakov, gave the following morbid and sickening details of the wrecking carried out by the Siberian centre in the sphere of railways, on the instructions of Trotsky and on the personal directions of Pyatakov:

"In 1934 the work of the Siberian Centre, and my work in particular, entered upon a new path. In 1934 I had my second meeting with Pyatakov ... This time Pyatakov said that our work was completely unsatisfactory, and set us tasks which, though not new, had a new sound ... In response to my pessimism, Pyatakov said: 'We have got to get down to work, especially as Trotsky has been sending letters and directives. He accuses us of inaction bordering, as he then said, on the sabotage of his, Trotsky's, directives' ... As regards work on the railways, which I was directing myself, the number of accidents on the line considerably increased in 1934 ... In 1934 there was a considerable increase in the number and percentage of locomotives put out of action" (Trial of Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre).

Treasonable Agreements with fascist powers

There is enough material in the testimonies of Krestinsky, Sokolnikov and Radek to prove that the Trotskyites and Rights had made treasonable agreements with Nazi Germany and fascist Japan for an armed attack by these countries on the USSR in coordination and close cooperation with the Fifth Column activities of the Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites. These contemptible traitors obviously believed that they could perhaps utilise German and Japanese fascism for their own purpose of coming to power by overthrowing the government of the USSR.

"We had to decide a political problem which consisted of only one point", said Sokolnikov at his trial, "could we by adopting this most painful course, which in regard to the existing Party leadership, in regard to the Soviet power, in regard to the Soviet Union, represented, as we understood full well, a series of the most heinous crimes, of the most shameful crimes, represented treason and so forth - we had to decide whether after paying this price we would be able to utilise this hostile force."

Vyshinsky: *"Or they would utilise you?" (ibid.)*

The intention of these despicable traitors, these menials of capitalism - the accused - was to transform the USSR into a colony of German fascism. Exposing the essence of the agreement with the Reichswehr, the threads of which led to the treason and treachery of the 'Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites', Krestinsky said:

"We [the Trotskyites] were receiving a small sum of money and they [the Reichswehr] were receiving espionage information which they would need during an armed attack. But the German government, Hitler particularly, wanted colonies, territory, and not only espionage information. And he [i.e., Hitler] was prepared to be satisfied with Soviet territory instead of colonies for which he would have to fight England, America and France." (The Trial of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, March 1938).

And still further Krestinsky continued:

"We were prepared to restore capitalist relations in the USSR and to make territorial concessions to the bourgeois states with which we had already come to an agreement." (ibid.)

Economic programme - restoration of capitalism

Radek explained the significance of the economic programme of these groups at this trial. In the sphere of industry, explained Radek, this programme meant:

"not only the granting of concessions on industrial enterprises of importance to capitalist states, but also the transfer, the sale to private capitalist owners, of important economic enterprises to be specified by them. Trotsky contemplated the issue of debenture loans, i.e., the admission of foreign capital for the exploitation of those factories which would formally remain in the hands of the Soviet state.

"In the sphere of agrarian policy, he (i.e., Trotsky) quite clearly stated that the collective farms would have to be disbanded, and advanced the idea of giving tractors and other complex agricultural machinery to individual peasants in order to revive a new kulak stratum. Lastly it was quite openly stated that private capital would have to be revived in the cities. It was clear that it meant the restoration of capitalism." (Trial of Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre, 1937, pp.113-4).

Bukharin related something similar at his trial. He explained that the practical formulation of their programme meant the restoration of capitalism in the economic sphere, and the restoration of bourgeois democracy in the political sphere. In other words, the programme of the Rights and Trotskyites meant nothing more and nothing less than the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and an end to socialist construction.

Said Bukharin:

"If my programme stand were to be formulated practically, it would be, in the economic sphere, state capitalism, the prosperous muzhik individual, the curtailment of the collective farms, foreign concessions, surrender of the monopoly of foreign trade, and, as a result - the restoration of capitalism in the country ...

"Inside the country our actual programme - this I think must be said with all emphasis - was a lapse into bourgeois-democratic freedom, coalition, because from the block with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the like, it follows that there would be freedom of parties, freedom of coalition, and follows quite logically from the combination of forces for struggle, because if allies are chosen for overthrowing the government, on the day after the possible victory they would be partners in power. A lapse not only into the ways of bourgeois-democratic freedom, but in the political sense into ways, where there are undoubtedly elements of Caesarism." (Trial of Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, pp. 381-2).

Any observer of the current developments in the USSR would have little difficulty in finding striking similarities between the above economic and

political programme of the Rights and Trotskyites, as outlined by the accused at the Moscow trials, and that which is being implemented today. Is it to be wondered at, then, that while Bukharin has been rehabilitated, attacks on Joseph Stalin, that indefatigable defender of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian dictatorship, have increased a thousand-fold? It is clear that to create the ideological and political conditions for a full-scale restoration of capitalism, Stalin must be thoroughly maligned as a prelude to attacking the entire edifice of Leninism. The recent referendum to change the name of Leningrad back to Petrograd is but a foretaste of things to come.

Rationale for this treachery

It is often asked: how could such prominent persons in the Bolshevik Party turn to such treasonable activity? We have already explained the rationale behind their heinous crimes. Now, let some of the accused speak for themselves. The total impotence of Trotskyism, its complete isolation from the Soviet working class and masses, its utter dependence on fascism, its efforts to provoke a war against the Soviet Union and to work for the defeat of the latter in the event of such a war, and its real counter-revolutionary essence is revealed by the following remarks made by the accused Radek during his last plea:

"... I perceived that Trotsky himself had lost faith. The first variant was a concealed way of saying: 'well boys, try to overthrow the Soviet power by yourselves, without Hitler. What, you cannot? Try to seize power yourselves. What, you cannot?' Trotsky himself already felt his complete internal impotence, and staked on Hitler. The stake was now on Hitler. The old Trotskyites had held that it was impossible to build up socialism in one country, and that it was therefore necessary to force the revolution in the west. Now they were told that revolution in the west was impossible, and so destroy socialism in one country, destroy socialism in the USSR. Yet nobody could help but see that socialism in our country had been built." (The Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre - our emphasis).

Bukharin's testimony, like that of Radek, cited immediately above, solves the mystery of how it was that a number of prominent ex-Bolsheviks found themselves in the dock, accused of crimes such as working for capitalist restoration and collaborating with fascism in order to achieve their aim of capitalist restoration. Let Nicolai Bukharin, in the dock, speak:

"Just because it seems to me that this trial is of public importance, and because this question has been dealt with extremely little, I thought it would be useful to dwell on the programme which has never been written down anywhere, on the practical programme of the 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites', and to decipher one formula, namely, what is meant by the restoration of capitalism, in the way it was visualised and conceived in the circles of the 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites' ...

"The Right counter-revolutionaries seemed at first to be a 'deviation'; they seemed, at first glance, to be people who began with discontent in connection with collectivisation, in connection with industrialisation, with the fact, as they claimed, that industrialisation was destroying production. This, at a first glance, seemed to be the chief thing. Then the Ryutin platform appeared. When all the state machines, when all the means, when all the best forces were flung into the industrialisation of the country, into collectivisation, we found ourselves literally in twenty-four hours, on the other shore, we found ourselves with the kulaks, with the counter-revolutionaries, we found ourselves with the capitalist remnants which still existed at the time in the sphere of trade. Hence it follows that the basic meaning, the judgment, from the subjective standpoint, is clear. Here we went through a very interesting process, an over-estimation of individual enterprise, a crawling over to its idealisation, the idealisation of the property-owner. Such was the evolution. Our programme was - the prosperous peasant farm of the individual, but in fact the kulak became an end in itself. We were ironical about the collective farms. We, the counter-revolutionary plotters, came at that time more and more to display the psychology that collective farms were music of the future. What was necessary was to develop rich property owners. This was the tremendous change that took place in our standpoint and psychology. In 1917 it would never have occurred to any of the members of the Party, myself included, to pity Whiteguards who had been killed; yet in the period of the liquidation of the kulaks, in 1929-30, we pitied the expropriated kulaks, from so-called humanitarian motives. To whom would it have occurred in 1919 to blame the dislocation of our economic life on the Bolsheviks, and not on sabotage? To nobody. It would have sounded as frank and open treason. Yet I myself in 1928 invented the formula about the military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, that is, I put the blame for the costs of the class struggle not on the class that was hostile to the proletariat, but on the leaders of the proletariat itself. This was already a swing of 180 degrees. This meant that ideological and political platforms grew into counter-revolutionary platforms. Kulak farming and kulak interests actually became a point

of programme. The logic of the struggle led to the logic of ideas and to a change of our psychology, to the counter-revolutionising of our aims." (Trial of Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites).

Reader, can you find the similarity between this programme, as outlined by Bukharin, with its idealisation and over-estimation of "individual enterprise, a crawling over to its idealisation, the idealisation of the property-owner" of the "prosperous peasant farm of the individual," and the programme being pushed through by the present leadership of the USSR? If so, are you still surprised that Bukharin is treated by the Gorbachev leadership with such tender affection while Joseph Stalin is subjected to most filthy and vile vilification?

Military aspect

The military aspect of the conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government was the most difficult to detect. It was not until May 1937 that the Soviet authorities discovered a most dangerous gang of plotters and conspirators, connected not only with the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites but also with fascist Germany. These plotters were headed by Marshall Tukhachevsky, who had then only just been given the much coveted title of Marshall of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government, with characteristic speed and determination, had these traitors (eight generals) arrested and put them on trial on the following charges:

"Being in the employ of the military intelligence services of one of the foreign states which carries on an unfriendly policy towards the USSR, had systematically furnished to the military circles of that State espionage information, committed wrecking acts with the aim of undermining the might of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, prepared, in the event of military attack on the USSR, the defeat of the USSR, the defeat of the Red Army, and pursued the aim of assisting in the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and in restoring the power of the landlords and capitalists in the USSR."

That the generals actually were involved in the conspiracy to overthrow the Soviet government, that they did plan a coup d'etat, that they did commit wrecking acts, was made amply clear by the evidence of various accused at the third Moscow trial.

Rykov gave the following account of the plan of the generals for a coup d'etat:

"I remember that once, in my presence, Bukharin formulated the idea of opening the front ... the existence of a military group, headed by Tukhachevsky, which was connected with our centre and which aimed at taking advantage of a war to overthrow the government. This meant preparing for intervention pure and simple. Our dealings with the Germans, which we intensified in every way, were meant to stimulate in every way an armed attack, inasmuch as in this sphere the conspiratorial organisation had entered into treasonable relations with them." (Trial of Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites)

The initial plan of the conspirators seems to have been to stage a coup d'etat in the event of a military attack on the Soviet Union, to take advantage of such an attack to overthrow the Soviet government. But this plan had to be reviewed in view of the fact that by the end of 1936 more and more Rights and Trotskyites were being discovered and their whole organisation was on the verge of collapse and disintegration. It was in these circumstances of increasing insecurity for the still at large renegades that the development of the conception of peacetime coup d'etat - a coup d'etat independent of war - took place. The details of such a plan for a coup d'etat were given by Rosengoltz at his trial:

"The point I stopped at was the conference we had with Tukhachevsky. It took place at the end of March (1937) ... At this conference Tukhachevsky stated that he counted definitely on the possibility of a coup and mentioned the date. He believed that by May 15, in the first half of May, he would succeed in carrying out this military coup ... Tukhachevsky had a number of variants. One of them, the one on which he counted most, was the possibility for a group of military men, his adherents, gathering in his apartment on some pretext or other, making their way into the Kremlin, seizing the Kremlin telephone exchange, and killing the leaders of the Party and the government" (Trial of Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, pp. 252-3).

The accused generals were found guilty on 11 June 1937 and executed the following day. By smashing the generals' conspiracy, the Soviet authorities smashed to smithereens the most dangerous Fifth Column in the Red Army, which in the event of war would have opened the front to the fascist invaders and overthrown the Soviet system of government and restored capitalism. People who are infected with Trotskyist, revisionist and openly imperialist propaganda, and who, therefore, do not believe in the authenticity of the Moscow trials (although they have never been able to explain why, in the presence of the world's press, these allegedly steadfast Bolshe-

viks would confess to committing the kinds of heinous crimes with which they were charged), ought at least to pay heed to the evidence emanating from the impeccably bourgeois sources.

Moscow Trials strengthened the USSR by eliminating the Fifth Column

As the Spanish fascist leader, General Franco, marched on Madrid in the summer of 1936, the drunken fascist general Quiapo de Llano boasted: "Four columns are marching on Madrid. A Fifth Column is waiting to greet us inside the city." He was of course referring to the pro-Trotskyist ultra-'left' POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista), which played the most disgusting role in disorganising the struggle of Republican Spain against Franco's fascists and thus aided the latter enormously. This was the first time that the world heard the phrase "Fifth Column", meaning internal collaborators, who worked in conjunction with the invading Nazi and fascist forces, and who facilitated on a grand scale the Nazi aims of aggression and conquest. One such Fifth Column, constituted by the Rights and Trotskyites and their allies in the Red Army, operated in the USSR. Had the Soviet authorities not taken swift and timely action, had they not brought these traitors to the dock of proletarian justice and liquidated them, the defeat of the USSR during the second world war, and therefore of the allied powers, and the victory of Nazi Germany, would have been certain. And if anyone would have preferred that option to the trial and liquidation of the accused at the Moscow trials, that is for them to say. For our part we are well pleased with the outcome of those trials and the victory of the allies in the war, in which victory the Red Army and the Soviet people played the decisive role.

In early 1936, Tukhachevsky visited London as Soviet army representative at the funeral of King George V. En route to London he stopped over in Warsaw and Berlin, holding conversations with Polish 'colonels' and German generals. So full of confidence was Tukhachevsky that he barely made any attempt to hide his admiration of the Nazi militarists. On his return from London, at a formal dinner at the Soviet embassy in Paris, Tukhachevsky astounded European diplomats by openly attacking the efforts of the USSR aimed at arriving a collective security with the western democracies. He told the Rumanian foreign minister, Nicholas Titulescu, who was sitting next to him:

"Monsieur le Ministre, you are wrong in linking your career and the fate of your country to countries that are old and 'finished' such as Great Britain and France. It is to the new Germany that we should turn. For a certain time, at least, Germany will be the country that will take the lead of the European continent. I am sure that Hitler will help to save us all."

These remarks of Tukhachevsky were recorded by the chief of the Press Service at the Rumanian Embassy in Paris, E Schachanan Esseze, who also attended the banquet at the Soviet Embassy. Yet another of the guests, Genevieve Tabouis, the famous French political journalist, subsequently wrote in her book *They Call Me Cassandra*:

"I was to meet Tukhachevsky for the last time on the day after the funeral of King George V. At a dinner at the Soviet Embassy, the Russian general had been very conversational with Politis, Titulescu, Herriot, Boncour ... He had just returned from a trip to Germany, and was heaping glowing praise upon the Nazis. Seated at my right, he said over and over again, as he discussed an air pact between the great powers and Hitler's country: 'They are already invincible, Madame Tabouis!'"

"Why did he speak so trustfully? Was it because his head had been turned by the hearty reception he had found among German diplomats, who found it easy to talk to this man of the old Russian school? At any rate I was not the only one that evening who was alarmed at this display of enthusiasm. One of the guests - an important diplomat - grumbled into my ear as we walked away from the Embassy: 'Well, I hope all the Russians don't feel that way.'"

Alexander Worth, in his book *Moscow '41* has this to say in this context:

"I am also pretty sure that the purge in the Red Army had a great deal to do with Stalin's belief in an imminent war with Germany. What did Tukhachevsky stand for? People of the French Deuxieme Bureau told me long ago that Tukhachevsky was pro-German. And the Czechs told me the extraordinary story of Tukhachevsky's visit to Prague, when towards the end of a banquet - he had got rather drunk - he blurted out that an agreement with Hitler was the only hope for both Czechoslovakia and Russia. And he then proceeded to abuse Stalin. The Czechs did not fail to report this to the Kremlin, and that was the end of Tukhachevsky - and of so many of his followers." (Trial of Tukhachevsky).

Joseph E Davies, the American Ambassador in Moscow, who, accompanied by an interpreter, attended and carefully followed the proceedings at the Moscow trials, was profoundly impressed. He related, after the second

trial, that Vyshinsky, the Soviet prosecutor, at the time being denounced in the anti-Soviet press as a "brutal inquisitor", impressed him as being "*much like Homer Cummings, calm, dispassionate, intellectual and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a manner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer.*"

On 17 February, 1937, a month after the second trial, in a confidential dispatch to Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State, Ambassador Davies reported that almost all the foreign diplomats in Moscow shared his opinion of the justice of the verdict:

"I talked to many, if not all, of the members of the Diplomatic Corps here and, with possibly one exception, they are all of the opinion that the proceedings established clearly the existence of a political plot and conspiracy to overthrow the government" (Mission to Moscow).

Powerful, anti-Soviet, forces saw to it that this truth about the Fifth Column in the USSR was not made public in the US or elsewhere in the western world.

Again, on 11 March, 1937, Ambassador Davies recorded in his diary:

"Another diplomat, Minister, made a most illuminating statement to me yesterday. In discussing the trial, he said that the defendants were undoubtedly guilty; that all of us who attended the trial had practically agreed upon that; that the outside world, from the press reports, however, seemed to think that the trial was a put-up job (facade, as he called it); that while he knew it was not, it was probably just as well that the outside world should think so." (ibid.)

The execution of Tukhachevsky and seven other generals was predictably greeted in the anti-Soviet western press with wild headlines proclaiming that the entire Red Army was seething with revolt against the Soviet government; that Voroshilov was "*marching on Moscow*" at the head of an anti-Stalin army; that the Red Army, having lost its "*best generals*," was "*no longer a serious factor in the international situation*", and so on and so forth. It was during this anti-Soviet hysteria that Ambassador Davies had an interview, on 4 July, 1937, with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, who told the American Ambassador that "*some day the world would understand that ... they were doing the whole world a service in protecting themselves against the menace of Hitler and Nazi world domination, and thereby preserving the Soviet Union strong as a bulwark against the Nazi threat.*" (ibid. p.167).

One week into the third Moscow trial (that of Bukharin and others) Ambassador Davies wrote on 8 March, 1937, to his daughter Emlen thus:

"All the fundamental weaknesses and vices of human nature - personal ambitions at their worst - are shown up in the proceedings. They disclose the outlines of a plot which came very near to being successful in bringing about the overthrow of this government." (ibid. p.177)

And further:

"This testimony now makes clear what we could not understand and what happened last spring and summer. You will recall that the folks at the chancery were telling us of extraordinary activity around the Kremlin, when the gates were closed to the public; that there were indications of much agitation and a changing of the character of the soldiers on guard. The new guards, you will remember we were told, consisted almost entirely of soldiers recruited from Georgia, Stalin's native land.

"The extraordinary testimony of Krestinsky, Bukharin, and the rest would appear to indicate that the Kremlin's fears were well justified. For it now seems that a plot existed in the beginning of November, 1936, to project a coup d'etat, with Tukhachevsky at its head, for May of the following year. Apparently it was touch and go at that time whether it actually would be staged.

But the government acted with great vigour and speed. The Red Army generals were shot and the whole party organisation was purged and thoroughly cleansed. Then it came out that quite a few of those at the top were seriously infected with the virus of the conspiracy to overthrow the government, and were actually working with the Secret Service organisations of Germany and Japan." (ibid.)

Finally, in the summer of 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, Ambassador Davies wrote the following appraisal of the historical significance of the Moscow trials:

"There was no so-called 'internal aggression' in Russia co-operating with the German High Command. Hitler's march into Prague in 1939 was accompanied by the active military support of Henlein's organisations in Czechoslovakia. The same thing was true of his invasion of Norway. There were no Sudeten Henleins, no Slovakian Tisos, no Belgian De Grelles, no Norwegian Quislings in the Russian picture ..." (ibid. p.179).

"The story had been told in the so-called treason or purge trials of 1937 and 1938 which I attended and listened to. In reexamining the record of these

cases and also what I had written at the time ... I found that practically every device of German Fifth Columnist activity, as we now know it, was disclosed and laid bare by the confessions and testimony elicited at these trials of self-confessed 'Quislings' in Russia ... " (ibid. p.180).

"All of these trials, purges, and liquidations, which seemed so violent at the time and shocked the world, are now quite clearly a part of a vigorous and determined effort of the Stalin government to protect itself not only from revolution from within but from attack from without. They went to work thoroughly to clean up and clean out all treasonable elements within the country. All doubts were resolved in favour of the government.

There were no Fifth Columnists in Russia in 1941 - they had shot them. The purge had cleansed the country and rid it of treason." (ibid. p.179-184).

Happily the Axis Fifth Column in the Soviet Union had been smashed.

Let George Sava be our final bourgeois witness. In his *War without guns*, having stated that "*Russia's splendid resistance surprised many a diplomat of the democratic countries, who were convinced that Russia could not resist more than ten weeks,*" he goes on to make the following perceptive, nay penetrating, observation:

"We may not understand the intricacies of Marxism, but we should have known that the grave Hitler has been digging for conservatives and democrats alike was intentionally made big enough to bury the Russians as well. Fortunately, unlike our diplomats, the Russians did realise the dangers and that is the reason for their ruthless suppression of fifth-columnists. The executions which so horrified us and were termed enigmatic and barbaric, should have been seen in a different light by an intelligent diplomacy, particularly if they considered the fate of Norway and France and the role which fifth-columnists played in those two countries. A clever diplomat could have willingly admitted that a little well-directed shooting in France and Belgium on the Russian model might have saved Brussels, Oslo, Amsterdam and Paris."

Thus it can be seen that once the western countries had become locked in a mortal conflict with Nazi Germany and became allies of the USSR, they had to overcome their deep-rooted anti-Comintern and anti-Bolshevik prejudices and speak out the truth in public on the Moscow trials as on many other issues; they had to admit publicly that these trials, far from weakening the CPSU(B), the Soviet government or the Red Army, had, by liquidating the Fifth Column in the USSR, strengthened the Party, the Government and the Red Army. In making this belated admission they were

only confirming the historical significance of these trials as being an integral part of the USSR's struggle - and indeed the struggle of the world as a whole - against the menace of Nazi world domination. In making these admissions the bourgeois spokesmen were doing no more than confirming the evaluation of these trials given by the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov and by Stalin.

Speaking in Leningrad on 27 November, 1937 (that is, after the first two Moscow trials and the trial of the Red Army generals, but before the third Moscow trial), Litvinov had this to say:

"Comrades, the preparation of war begins in peacetime. It consists, among other things, in the formation of a web of espionage on foreign territory and numerous agencies to carry out all kinds of instructions - in short, what is now commonly called the 'fifth column.' You read a few days ago that about 1,000 spies were arrested recently in Czechoslovakia and that a serious conspiracy has been hatched against the French Republic. Our likely enemies should know by now that they will not find the line of least resistance on Soviet territory in this respect, either. They know that the creation of ammunition dumps, fortifications, dugouts, and the organisation of internal squads to man those enterprises and use them might be possible in some places, but certainly not in the Soviet Union. They know that our People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs is very unwilling to let such plans come to fruition and that it is vigilant and strong enough to destroy the Trotsky-Fascist organisations of spies and wreckers in embryo." (Quoted according to A Pope, op. cit., pp. 420-1).

And this is what Stalin had to say on this question:

"Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of Soviet organisations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has 'shaken' the Soviet system and caused its 'demoralisation'. All this cheap drivel deserves is laughter and scorn. How can the purging of Soviet organisations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralise the Soviet system? The Trotsky-Bukharin bunch, that handful of spies, assassins and wreckers, who kowtowed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig and were ready to serve him as spies - that handful of individuals who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery - of what use that miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the

people, and whom can they 'demoralise'? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Ubovich and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet government. At the beginning of 1938, Rosengoltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet government. Where are the symptoms of 'demoralisation', we would like to know, and why was this 'demoralisation' not reflected in the results of the elections?

"To listen to these foreign drivellers one would think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organisations would have been far sounder and stronger. (Laughter). Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins and wreckers?"

"Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet organisations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organisations?"

"What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations?" (Report to the 18th Party Congress).

Thus the convergence of honest bourgeois and proletarian views alike compels us to the only conclusion possible, namely that the accused at the Moscow trials were justly tried and justly punished, and that the liquidation of the accused eliminated the Fifth Column in the USSR. This is how an authoritative bourgeois correspondent summarised the general conclusion:

"That purge eliminated Russia's Fifth Column. I found no British or American correspondent in Russia who thought that the famous confessions made by Radek, Tukhachevsky, Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky, Pletnov, Rosengoltz and others had been extracted by torture." (Quentin Reynolds, *Only the Stars are Neutral*, New York, 1943, p. 93).

We would sincerely welcome evidence, as opposed to mere assertions, from Gorbachev and other critics of Stalin to refute what has been said above. In the absence of any convincing evidence from the professional Stalin bashers, be they the ordinary bourgeois or the bourgeois of Trotskyite/revisionist variety, we have a right - indeed a duty - to reaffirm our conviction as to the justness of these trials.

Admission of mistakes by Bukharin and others.

Before concluding this article, we must deal with one other matter. In his 1987 Report, Gorbachev says that Trotsky "*always vacillated and cheated*," and "*negated the possibility of building socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement*." Bukharin and his followers, too, says Gorbachev in the same Report, took a mistaken stand and they "*soon admitted their mistakes*," and that Bukharin's "*theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve*."

These perfunctory remarks, taken in conjunction with Gorbachev's assertion that Stalin suppressed all dissent and liquidated loyal party members and loyal Army generals, not to mention the rehabilitation of Bukharin subsequently, leave the impression that the accused at the Moscow trials had not committed the crimes they were charged with, but simply ended up in court for disagreeing with Stalin, or for a little bit of cheating here and there, or a few mistakes which soon they admitted in any case. That this is not the case has been amply demonstrated in the foregoing pages. As to admission of mistakes, the Moscow trials laid bare the duplicity practised by the various accused, who had become accomplished in matching public admissions for their mistakes and their pledges of loyalty to the Party with their underground conspiratorial and murderous, wrecking and spying activities for the overthrow of socialism and the restoration of capitalism. Fully to understand the moral depravity of the accused at the Moscow trials and the magnitude of their crimes, it is necessary to make a mention of the political duplicity, double-dealing, hypocrisy and treachery practised by them. Here are a few examples.

(1) Just at the time when his terrorist centre was putting the finishing touches to its plan to murder Sergei Kirov, Zinoviev, on 8 May, 1933, sent a letter to the central committee renouncing his mistakes and vowing his loyalty to socialism and to the Party. These are the words with which he ended his letter:

"I ask you to believe that I am speaking the truth and nothing but the truth. I ask you to restore me to the ranks of the Party and to give me an opportunity of working for the common cause. I give my word as a revolutionary that I will be the most devoted member of the Party, and will do all I possibly can at least to some extent to atone for my guilt before the Party and its Central Committee."

After the Moscow trials, we know now what these words were worth.

Zinoviev carried his perfidy to such lengths that after Kirov's murder, which he, Zinoviev, had organised, he sent an obituary notice to *Pravda* under the title *The Beacon Man*. Here is what Zinoviev wrote:

"The grief of the Party is the grief of the whole people, of all the peoples of the USSR. The Party's mourning is the mourning of the whole of our great country ... The whole people have felt the bitterness of bereavement."

"The foul murder of Sergei Mironovich Kirov has in truth roused the whole Party, the whole of the Soviet Union."

"The loss of this beloved and dear man has been felt by all as the loss of one who is nearest and dearest of all ..."

"Beloved son of the Party."

"A son of the working class - this is what this Beacon Man was", "our dear, deep, strong ... one could not help loving him, one could not help being proud of him."

Kamenev, too, in May 1933, wrote similar deceptive and hypocritical articles which are remarkable for their duplicity and perfidy.

And the Party responded to their admission of mistakes and promises to be faithful to the Party by ending their exile. Thus, the allegedly vindictive and unforgiving Stalin was more than willing to let Kamenev and Zinoviev return from exile and do useful work. And in the summer of 1933, after the return of these two gentlemen from exile, a meeting of the Trotskyist-Zinovievite centre was held in Zinoviev's apartment for the purpose of organising terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and the Soviet government.

(2) Radek, in number 3 of *The Bolshevik* for 1935, by way of exposure of the duplicity of Zinoviev and all the heads of the Zinoviev faction, wrote these lines:

"Having slipped into counter-revolution, the ex-leaders of the Zinovievite-Trotskyist bloc have resorted to the methods of interventionist spies, dynamiters and wreckers. Duplicity proved to be camouflage enabling them to bombard the proletarian General Staff."

And further, at the time of the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev and others, Radek exclaimed:

"Crush the vipers! It is not a matter of exterminating ambitious men who have gone to the length of committing a great crime, it is a matter of extermi-

nating the agents of fascism who were prepared to assist in igniting the conflagration of war, to facilitate the victory of fascism in order to receive from its hands at least the shadow of power."

Radek talked in this article about the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Fascist gang and its hitman - Trotsky," etc.

Radek ended this article with the following paragraph:

The proletarian court will pass sentence on these sanguinary murderers, which they have deserved a hundred-fold. People who have raised the sword against the beloved leaders of the proletariat must pay with their heads for their unparalleled crime. The chief organiser of this gang and of its deeds, Trotsky, has already been condemned by history to the pillory of shame. He will not escape the verdict of the proletariat."

Pyatakov does not lag behind his fellow wrecker, Radek. Pyatakov wrote on 21 August, 1936:

"One cannot find the words fully to express one's indignation and disgust. These people have lost the last semblance of humanity. They must be destroyed, destroyed like carrion which is polluting the pure, bracing air of the land of Soviets; dangerous carrion which may cause the death of our leaders, and has already caused the death of one of the best people in our land - that wonderful comrade and leader S.M. Kirov."

This is what Radek and Pyatakov wrote about Zinoviev and Kamenev. But it turned out that they wrote it about themselves, for, as we now know, not only did Radek and Pyatakov know in advance about the attempt on Kirov's life, but they actually consented to such an attempt being made.

(3) Take Bukharin. Leaving aside his earlier hypocritical denunciations of himself, let us begin with the year 1928. In this year Bukharin declared at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party that he had no differences with the Party. But it turns out that at the very time Bukharin was engaged in secret negotiations and reached an agreement with Kamenev. In 1929 Bukharin wrote in *Pravda* about his erroneous views thus:

"While admitting these errors of ours, we on our part will exert every effort to wage, together with the entire Party, a resolute struggle against all deviations."

It was precisely at that time that there was taking shape the underground organisation that began to oppose the Soviet power with arms. And Bukharin admitted during his trial that the above declaration was a lie - a

tactical manoeuvre designed to mislead the Party. When Bukharin wrote the above lines - at that very time, according to his own testimony and that of Rykov and Ivanov - he (Bukharin) was engaged in fanning the struggle in the North Caucasus and in organising kulak revolts against Soviet power.

The year 1930 - Bukharin hands in a declaration to the Central Committee and admits his errors. Bukharin, in this declaration, writes about his *"unreserved condemnation of every attempt against the unity of the Party, all factional activity, all attempts at surreptitious struggle against the Party leadership, surreptitious defence of another political line differing from that of the Party."*

But, it turns out, according to Bukharin's own testimony, that it was precisely at this moment that he was engaged in negotiations with Semyonov concerning the organisation of terroristic acts against the leaders of the Soviet government and Party.

The year 1933 - Bukharin makes a speech at the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B) in which he demands *"severe punishment for A.P. Smirnov's grouping"*, speaks about his own *"Right opportunist, absolutely wrong general political line"* and of his *"guilt before the Party, its leadership, before the Central Committee of the Party, before the working class and the country,"* and so on and so forth.

But it turns out that this was the first year of the formation of the 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites', with Bukharin and Rykov as its leaders, which proceeded to engage in terrorism, diversion, wrecking, espionage, and high treason, and in the severance of the national republics from the USSR.

The year 1934 - at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Bukharin in his speech approved of the *"ruthless crushing of all opposition and of the Right opposition as the main danger, i.e., of the very group to which I once belonged."*

But it turns out that precisely at that time Bukharin was engaged in mobilising all forces with the purpose of intensifying the activity of his group - of this criminal gang - which had already become a group of murderers, professional wreckers, genuine spies, and agents of intelligence services of foreign countries.

The other accused were no less experienced in the game of hypocrisy and double-dealing, duplicity and treachery. Each one of them was able to mask himself and his criminal activities. It was precisely because of the

masks worn by them and the high official positions held by them that they escaped detection for so long. With a thousand apologies to the reader, we end this rather long article with the following remark of Vyshinsky in his concluding speech in the first Moscow trial - a remark which is applicable with equal force to the accused in the subsequent trials:

"This is perhaps one of the most striking cases in history when the word mask acquired its real meaning: these people put their masks on their faces, adopted the pose of repentant sinners who had broken with the past, who had abandoned their old erring ways and mistakes which grew into crime" (Trial of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre).

In the next chapter we shall deal with the so-called cult of the personality.

Chapter 10

LALKAR

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Historical Questions - A re-assessment of the past Part IV Stalin and the 'Cult of the Personality'

Beginning with Khrushchev, the successive revisionist leaders of the USSR have denounced Joseph Stalin for cultivating the "cult of the personality", which, they allege, greatly distorted inner party life, did great damage to Soviet social development, and hindered economic development. When Khrushchev, in his capacity as the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, delivered his report on 14 February 1956 to the 20th Party Congress, he did not feel strong enough to attack Stalin openly and directly. On the contrary, he was obliged to make deferential and highly approving remarks about Stalin and the struggle of the Party during his leadership:

"Shortly after the 19th Congress", he said, "death took Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin from our ranks. The enemies of socialism hoped there would be confusion in the Party's ranks, discord among its leadership, hesitation in carrying out its internal and foreign policy. However, their hopes came to nought." (N.S. Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee, 20th Congress of the CPSU, London, February 1956, page 78).

We know only too well that the imperialist hopes were more firmly grounded in reality than Khrushchev's boastful assertions.

And further:

"The Party's unity has been built up over the course of many years and decades; it grew stronger in battle with a host of enemies. The Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists, and other malignant enemies of the people, the men who wanted to restore capitalism, tried desperately to under-

mine the Party's Leninist unity from within, and all of them broke their necks" (*ibid* p.79).

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in this report was veiled and shrouded in language almost allegorical:

"It was of paramount importance to re-establish and to strengthen in every way the Leninist principle of collective leadership ...

"The Central Committee ... vigorously condemned the cult of the individual as being alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and making a particular leader a hero and a miracle worker ... currency of the cult of the individual tended to minimise the role of collective leadership in the Party, and at times resulted in serious drawbacks in our work." (*ibid*. pp. 80-81).

Having already eliminated, through judicial murder, Beria and a few other Marxist-Leninists, Khrushchev felt bold enough to condemn Beria as an imperialist agent - a most absurd accusation:

"The imperialists had placed special hopes on their old agent, Beria, who had perfidiously wormed his way into leading posts in the party and government. The Central Committee put an end to the criminal conspiracy of that dangerous enemy and his accomplices. That was a big victory for the party, a victory for its collective leadership." (*ibid*. pp. 78-79).

If, in the remarks quoted immediately above, one were to substitute the name of Khrushchev for that of Beria, one would be very much closer to the truth. For this truth is that Beria was a Marxist-Leninist, and imperialists, so far removed were they from placing special hopes on him, went lurid with delight at the news of his physical elimination. With Khrushchev, matters stood differently. The imperialists had placed "special hopes" on this arch-revisionist, "who had perfidiously wormed his way into leading posts in the party and government," and their hopes were not belied. This hypocritical high priest of capitalist restoration, this cringing flatterer, this double dealer and intriguer, learning his lessons from the "Trotskyites, Bukharinites, bourgeois nationalists, and other malignant enemies ... who had wanted to restore capitalism," and who had all broken their necks, bided his time and waited for his opportunity, which came his way following the death of Stalin in March 1953.

"Honesty in politics is the result of strength," remarked Lenin, "hypocrisy the result of weakness." (*Polemical Notes, Collected Works Vol XVII* p. 166).

It is a testimony to the hypocrisy - and weakness - of Khrushchev, and his revisionists cohorts, that his direct attack on Stalin was made in a "secret speech" to the 20th Party Congress on 25 February, 1956. So fearful were the revisionist clique of the reaction of the Soviet people to Khrushchev's baseless and unwarranted abuse of Stalin that they never dared publish it in the USSR. Instead they leaked it to the US State Department, leaving it to the imperialist mass media to broadcast it to the Soviet people. For the revisionists this proved to be an extremely wise precaution, as even the rumours about the content of Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Congress led to industrial unrest, demonstrations and riots in the USSR. In this "secret speech", Khrushchev charges that:

"... the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person." (Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.): *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, New York, 1956, p. 69).

As time went on, and Khrushchev felt more secure and bold, he gave vent to his anti-Stalin spleen in language most absurd, violent and venomous. In his conversation with the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) on 22 October 1961, he abused Stalin as a "murderer" a "criminal", a "bandit" and an "idiot". In his speech at a 1962 May Day reception given by the Soviet government, Khrushchev described Stalin as a "gambler," a "despot of the type of Ivan the Terrible", "the greatest dictator in Russian history" and a "fool."

The meaning of Khrushchev's abuse, its real significance, can only be that the first socialist state was for nearly three decades headed by a "bandit"; that the heroic struggle of the glorious CPSU was, over this period, waged under the leadership of a "fool;" that the great Red Army, which by smashing the Nazi war machine triumphed in the anti-fascist and Great Patriotic War, had an "idiot" as its supreme commander. That the international communist movement had a "murderer" for its teacher over 30 long years; and that the international proletariat and the oppressed people the world over had a "gambler" as their standard-bearer in the struggle against international imperialism and all reaction. As the Chinese comrades at the time correctly commented, such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev was "a gross insult to the Soviet people, a gross insult to the CPSU, to the Soviet army, to the dictatorship of the proletariat and to the socialist system, to the international communist movement, to the revolutionary people the world over and to

Marxism-Leninism." (On the Question of Stalin; Second Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of People's Daily and Red Flag; 13 September, 1963).

The Chinese comrades went on to ask:

"In what position does Khrushchev, who participated in the leadership of the Party and the state during Stalin's period, place himself when he beats his breast, pounds the table and shouts abuse at the top of his voice? In the position of an accomplice to a "murderer" or a "bandit"? Or in the same position as a "fool" or an "idiot"? (Ibid).

Asked the Chinese comrades: *"What difference is there between such abuse of Stalin by Khrushchev and the abuse by the imperialists, the reactionaries in various countries, and the renegades to communism? Why such inveterate hatred of Stalin? Why attack him more ferociously than you do the enemy?"*

"In abusing Stalin," said the Chinese comrades by way of an answer to the above question, *"Khrushchev is in fact wildly denouncing the Soviet system and state. His language in this connection is by no means weaker but actually stronger than that of such renegades as Kautsky, Trotsky, Tito and Djilas." (ibid.).*

While pouring such abuse on Stalin, the Khrushchevites were heaping praise on the political representatives of US imperialism. Noted the Chinese comrades:

"On the one hand, they viciously lash out at a great Marxist-Leninist, a great proletarian revolutionary and a great leader of the international communist movement, and on the other, they laud the chieftains of imperialism to the skies." Hitting the nail on the head, they pertinently asked:

"Is there any possibility that the connection between these phenomena is merely accidental and that it does not follow with inexorable logic from the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism?" (Ibid.).

That was indeed the political significance of Khrushchev's vicious attack on Stalin, of his vituperative invective. In attacking Stalin, he (Khrushchev) was only maligning the party of great Lenin, the motherland of socialism, the Soviet people who were the first to accomplish a socialist revolution, who upheld its great gains in fierce battles against international imperialism and internal counter-revolution, who displayed miracles of heroism and

dedication in the task of socialist construction, and who faithfully fulfilled their internationalist duty to the working people the world over.

In his article, *The Political Significance of Abuse*, Lenin made the observation:

"Abuse in politics often covers up the utter lack of ideological content, the helplessness and the impotence, the annoying impotence of the abuser."

This apt observation so neatly described the Khrushchevite revisionists who, feeling constantly haunted by the spectre of Stalin, tried to cover up their utter lack of principle, their helplessness and their annoying impotence by abusing Stalin. Khrushchev merely abused Stalin; he never even attempted to substantiate his accusations and charges against Stalin. Such was his hatred of Stalin that in his speech at the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Rally in Moscow on 19 July, 1963, Khrushchev said: *"Ah! If only Stalin had died ten years earlier."* As is known, Stalin died in 1953. Ten years earlier would have meant 1943, the very year in which the glorious Red Army began its counter-offensive against the Nazi beasts in the Great Patriotic War. None but Hitler would have wanted Stalin to die just then - one would have thought! No, it turns out that the Khrushchevite revisionists were at one with Hitler in wishing Stalin's demise in that fateful year when the fortunes of the war, and with them the destiny of the entire humanity, hung so precariously in the balance.

Lenin, in the Preface to his remarkable work in defence of Marxian philosophy, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, made this penetrating observation in regard to revisionism:

"... it was only the revisionists who gained a sad reputation for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism, and by their fear or inability, to 'settle accounts' openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the views they had abandoned. When orthodox Marxists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx ... , it was always done with such precision and thoroughness that no one found anything ambiguous in such literary utterances."

Khrushchevite revisionism is, or shall we say was, characterised by precisely such a duality - by its departure from the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism accompanied by its fear of, or inability to, 'settle accounts' openly and honestly with the views it had abandoned. Even as late as Gorbachev's accession to power, the revisionists in the USSR, while doing everything to bring about the final collapse of even the remnants of socialism, continued

to invoke the names of Marx and Lenin. They have found an easy way: instead of openly taking up cudgels against Marxism-Leninism even today, they confine themselves to abusing Stalin and blaming everything and every misfortune, real and imaginary, on Stalin's 'personality cult'.

In what follows we intend to refute beyond doubt the revisionist assertions that Stalin was an extremely vain person, who not only encouraged the 'Stalin personality cult', but also took great pleasure in it, that he regarded himself as a superhuman being who knew everything, that he made statements without prior investigation and forced everyone to agree with him through sheer conceit. What emerges in our study of the real Stalin, as distinct from the mythical Stalin, is an extraordinarily competent Marxist-Leninist, who hated flattery and flatterers, who hated the cult of personality and did everything to stop it. What emerges is a great proletarian revolutionary suffering neither from conceit nor mock-modesty, and one mission - one burning desire - in life, namely, to contribute to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for its social emancipation; who never opened his mouth without making a careful study of the matter concerned. What also emerges clearly is that it is precisely his detractors, the Khrushchevite revisionists, who were guilty of building the Stalin 'personality cult'. But he was never fooled or distracted by their flattery from the proletarian course he had set himself. That is precisely why the bourgeois intelligentsia - in particular the revisionists - entertained such burning resentment against him. For three long decades he frustrated their attempts to divert the international communist movement along opportunist channels and curtailed their freedom to corrupt the working-class movement with bourgeois ideology. It is natural that his consistent refusal to assume the pictorial leadership of a cult officiated by the opportunist intelligentsia aroused such uncontrollable hatred of him as that felt by the revisionist clique which seized the leadership of the CPSU after his death.

Friend and foe alike testify to Stalin's simplicity and modesty. This is how Enver Hoxha, the Albanian leader, describes Stalin:

"Stalin was no tyrant, no despot. He was a man of principle; he was just, modest and very kindly and considerate towards people, the cadres and his colleagues." (E Hoxha: *With Stalin: Memoirs*, Tirana, 1979, pp.14-15.

Henri Barbusse, the French writer, gives the following vivid picture of Stalin's lifestyle:

"One goes up to the first floor, where white curtains hang over three of the windows. These three windows are Stalin's home. In the tiny hall a long military cloak hangs on a peg beneath a cap. In addition to this hall there are three bedrooms and a dining-room. The bedrooms are as simply furnished as those of a respectable, second-class hotel. ... The eldest son, Jasheka, sleeps at night in the dining room, on a divan which is converted into a bed; the younger sleeps in a tiny recess, a sort of alcove opening out of it. ...

"Each month he earns the five hundred roubles which constitute the meagre maximum salary of the officials of the Communist Party (amounting to between £20 and £25 in English money). ...

"This frank and brilliant man is ... a simple man. ... He does not employ thirty-two secretaries, like Mr Lloyd George; he has only one. ...

"Stalin systematically gives credit for all progress made to Lenin, whereas the credit has been in very large measure his own." (H Barbusse: *Stalin: A New World Seen Through One Man*, London 1935, pp. vii, viii, 291, 294).

Although Stalin had the use of a country cottage (*dacha*), his lifestyle in it was just as simple and modest. Let Svetlana, his daughter, speak:

"It was the same with the dacha at Kuntsevo. ... My father lived on the ground floor. He lived in one room and made it do for everything. He slept on the sofa, made up at night as a bed" (S Alleluyeva, *Letters to a Friend*, London, 1967, p. 28).

The Russian-born American writer, Eugene Lyons, in his biography of Stalin, paints the following picture of the simplicity of Stalin's lifestyle and of his pleasant, likable and friendly manner:

"Stalin lives in a modest apartment of three rooms ... In his everyday life his tastes remained simple almost to the point of crudeness Even those who hated him with a desperate hate and blamed him for sadistic cruelties never accused him of excesses in his private life ...

"Those who measure 'success' by millions of dollars, yachts and mistresses find it hard to understand power relished in austerity ...

"There was nothing remotely ogre-like in his looks or conduct, nothing theatrical in his manner. A pleasant, earnest, aging man - evidently willing to be friendly to the first foreigner whom he had admitted to his presence in years. 'He's a thoroughly likable person,' I remember thinking as we sat there, and thinking it in astonishment." (E Lyons, *Stalin: Czar of All the Russias: Philadelphia*, 1940, pp 196 and 200).

Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the famous British Fabians, in their enduring work *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation*, forcibly reject the myth of exercise by Stalin of dictatorial power:

"Sometimes it is asserted that ... the whole state is governed by the will of a single person, Josef Stalin.

"First let it be noted that, unlike Mussolini, Hitler and other modern dictators, Stalin is not invested by law with any authority over his fellow-citizens. He has not even the extensive power which ... the American Constitution entrusts for four years to every successive president ... Stalin is not, and never has been, ... the President of the USSR ... He is not even a People's Commissar, or a member of the Cabinet ... He is ... the General Secretary of the Party. ...

"We do not think that the Party is governed by the will of a single person, or that Stalin is the sort of person to claim or desire such a position. He has himself very explicitly denied any such personal dictatorship in terms which ... certainly accord with our own impression of the facts.

"The Communist Party in the USSR has adopted for its own organisation the pattern which we have described ... In this pattern individual dictatorship has no place. Personal decisions are distrusted, and elaborately guarded against. In order to avoid the mistakes due to bias, anger, jealousy, vanity and other distempers ... it is desirable that the individual will should always be controlled by the necessity of gaining the assent of colleagues of equal grade, who have candidly discussed the matter and who have to make themselves jointly responsible for the decision ...

"Stalin ... has ... frequently pointed out that he does no more than carry out the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party ...

*"The plain truth is that, surveying the administration of the USSR during the past decade under the alleged dictatorship of Stalin, the principal decisions have manifested neither the promptitude nor the timeliness, nor yet the fearless obstinacy that have often been claimed as the merits of a dictatorship. On the contrary, the action of the Party has frequently been taken after consideration so prolonged, and as the outcome of discussion sometimes so heated and embittered, as to bear upon their formulation the marks of hesitancy and lack of assurance... These policies have borne the stigmata of committee control." S and B Webb: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation*, London, 1947, pages 333-336).*

For those who are disinclined to believe in the testimony of Hoxha, Barbusse and the Webbs as being biased witnesses, we shall reproduce excerpts from the writings of those very critical of Stalin but who, nevertheless, corroborate the testimony already cited.

Joseph Davies, the US ambassador to Moscow from 1936-1938 - the period of the Moscow Trials - has this to say of Stalin:

"I was startled to see the door ... open and Mr Stalin come into the room alone ... His demeanour is kindly, his manner almost deprecatingly simple ...

*"He greeted me cordially with a smile and with great simplicity, but also with a real dignity ... His brown eye is exceedingly kindly and gentle. A child would like to sit in his lap and a dog would sidle up to him." (J.E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow*, London, 1940, pages 222 and 230).*

Walter Bedell Smith, another US ambassador to Moscow, from 1946-1949, writes of Stalin:

*"He is not, for instance, an absolute dictator, on the one hand, nor a prisoner of the Politburo, on the other; his position, I would say, is more that of chairman of the board with the decisive vote ... " (Walter Bedell Smith: *Moscow Mission*, William Heinemann Limited, London, 1950, p. 44).*

Another Russian-born American correspondent, Isaac Don Levine, in his far from friendly biography of Stalin, writes:

*"Stalin does not seek honours. He loathes pomp. He is averse to public displays. He could have all the nominal regalia in the chest of a great state. But he prefers the background." (I.D. Levine, *Stalin: A Biography*, London, 1931, p.248-249).*

The American writer Louis Fischer, who is equally hostile to Stalin, gives this description of Stalin's capacity to listen:

*"Stalin ... inspires the Party with his will-power and calm. Individuals in contact with him admire his capacity to listen and his skill in improving on the suggestions and drafts of highly intelligent subordinates.")L Fischer, from an article in *The Nation*, Vol. 137, 9 Aug. 1933, p. 154).*

To Eugene Lyons' question "Are you a dictator?" Stalin replied:

"No, I am no dictator. Those who use the word do not understand the Soviet system of government and the methods of the Communist Party. No one man or group of men can dictate. Decisions are made by the Party and acted upon by its organs, the Central Committee and the Politburo." (Ibid, p.203).

Arvo Tuominen, the Finnish revisionist politician, who, while being hostile to Stalin feels nevertheless able to testify to Stalin's self-effacement and to stress, albeit with surprise, the contrast between the real and the mythical Stalin in the following words:

"In his speeches and writings Stalin always withdrew into the background, speaking only of communism, the Soviet power and the Party, and stressing that he was really a representative of the idea and the organisation, nothing more ...

"I never noticed any signs of vainglory in Stalin." (A Tuominen: *The Bells of the Kremlin*, Hanover (New Hampshire USA), 1983, pp.155 and 163).

And:

"During my many years in Moscow I never stopped marvelling at the contrast between the man and the colossal likenesses that had been made of him. That medium-sized, slightly pock-marked Caucasian with a moustache was as far removed as could be from that stereotype of a dictator. But at the same time the propaganda was proclaiming his superhuman abilities." (Ibid p. 155).

Marshal Georgy Zhukov writes of Stalin thus:

"Free of affectation and mannerisms, he won the heart of everyone he talked with." (G.K. Zhukov, *The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov*, London, 1971, p.283).

Svetlana, Stalin's daughter, with her notorious ability to fall for all manner of slander hurled at Stalin, nevertheless rejects the charge that her father was personally responsible for directing the 'cult' of his personality. Describing a train journey with him from the Crimea to Moscow in 1948, she says:

"As we pulled in at the various stations we'd go for a stroll along the platform. My father walked as far as the engine, giving greetings to the railway workers as he went. You couldn't see a single passenger. It was a special train and no one was allowed on the platform ... Whoever thought such a thing up? Who had contrived all these stratagems? Not he. It was the system of which he himself was a prisoner and in which he suffered from loneliness, emptiness and lack of human companionship.

"Nowadays when I read or hear somewhere that my father used to consider himself practically a god, it amazes me that people who knew him well can even say such a thing ...

"He never thought of himself as a god." (S Alleluyeva, *Letters to a Friend*, London 1968, pp.202-3 and 213).

She paints this poignant picture of the grief-stricken servants at Stalin's *dacha* immediately following his death:

"These men and women who were servants of my father loved him. In little things he wasn't hard to please. On the contrary, he was courteous, unassuming and direct with those who waited upon him ...

"Men, women, everyone, started crying all over again ...

"No one was making a show of loyalty or grief. All of them had known one another for years ...

"No one in this room looked on him as a god or superman, a genius or a demon. They loved and respected him for the most ordinary human qualities, those qualities of which servants are the best judges of all." (ibid. pp.20 and 22).

To those who say that Stalin, for reasons of vanity, conceit and subjective pleasure, encouraged the 'cult' of Stalin's personality, we answer that Stalin frequently condemned and derided the 'cult of the individual' as being contrary to Marxism-Leninism. We reproduce below his pronouncements on this question made over a period of more than two decades. In June 1926, in his *Reply to Railway Workers' Greetings*, he expressed himself as follows:

"I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not deserve a good half of the flattering things that have been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest of it. This is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary exaggeration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no intention of dying yet...

"I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops." (J.V. Stalin, *Works* Vol. 8, Moscow, 1954, p.182).

On 21 December, 1929, he sent a reply *"To All Organisations and Comrades who sent Greetings on the Occasion of Comrade Stalin's Fiftieth Birthday,"* which shows his modesty and utter devotion to the cause of the world proletariat:

"Your congratulations and greetings I place to the credit of the great Party of the working class which bore me and reared me in its own image and likeness.

And just because I place them to the credit of our glorious Leninist Party, I make bold to tender you my Bolshevik thanks.

"You need have no doubt, comrades, that I am prepared in the future, too, to devote to the cause of the working class, to the cause of the proletarian revolution and world communism, all my strength, all my ability and, if need be, all my blood, drop by drop." (J.V. Stalin, Works, Vol 12, Moscow 1955, p.146).

In early March 1930, Stalin wrote his article *Dizzy with Success*, in which he criticised the deviations from the Party line in the implementation of the policy of collectivisation, stressing the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement, among other matters. This article had a singularly beneficial effect in winning the vast masses of the peasantry to the side of collectivisation by removing the errors of some zealous functionaries in the field of collectivisation. He was rightly given credit for his initiative. In his typically self-effacing manner he passes all credit to the Party Central Committee. This is what he wrote in his *Reply to Collective-Farm Comrades* in April 1930:

"There are some who think that the article 'Dizzy with Success' was the result of Stalin's personal initiative. That, of course, is nonsense. It is not in order that personal initiative is a matter like this to be taken by anyone, whoever he might be, that we have a Central Committee (Ibid. p. 218).

In August 1930, in his *Letter to Comrade Shatknovsky*, he denounces devotion to persons as "vain and useless bauble of weak-minded intellectuals."

"You speak of your devotion to me ... I would advise you to discard the 'principle' of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not confuse it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of weak-minded intellectuals." (J.V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 13, Moscow, 1955, p.20).

During December 1931, during his *Talk with the German Author, Emil Ludwig* Stalin has this to say on the role of outstanding individuals in history:

"As for myself, I am just a pupil of Lenin's, and the aim of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his..."

"Marxism does not deny at all the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. But ... great people are worth anything at all

only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will find themselves in the situation of Don Quixote ...

"Individual persons cannot decide. Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided decisions ... In every collective body, there are people whose opinion must be reckoned with ... From the experience of three revolutions we know that out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 90 are one-sided..."

"Never under any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of one person. With us, personages of the greatest authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence in them. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptionally great prestige ... As soon as he began to stumble politically the workers forgot him. They forsook him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. His prestige too was great, although, of course, it was nothing like Plekhanov's ... As soon as he drifted away from the workers they forgot him". (Ibid. pp.107-109 and 113).

In his *Letter to Comrade I.N. Bazhanov* in February 1933 he wrote:

"I have received your letter ceding me your second Order as a reward for my work.

"I thank you very much for your warm words and comradely present. I know what you are depriving yourself of in my favour and appreciate your sentiments.

"Nevertheless, I cannot accept your second Order. I cannot and must not accept it, not only because it can only belong to you, as you alone have earned it, but also because I have been amply rewarded as it is by the attention and respect of comrades and, consequently, have no right to rob you.

Orders are instituted not for those who are well known as it is, but mainly for heroic people who are little known and who need to be made known to all.

"Besides, I must tell you that I already have two Orders. That is more than one needs, I assure you.

"I apologise for the delay in replying.

"With communist greetings,

"J Stalin.

"P.S. I am returning the Order to where it belongs." (*Ibid.* p. 241).

In his *Talk with Colonel Robins* in May 1933, we find this dialogue:

"Robins: I consider it a great honour to have the opportunity of paying you a visit.

Stalin: There is nothing particular in that. You are exaggerating.

Robins: What is most interesting to me is that throughout Russia I have found the names Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, linked together.

Stalin: That, too, is an exaggeration. How can I be compared to Lenin?" (*ibid.* p. 267).

When in 1938 it was suggested by some well-meaning sycophants that a book entitled *Stories of the Childhood of Stalin* be published, Stalin characteristically came down on them like a ton of bricks, suggesting that the book be banned:

"I am absolutely against the publication of 'Stories of the Childhood of Stalin'.

"The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited praise ...

"But ... the important thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental. The theory of 'heroes' and 'crowd' is not a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory ...

"I suggest we burn this book." (J.V. Stalin, *ibid.* Volume 14).

Here is our final piece of evidence on this question. In the latter half of 1950, a 4-man delegation of the then united Communist Party of India, composed of M. Basavapunniah, C. Rajeswara Rao, Ajoy Ghosh and S.A. Dange, met a 4-man delegation of the CPSU(B), headed by Stalin, the other members of it being Molotov, Suslov and Malenkov. In an article, in connection with the role of Stalin, which appeared in the 8 July 1990 issue of *People's Democracy*, the weekly organ of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Comrade Basavapunniah has this to say, which testifies to Stalin's modesty, prodigious memory and tremendous willingness to help fraternal parties and to treat their leaders with respect and on a footing of equality:

"Stalin said: 'Comrades, you have requested us to assist you in sorting out some issues connected with the Communist movement in India. Our knowledge about present-day India is not up to the mark, and we are stating our views based on our old study of India and our general understanding of historical and dialectical materialism.'

"After some preliminary exchange of views, Stalin asked our delegation to prepare two drafts, one relating to our party programme, and the second on the then current tactical line. ...

"Stalin asked our delegation whether the CPI had its Party Programme. We felt humbled since our Party in India had no programme as such, and it was being run by political resolutions from time to time. Then Stalin reminded our delegation about our Draft Programme forwarded to the centre of the Communist International in the year 1928. Besides reminding us of our forgotten 'Draft Programme', Stalin told us that it must be available in the archives of the Communist International which was locked and closed after the dissolution of the Third International in the year 1943. Stalin asked his aides at hand to unlock and open the doors of the closed CI archives, and find out our Draft Programme of 1928. It was found and delivered to our delegation for reading and returning back to the CI archives. We were all terribly impressed by how Stalin could remember this Indian draft of 1922, after two decades and more, and how all members of our delegation had almost forgotten about such a document."

Comrade Basavapunniah concludes with the following quotation from Stalin's speech made at the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU, delivered on October 14th, 1952, which testifies to the proletarian internationalism as propagated and practised by Stalin:

"Comrades, permit me to express the gratitude of our Congress to all the fraternal parties and groups whose representatives have honoured our Congress with their presence, or who have sent greetings to the Congress - gratitude for their friendly felicitations, for their wishes of success, for their confidence.

"It is their confidence that we particularly prize, for it signifies readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a brighter future for the peoples in its struggle against war, its struggle for the preservation of peace.

"It would be a mistake to think that, having become a mighty force, our Party is no longer in need of support. That is not true. Our Party and our country have always needed, and will need, the confidence, the sympathy and support of fraternal peoples abroad.

"The distinguishing feature of this support is that whenever any fraternal party supports the peaceable aspirations of our Party, it is at the same time supporting its own people in their struggle for the preservation of peace. When in 1918-19, at the time of the armed attack of the British bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, the British workers organised a struggle against war under the watchword of 'hands off Russia!' this was support - support, primarily, for the struggle of their own people for peace, and support also for the Soviet Union. ... This distinguishing feature of mutual support is to be explained by the fact that the interests of our Party do not contradict, but on the contrary, merge with the interests of the peace-loving peoples. As to the Soviet Union, its interests are altogether inseparable from the cause of worldwide peace.

"Naturally our Party cannot but remain indebted to the fraternal parties, and it must in turn render support to them and also their peoples in their struggle for emancipation, and in their struggle for the preservation of peace. As we know, this is exactly what it is doing. After our Party had assumed power in 1917, and after it had taken effective measures to abolish capitalist and landlord oppression, representatives of the fraternal parties, in their admiration for the daring and success of our Party, conferred upon it the title of the 'Shock Brigade' of the world revolutionary and labour movement. By this, they were expressing the hope that the success of the Shock Brigade would help to ease the position of the peoples languishing under the yoke of capitalism.

The question then arises: if Stalin was not behind the 'personality cult' drive, who initiated it, who perpetrated and perpetuated it? The answer is none other than the revisionists - like Khrushchev, Karl Radek, Mikoyan and many others, who had wormed their way into a position of authority and influence in the CPSU and the Soviet government. And they did this partly to conceal their own revisionist position, for, learning from the total defeat and rout of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite opposition, the revisionists, the would-be restorers of capitalism, considered it wise to profess loudly their loyalty to the Party, and especially to its deservedly respected leader; partly they indulged in this sycophancy to discredit Stalin by laying blame for all real and imaginary misfortunes at the door of Stalin by alleging that he alone was running the show, that his dictatorial behaviour suppressed all dissent and democratic norms, etc. None was more sycophantic, none so revoltingly cringing, as Nikita Khrushchev, who played probably the most leading role in building up Stalin's 'personality cult' - a cult which neither Stalin nor anyone of his truly Marxist-Leninist supporters in the politburo ever encouraged.

As to how the 'cult of personality' got going, the following account, given by the Soviet revisionist historian, Roy Medvedev, is pretty authentic:

"The first issue of Pravda for 1934 carried a huge two-page article by Radek, heaping orgiastic praise on Stalin. The former Trotskyite, who had led the opposition to Stalin for many years, now called him 'Lenin's best pupil, the model of the Leninist Party, bone of its bone, blood of its blood.' ... He 'is as far-sighted as Lenin', and so on and on. This seems to have been the first large article in the press specifically devoted to the adulation of Stalin, and it was quickly reissued as a pamphlet in 225,000 copies, an enormous figure for the time." (R. A. Medvedev *Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism*, London, 1972, p.148).

Everyone knows who Karl Radek was and where he ended up. At the Second Moscow Trial he admitted to, and was convicted of, terrorism and working for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR (See *Report of the Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre*, Moscow, 1937, pages 88-115).

Khrushchev, who with his anti-Stalin outburst combined with a wholesale revision of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, set the ball rolling at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU towards the restoration of capitalism, was the most fervent promoter of the 'cult of the personality' around Stalin. Here are a few examples. He finished his speech at the Moscow Party Conference in January 1932, introducing for the first time the term *vozhd* (leader) to refer to Stalin, with these words:

"The Moscow Bolsheviks, rallied around the Leninist Central Committee as never before, and around the 'vozhd' of our Party, Comrade Stalin, are cheerfully and confidently marching toward new victories in the battles for socialism, for world proletarian revolution." (*Rabochaya Moskva*, 26 January 1932, cited in L. Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power*, London, 1961, p.159).

The same man, whom he was to abuse in his "secret speech" at the 20th Party Congress as an "idiot" and a "fool", he cringingly called "'vozhd' of genius" at the 17th Party Conference in January 1934 (see L. Pistrak, *ibid.*, p.160).

During the Kamenev and Zinoviev Trial (first Moscow Trial) during 1936, Khrushchev, who was then the Moscow Party Secretary, said:

"Miserable pygmies! They lifted their hands against the greatest of all men, ... our wise 'vozhd' Comrade Stalin! Thou, Comrade Stalin, hast raised the great banner of Marxism-Leninism high over the entire world and carried it forward. We assure thee, Comrade Stalin, that the Moscow Bolshevik organisation - the faithful supporter of the Stalinist Central Committee - will increase Stalinist vigilance still more, will extirpate the Trotskyite-Zinovievite remnants, and close the ranks of the Party and non-Party Bolsheviks even more around the Stalinist Central Committee and the great Stalin." (*Pravda*, 23 August 1936, cited in L Pistrak, *ibid.* p. 162).

In November 1936, at the Eighth All-Union Congress of the Soviets, Khrushchev proposed that the new Constitution be called the 'Stalinist Constitution' as, he claimed, "... it was written from beginning to end by Comrade Stalin himself." (*Pravda*, 30 Nov 1936, cited in L Pistrak, *ibid.*, p.161).

Be it noted in passing that neither Molotov, who was Prime Minister, nor Zhadanov, the Party Secretary in Leningrad, made reference to any special part played by Stalin in writing this Constitution. In the same speech it was Khrushchev who coined the term Stalinism:

"Our Constitution is the Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism that has conquered one sixth of the globe." (*ibid.*).

Speaking to a mass rally of 200,000 in Moscow in January 1937 during the Second Moscow Trial (that of Pyatakov and Radek), Khrushchev declared:

"By lifting their hands against Comrade Stalin, they lifted them against all the best that humanity possesses. For Stalin is hope; he is expectation; he is the beacon that guides all progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!" (*Pravda*, 31 January 1937, cited in L Pistrak, *ibid.* p.162).

Khrushchev repeatedly extolled Stalin as an "intimate friend and comrade-in-arms of the great Lenin" (December 1939); as "the greatest genius, teacher and leader of mankind" (18th Party Congress, March 1939), as "the great, ever-victorious Marshal" (May 1945), as "the sincere friend of the people" (December, 1939), and as his "own father" (December 1949). [All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* editorial cited above].

On the occasion of Stalin's 50th birthday in December 1929, Mikoyan made the demand:

"... that we, meeting the rightful demand of the masses, begin finally to work on his biography and make it available to the Party and to all working people in our country." (*Izvestia*, 21 December, cited in L Pistrak, *ibid.* p. 164). Mikoyan repeated this demand 10 years later on the occasion of Stalin's 60th birthday in December 1939.

Eventually *Joseph Stalin: A Short Biography*, written by six people - Alexandrov, Glatonov, Kruzhkov, Mitin, Mochalov and Pospelov - was published in 1947. And yet Khrushchev, in his "secret speech", claimed that Stalin had personally written it to glorify himself:

"One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his 'Short Biography' ...

"This book is an example of the most dissolute flattery." (Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *op. cit.* p.69).

The truth is that Stalin disliked flattery and was fully aware that the exponents of the 'personality cult' were up to no good. According to the Finnish revisionist, Tuominen, when Stalin was informed in 1935 that his busts had been prominently displayed in Tretyakov, Moscow's major art gallery, Stalin exclaimed:

"That's downright sabotage!" (A Tuominen, *op. cit.* p. 164).

Leon Feuchtwanger says that Stalin believed that the "wreckers", with the purpose of discrediting him, were encouraging the 'cult of personality.'

"It is manifestly irksome to Stalin to be worshipped as he is, and from time to time he makes fun of it ...

"Of all the men I know who have power, Stalin is the most unpretentious. I spoke frankly to him about the vulgar and excessive cult made of him, and he replied with equal candour ...

"He thinks it is possible even that 'wreckers' may be behind it in an attempt to discredit him." (L Feuchtwanger, *Moscow 1937*, London, 1937, pp.93-95).

Stalin poured scorn on the 'personality cult' drive then under way by proposing this sarcastic toast, recorded by Tuominen, at a New Year Party in 1935:

"Comrades! I want to propose a toast to our patriarch, life and sun, liberator of nations, architect of socialism (he rattled off all the appellations applied to him in those days), Josef Vissarionovich Stalin, and I hope this is the

first and last speech made to that genius this evening." (A Tuominen, *op. cit.* p.162).

Stalin was never fooled by flattery showered on him by the intellectuals and bureaucrats occupying influential positions either in the USSR or in the Communist Parties of other countries. We know only too well how the very people who were to accuse him, after his death, of practising the 'cult of the personality' were declaring him at the time to be the virtual creator of the universe. Refusing to be taken in by this kind of sycophancy, and referring in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, to the textbook *The Elements of Marxist Political Economy*, which was then under preparation, he declared:

"Incidentally, in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the communist parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young."

And when Yaroshenko, who had put forward a series of erroneous ideas on questions of political economy and whom Stalin had criticised for that, requested that he be entrusted with the task of compiling the book on the political economy of socialism, adding that he would be able to expound in it *"the Marxist, Leninist-Stalinist theory of the political economy of socialism, a theory which would convert this science into an effective weapon of the struggle of the people for communism,"* Stalin retorted *"Comrade Yaroshenko's request ... cannot be taken seriously, if only because it reeks of Khlestakovism [boastfulness]"*. (*ibid.* pp. 85-86).

He also addressed himself to the question *"Should there be a special chapter in the textbook on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?"*, to which his response was:

"I think that the chapter, 'The Marxist Theory of Socialism. Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V I Lenin and J V Stalin,' should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the book." (*ibid.* p.45).

It is indeed a tribute to Stalin's revolutionary leadership, to his steadfast defence of Marxism-Leninism and the interests of the international proletariat, that even Khrushchev in his "secret speech" was compelled to make the following remark:

"This question is complicated by the fact that all this which we have just discussed was done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defence of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of the enemies and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interest of the working class, of the interest of the labouring people, of the interest of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He considered that this should be done in the interests of the Party; of the working masses, in the name of the defence of the revolution's gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!" (*op. cit.* p. 85).

And since then the revisionists have been at sixes and sevens in dealing with Stalin. Each time they try to reassess his role, they are compelled, against their wishes and intentions, to pay the highest compliments to him. The revisionist attacks on Stalin bring to our memory a remark made by Marx in his preface to *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Marx commented that when Victor Hugo made a scathing personal attack on Louis Bonaparte, he made his literary victim appear *"great instead of little by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history."*

Only a few months after Khrushchev's "secret report", on 30 June 1956, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a special resolution entitled *On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and its Consequences*. This resolution reads:

"J.V. Stalin, who held the post of General Secretary of the Party's Central Committee for a long period of time, worked actively in common with other leading officials of the Party to carry Lenin's behests into life. He was faithful to Marxism-Leninism and led, as a theorist and organiser of large calibre, the Party's fight against the Trotskyites, Right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, against the intrigues by capitalists from without. In this political and ideological fight Stalin earned great authority and popularity. But there appeared a mistaken practice of associating all our great victories with his name."

In January, 1959, the leadership of the CPSU returned to the question of Stalin for the third time and published another version under the title *Stalin and his Work*, which was to be incorporated into a volume of the Soviet Encyclopaedia. The publisher's note in it asserted:

"It may perhaps be right to add that this is the first authoritative reassessment of Stalin made since the 20th Congress of the CPSU." This "First auth-

oritative reassessment" ends up with two concluding paragraphs under the caption "Name of Stalin Inseparable from Marxism-Leninism" And they read as follows:

"Stalin has long occupied a leading position in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. All his activity is linked with the realisation of great socialist changes in the Soviet country. The Communist Party and the Soviet people remember and respect Stalin. His name is inseparable from Marxism-Leninism and it will be a gross historical distortion to extend the errors committed by Stalin during the last period of his life to all the long years of his activity as leader of the Party and the State.

"The campaign started by the imperialist reactionaries against 'Stalinism', which they themselves invented, is in reality a campaign against the revolutionary movement.

"The outbursts of revisionists against 'Stalinism' are similarly, in essence, a form of struggle against the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism."

We know already that it was none other than Khrushchev and other concealed revisionists who, while Stalin was alive, initiated and continued the "mistaken practice of associating all our great victories with his name." What is more, this was done against the often expressed wishes of Stalin. We also know that the "outbursts of revisionists against 'Stalinism'," which are "in essence a form of struggle against the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism," were the handiwork of Khrushchevite revisionists and no one else. The Trotskyite and imperialist campaign against 'Stalinism' got nowhere until triumphant Khrushchevite revisionism after the 20th Party Congress decided to weigh into the scales on the side of this imperialist campaign. On one thing we can, however, agree with the above "First authoritative reassessment", namely, that the essence of the campaign against 'Stalinism' lies in the fact that it is "a form of struggle against the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism," irrespective of whether it is indulged in by Trotskyism, imperialism or modern Khrushchevite revisionism. Be it said in passing that while the revisionists constantly talk about "the errors committed by Stalin during the last period of his life," they never specify these errors, let alone bother to substantiate their accusations.

It is also a tribute to Stalin's revolutionary leadership, to his steadfast defence of Marxism-Leninism and the interests of the international proletariat, that after more than thirty years of combined revisionist and imperialist vilification and negation of Stalin, there exist in the USSR vast numbers of

people who cherish with affection the memory of Stalin, who hold dear, and with pride, the supremely meritorious services rendered by Stalin to his socialist motherland and to the international proletariat. At the end of 1987, the Soviet magazine *Oktyabr*, which had been in the forefront in propagating the twin reactionary policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, was obliged to publish 16 pages of readers' letters passionately defending Stalin as a bulwark of socialism and vehemently denouncing Khrushchevite revisionism as counter-revolutionary:

"Stalin and Lenin are the two bulwarks, the twin legs of our Socialist ideology. To remove either one means to cause irreparable damage to the cause of communism.

"That is something the ideologists of Zionism-imperialism saw clearly, as they worked out their strategy of anti-Socialist struggle. Having realised that their gamble on Hitler had failed, they decided to stake all on a fifth column - and they made no mistake.

"You may claim that the 20th Party Congress (when Khrushchev launched the de-Stalinisation campaign in 1956) laid down the foundation of democratisation in Soviet society. But I think it was the reverse. The activities of Khrushchev and the writers who supported him like Solzhenitsyn and Tvardovsky, meant counter-revolution. And if it was not clear enough in 1956, it is today." (cited according to the Guardian, 16 Dec. 1987).

And when the August 1987 issue of *Oktyabr* published a commentary by Yuri Burtin, its editor, on the posthumous publication of Tvardovsky's anti-Stalin poem *By Right of Memory*, it produced a wave of letters in passionate defence of Stalin, including the following:

"The poem for you was just a pretext to launch a murderous attack on our Soviet history of the 1930s and 1950s ... our people refuse to continue spitting on Stalin's name for the sake of pleasing some aesthetic snobs", wrote I Perov, aged 23, from Kishinev.

"Ask the workers and peasants what they think about Stalin ... if you try to convince them that it was under Stalin that the system of privileges for the top party echelons began, they will tell that it's rubbish, and every sane person knows these privileges grew up under your beloved Khrushchev."

Another letter goes on:

"If you were an honest man or a true patriot, you would have to recognise that despite the slanderous campaigns against Stalin, the trust in him, in his

cause and righteousness is not only alive, but it is being reborn among the new generation."

"Khrushchev's supporters seized control of the central apparatus, and removed as supporters of the cult of personality the real adherents to socialism, the true revolutionaries," says another.

We end this article with the following quotation of Stalin's, taken from his speech of 23 October 1927, delivered at a meeting of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B):

"The reason why the main attacks were directed against Stalin is because Stalin knows all the opposition's tricks better, perhaps, than some of our comrades do, and it is not so easy, I dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart's content.

"And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged an even more scurrilous campaign against Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example:

"The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless obsession' (see 'Trotsky's Letter to Chkheidze,' April 1913).

"Note the language, comrades! Note the language! It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin.

"Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose shoe-laces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl abuse at one of Lenin's numerous pupils - Comrade Stalin?

*"More than that, I think the opposition does me honour by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals of the Leninist Party principle." (J.V. Stalin, *The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now*, Collected Works Vol 10, p. 177-178).*

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that Stalin was not guilty of practising the 'cult of personality'. The practice of such a cult was entirely against his wish and was indulged in by concealed revisionists - the very people who were to denounce him on this score at and after the 20th Congress of the

CPSU. Thus their hatred of Stalin cannot be attributed to the 'cult of personality,' which was their own creation in any case. To what, then, must we attribute this hatred?

The answer to this question is to be found in the economics of class struggle - a subject with which we shall deal in the next issue of *Lalkar*.

Chapter 11

LALKAR

January/February

1992

and subsequent

The Economics of the Class Struggle Under Socialism

Why Such Venomous Hatred for Stalin?

Now that we have dealt with the historical questions, we must, in this, the final section, provide an answer to the question: why is such a hatred all over the world entertained towards Joseph Stalin, not only by the bourgeoisie - imperialist and non-imperialist - and its ordinary bourgeois ideologues, but also by the 'socialist' ideologues of the bourgeoisie, namely, the social democrats, Trotskyists and revisionists? Why does the very mention of Stalin's name stir in this gentry venomous hatred and uncontrollable rage against him?

A correct answer to this question carries with it the advantage of furnishing us with the key that unlocks the door to a proper and clear understanding of the long process which has brought about the collapse of the mighty USSR and liquidation of the once glorious CPSU(B), the Party of Lenin and Stalin, which by its brilliant leadership before, during and after the Great October Revolution, shook the world and ushered in the era of the downfall of imperialism and the success of proletarian revolution and national liberation. It has become all the more urgent since the events of August 1991, which have brought about much joy and gloating in bourgeois circles over the alleged "*ultimate and final failure of communism, of Marxism-Leninism*", and also confusion and pessimism in the communist movement the world over. It is the purpose of this section to provide a correct answer to the question posed at the outset, and to give a correct and clear explanation of the process leading to the counter-revolution of August 1991, with the hope that this will be of some help, no matter how insignificant, to the world communist movement (if one may say so without the slightest

desire to be pretentious, pompous or arrogant) in learning the necessary lessons from the history of socialism in the USSR and charting its own future on the only sound and sure basis, i.e., Marxism Leninism, which continues to be even more relevant than ever before.

An important clue to the answer to the above question is to be found in the following quotation from Marx:

"In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific enquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39th of its income. Nowadays atheism itself is culpa levis [a minor sin], compared to the criticism of property relations." (Preface to the first edition of Capital).

When Marx published the volume from the preface of which the above remarks are quoted, the bourgeoisie and its learned flunkies tried to bury it with a conspiracy of deafening silence and, when that did not work, they indulged in the vilest of distortion and the meanest of personal abuse, all with the sole purpose of discrediting his ideas. He was accused of being a dictator, a megalomaniac, and a plagiarist. If Marx was subjected to such foul treatment for no greater a crime than a scientific literary analysis and exposure of capitalist property relations and an elucidation of the means for overthrowing these property relations, it is hardly to be surprised at that those who are actually abolishing capitalist property relations and replacing them with socialist property relations should become the targets of the "most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest."

By the summer of 1918 - just a few months, that is, after the October Revolution - although the United States was still at war with Germany and not with Russia - the *New York Times* was already characterising the Bolsheviks as "our most malignant enemies," and as "raving beasts of prey." The Soviet leaders were being universally denounced in the American press as "paid agents" of Germany. "Butchers", "assassins and madmen," "blood-intoxicated criminals", and "human scum" - these are but a few of the typical expressions with which the American imperialist press referred to Lenin and his comrades. In the US Congress they were described as "damnable

beasts." And the descriptions of the Bolsheviks in the US press were typical of their descriptions in the press of other imperialist countries.

If these are the abuses with which the exploiting classes and the imperialist bourgeoisie reacted to the political revolution, one can scarcely be surprised at the rabid response that the actual building of socialism evoked on its part. After the NEP, having prepared the necessary grounds for the second assault of socialism, was jettisoned in 1929, and the building of socialism was started in earnest - with the first Five-Year Plan and the collectivisation of agriculture - the bourgeoisie within the USSR as well as without it, seeing all its fond hopes for the restoration of capitalism disappearing, intensified a hundred-fold its counter-revolutionary sabotage and let loose a veritable barrage of the most vulgar mass propaganda against socialist construction and the leaders of the movement leading this construction. Since Stalin was the leader of the Bolshevik Party during the course of this second assault, since he epitomised, from the late 1920s until his death in 1953 in a way that no one else did, the will and determination of the Bolshevik Party to build socialism by overcoming all internal and external obstacles, by defeating the internal and external enemies of the USSR - ranging from the Trotskyist-Bukharinite opposition within the Bolshevik Party to the kulaks and white guards and the bourgeoisie of the most powerful imperialist countries - it is hardly to be surprised at that he, Joseph Stalin, more than anyone else, should have become the target of "the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest". And these mean and malignant passions were expressed, and continue to be so expressed, all the more violently since this second assault of socialism was mightily successful in every field - political, economic and military. During this period, the USSR performed miraculous feats of socialist construction, transforming a technologically backward country into a modern society with advanced technology and culture, ridding its people of the torments of hunger, deprivation, degradation, unemployment and illiteracy; with its powerful socialist industry combined with the matchless heroism of its people and the truly inspirational leadership of the CPSU, its General Secretary, Joseph Stalin, the USSR made the greatest contribution to the defeat of Hitlerite fascism and to bringing into existence People's Democracies in Eastern Europe. Even a renegade like Gorbachev was obliged to pay tribute to these achievements in his *Perestroika*, which we quoted in an earlier article. In view of these successes it is only to be expected that the enemies of socialism - from the imperialist bourgeoisie to its hirelings in the working-class

movement, the revisionists, social democrats and Trotskyites - would fulminate with all sorts of dithyrambs against the Soviet builders socialism and especially against Joseph Stalin.

We have always maintained, and continue to do so now, that all the vituperative abuse hurled at Stalin is not merely aimed at the person of this very great and indefatigable defender of Marxism-Leninism, but at the very foundations of Marxism-Leninism.

The Twentieth Party Congress and the Triumph of Khrushchevite revisionism

We are not in this article concerned with the imperialist bourgeoisie. Our purpose is to explain how revisionism, since its triumph in 1956 at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU has been restoring capitalism in the USSR; the methods and the means, both political and economic, adopted by it to this end; and why it found it advisable to attack and malign Stalin under the pretext of defending Leninism by criticising Stalin's alleged departures from Leninism.

Unfortunately, our task is made easier by the counter-revolution of August 1991, which is the cumulative product of all the economic and political changes set in train by the Khrushchevite revisionists and implemented at an ever-accelerating tempo since then. At the beginning the revisionists were not strong enough, such was the strength of the socialist system, openly to attack Leninism or socialism. They had to do their dirty work by distorting the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and putting into effect bourgeois economic measures, but always taking care to act in the name of Leninism and under the guise of combating Stalin's "personality cult", his "errors", and his "departures" from Leninism. Only with the accession of Gorbachev did the counter-revolutionary restorationists feel strong enough openly to question fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism. And since the August counter-revolution, the new bourgeoisie has been giving free rein to its iconoclastic hatred of socialism and even smashing the symbols and monuments of the October Revolution. Statues of not only great revolutionaries such as Yakov Sverdlov and Felix Dzerzhinsky (Stalin was given this treatment long ago by the selfsame "defenders" of Leninism) but also of the great Lenin himself have been coming down like ninepins. The name of Leningrad, the pride and joy of the international proletariat, has been changed back to what it was in pre-revolutionary days, just as the name of Stalingrad,

that proud symbol of anti-fascist resistance, was long ago changed by the Khrushchevites to Volgograd. Obviously, even the names and symbols of the period of socialism and of revolution haunt the new bourgeoisie so much and disturb its sleep - like Banquo's ghost did Lady Macbeth's - that it has to efface the very memory of that glorious period in the history of the international proletariat.

It is not enough for us to hurl abuse at Khrushchev and Gorbachev and denounce them as scoundrels and renegades; it is much more important to refute their theories. "True refutation," said Hegel, "must penetrate the stronghold of the opponent and invade the sphere of his power." This is precisely what we propose to do, no matter how laborious and painful this course may prove to be.

In an article published in April 1956, the Communist Party of China (CPC) made the following statement on the great services rendered by Stalin to the development of the Soviet Union and the international communist movement:

"After Lenin's death Stalin creatively applied and defended Marxism-Leninism as the chief leader of the Party and the state. Stalin expressed the will and the aspirations of the people, and proved himself an outstanding Marxist-Leninist fighter, in the struggle in defence of the legacy of Leninism against its enemies - the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and other bourgeois agents. Stalin won the support of the Soviet people and Party and played an important role in history primarily because, together with the other leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he defended Lenin's line on the industrialisation of the Soviet Union and the collectivisation of agriculture. By pursuing this line, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union brought about the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union and created the conditions for the victory of the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler; these victories of the Soviet people accorded with the interests of the working class of the world and all progressive mankind. It was therefore natural that the name of Stalin was greatly honoured throughout the world." (On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat), p.7)

Anyone wanting to restore capitalism in the USSR must, therefore, start with attacking and maligning the man whose name was so indelibly connected, as was Stalin's, with the victories and triumphs of socialism. Such was precisely the aim that Khrushchev was pursuing at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU (in 1956), when, in his secret report, he launched a wan-

ton attack on Stalin, accusing him of suffering from a "persecution mania," indulging in "brutal arbitrariness," resorting to "mass persecution and terror," of being ignorant to the point that he "knew the country and agriculture only from films" and "planned operations on the globe," and asserting that Stalin's leadership "became a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development." Well, we know now the "path of Soviet social development" to which Stalin's leadership had become a truly mighty obstacle, to wit, the restoration of capitalism. Khrushchev offered no proof of his assertions; he merely strung together in a sensational style, so typical of this arch-revisionist and capitalist roader, a collection of abuse. But the 'secret' report, carefully leaked to the imperialist intelligence agencies, had done the trick. Once again, to borrow the words of the CPC:

"In completely negating Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev in effect negated the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism which Stalin defended and developed. It was at that Congress that Khrushchev, in his report, began the repudiation of Marxism-Leninism on a number of questions of principle." (The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves, 6 September 1963).

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin served the dual purpose of negating the achievements of socialism and at the same time distracting attention from the revisionist distortion of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism on a number of cardinal questions. For it was at this Congress that Khrushchev began the revision of Leninism on such important questions as the road to socialism and the attitude towards imperialism. Flying in the face of reality, he counterposed his "peaceful transition" and "parliamentary road to socialism" to the road of the October Revolution, asserting that in the light of the "radical changes" that had taken place in the world, the latter was no longer of universal significance. By way of complete revision of Lenin's teachings on imperialism and war, Khrushchev painted a picture of the US government and its chief as resisting the forces of war, and not as representatives of the imperialist forces of war.

Imperialism and counter-revolutionaries were well pleased with Khrushchev's outbursts against Stalin and, by implication, against socialism. T.C. Streibert, Director of the US information Agency, in a radio talk on 11 June 1956, declared that Khrushchev's attack on Stalin was "never so suited to our purposes." In its editorial of 23 June 1956, the *New York Times* openly

talked about using Khrushchev's secret report as "a weapon with which to destroy the prestige and the influence of the communist movement" (*The Communist Crisis*). And John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State, at a Press Conference in April 1956, took the opportunity to advocate a "peaceful transformation" in the Soviet Union. Tito, who had taken the road of capitalist restoration as early as 1948, consequent upon which Titoite Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform - the successor to the Comintern - was jubilant over the developments in the USSR. Flaunting the reactionary flag of "anti-Stalinism," Tito declared that the 20th Congress had "created sufficient elements" for the "new course" which Yugoslavia had started and that "the question now is whether this course will win or the course of Stalinism will win again" (J.B. Tito, Speech made in Pula, 17 November, 1956).

The Trotskyist and revisionist scum all over the world went wild with joy and excitement at this "new course."

Consolidation of Khrushchevite Revisionism

The period between the 20th and the 22nd Congresses of the CPSU saw the emergence, formation, growth and systematisation of Khrushchevite revisionism on a number of very important questions. The teachings of Marxism-Leninism were subjected to downright distortion and wholesale revision. At the 22nd Congress, a new programme of the CPSU was adopted, which declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat "has ceased to be indispensable in the USSR" and that "the state, which arose as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has, in the new, contemporary stage, become a state of the entire people." Likewise the party of the proletariat was replaced by a "party of the entire people."

"As a result of the victory of socialism in the USSR and the consolidation of the unity of Soviet society, the Communist Party of the working class has become the vanguard of the Soviet people, a party of the entire people", declared the Programme of the CPSU adopted at that Congress. And so on and so forth. Since these distortions and revisions of Leninism were subjected to an extensive, even thorough, criticism in the international anti-revisionist movement, in which the CPC played a most prominent role, it is not proposed to discuss and dissect them here any further. Instead, we shall concentrate on the economic side of revisionism, the economic theories propounded and the practical steps taken and "reforms" instituted, on the

road to and by way of restoring capitalism in the USSR and in Eastern Europe.

Background: Imperialist Pressure in the Arena of Economic Theory or the Market and Economic Efficiency

Revisionism did not suddenly appear in 1953 out of nowhere like Jupiter out of the head of Minerva. In order to comprehend the emergence of revisionism and its success in taking the USSR back on to the capitalist road, it is necessary to acquire knowledge of the situation that existed before Stalin's death. As a matter of fact it is impossible to understand the developments in the international communist movement in general, and in the field of political economy in particular, since the death of Stalin unless one grasps the developments in bourgeois economic theory since the mid-19th century, particularly since the end of the first world war. Furthermore, one must have a thorough grasp of the bourgeois theoreticians' analysis of the problems confronting socialism, which had to develop in conditions of relentless pressure from world imperialism on all fronts. The forms of imperialist pressure ranged from armed invasion, trade and economic blockade, assassination, wrecking and sabotage, to hysterical mass propaganda of the most revolting and vulgar type combined with sophisticated propaganda and theoretical analysis of the most subtle kind. For the present we wish to confine ourselves to imperialist pressure in the arena of economic theory.

In the imperialist struggle against socialism in the field of economic theory, one argument has played an increasingly important part, namely, that without the market it is impossible to have an efficient economy. And further that, so runs the argument, since socialism aims at the abolition of the market, it cannot but result in ever-increasing inefficiency and bureaucracy, which in turn are bound to produce conditions of an incurable crisis in which the market will reassert itself. This is but another way of saying that the capitalist system of production is not a historically conditioned, transitional, phase in the development of human society, but is the final stage of its development. The emergence of revisionism and its development is explained by, and in turn has given much weight to, this argument.

In 1920, in the aftermath of the October Revolution, and under its direct stimulus, two books containing a comprehensive statement of the economic case against socialism appeared - one in Germany, the other in Russia. In his *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth*, Ludwig Von

Mises stated that in the absence of the market "*the human mind cannot orientate itself properly among the bewildering mass of intermediate products and potentialities of production ... It would stand perplexed before the problems of management and location ... As soon as one gives up the conception of a freely established monetary price for goods of a higher order [i.e., capital goods] rational production becomes impossible. Every step that takes us away from private ownership of the means of production and from the use of money takes us away from rational economics ...*

"Where there is no free market, there is no pricing mechanism; without a pricing mechanism, there is no economic calculation."

Boris Brutzkus' *Marxism and the Problems of Socialist Economics* was written in Russia. In this work he deals with the question of incentives for organisers of production, as well as the determination of prices in the market. He reaches the conclusion that the economic position of socialism suffered from two main weaknesses: first that, in the absence of prices determined in the market, socialism was incapable of making efficient economic calculations; and, secondly, that it was incapable of providing the organisers of production with as effective an incentive as the profit motive.

In their alas successful efforts to undermine and destroy socialist production, the modern revisionists, following the 20th Party Congress, have made tremendous use of these arguments put forward by this bourgeois economist, Brutzkus, in 1920. Here are a couple of passages from his work:

"... capitalism rewards no one so generously ... as the skillful entrepreneur who is able to combine the elements of production successfully; and this though the need which he satisfies be of the most prosaic order. Thus, in the capitalist society, the entrepreneur's condition is one of sustained exertion, and this he seeks to communicate to all who take part in production. Some he will endeavour to interest directly in the goods he has produced, others he will spur on by means of increased wages, others he will hold in check by threats of dismissal. Thus in capitalist society, divided as it is into classes and separate groups of owners, the economic principle finds realisation." (p.10-11).

In the socialist system of society, "*unlike the capitalist, there is no great body of entrepreneurs whose economic standing gives them an interest in bringing about successful production. On the contrary, the managers of socialist enterprises gain nothing in material profit if the efforts of the management are successful, any more than they suffer if the results of such efforts are unfavourable.*" (p. 11).

Failure of Western 'Marxist' Theoreticians to Refute Bourgeois Economic Theories

The ideas and work of Von Mises and Brutzkus were further developed in the 1930s by various bourgeois economists such as F.A. Von Hayek, G Holm, A. P. Lerner, H.D. Dickinson and others. 'Marxist' intellectuals and economic theoreticians in the west did very little to refute these bourgeois attacks on socialism. Instead, Oscar Lange, one of the two most prominent 'Marxist' political economists (the other being Maurice Dobb of the UK) and who was later to become the Vice-Chairman of the Polish Council of the State and a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, made it his mission to construct 'socialism' on the foundations of bourgeois economics. In his *Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory*, which appeared in 1935, this is how this 'Marxist' intellectual objects with vehemence to the statement of a Japanese economist to the effect that Marxian economics had proved to be superior to bourgeois economic theory:

"This superiority of Marxian economics seems strange, indeed, in view of the fact that it works with concepts which are long since outdated and which ignore the whole development of economic theory since the time of Ricardo..."

Professor Lange 'forgets' to add that in its heyday, when the enemy facing it was still feudalism, the bourgeoisie produced brilliant theoreticians and political economists who laid the foundations of the science of political economy. Bourgeois political economists such as William Petty, Adam Smith and David Ricardo developed the labour theory of value, according to which the value of a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour contained in it - a theory which provided a stepping stone for the development by Marx of his theory of surplus value which revolutionised economic science and explained for the first time the secret of capitalist exploitation. Ricardo, who died in 1827, is the last bourgeois political scientist to have made any scientific contribution to the development of political economy. Up to this time, since the bourgeois system was historically progressive as compared with feudalism, bourgeois political economists could make a contribution to the development of a scientific understanding of the laws governing human society.

But the defeat of feudalism and the development of capitalism brought about the intensification of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and

the proletariat and the capitalist system of production itself became an obstacle to the development of the productive forces of society. The science of political economy from this time onwards could no longer develop on the basis of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. Any scientific explanation of the process of production under capitalism, in which the capitalist class exploits the working class, could only further the development of the class-consciousness of the working class at a time when it was beginning to organise itself to resist the daily encroachments of capital. From then on no more scientific investigation, clarification and explanation, but the spreading of confusion by bourgeois theoreticians in the field of political economy, which ceased to be a science and simply became one of the branches of bourgeois morality. Bourgeois political economists ceased to be scientific investigators, becoming instead the "hired prize-fighters" of the bourgeoisie. This is how Marx described this development in bourgeois political economy:

"It was thenceforth no longer a question, whether this theorem or that was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, politically dangerous or not. In place of disinterested enquirers there were hired prize-fighters; in place of genuine scientific research the bad conscience and the evil intent of apologetics." (Preface to 2nd edition of *Capital*).

These hired prize-fighters not only attacked the labour theory of value but also conjured up countless metaphysical theories of value. Insofar as they dealt with reality, they merely concentrated on price fluctuations in the market. In course of time bourgeois economists divided up into technical economists who studied market fluctuations and political economists who concentrated on preaching bourgeois morality.

But to return to Lange:

"This superiority of Marxian economics is only a partial one. There are some problems before which Marxian economics is quite powerless, while 'bourgeois' economics solves them easily. What can Marxian economics say about monopoly prices? What has it to say on the fundamental problems of monetary and credit theory ...

"That Marxian economics fails is due to the labour theory of value."

"... 'bourgeois' economics is able to grasp the phenomena of the everyday life of capitalist economy in a manner that is far superior to anything the Marxists can produce."

"Marxian economics would be a poor base for running a central bank or anticipating the effects of a change in the rate of discount."

Lange not only thought, as is clear from his above remarks, it was the job of Marxist economists to assist the functioning of the bourgeois economy, but also that bourgeois economics could furnish the basis, one superior to Marxist economics, for the actual development of a socialist economy. To bourgeois economics Lange attributes "universal significance", while reserving for Marxist economics a certain prophetic role in capitalist society. This is what he says:

"... in providing a scientific basis for the current administration of the capitalist economy 'bourgeois' economics has developed a theory of equilibrium which can also serve as a basis for the correct administration of a socialist economy. It is obvious that Marshallian economics offers more for the current administration of the economic system of Soviet Russia than Marxian economics does, though the latter is surely the more effective basis for anticipating the future of Capitalism. In so far, modern economic theory, in spite of its undoubted 'bourgeois' origin, has a universal significance." (*Marxian Economics and Modern Economic Theory*, Review of Economic Studies, June 1935).

While still lecturing in Chicago University, Lange published *The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy*. In it he characterised the Soviet economy as "an authoritarian economy," for the achievement of whose objectives the Soviet people had not given their consent. The sacrifices of the Soviet people, he asserted, had been "dissipated by bureaucratic inefficiency" and "the growth of such strong vested interests in the dictatorial and authoritarian methods of government, that the realisation of the democratic socialist ideals officially professed had become an impossibility." (page 26).

Lange went on to assert that Soviet communism and US imperialism shared a common aim:

"The common aim is the ideal of a free democratic welfare society. Whether, to what extent, this ideal is better realised through private or through public enterprise and ownership of the means of production, or through a combination of the two, is a matter of technique, a matter of the most effective means of economic and social policy. It is not a matter of ultimate values. For a long time we were so very excited about the problems of means and techniques, that we forgot to realise that the ultimate values of liberal capitalism and democratic socialism are the same. The realisation of this community of

values was brought back to us in very painful ways through the successes of Fascism." (page 30).

In conclusion, Lange stated that there was no need for socialism in the US, for there capitalism could do what could only be done through socialism elsewhere:

"We in this country will find our own way of fuller realisation of our democratic ideals, a way which will be inspired by the heritage of Jefferson, of Jackson, of Lincoln, of frontier individualism and of populism rather than by socialism of any of the European brands ..."

While US capitalism had some secondary differences with Soviet communism, he said, "through these differences we can, and we must, preserve a fundamental community of ultimate values."

All the Gorbachevite gibberish about universal human values and the modification of contradictions is already fully contained in the writings of Lange.

Following Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress, Lange published in 1958 his *Political Economy of Socialism*, in which he describes the "basic laws" of socialism, which turn out to be laws applicable to "every socio-economic system." Lange not only manages to discover scores of "laws of political economy" which had eluded Marx, but even manages to reduce political economy to an absurdity by giving the title of a fundamental and universal law of political economy to a banal tautology according to which "one cannot accumulate if one consumes the whole product."

"Anyone who attempts to bring the political economy of Tierra del Fuego," said Engels, "under the same laws as are operative in present-day England would obviously produce nothing but the most banal commonplaces." (*Anti-Duhring*, page 204, Moscow 1954). The writings of Lange, as indeed of many revisionist theoreticians, only go to confirm the correctness of Engels' above remark. Lange's "universal laws", which apply with equal force to primitive, industrial capitalist, and socialist economies, are the embodiment of "the most banal commonplaces."

There were plenty of intellectuals like Lange who held prominent positions in the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe after the end of the Second World War. These intellectuals were basically bourgeois liberal elements who had played a progressive role in the struggle against fascism. Only the course of class struggle could determine whether these intellec-

tuals would serve the interests of the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The paucity of experienced and tried proletarian revolutionary Marxist theorists, combined with the triumph of Khrushchevite revisionism in the USSR itself, which opened the floodgates through which countless microbes of bourgeois ideology invaded and soon overwhelmed all the socialist countries, strengthened the bourgeois liberal intellectuals of the Lange variety at the expense of the few working-class Marxist theorists in Eastern Europe.

In the USSR itself, while there were plenty of working-class Marxist theorists who had shown their worth through the trials and tribulations of socialist construction and collectivisation, revisionist ideas were by no means absent. Indeed, there were many important persons, holding positions of great authority who, as was shown by Stalin and Zhdanov in 1947-48, were downright bourgeois and who, while biding their time, spread their bourgeois ideas whenever and wherever they could and got away with it.

Stalin's Defence of Marxism in the Field of Political Economy

As in every other field, in the field of political economy too, Stalin resolutely defended the orthodox position of Marxism. As is known to everyone, he had led the struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite-Bukharinite oppositions' incorrect ideas on the building of socialist industry and the collectivisation of agriculture. So thoroughly were the right and 'left' opportunist deviationists from Marxism-Leninism defeated that their remnants never dared openly to challenge the positions of the Bolshevik party. Instead they adopted far more devious methods - especially in the field of political economy. In view of the harm being done, and the confusion wrought, by the spread of erroneous and poisonous ideas propagated by concealed bourgeois elements in the USSR, the restoration of capitalism by the Titoites in Yugoslavia (under the banner of anti-Stalinism and in the name of 'creative' Marxism Leninism), and the predominance of bourgeois ideas in the field of political economy in Western Europe and North America, Stalin wrote his last major work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*. In this work (which is a veritable defence of Marxian political economy and must be read and mastered by every class-conscious worker, without grasping which it is impossible to understand the collapse of the USSR), Stalin expressly refutes the erroneous views of the Russian political economists named in this book, and by implication the views of liberal Marxists, such as Lange, and of the Titoite capitalist roaders. The authors criticised

by Stalin in *Economic Problems*, namely Yaroshenko, Notkin, Sanina and Venzher, were by no means the only ones to hold the erroneous views that they did. These views, leaving aside the non-Soviet political economists like Lange, are to be found in such works of the time as *An Outline of Political Economy* by I Lapidus and K Ostrovitynov (English edition, 1929) and in *The War Economy of the USSR* by Voznesensky (1948) who, prior to his purge in 1949, held the important post of Chairman of the State Planning Commission. There is not a single idea in the field of political economy put forward by the revisionists since Stalin's death which was not subjected to merciless Marxian analysis, and exposed as being false, by Stalin in his *Economic Problems*. This alone would have earned him the hatred and enmity of the bourgeoisie and the revisionists as well as the Trotskyist fraternity.

In this short work, which is a work of genius, Stalin pronounces in a very lucid manner so characteristic of him, on a number of important questions of political economy which are of great interest to us, helpful as they are in understanding the developments in the field of economy in the USSR and Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin - resulting finally in the bourgeois counter-revolution thanks to institution by Khrushchevite revisionists of the very bourgeois economic theories which are the subject of Stalin's criticism in this work.

In order to restore capitalism in the USSR, the revisionists had to distort the Marxian teaching in the field of political economy - and this they did, after the death of Stalin, on the pretext of fighting against the "cult of the personality" and allegedly for the sake of correcting Stalin's 'errors' and 'distortions' of Marxism. Therefore *Economic Problems*, in which Stalin refutes a string of revisionist theses and defends Marxian political economy, bore the brunt of these revisionist attacks after his death. In view of the enormous significance of this work, and the bearing it has on the subject matter of this article, we shall touch upon some of the issues raised in it.

The Chief Task of the Political Economy of Socialism: The Role of Productive Forces and the Relations of Production

To the question: what is the chief task of the *Political Economy of Socialism*? Yaroshenko replied thus:

"The chief problem of the Political Economy of Socialism ... is not to investigate the relations of production of the members of socialist society: it is to

elaborate and develop a scientific theory of the organisation of the productive forces in social production, a theory of the planning of economic development." In socialist society "men's production relations become part of the organisation of the productive forces, an element of their organisation."

"... under socialism, the basic struggle for the building of a communist society reduces itself to a struggle for the proper organisation of the productive forces and their rational utilisation in social production ... Communism is the highest scientific organisation of the productive forces in social production."

In his *Political Economy of Socialism* he declares that "disputes as to the role of any particular category of socialist political economy - value, commodity, money, credit, etc - ... are replaced by a healthy discussion of the rational organisation of the productive forces in social production, by a scientific demonstration of the validity of such organisation."

"In short," remarks Stalin, "political economy without economic problems." (*Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, page 61).

Stalin criticises Yaroshenko's answer which confuses the problems of political economy with the problems of economic policy of the directing bodies - the differences between political economy and economic technique - in these words:

"Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the problems of political economy of socialism to problems of the rational organisation of the productive forces, to problems of planning, etc. But he is profoundly in error. The rational organisation of the productive forces, economic planning, etc., are not problems of political economy but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies. They are two different provinces which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko has confused these two different things, and has made a terrible mess of it. Political economy investigates the laws of development of men's relations of production. Economic policy draws practical conclusions from this, gives them concrete shape, and builds its day to day work on them. To foist upon political economy problems of economic policy is to kill it as a science." (*ibid.* pp. 74-75).

"Never before has any retrograde 'Marxist' delivered himself of such unholy twaddle," says Stalin, accusing Yaroshenko of an attempt to "abolish the political economy of socialism" by inordinately overrating the role of productive forces, and just as inordinately underrating the role of relations of production. Stalin goes on to refute Yaroshenko's assertion that the essence of the communist system begins and ends with the "rational organisation of the pro-

ductive forces", and the conclusion that Yaroshenko drew therefrom, namely, that there cannot be a single political economy for all social formations. Instead there must be two: one political economy for pre-socialist social formations, whose subject of investigation is man's relations of production, and the other for the socialist system, whose subject of investigation is not the production, i.e., the economic, relations, but the "rational organisation of the productive forces." Stalin denounces this perfidious attempt at revision of Marxian political economy, which "regards social production as an integral whole which has two inseparable sides: the productive forces of society (the relations of society to the forces of nature, in contest with which it secures the material values it needs), and the relations of production (the relations of men to one another in the process of production) ... And just because they constitute different sides of social production, they are able to influence one another. To assert that one of these sides may be absorbed by the other and be converted into a component part, is to commit a very grave sin against Marxism." (*Ibid.* p.64).

And further: "Consequently, social production consists of two sides [i.e., productive forces and production relations] ... only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation." (*ibid.* p.65).

With Yaroshenko, however, instead of "full-blooded production," with relations of production, classes and contradictions, we get "a lopsided and a scraggy technology of production - something in the nature of Bukharin's 'technique of social organisation'." (*ibid.*)

But there is method in Yaroshenko's madness. If Stalin took the trouble to join the controversy with, and to criticise, Yaroshenko, he was not doing so merely to show his erudition or for purely esoteric purposes. Yaroshenko, in the tradition of all revisionists and capitalist roaders, wants to ignore, to overlook, relations of production, which are the proper subject of political economy; instead he wants to concentrate on "the organisation of productive forces," for only by overlooking the existence of classes and class contradictions, the existence of different forms of property in the economy of the USSR, of commodity circulation, the law of value, etc., can he prepare the ground for taking the road that leads, and has led, inexorably to capitalism - only by "freeing" Marxist political economy from a critical study of relations of production - property relations - and diverting it to a "harmless" (i.e., for the bourgeoisie) study of allegedly classless "rational" econ-

omic activity, could the agents of private property in the USSR pave the way for the restoration of capitalism.

In criticising Yaroshenko, Stalin is defending Leninism and following the road that leads to the highway to communism. This is what Lenin has to say on the question of the subject of political economy:

"... the subject of political economy ... is not by any means 'the production of material values', as is often claimed (that is the subject of technology), but the social relations between men in production." (Lenin, *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism*).

Strictly adhering to this Marxist-Leninist formulation, Stalin does not want to ignore the relations of production. On the contrary, by highlighting relations of production, the negative role of the old relations of production under capitalism which, failing to conform to the growth of the productive forces, retards their development, as well as the positive role of the relations of production under socialism which, being in conformity with the growth of the productive forces, acts as a spur to their powerful development, Stalin wants to emphasise the need constantly to adjust and update the relations of production, to bring them into conformity with the growth of the productive forces, so as to prevent the former from becoming a brake on the latter. "Can it be said," asks Stalin, "that the role of the new relations of production is that of a brake on the productive forces?" And he answers this question thus:

"No, it cannot. On the contrary, the new relations of production are the chief and decisive force, the one which in fact determines the further, and, moreover, powerful, development of the productive forces, and without which the latter would be doomed to stagnation, as is the case today in the capitalist countries."

"Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our Soviet industry has made tremendous strides in the period of five-year plans. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in October 1917, replaced the old, capitalist relations of production by the new, socialist relations of production. Without this revolution in the production, the economic, relations of our country, our productive forces would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries."

"Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our agriculture has made tremendous strides in the past twenty or twenty-five years. but this development would not have occurred if we had not in the 'thirties replaced the old, capitalist production relations in the countryside by new, collec-

tivist production relations. Without this revolution in production, the productive forces of our agriculture would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries." (*Economic Problems*, pp.62-63).

By way of warning, Stalin goes on to add:

"Of course, new relations of production cannot, and do not, remain new forever; they begin to grow old and to run counter to the further development of the productive forces; they begin to lose their role of principal mainspring of the productive forces, and become a brake on them. At this point, in place of these production relations which have become antiquated, new production relations appear whose role it is to be the principal mainspring spurring the further development of the productive forces."

"This peculiar development of relations of production from the role of a brake on the productive forces to that of the principal mainspring impelling them forward, and from the role of principal mainspring to that of a brake on the productive forces, constitutes one of the chief elements of the Marxist materialist dialectics. Every novice in Marxism knows that nowadays. But Comrade Yaroshenko, it appears, does not know it." (*ibid.* pp.63-64).

Transition from Socialism to Communism

Stalin refutes Yaroshenko's revisionist thesis that communism means the rational organisation of productive forces, that it is only necessary to organise the productive forces rationally to be able to obtain an abundance of products and the transition to communism (from the formula "to each according to his work," to the formula "to each according to his needs") will take place without particular difficulty. Exposing this thesis of Yaroshenko's to be a "profound error" revealing "a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism," Stalin goes on to say:

"Comrade Yaroshenko's conception for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula, 'to each according to his needs', can be brought about if such economic factors as collective-farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula 'to each according to his needs', we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life's prime

want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society." (*Economic Problems*, p.68).

"In order to pave the way for a real, and not a declaratory transition to communism", says Stalin, "at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied." And he lists them with meticulous care and remarkable clarity in the following order:

First it is necessary to ensure "a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production," for without the latter "reproduction on an expanded scale becomes altogether impossible." (*Ibid.* p.68).

Secondly, it is necessary "by means of gradual transitions ... to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the government, or some other socio-economic centre, might control the whole social product in the interests of society." (*Ibid.* pp. 68-69).

Criticising Yaroshenko for his assertion that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism, Stalin, while admitting that the relations of production in the USSR at the time (in 1952) were in a period when they fully conformed to the growth of the productive forces and helped to advance them with giant strides, adds that "it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces." He then adds the following prophetic warning:

"Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies, these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there's no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends. In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

"The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, con-

cerns such economic factors as group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation." (*Ibid.* p. 68 - our emphasis).

While admitting that "at present [1952]" and "also in the near future," these factors (group property and commodity circulation) were "being successfully utilised" and were of "undeniable benefit", nevertheless, he says "it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property, and by introducing - also gradually - products-exchange in place of commodity circulation." (*Ibid.* p. 69-70 - our emphasis).

As we shall see in the pages that follow, the Khrushchevite revisionists, ever since the 20th Party Congress, have been following a wrong policy, of the type recommended by Yaroshenko and his ilk, instead of the Marxist-Leninist policy recommended by Stalin. Instead of gradually eliminating commodity circulation, they have been extending its sphere of operation at an ever-accelerating pace; instead of raising collective-farm property to the level of public property, their agricultural 'reforms' have prepared the ground for decollectivisation and back to individual farming, as we have already seen. While making declamations about the imminent transition to the higher stage of communism to fool and hoodwink the working class in the USSR and elsewhere, Khrushchevite revisionists took systematic and real steps for the transition back to capitalism. As can now be seen by everyone, except those with stultified brains, the Khrushchevites have at last been successful in their designs to restore capitalism.

Thirdly, says Stalin, it is necessary, to ensure a "substantial advance in the cultural standard" of society, which in turn requires shortening of the working day to six, and subsequently to five, hours so that "the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all-round education". Further, "universal compulsory polytechnic education" must be introduced "in order that the members of society might be able freely to choose their occupations and not be tied to some one occupation all their lives" owing to the existing division of labour. Housing conditions, adds Stalin, must be "radically improved" and the wages of workers and employees "should at least be doubled,

if not more, by ... direct increases, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods." (ibid. pp. 70-71 - our emphasis).

The Khrushchevite revisionists, by their market reforms, have been compelled to move in the opposite direction. Instead of the systematic reduction of prices for consumer goods, the revisionist sages have been arguing for, and implementing, rises in these prices. Instead of moving in the direction of the elimination of the existing division of labour, and with it the distinction between mental and physical work, they have by their reforms further consolidated this division of labour. Instead of narrowing the gap between the incomes of various groups of Soviet society, they have enlarged this gap to such a point that a significant parasitic layer has been created, which takes little part in the production of wealth but demands more and more in return for less and less work, and which, like its bourgeois counterparts in the old-style capitalist countries, increasingly lives at the expense of the working class. In the light of this one does not have to be brilliant to understand the reason why this parasitic bourgeois layer displays such venomous hatred towards Joseph Stalin, and why the latter has for so long been the target of their "most violent, mean and malignant passions."

Acceptance of 'Market Socialism' by Khrushchevite Revisionism

At one time only renegades from Marxism and imperialist agents such as Kautsky and Trotsky accepted the bourgeois argument of Von Mises and Brutzkus directed against socialism, namely, that there could be no efficient economic calculation in the absence of the market, and further that, since socialism aimed at the abolition of the market, it must lead to increasing inefficiency and bureaucracy, resulting in an insoluble crisis, from which the only escape route would be through the reassertion of the market; but with the emergence and development of Khrushchevite revisionism this argument was accepted lock, stock and barrel and put into effect with the consequences which now are common knowledge.

To begin with, however, the revisionist (bourgeois) theory of 'market socialism' could only be put into effect by distorting the teachings of Marxism-Leninism in the field of political economy. In order to expand the market and revert on a gigantic scale to the profit motive and material incentives, revisionist economic theoreticians went to work in search for quotations in Lenin's writings which, torn from their historical and textual context, give the appearance of supporting their arguments. These statements of Lenin's,

made at the time of the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), do speak of the need for freeing trade and commodity relations as well as of the need for greater material incentives. Lenin, however, made no attempt to delude himself or the Russian proletariat that the NEP was ushering in 'market socialism'. On the contrary, as we have demonstrated in an earlier article, with his characteristic ruthless honesty, he stated that NEP was a compromise with capitalism forced on the politically victorious Russian proletariat by economic circumstances. This is what he said at the time:

"Commodity exchange and free trade inevitably imply the appearance of capitalists and capitalist relationships". (Introduction to Local Bodies, May 1921).

Precisely because NEP was giving rise to capitalists and capitalist relations, only the strengthening of the political dictatorship of the proletariat could guarantee that the compromise with capitalism, the retreat implicit in the NEP, would be no more than a temporary retreat - a preparation for a second assault of socialism. This is precisely what happened. This second assault began with the ending of NEP in 1929 and the launching of the first five-year plan and the collectivisation of agriculture strictly in accordance with Lenin's plan. Following the 20th Party Congress, revisionist theoreticians increasingly began to characterise Lenin's statements about freeing trade and commodity relationships at the time of the introduction of the NEP as true and 'mature' Leninism, whereas the successful second assault, under the leadership of Stalin this time, which put an end to the NEP, is represented as a Stalinist deviation from 'mature' Leninism and 'true' socialism! Not surprisingly Stalin, who defended and upheld the Marxist-Leninist position on socialism for three long decades after the death of Lenin, decades of unimaginable difficulty and extraordinary achievement by the Soviet proletariat, was roundly condemned by the Khrushchevite revisionist renegades as a "dogmatist" and a "deviator" from what this revolting gentry considered to be Leninism.

In order to reveal the revisionist distortions of Marxian political economy aimed at foisting on the latter the bourgeois theory of 'market socialism', which is no more than a modern revisionist version of the arguments of Von Mises and Brutzkus three decades earlier, it is neither necessary nor desirable to quote every revisionist theoretician. Anyone who is interested in a detailed study of the subject is advised to refer to the main Russian revisionist economic journal *Voprosi Ekonomiki* (Problems of Economics)

which began being published in English in its entirety in 1958. Since 1960 this English version has consisted of translations of main articles from the major specialist economic publications in Russian. The English version started appearing as a result of arrangements between the Soviet government and the International Arts and Sciences Press, New York. It was meant to keep US monopoly capitalism informed of the economic debate and economic developments in the USSR; it was never meant for mass circulation. In it the revisionist theoreticians spoke with far greater candour and courage than they ever dared to in publications meant for mass circulation.

The Marxist View: Commodity Production and the Market are Incompatible with Socialism and Communism

Marxism holds that commodity production is incompatible with socialism and communism. Stalin upheld this proposition and explained the continued existence of the market and commodity production in the USSR not merely as a remnant of capitalism but also of its incomplete development in pre-revolutionary Russia. The victorious proletariat inherited a Russia in which it formed a tiny minority of the population and the peasantry made up the vast majority. He explained the existence of commodity production as a result of the existence, side by side with publicly owned production, of collective-farm production, the product of which was the property of the different collective farms. This is what he says:

"Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our country: state, or publicly owned production, and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farms, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms, since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land ... is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

"The effect is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms being their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate their product except in the form of commodities, in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognise

any other relation with the town except the commodity relation - except through purchase and sale...

"Of course, when instead of two basic production sectors, the state sector and the collective farm sector, there will be only one all-embracing production sector, with the right to dispose of all consumer goods produced in the country, commodity circulation, with its "money economy" will disappear, as being an unnecessary element in the national economy." (Ibid pp. 15- 16).

And again:

"Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective-farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear. It cannot therefore be denied that the disappearance of this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us." (Ibid. p.27).

Stalin quite correctly held that the market is a heritage of capitalism and it is one of the functions of socialism to abolish it, for *"commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism."* (ibid. p.96). With the growth of socialism, commodity circulation must be replaced by a system of products exchange. *"We still have no developed system of products-exchange,"* says Stalin, *"but the rudiments of such a system exist ... The task is to extend these rudiments of products-exchange to all branches of agriculture and to develop them into a broad system, under which the collective farms would receive for their products not only money, but also and chiefly the manufactures they need. Such a system would require an immense increase in the goods allocated by the town to the country, and it would therefore have to be introduced without any particular hurry, and only as the products of the town multiply. But it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange." (Ibid. p. 98 - our emphasis).*

that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

"The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit. What do Comrades Sanina and Venzher think - is the extension of the sphere of commodity circulation calculated to promote our advance towards communism? Would it not be truer to say that our advance towards communism would only be retarded by it?

"Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's basic error lies in the fact that they do not understand the role and significance of commodity circulation under socialism; that they do not understand that commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism. They evidently think that the transition from socialism to communism is possible even with commodity circulation, that commodity circulation can be no obstacle to this. That is a profound error, arising from an inadequate grasp of Marxism.

"Criticizing Duhring's 'economic commune,' which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his Anti-Duhring, convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was inevitably bound to lead Duhring's so-called 'economic communes' to the regeneration of capitalism. Comrades Sanina and Venzher evidently do not agree with this. All the worse for them. But we, Marxists, adhere to the Marxist view that the transition from socialism to communism and the communist principle of distribution of products according to needs preclude all commodity exchange, and, hence, preclude the conversion of products into commodities, and, with it, their conversion into value." (ibid. p.95-96 - our emphasis).

And here is Stalin's Marxist-Leninist plan for elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property, which in turn prepares the ground for the elimination of the market (of commodity production and circulation, of value and its forms and the law of value):

"But what, then, should be done to elevate collective-farm property to the level of public property?

"The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective-farm property. Consequently the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates.

"Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production.

"Further, the collective farm is a cooperative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

"What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective-farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the collective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective-farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property must be tackled.

In order to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms. That is the point." (ibid. pp 97-98 - our emphasis).

Revisionist View: Socialism and Communism are Impossible without Commodity Production and the Market

After the death of Stalin, on Venzher's proposals, the Khrushchevite revisionists made over the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms, which, at one stroke, undermined Soviet agriculture by slowing up the development of collective-farm production, as Stalin had predicted, and extended the sphere of operation of commodity circulation on a vast scale by bringing into its orbit "a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production," just as Stalin had warned. This revisionist measure truly turned

back the wheel of history and the imperialist bourgeoisie was well satisfied (as were its Trotskyist hirelings, being the 'market socialists' that they are) - and expressed its satisfaction with malicious glee.

If Stalin, following the orthodox Marxist position, held that the existence of commodity production and circulation, the existence of the market, was incompatible with communism, and that, therefore, it was the function of socialism to abolish the market, revisionism on the contrary, following in the wake of bourgeois economists such as Von Mises and Brutzkus, believes in 'market socialism' according to which the continued existence of commodity relations under socialism was not merely a heritage of capitalism, reflecting the incomplete development of capitalism in the economy which the working class inherited, but an inherent need of the socialist economy, which required not only the continuation of the market but also its expansion. Whereas orthodox Marxism holds that capitalism is the highest expression of commodity production, the revisionist economists propound the view that capitalism merely inherits commodity production, it being the function of socialism to raise commodity production to the highest level of development by "purifying" the market and "freeing" it of the distortions to which it is subjected under capitalism.

Before the advent of Gorbachev, by which time quantity had been transformed into quality, and, therefore, the expression of bourgeois ideas in all spheres of life (including the field of political economy) began to be done more openly, boldly, frequently and on a mass scale, bourgeois views in the field of political economy were expressed mainly in Soviet special economic journals, and in a language at once circumloquacious and ponderous. At that time the Czech revisionist theoreticians, in particular Ota Sik, were the exception to this rule. They expressed their bourgeois ideas with candour and simplicity. Their advocacy of 'market socialism', because of the greater (at the time) extension of the market in Czechoslovakia, is distinguished by its clarity of expression from the advocacy of 'market socialism' by their Soviet counterparts who, Marxism then still being the official ideology, had to tread with meticulous care and trepidation. Hence the obscure language of the Soviet revisionist economic theoreticians of the late '50s and the '60s - a language which can be understood only by the initiated.

Revisionist Theoreticians and the 'Socialist Market'

Revisionist economic theoreticians, being 'market socialists', can hardly be expected to like a Marxist-Leninist of the calibre, staunchness and determination of Stalin, who held steadfastly to the Marxist view that the market and communism are incompatible. In this instance we start with a quotation from Ota Sik who, of all the revisionist economic theoreticians, can be credited with having made a most comprehensive exposition of 'market socialism'. Sik says that Stalin:

"committed ... serious theoretical errors, which flowed in large measure from the state of the economy at the time ... He put forward the theory that commodity money relations are in the nature of a foreign element in a socialist economy which has to suffer them purely because their existence is forced upon it by the co-operative forms of socialist ownership [i.e., the collective farms] which he regarded as inferior forms in which socialist principles were inadequately embodied.

*"He believed that in the socialist state sector there could be room only for accounting and recording of values in response to external relations (with co-operatives and other countries) and that genuine commodity-money relations could not exist between socialist state enterprises ... This theory of Stalin's which was strictly adhered to during his lifetime and is still widely applied in practice, became a deeply-rooted dogma with grave consequences for socialist economic growth." (Ota Sik, *Socialist Market Relations and Planning*, included in *Socialism, Capitalism and Economic Growth: Essays Presented to M Daub*, Cambridge University Press, 1967).*

So, according to this revisionist sage, the market is NOT merely handed down from capitalism, which it is the function of socialism to abolish. On the contrary, he says, there is an "objective necessity for the existence of commodity money relations and the market in a socialist economy," because of the "impossibility of resolving economic conflicts when these relations are restricted or suppressed by the old method of administrative planning. The explanation of market relations is ... the inner contradictions of socialist labour at a given stage of the development of the productive forces and, therefore, the market" is "a necessary economic form of resolving these contradictions within the framework of socialist planning." (*ibid.* p.148).

Further comment on this extremely lucid and self-explanatory statement of 'market socialism' would be futile.

Sik's counterparts in the Soviet Union had expressed similar views in the late '50s and the '60s. Venzher, with whom the reader is already very familiar, wrote in 1958:

"Socialist commodity production is commodity production of a special kind, its development being directly connected with strengthening and expanding commodity/money relations and with the gradual dying away of natural economy relations. Because of social diversity, labour under socialism preserves its dual character and the goods created by labour are exchanged according to the amount of abstract labour embodied in them. That is why all products have a commodity form.

"Socialist production is large-scale commodity production planned on the scale of the whole national economy."

"Socialist exchange is realised on the basis of the law of value" (Commodity Production under Socialism and the Collective Farms, 'Voprosy Ekonomiki, August 1958).

"Under socialism products and services are also produced as commodities and also sold for money." (B.G. Liberman, Are We Flirting with Capitalism? Profits and 'Profits', 'Soviet Life', July 1965).

The writings of these revisionist economists - Venzher, Liberman, Sik and many others - are no more than a repetition in 'Marxian' phraseology of the arguments of bourgeois political economy (including those of Trotskyists) that without the market, efficient economic calculation is impossible. Since, as we know, Marxian socialism - and there is no other socialism - aims at the abolition of the market, the abolition of commodity production and commodity circulation, it is only another way of saying that Marxian socialism is a Utopian impossibility, and that capitalism, far from being a transitional social formation, is the highest stage in the development of human society. This is precisely what the revisionist economic theoreticians, the proponents of 'market socialism' of the '50s and '60s, did say in the semi-veiled language of the times. However, their writings, and more importantly, the implementation of the bourgeois reforms advocated by them, prepared the ground in which could flourish the Gorbachevs and Yeltsins, and, of course, the Makarovs, Shatalins and Yavlinskys, of today. Three decades of luxuriant growth of revisionist politics and economics culminated in the OPEN conversion of the General Secretary - no less - of the CPSU to, first, a "regulated market economy", and, following the attempted coup by the allegedly Stalinist (if ever there was an insult hurled at Stalin, it

is to describe the authors of this miserable attempt by the epithet 'Stalinist') hardliners, to disband the CPSU, confiscate its property and to declare it illegal. This indeed is the essence and end product of 'market socialism'. In the light of this, it is only to be expected that this unpleasant gentry should entertain feelings of utmost hostility towards Joseph Stalin, whose Marxist-Leninist theory that the market and money relations were incompatible with socialism, which the latter aimed at abolishing, "was strictly adhered to during his lifetime" and who also fought with might and main, and successfully, against the pedlars of the theory of 'market socialism'. Is it to be wondered at that this bourgeois gentry should claim that Stalin, because of his fidelity and adherence to this theory, did great damage to the economy? There is no denying that, from the bourgeois viewpoint of 'market socialism', the Russian economy was 'damaged' during the period of socialist construction, under Stalin's leadership, to such an extent that it took the revisionists over three decades to bring to fruition their nefarious schemes aimed at the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.

Revisionist Theoreticians and the 'Socialist Commodity'

In order to be able to peddle their theory of 'market socialism', revisionist economic theoreticians had to indulge in a wholesale distortion and revision of Marxian political economy, in particular the Marxian teaching on the nature of commodities and commodity production, the attacks on Stalin merely serving as a distraction from this distortion. Market socialism had to invent new categories of the commodity, such as the 'socialist commodity', as distinct from the 'capitalist commodity' in complete violation of Marxism. According to Marxism, while commodity production is to be found under different social formations, the nature of the commodity remains the same, although only under the capitalist mode of production does it find its full expression. Under socialism, commodity production carries on for some time as a heritage of capitalism and is finally abolished. In other words, commodity production, which began as a subsidiary form of production in pre-capitalist societies, acquires the general form of production under capitalism, continues to exist in subsidiary form for some time under socialism before disappearing completely. Thus there is the emergence, growth, predominance, decline, and disappearance of commodity production.

Engels defines commodities as:

"... objects which, within a society composed of private producers, are produced and exchanged against each other by these private producers for their private account" (*Anti-Duhring*).

And further, stressing again the private nature of commodity production, Engels says:

"What are commodities? Products made in a society of more or less separate private producers, and therefore in the first place private products. These private products, however, become commodities only when they are made, not for consumption by their producers, but for consumption by others, that is, for social consumption; they enter into social consumption through exchange." (*ibid.* - p. 425, our emphasis).

According to Marx, this is how articles become commodities:

"As a general rule, articles of utility become commodities, only because they are products of the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of each another." (*Capital* Volume 1, p.72-3).

Unlike the revisionist theoreticians of 'market socialism', Marx only knew the commodity, being as completely unaware of the 'socialist commodity' as he was of the 'capitalist commodity':

"No matter what the basis on which products are produced, which are thrown into circulation as commodities - whether the basis of the primitive commodity of slave production, of small peasant and petty-bourgeois, or the capitalist basis, the character of products as commodities is not altered, and as commodities they must pass through the process of exchange and its attendant changes of form." (*Capital*, Vol 3, p. 325 - our emphasis).

Commodity production, says Marx, "reaches its maximum in the ultimate development of capitalist production." (*Capital*, Vol 3, p.320).

Already in Volume I of *Capital*, the same point is expressed thus:

"Definite historical conditions are necessary that a product may become a commodity. It must not be produced as the immediate means of subsistence of the producer himself. Had we gone further, and enquired under what circumstances all, or even the majority of products, take the form of commodities, we should have found that this can only happen with production of a specific kind, capitalist production." (Vol. I, page 169 - our emphasis).

In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that, according to Marxism, articles become commodities only when they are produced by private produ-

cers, "not for use by their producers, but by others, for social use. They enter into social use through exchange". Secondly, that the character of the products as commodities is not altered no matter under what social formation they are produced. Since it was, according to Marx and Engels, the function of socialism to abolish commodity production, it stands to reason that they did not support the theory of 'market socialism' - socialism based on commodity production. They rose up in arms against the proponents of this theory, namely, Proudhon and Duhring (see Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy* in refutation of the former and Engels *Anti-Duhring* in refutation of the latter).

Here is what Engels has to say on this account:

"Direct social production and direct distribution preclude all exchange of commodities, therefore also the transformation of the products into commodities (at any rate within the community) and consequently also their transformation into values."

"From the moment when society enters into possession of the means of production and uses them in direct association for production, the labour of each individual, however varied its specifically useful character may be, becomes at the start and directly social labour. The quantity of social labour contained in the product need not be established in a roundabout way ... Society can simply calculate how many hours of labour are contained in a steam engine ... It could never therefore occur to it still to express the quantities of labour put into the products ... in a third product, in a measure which, though formerly unavoidable for lack of a better, rather than express them in their natural, adequate and absolute measure, time," (*Ibid.* p.429).

Revisionist economic literature of the late '50s and of the '60s often got into tangles in trying to explain the existence of commodity production under socialism, that is, as a general form of socialist production, and not merely as a heritage of capitalism, which it is the task of socialism to abolish. Here is an example of this tangle, taken from *Political Economy of Socialism* (Moscow, 1967):

"Commodity production, irrespective of its socio-economic nature, is characterised, first by the economic isolation of producers and, second, by their specialisation on the production of definite use-values, and third, by the production of commodities for sale at their social value." (p.129).

"Private ownership is the cause of commodity production. Social division of labour is only an indispensable condition. In the absence of private ownership, the social division of labour does not give rise to commodity production."

"As distinct from capitalism, in socialist society there is not private ownership ... But commodity production remains also under socialism" (page 130).

And further:

"The necessity of commodity production is not incompatible with the fact that labour is directly social under socialism" (*ibid.* p.134).

Could one find a better example of "unholy twaddle", to use Stalin's apt expression? Private ownership of the means of production, we are told, is the cause of commodity production. In socialist society there is no private ownership and yet commodity production remains also under socialism!! The production process is not broken up among private producers, who produce for the market, as is the case under capitalism. Instead there is only one owner of the means of production, the collective producer producing in accordance with the national plan, the product belonging to this producer and never leaving its ownership, but, by some miracle, this "also becomes commodity production." !!

In the sensuous language of the British and Irish Communist Organisation (BICO):

"The single collective owner of the product engages in fantasy exchange with himself and gives rise to commodity production - in much the same way, we assume, as the fantasy of sexual intercourse in masturbation produces children." (*Marxism and 'Market Socialism' Part Two* p. 2, Second ed. Sept. 1971).

The Laws Inherent to Commodity Production Assert Themselves

The truth of the matter is that since the triumph of revisionism, following Stalin's death, a multitude of 'economic reforms' were instituted which paved, over a period of three decades, the way for the restoration of capitalism. Under these reforms, instead of the associated proletariat producing under a single national economic plan of production, and distributing (allocating) the product directly among various claimants on it, as was the case during Stalin's lifetime, production has been broken up (not just physically but from a social point of view), fragmented, into what Ota Sik calls "separate relatively independent producing and deciding groups", (page 139), i.e., into units of private production which alone decide what to produce and which exchange these products through the market. Under such a system, naturally, the law of value operates as a regulator of production, regulating

the proportions of labour distributed among the various branches of industry. Under such a system, the prices of commodities can only be 'market prices' based on their values, or their converted form, the 'prices of production' (which, according to Marx, are equal to the cost of production plus an average profit). Under such a system, profitability of individual enterprises ('cost accounting') alongside material incentives in the form of higher wages and bonuses to the personnel of these individual enterprises, based on the profitability of each enterprise, assume enormous significance. Such a system, in all but name, is a system of private production, for, as Marx correctly stated, commodities are "the products of the labour of private individuals or groups of individuals who carry on their work independently of one another." This definition of commodity production embraces production by cooperatives as well. Private production is by no means confined to individual or domestic production, though the latter is included in it. Sik's "separate, relatively independent producing and deciding groups" are no more and no less than groups of private producers. Thus it can be seen that the commodities produced under 'market socialism' are characterised by the same attributes which characterise all commodities, namely, they are "in the first place private products." Since "commodity production, like all other forms of production, has its own laws which are inherent and inseparable from it," it is not surprising that these laws should assert themselves under the conditions of 'market socialism' - the extent of their manifestation being dependent on the degree of the development of commodity production. As Engels put it:

"... every society based upon the production of commodities has this peculiarity: that the producers have lost control over their own social interrelations ... But the production of commodities, like every other form of production, has its peculiar, inherent laws inseparable from it; and these laws work, despite anarchy, in and through anarchy. They reveal themselves in the only persistent form of social interrelations, i.e., in exchange, and they affect the individual producers as compulsory laws of competition. They are, at first, unknown to these producers themselves, and have to be discovered by them gradually and as a result of experience. They work themselves out, therefore, independently of the producers, and in antagonism to them, as inexorable laws of their particular form of production. the product dominates the producers." (*Ibid* p.376).

According to revisionist political economy, however, commodity production has no laws of its own which are inherent in it and inseparable from it. On the contrary, according to it, the development of commodity produc-

tion can just as readily lead to communism as to capitalism. To put it in the words of Ota Sik:

"... the founders of scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, were able in their day to acquaint themselves only with the private type of commodity production. They tied these relations to private production, and therefore supposed that with the extinction of the capitalist economy, commodity production would also disappear. Today we should clearly recognise that Marx and Engels were in their day unable to foretell the complexities of a socialist economy, and indeed they never set themselves the task ... Only a hopelessly dogmatic interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory is capable of denying the existence of new realities just because they were never stated and explained by the classics of Marxism-Leninism ... The true proponents of this teaching are not those who deny the existence of socialist commodity relations because they contradict the letter of the classics, but those who in line with the realities of these relations undertake their theoretical elucidation and then help to extend and apply them in practice." (p. 145).

If Sik's theory of 'market socialism' is correct, if indeed the commodity can equally be a product of private or collective production, then Marxian analysis of the commodity, which is basic to his entire economic analysis, must be discarded as irrelevant rubbish.

Revisionist Theoreticians and the Concept of 'Socialist' Value

Just as 'market socialism' requires as its basic component the concept of the 'socialist commodity', so does it require the concept of 'socialist value' and the 'socialist law of value', which assists in the development of socialist society through its categories of 'socialist' rent, interest and profit.

"Commodity', 'money', 'price', 'profit', and other categories of the socialist economy ... are inherent in socialist production relations, are inalienably connected with them." However, "Under socialism we are speaking of a law of commodity-money relations, and of a law of value, with a social content and role altogether different from those under capitalism, of a law of value and commodity-money relations the like of which has never before existed in history." (Soviet News 9 April 1964, reprinted from *Pravda*).

Liberman wrote:

"The significance of profit in the Soviet Union was underestimated owing to a certain disregard of the law of value. Some Soviet economists incorrectly in-

terpreted the law as an unpleasant leftover from capitalism and said we had to get rid of it as quickly as possible." But the "law of value is not a law of capitalism but a law of all commodity production, including planned commodity production under socialism."

The only difference, we are told, between this "socialist law of value" and the one that operated under capitalism is that the former is purified of the distortions which affect the "capitalist law of value". This purified "socialist law of value" was fully known to Marx and Engels. Here is what Engels had to say on this score in *Anti-Duhring*:

"To seek to abolish the capitalist mode of production by establishing 'true value' is therefore tantamount to attempting to abolish catholicism by establishing the 'true' Pope, or to set up a society in which at last the producers control their products, by consistently carrying into life an economic category which is the most comprehensive expression of the enslavement of the producers by their own product." (*Ibid.* p.431).

The revisionist theoreticians even stated that the law of value would become inoperative one day. But how? In the *Pravda* article cited above, we are told:

"... the law of value will become unnecessary owing to ... having been ... consciously applied to the planned economy."

We answer this Duhringian assertion with the following words of Engels in his *Anti-Duhring*:

"... the law of value is, the fundamental law of precisely commodity production, hence also of its highest form, capitalist production. It asserts itself in present-day society in the only way in which economic laws can assert themselves in a society of private producers: as a blindly operating law of nature inherent in things and relations, and independent of the will or action of the producers... By elevating this law into the basic law of his economic commune, and demanding that the commune should execute it in all consciousness, Herr Duhring converts the basic law of existing society into the basic law of his imaginary society. He wants existing society, but without its abuses. In this he occupies the same position as Proudhon. Like him, he wants to abolish the abuses which have arisen out of the development of commodity production into capitalist production, by giving effect against them to the basic law of commodity production, precisely the law to whose operation these abuses are due. Like him, he wants to abolish the real consequences of the law of value by means of fantastic ones." (*Ibid.* p. 433-4).

But never mind about all this, we are told by another revisionist theoretician:

"... the chief function of research is not to argue about whether the law of value does or does not exist, since experience has long since and convincingly shown that the law of value and value categories do exist, but to study the specific forms in which the law of value appears in the different stages of building socialism. ... We know that the entry of our country into the period of the comprehensive building of communism is marked by a broadening rather than a curtailing of the sphere of operation of value categories within the country and in relations between countries." (S. Pervushkin, *Planovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1961 no. 7).

But we now know that the end product of the conscious application of this purified law of 'socialist value' is to harness society even more firmly to the market. The developments in Eastern Europe and the USSR are an eloquent proof of these eternal truths of Marxism, as they are an equally eloquent refutation of the assertions of the 'creative Marxism' of 'market socialism'. The conscious application of the 'purified', the 'transformed', law of value has only led to the expansion of the sphere of operation of the law of value, and with it private production and the restoration of capitalism under the guise of socialist phraseology.

Stalin and the Law of Value

Stalin, upholding the Marxian position on the law of value, says:

"Value, like the law of value, is a historical category connected with the existence of commodity production. With the disappearance of commodity production, value and its forms and the law of value also disappear." (*Economic Problems*, p.22).

"Whenever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist." (*ibid.* p.18).

To those who trade in the transformation of the laws of natural science or laws of political economy, he answers in the following trenchant terms:

"Marxism regards laws of science - whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy - as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilise them

in the interests of society, but he cannot change them or abolish them. (*Ibid.* p. 2).

"It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our country under socialism, including the law of value, have been 'transformed', or even 'radically transformed', on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. Laws cannot be 'transformed', still less 'radically' transformed. If they can be transformed, then they can be abolished and replaced by other laws. The thesis that laws can be 'transformed' is a relic of the incorrect formula that laws can be 'abolished' or 'formed'. Although the formula that economic laws can be transformed has already been current in our country for a long time, it must be abandoned for the sake of accuracy. The sphere of action of this or that economic law may be restricted, its destructive action - that is, of course, if it is liable to be destructive - may be averted, but it cannot be 'transformed' or 'abolished'. (*Ibid.* pp. 7-8).

Adding: "One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give place to new laws. However, these laws are not abolished, but lose their validity owing to new economic conditions and depart from the scene in order to give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man but which arise from the new economic relations." (*Ibid.* p. 4).

In other words, as regards the commodity production that existed in the USSR, as already stated, owing to the existence of collective-farm production alongside the publicly-owned production, the aim was to restrict the sphere of this commodity production, and with it of the law of value, and eventually to replace commodity production by a system of products exchange. The idea of transformation of the laws of commodity production was quite rightly declared by Stalin to be an absurdity.

The type of 'economic reforms' put into operation by the revisionists following Stalin's death were also advocated during his lifetime and sought to be put into effect then. The chief advocate, although not the only one, of these reforms was Nikolai Voznesensky, who published in 1947 a book under the title *The War Economy of the USSR During the Period of the Patriotic War*. In this book he claimed that the law of value functioned (what he meant was that it should function) as a regulator of production in the USSR, i.e., that it determined the distribution of the proportion of labour between the different branches of the economy - the more profitable an en-

terprise, the more labour and investment it attracted. He advocated, therefore, that the prices of commodities should reflect their value (prices of production) and in the organisation of production he laid great emphasis on 'cost accounting' rooted in the profitability of individual enterprises and industries, as well as on material incentives, such as bonuses and higher wages, for the personnel employed in various enterprises.

Voznesensky's theses were by no means merely of academic interest. Using his position as chairman of the State Planning Commission, enjoying considerable support among the highest ranks of the Party and the state, as well as a goodly number of the top economists, such as Gatovsky and Leontiev, who publicly supported his theses (and who, by giving powerful support to Liberman's theses, were instrumental in instituting similar 'economic reforms' during the Brezhnev years), Voznesensky went on to institute an 'economic reform' to give effect to his theses. Under this 'reform', which came into effect on 1st January 1949, in order to make them conform to their values (or prices of production - cost of production plus an average rate of profit), wholesale prices were reorganised, resulting in the doubling or trebling overnight of the prices of many basic materials. Within weeks of the 'economic reform' of Voznesensky being instituted, its opponents, under the leadership of Stalin, struck back. (In early March 1949 Voznesensky was relieved of his post as the chairman of the State Planning Commission, being expelled from the Party by July 1949. At the end of 1949 Voznesensky was arrested along with a few others and in 1950 he was tried on charges which, in his case, included the passing of secret papers of the State Planning Commission to a foreign state. Some of the defendants in what came to be called the 'Leningrad Affair', including Voznesensky, were sentenced to death and executed on 30 September 1950. Voznesensky's 'economic reform' of 1949 was annulled in two stages - on 1 January and 1 July 1950.

Stalin publicly refuted the theses of Voznesensky, without however naming the latter, in his last but immortal work, in the following terms:

"It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country under the socialist system.

"Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist ..." (Ibid p.18).

"Does this mean that the operation of the law of value has as much scope with us as it has under capitalism, and that it is the regulator of production in our country too? No, it does not. Actually, the sphere of operation of the law of

value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds. It has already been said that the sphere of operation of commodity production is restricted and placed within definite bounds by our system. The same must be said of the sphere of operation of the law of value. Undoubtedly, the fact that private ownership of the means of production does not exist, and that the means of production both in town and country are socialised, cannot but restrict the sphere of operation of the law of value and the extent of its influence on production." (Ibid. pp.20-21).

"Totally incorrect, too, is the assertion that under our present economic system ... the law of value regulates the 'proportions' of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

"If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why our light industries, which are the most profitable, are not being developed to the utmost, and why preference is given to our heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable.

"If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable ... are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable ... are not opened.

"If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable - in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the 'proportions' of labour distributed among the branches of production ...

"The law of value can be a regulator of production only under capitalism..."

"If profitability is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, ten or fifteen years, which is the only correct approach to the question, then the temporary and unstable profitability of some plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of stable and permanent profitability which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning." (Economic Problems, pp.22-4).

Soon after the publication of Stalin's *Economic Problems*, an article written by Mikhail Suslov appeared in *Pravda*, which for the first time quoted from a resolution of the Central Committee, passed three years earlier in

connection with the 'Leningrad Affair', and which, for the first time again, denounced by name Voznesensky's theses as revisionist:

"This booklet of Voznesensky's [The War Economy of the USSR] confused the solution of problems of the political economy of Socialism, represented a hotchpotch of voluntarist views on the part to be played by plans and the state in Soviet society and fetishism of the law of value, which was alleged by the governor of the distribution of labour between the sections of the national economy of the USSR." (M Suslov, in *Pravda*, 24 December 1952).

An intensive ideological campaign directed against Voznesensky's theses followed the publication of Suslov's article. January 9-11 witnessed the gathering of nearly 1,000 economists at a conference which condemned the error of those of their profession who had given their support to the theses of Voznesensky. An editorial in *Pravda* likened the struggle waged against Voznesensky's theses to that waged against "... the Trotskyist adventurers and right capitulators." (*Pravda*, 12 January, 1953).

On 28 January, the journal *Kommunist* named a number of economists and philosophers, denouncing them for supporting Voznesensky's theses.

Following Stalin's death on 5 March, 1953, the campaign against Voznesensky's theses came to an abrupt halt. At the 20th Party Congress, four years after Stalin's death, Khrushchevite revisionists felt strong enough to accuse Stalin of 'murder' of many 'good communists', to characterise Voznesensky and Kuznetsov as "... talented and eminent leaders" and rehabilitate those condemned in the 'Leningrad Affair', which in turn was denounced as a fabrication (see Khrushchev's *Secret Speech* at the 20th Party Congress).

Revisionist Propaganda in Favour of 'Economic Reforms'

Once firmly in power, the Khrushchevite revisionists took systematic steps to negate the gains of socialism and initiate 'economic reforms' that have at long last led to the restoration of capitalism in the once glorious and mighty socialist USSR. In the political field they started with an orchestrated campaign of vilification of Stalin, which enabled them to put into effect bourgeois norms in the name of 'creative Marxism-Leninism' and the fight against the 'cult of personality' of Stalin. Since, as has been amply demonstrated in the foregoing pages, Stalin held steadfastly to the propositions of Marxism-Leninism and defended these propositions during the thirty long years - thirty years of particular difficulty and particular achieve-

ment for the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR - after Lenin's death, not a single step in the direction of bourgeois restoration could be taken without denouncing 'Stalinism', i.e., Leninism. The revisionists, however, apart from the fact that their official ideology continued to be Marxism-Leninism, were not strong enough to take up the cudgels directly and openly against Leninism. (This only happened with the advent of Gorbachev). So the revisionists took all their anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist measures under the flag of anti-Stalinism. We said this all along. Now even idiots can see that attacks on 'the dictatorship of Stalin' were only a cover for attacks on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Hand in hand with the vilification of Stalin went the removal from positions of power of staunch Marxist-Leninists such as Molotov, Kaganovich and Beria. Economists such as Evsei Liberman were let loose to conduct a campaign for 'economic reforms', which increasingly received official approval. Apart from making over the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms, already referred to above, and thus vastly increasing the sphere of commodity circulation by bringing a gigantic quantity of the instruments of agricultural production within its orbit, the Khrushchev administration introduced in 1964 a pilot scheme whereby the economic reform was applied on an experimental basis to two clothing factories.

Although Khrushchev was overthrown in October 1964, and although his successors - Brezhnev and Kosygin - went on to make him a non-entity, they did not jettison the 'economic reforms' initiated during the Khrushchev years. On the contrary, these 'economic reforms' were intensified on an extensive scale and in due course they undermined the socialist basis of Soviet society through the systematic application of bourgeois norms such as profit as a regulator of production, the price reform whereby prices increasingly reflected value (prices of production), the increasing emphasis on material incentives and the profitability and independence of individual enterprises, which produced for the market and whose products faced each other in the market as commodities. This undermined and, over time, rendered meaningless centralised planning. Once the commodity form of production is given full sway, the only economic laws and categories that make economic sense are the laws and categories of capitalism. Every system of production has laws of its own, which are inseparable from it. Once it is assumed that socialism is a system of commodity production, as the revisionists do, justification and reason is on the side of the advocates of 'reforms' for the realisation of a functioning market. In the USSR, however,

with its history of a quarter of a century of planning, a fully operational market could not emerge suddenly, all of a sudden, in 1956. Such a thing would not merely have been a political impossibility, but an economic impossibility too. Had centralised comprehensive economic planning been abolished overnight, and all restrictions on market operations been lifted, the result would have been economic collapse - not an operational market. So, to bring about an operational market, the market had to be carefully reconstructed:

"In such a vast and complex organism as is the national economy of the Soviet Union it would be impossible ... to introduce radical changes in the system of price formation until a new system has been worked out in every detail and tested. And perhaps, on the whole, the transition should be made gradually, as the conditions for it are prepared and matured." (S Pervushkin, *The Law of Value and Prices*, 'Planovoe Khoziastvo', 1961, no.7).

With this aim in mind, the revisionists set themselves to work to create, by stages, the conditions for an operational market. While claiming that their 'economic reform' was aimed at 'consolidating' centralised economic planning, the revisionists unleashed a veritable propaganda barrage denouncing centralised economic planning as 'bureaucratic', 'restrictive', 'obsolete' and the result, of course, of 'Stalin's distortion of socialism':

"These shortcomings in economic management should be eliminated not by making planning more complicated, more detailed and more centralised, but by developing the economic initiative and independence of enterprises ... Enterprises must be given broader initiative; they must not be bound by petty tutelage and the bureaucratic methods of planning from the centre." (E.G. Liberman, *Cost Accounting and Material Encouragement of Industrial Personnel*, in 'Voprosy ekonomiki' no.6, 1955).

"Stalin ... who substituted naked administration by fiat for economic instruments of directing the economy ...

"Regulation of the use of financial resources by enterprises, where it is excessive and too detailed, should be eliminated, and enterprises should be given greater opportunity to manoeuvre with these resources." (L Gatovsky, *The Role of Profit in a Socialist Economy*, in 'Kommunist' no. 18, 1962).

The 'Economic Reform' of 1965 and the Undermining of Central Planning

Following this propaganda barrage against central planning, the Central Committee adopted the 'economic reform' officially in September 1965:

"A serious shortcoming of industrial management is that administrative methods have superseded economic necessity ... The powers of enterprises with regard to their economic activity are restricted."

"The work of enterprises is regulated by numerous indices which restrict the independence and initiative of the personnel of enterprises, diminish their sense of responsibility for improving the organisation of production ...

"It has been found expedient to put a stop to excessive regulation of the activity of enterprises, to reduce the number of plan indices required of enterprises from above." (Central Committee of the CPSU, decision On Improving Management of Industry, Perfecting Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production).

What was done, however, was not merely the extension of the economic independence and initiative of the enterprises and the reduction of the number of "plan indices required of enterprises from above", but the emasculation of the remaining indices from being directives, which were binding on the enterprises, to mere 'guidelines', which the enterprises could choose to follow or ignore altogether:

"Control figures will be drawn up ... in a generalised, value form, to be given to sectors of the economy. In the same form these control figures will be handed down to the enterprises, not as precise directives, but rather as guidelines for drawing up their plans." (E.G. Liberman, *Plan, Direct Ties and Profitability*, in *Pravda*, 21 November 1965).

After being brought under the regime of the 'reformed' system, enterprises began to plan their own production, determining even the type and qualities of the products to be produced. All this came to be called by the revisionist economists "planning from below", and, in the circumstances of the prevalence of this kind of 'planning', the 'central' economic plan assumed the form of a totality, an aggregate, of the economic plans of the individual enterprises. And as the individual enterprises often changed their plans in the course of a 'planning period', and therefore the central economic plan produced at the beginning bore no resemblance to end results, it

is hardly surprising that leading lights among the revisionist economists should themselves say that: "*It is practically impossible to compile a Five-Year Plan*". (A Komin, *Problems in the Methodology and Practice of Planned Price Formation*, in *Planovoe Khosiaistvo*, no. 9, 1972).

Equally it is not surprising that as early as 1972 the same revisionist economists should have admitted that, as a result of the 'economic reform' the Soviet economy had become characterised by anarchy ("*indeterminacy*") was their word for it as they studiously avoided using terminology understood by all and sundry):

"Centralised planning in conditions of broad independence of enterprises is also faced with the need of elaborating methods of managing the economy marked by growing indeterminacy, probability (stochastics) of its processes." (A.M. Romyantsev, *Management of the Soviet Economy Today: Basic Principles*, in *Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems*, Moscow, 1972, p.23).

As comprehensive centralised economic planning was dismantled and replaced by "*planning from below*," the role of the state was reduced to merely laying down economic guidelines and attempting to influence individual enterprises by use of economic levers of various kinds, such as credit supply, rates of interest, etc. Thus, instead of the associated proletariat engaging in production, instead of society distributing labour- power and means of production in the different branches of production as had been the case earlier, production after the 'economic reforms' were instituted was broken up and fragmented (from a social viewpoint) and increasingly became private production, i.e., commodity production. And commodity production, once it becomes the general form of production can only mean capitalist production. Calling it "*socialist commodity production*" does not change it one whit. As Stalin correctly stated, by way of reiteration of the generally-known truth, "*capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production.*" (*Economic Problems* p.13).

In his controversy with Yaroshenko, Stalin criticised Yaroshenko for failing to realise "*what aim society sets social production, to what purpose it subordinates social production, say under socialism*", adding that "*Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for production's sake, but in order to satisfy their needs.*" (*ibid.* p.78).

And further: "*... the aim of capitalist production is profit-making ... Man and needs disappear from its field of vision.*" The aim of socialist production,

on the other hand, is "*the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society*" (*ibid.* pp. 79-80).

Profit as the Regulator of Production

If man and his needs are ignored, if production ceases to be centrally planned on the basis of social need, if such production is replaced by group production (which is undoubtedly a form of private production) with its "*planning from below*," then, under the latter there could only be one regulator of production, namely, profit and profitability of individual enterprises (the law of value, in other words).

"*We must elevate the importance of profit and profitability*," said Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress. The 'economic reform' of Brezhnev and Kosygin further enhanced the role of profit as "*one of the economic instruments of socialism. A considerable enhancement of its role in socialist economy is an indispensable requisite for cost accounting*". (Editorial, *Economic Policy and Work for Communism*, in *Pravda* 14 January 1966).

And cost accounting (*Khozraschot*) is defined as a method of management designed to achieve the profitability of each individual enterprise. In fact, profit, under this system of 'cost accounting', becomes a "*criterion that characterises to the greatest degree the operation of the enterprise.*" (Trapeznikov, *For Flexible Economic Management of Enterprises*, *Pravda*, 17 August, 1964).

Another revisionist economist adds: "*The system of cost accounting makes every enterprise interested in obtaining a bigger profit*" (Gatovsky).

The criterion of efficiency under this system of 'cost accounting' came to be expressed by what Soviet economists euphemistically called the "*index of profitability*," that is, the annual profits of an enterprise as a percentage of its total assets. In ordinary language it is called the "*rate of profit*" - an expression which was at the time avoided by revisionist economists because of its obvious capitalist connotations and connections, which they, as the builders of 'communism' could have no truck with! But the "*socialist rate of profit*" of individual enterprises - rechristened the "*index of profitability*" - was quite another matter!

Revisionist economists from the late '50s have hurled the accusation that Stalin not only belittled the role of profit but also had a supreme disregard

for 'immutable' economic laws. Writing in *Pravda* of 10 July, 1964, L Leontiev sallied forth thus:

"The problem which we now face in determining if profit should be the basic index judging the work of an enterprise can be attributed in no small way to the lack of regard for the immutable law of economic construction during the Stalin era. This immutable law, regardless of the system under which it operates, is universal; an economy must produce more than is expended on production; and it is this principle, however unheeded it has been in the past, that theoretically provides for the foundation for the acceptance of profits today in the Soviet Union."

The truth is just the opposite. Far from disregarding objective economic laws, as the above-quoted remarks imply, Stalin rose up in arms against those who denied the existence of such laws, or those who attributed to the Soviet system such miraculous powers as would allow it to abolish or transform these laws - although he was far from regarding the laws of political economy, "or at least the majority of them," as permanent and immutable. We have already quoted him in this regard and there is therefore no need to quote him again. If Stalin indeed ignored the "immutable law" according to which "an economy must produce more than is expended on production," how is one to explain the gigantic growth in production witnessed in the USSR during the period of socialist construction? And the acceptance of the principle that "an economy must produce more than is expended on production" in no way leads to the acceptance of the principle of profitability of individual enterprises, as is asserted by the sages of the political economy of revisionism. What Stalin was actually guilty of was of opposing the law invented by revisionism, namely, that the law of value functions as a regulator of production under socialism. He quite rightly fought against those who wanted the law of value to function as the regulator of production under socialism. We have already cited his reply to those who would have the law of value function as a regulator of production under socialism.

With the implementation of 'economic reform', slowly but surely, private production by individual enterprises, who produced for the market and whose products stared at each other in the market, came to replace comprehensive centralised planned production, and profit (the law of value, which is a law of commodity production, which operates under capitalism as a regulator of production) became a regulator of production in the USSR too.

Revisionism and the 'Socialist Market'

In order for profit to be realised, the producer of a commodity must sell it. The enterprises must, therefore, adapt their production to the market for their commodities, for the regulation of production by profit (law of value) is nothing but regulation by the market. And an operational market implies not only the existence of competition between sellers but also the operation of supply and demand through which the law of value operates. Here are a few quotations from authoritative revisionist economists:

"Under socialism the market is ... a sphere for the marketing of products - means of production and consumer goods manufactured by state and cooperative enterprises." (L Gatovsky, *Unity of Plan and Cost Accounting*, in *Kommunist* no. 15, 1965.

"Without utilising the mechanism of the socialist market ..., it is impossible to ensure the operation of enterprises on the basis of complete khozraschot." (B Rakitsky, *Bourgeois Interpretation of the Soviet Economic Reform*, in *Voprosy ekonomiki* no. 10, 1965.

"The enterprise will compete for orders", wrote E Liberman in *Pravda* of 21 November, 1965.

"Market demands ... are a major factor in determining proportions in the national economy ..."

"Under socialism, since commodity production exists, the objective law of demand and supply ... operates ..." (Gatovsky).

"We must acknowledge that ... the market mechanism ... plays a regulating role in socialist production." (L Konnik, *Planning and the Market*, in *Voprosy ekonomiki* no. 5, 1966.

And further: *"Today it is generally acknowledged that the problem of marketing and of market fluctuations continues even in the planned socialist economy"* (*ibid.*)

And we are assured that this ceaseless hankering after more and more profit by each enterprise is in the best interests of society:

"What is profitable to society as a whole will also be profitable to each production collective." (E.G. Liberman, *Planning Production and Standards of Long-term Operation*, in *Voprosy ekonomiki* no.8, 1962.

But in the market 'demand' means 'effective demand', that is, demand backed by money, and in a society with unequal distribution of income, 'effective demand' bears no correlation to social demand, to social need. With the implementation of the 'economic reform' this phenomenon made its appearance in the USSR and its existence was acknowledged:

"Uneven distribution of incomes between different sections of the population results in that the groups in the lower brackets do not fully satisfy their prime needs, while groups in the higher brackets are able to satisfy less essential needs" (A.M. Rumyantsev, *Management of the Soviet Economy Today: Basic Principles*, in *Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems*, Moscow, 1972, p.28.

When profit is the supreme criterion of production, man and his needs disappear:

"The Ministry of the Meat and Dairy Industry of the Tadjik SSR, in the quest for high profits for its enterprises in 1970 and 1971, reduced the production of inexpensive products that were in stable demand among the population and unjustifiably increased the production of more expensive products. As a result, the enterprises of this Ministry obtain millions of rubles of profit in excess of the plan." (S Starostin and G Emdin, *The Five Year Plan and the Soviet Way of Life*, in *Planovoe Khoziaistvo* - 'Planned Economy' - no. 6, 1972).

"The expansion of the market, increasing competition among enterprises in their chase for bigger and bigger profits, brought in their wake such phenomena as market research, salesmanship and advertising, as are to be witnessed in capitalist countries.

"Under the new system of planning and economic incentive, ... well-placed advertising also promotes the success of the enterprise ...

"Posters, signs and showcases, as we know, make a city and its streets attractive." (V Rusakova and G Sudets, *Problems and Judgments, Let's Remember Advertising*, in *Pravda*, 19 February, 1969.

Poor old Lenin and Stalin never knew how to make Soviet cities and streets attractive. Instead of wonderful commercial advertisements they had the Soviet cities littered with revolutionary posters, paintings, statues and other cultural and architectural endowments.

Production enterprises were encouraged under the 'economic reform' to conclude direct contracts with trading enterprises:

"We plan to complete the switch of associations and enterprises engaged in mass and large-volume production to direct and long-term ties, basing their relations on long-term economic contracts," (A.N. Kosygin, *Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-80*, 25th Congress CPSU, Moscow 1976, pp.40-41).

An enterprise found breaking its contract was just as liable to be ordered to pay damages under the Soviet law of contract as any of its counterparts in Western countries.

With the implementation of the economic reform, the majority of the enterprises came to sell their products to each other rather than to the state:

"A majority of the industrial enterprises do not sell their goods to the state, but to other industrial enterprises or trading organisations. This represents the major part of the internal market of industry." (B Sukharevsky, *The Enterprise and Material Stimulation*, in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, no 49, 1965.

"... Capital," said Marx, *"is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things."* (*Capital*, Vol I, pp.766).

In a footnote to the above sentence, Marx reproduces from an earlier article of his own, written as early as 1849, the following penetrating observation:

"A negro is a negro. In certain circumstances he becomes a slave. A mule is a machine for spinning cotton. Only under certain circumstances does it become capital. Outside these circumstances, it is no more capital than gold is intrinsically money, or sugar is the price of sugar ... Capital is a social relation of production. It is a historical relation of production. (Ibid).

And further: *"We know that the means of production and subsistence, while they remain the property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They become capital, only under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation and subjection of the labourer. But this capitalist soul of theirs is so intimately wedded in the head of the political economist, to their material substance, that he christens them capital under all circumstances, even when they are its exact opposite. (Ibid. p.767 - our emphasis).*

And further still: *"... Capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character. Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of production. Capital is*

rather the means of production transformed into capital, which in themselves are no more capital than gold or silver in itself is money. It is the means of production monopolised by a certain section of society, confronting living labour-power as products and working conditions rendered independent of this labour-power, which are personified through this antithesis in capital." (Capital, Vol III pp. 814-5).

Means of Production Enter the Sphere of Commodities under the Revisionist 'Economic Reform'

Up to the late '50s, enterprises were allocated the means of production which they utilised in accordance with the plans established by the state. As a result the means of production did not enter the category of commodities. What is more, the produce (apart from collective-farm produce) belonged to the state too. Thus the enterprises had no right to dispose of it:

"A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity, which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come within this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not 'sold' to any purchaser; ... they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owner - the state - does not at all lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilisation of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.

"It will be seen, then, that under our system means of production can certainly not be classed in the category of commodities." (J.V. Stalin, op. cit. p.53)

Under such a system as is described by Stalin in the above quotation, which system prevailed in the USSR at the time, the rate of profit of an enterprise could have little reality. In order to make it a reality, the economic theoreticians of revisionism conducted a campaign demanding that enterprises should be made to pay for their production assets, i.e., means of production:

"The time has come to eliminate the situation in which fixed assets allocated by society to any given production entity are given without charge" (V.S.

Nemchikov, The Plan Target and Material Incentive, in Pravda 21 September 1962.

The Central Committee of the CPSU, at its meeting of September 1965, endorsed the principle of enterprises paying for the means of production:

"It is necessary to introduce deductions in favour of the state budget from the profits of enterprises in proportion to the value of the fixed and circulating assets allocated to them, with these deductions being considered as payment from production assets ...

"In future, payments for assets will become the most important part of the state's income, and the importance of other payments, including the turnover tax, will be correspondingly reduced." (A.N. Kosygin, On Improving Industrial Management, Perfecting Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production, in Izvestia, 28 September, 1965.

Initially the enterprises paid for their production assets by making annual payments to the state budget. Subsequently, under an alternative method of payment, enterprises were permitted to pay in a lump sum, which might come from their own funds or might be financed by a bank loan. Profit being the supreme criterion of production, under such a system enterprises have every incentive to pay for their production assets in a lump sum as well as in continuing to use obsolete equipment, which has already been paid for, as long as possible.

The need of enterprises to borrow in order to be able to pay for their production costs gave a powerful stimulus to a gigantic increase of bank credit, and with it the enhanced significance of the rate of interest.

Even as early as 1965, 40% of the circulating assets of enterprises were financed through bank credit, rising to 50% by 1976.

"At present, every second ruble of circulating assets in industry comes from credit, with the share of credit in agriculture, trade and other branches being even higher." (A.N. Kosygin, Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-1980, 25th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow 1976, pp. 42-3).

Thus, step by step, the old system whereby the state owned the means of production, which it allocated free of charge to various enterprises for utilisation as mere agents of the state and not as owners, was replaced by one under which enterprises paid for their production assets and ended up by becoming the owners of those assets.

Although all credit in the USSR is granted by banks which are state-owned (the USSR State Bank - Gosbank SSSR - specialising in short-term lending, and the Construction Bank - Stroibank - specialising in long-term lending for construction), their economic policy with regard to lending is hardly distinguishable from that which is pursued by their counterparts in the Western world.

Under the 'economic reform', the means of production entered the sphere of commodities. Having paid for them their purchasers, i.e., the various enterprises, acquired rights of disposal over them. As early as September 1965, Premier Kosygin was showering praise on five transport organisations for having sold superfluous trucks and equipment, adding:

"The enterprises will enjoy broader powers in the use of ... the money from the sale of surplus equipment and other material values." (A.N. Kosygin, *On Improving Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production*, (op. cit).

"The socialist market for the means of production is the sphere ... where the economic relations operate directly as the relations of supply and demand, and are realised in the act of buying and selling the means of production." (V. Budaragin, *The Price Mechanism and Circulating of the Means of Production*, in *Scientific Reports of Higher Schools: Economic Science*, no. 11, 1971, in *Problems of Economics*, Vol 15 no. 3, July 1972, p.74).

Subsequent to the 'economic reform', the buying and selling of the means of production was over a number of years transferred to wholesale trading organisations. And by 1971 two-thirds of the USSR's total trade turnover was accounted for by the market in the means of production (see Budaragin, *op. cit.*)

And under the Statute on Socialist State Production Enterprise, the property rights of the enterprise are vested in its director, who " ... may, without power of attorney, act in its name, dispose of the property and funds of the enterprise."

Marxism and Revisionism on the Workers' Attitude to Labour

The result of the 'economic reform', instead of increasing the productivity of labour - the declared aim of the reform - was the opposite. Between 1955 and 1965, while they were being provided with increasing amounts of means of production, the enterprises were proportionately producing de-

creasing amounts. Obviously the 'economic reform', with its creeping capitalist norms, had the effect of alienating the working people of the USSR. In this regard one cannot fail to note the aptness of Marx's observation on the attitude of workers to production under the system of commodity production at its highest stage:

"Since, in this mode of production, the workman finds the instruments of labour existing independently of him as another man's property, economy in their use appears ... to be a distinct operation, one that does not concern him."

Before the 'economic reform' was instituted, the attitude of Soviet workers was very different. They regarded the means of production as their own, they looked after them, and they took pride in achieving and over-achieving production targets, for they knew that they were building a new life for themselves, their children and grandchildren; they knew that by their efforts they were strengthening the proletarian dictatorship and rendering fraternal and selfless support to proletarian revolutionary and national liberation struggles against imperialism abroad. In other words, they were guided in their work by proletarian fraternal solidarity rather than commercial competition. By their production records during the period of socialist construction, the proletariat of the USSR proved in practice the correctness of the Marxian proposition that the abolition of the market under socialism, far from making for inefficiency and waste, would only lead to greater efficiency by freeing it from the waste inextricably connected with the market system. Whereas under capitalism only a tiny section of the population - the robber barons of capitalism - have an interest in production efficiency (for the mass of the workers such efficiency only means intensified exploitation of labour), socialism, by effecting a change in the relations of production, by bringing these relations into conformity with the productive forces, and by abolishing class exploitation, would give the workers an abiding interest in the productivity of labour - in increased efficiency in production. Marx's scientific conclusion that socialism is the outcome of relations of production under capitalism coming into contradiction with the forces of production, the former acting as a brake on the latter, means precisely this. Socialism, being a system of production for use rather than for the market and for profit, would be free from the disruptions of the periodic crises which are inevitable under capitalism. Under the conditions of capitalist production, wrote Marx:

"... Insofar as the means of production in capitalist production processes are at the same time means of exploiting labour, the labourer is no more concerned with their cheapness or dearness than a horse is concerned with the cheapness or dearness of its bit and bridle. ... the labourer looks at the social nature of his labour ... at his own combination with the labour of others for a common purpose, as he would at an alien power; the condition of realising this combination is alien property, whose dissipation would be totally indifferent to him if he were not compelled to economise with it. The situation is quite different in factories owned by the labourers." (*Capital*, Vol III, p. 85).

Kalinin, the then Soviet President, expressed the Marxian truth in 1940 in the following words:

"Formerly, before the Soviet system was established, a person who worked well thereby objectively assisted capitalism, riveted the chains of slavery still more firmly on himself and on the working class as a whole. But now, in socialist society, a person who works well sides with Socialism and by his achievement not only clears the way to Communism, but also shatters the chains of slavery shackling the world proletariat. He is an active fighter for Communism." (*On Communist Education*, p. 138).

Before the emergence of modern, Khrushchevite, revisionism the above proposition of Marxism in regard to the attitude of the working class towards work was universally accepted in working-class circles, and Marxists never paid much attention to the bourgeois arguments à la Von Mises that efficient economic calculation was impossible without the market. Only renegades from Marxism (Kautsky, Trotsky, etc) repeated the Von Mises thesis in their campaign against socialist construction in the USSR. With the emergence, however, of modern revisionism, the Von Mises thesis was accepted, applied and developed in all the revisionist countries, with an accompanying denunciation of the Marxian position as dogmatic 'Stalinism'.

The revisionist position on the attitude of the working class to labour under socialism is just the opposite of the Marxian position. The clearest revisionist statement on this question is to be found in Ota Sik's *Socialist Market Relations and Planning* referred to above, on pages 139-142.

Marxism holds that on the morrow of the proletarian revolution, society is "in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges." (Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*).

Therefore it is the task of socialism - a stage transitional between capitalism and communism - to lead the transformation of society from bourgeois to communist. The Marxian position has always been that communist forces, relatively weak after the revolution, become stronger with each victory in socialist construction, and with the advances and victories of socialism the communist attitude to labour takes deep roots and grows stronger.

According to the revisionist theoreticians of political economy - the Siks - however, the communist attitude to labour is shortlived, the attitude of the workers to labour under socialism is not very much different from that which exists under capitalism. Early enthusiasm on the part of the workers is merely due to the general excitement of the revolutionary period but it soon disappears. But this enthusiasm of the ignorant masses cannot be characterised as true socialist consciousness, for the latter requires "profound theoretical training". Thus such consciousness is limited to a "relatively small section of the community" - the intelligentsia and the managers. But even this "socialist consciousness" does not cause the elite to work for society without any thought of personal reward, for this elite knows how to look after its own interests.

Socialism, says Sik, is " ... production of specific products in separate relatively independent producing and deciding groups, in which people are associated to produce for each other and to meet social needs ... Nevertheless, labour cannot yet be man's prime want.

" ... as a general rule people expend their labour for others primarily because labour is the condition for acquiring from others the use values needed for themselves.

" ... In the immediate post-revolutionary years people undoubtedly did work with enthusiasm ... Then in the course of time ... work became a matter of routine. The younger generation, who did not experience the change-over [from capitalism to socialism] and who now tend to compare their work and its results ... with the situation in the developed capitalist countries, are unable to conjure up the post-revolutionary enthusiasm for occupations which fail to satisfy them."

And further: "For a thorough understanding of the changed nature of work under socialism as compared with capitalism, we need profound theoretical training; it involves a grasp of the substance of Marxist political economy, not to mention other social sciences. Such an understanding, naturally, is still attainable by only a relatively small section of the community ...

"Even a deep understanding of the transformation of the social character of labour under socialism does not, however, signify anything of optimum performance on behalf of society ... Labour itself, however, is not changed in the sense that monotonous and uninteresting or highly intensive work would even for socially conscious people become their prime want and concern..."

"... they will not be motivated in their everyday work by considerations other than those motivating the majority of their fellows..."

"The majority are motivated by the desire to make sure of the highest possible level of material consumption."

"Enthusiasm, in some cases without fuller understanding, is manifested ... in work for which personal reward is not expected. But such work ... can only be a short-lived, exceptional occurrence at the socialist stage of development and cannot rule out the vital role of consumption which, operating through the medium of material reward, is the general incentive under socialism."

In view of the above, it is not surprising that the labour enthusiasm of the masses found itself shackled and exploited by the self-seeking, greedy, hypocritical, bourgeois intellectuals and capitalist restorationists who had wormed their way into positions of influence and authority. When after years of sabotage of the socialist economy, after years of 'economic reform', which brought in its train bourgeois norms of production with profit (law of value) as the supreme criterion and regulator of production, a vastly expanded sphere of commodity production and circulation, these parasites managed to bring the revolution to a grinding halt, naturally the labour enthusiasm which the mass of labouring people had demonstrated during the period of socialist construction, during and in the aftermath of the war, gave place to apathy. But it took a long time for this apathy to replace labour enthusiasm, characteristic of socialism. In spite of all the rot brought in by the revisionist 'economic reforms' and political distortions, the Soviet workers, from time to time, continued to display such enthusiasm and ingenuity in their work, e.g., during the Siberian gas pipeline construction.

It would be surprising if it were otherwise, for work, which in itself is far from being oppressive, becomes so occasionally by the physical, but always by the social conditions in which it must be performed. Under capitalism, even where the physical side of labour is not itself oppressive, the consciousness, the almost instinctive realisation, of the worker that he is working for an alien power, for the profits of the exploiting class, and in the process

doing his fellow workers and himself out of a job through hard work, makes work an oppression.

But once the social conditions of exploitation are done away with, as is the case with the victory of proletarian revolution, the realisation by the worker that he is no longer working for the augmentation of the profits of a hostile exploiting class, along with the natural attractiveness of the work, cannot fail to bring a revolution in the attitude to work. The history of socialist construction in the USSR, where the working class truly performed miracles with labour heroism, proves this.

But Sik and other revisionists, who deny this truth, only prove that they look at life only from a bourgeois angle, for like Proudhon they *"cannot imagine a society in which men have ceased to be bourgeois."* (Marx, *Poverty of Philosophy*).

That the revisionist theoreticians have completely broken with Leninism on the question of the attitude of workers to labour, as on countless other questions, becomes apparent from the following pronouncements of Leninism:

"Communist labour in the narrower and stricter sense of the term is labour performed, not as a definite duty, not for the purpose of obtaining a right to certain products, not according to previously established and legally fixed quotas, but voluntary labour, irrespective of quotas, labour performed because it has become a habit to work for the common good, and because of a conscious realisation (become a habit) of the necessity of working for the common good - labour as the requirement of a healthy organism." (From the *Destruction of the Ancient Social System to the Creation of the New*, April, 1920).

Having given the above description of the communist approach to labour, Lenin goes on to say that the development of this approach was *"the paramount problem in the building of socialism"* (*ibid.*)

Without the development of communist labour, socialist society cannot reach its goal of communism. When in 1919, in the midst of the hunger, poverty and ruin caused by the imperialist war of intervention against the young Soviet Republic, the *Subbotnik* movement (i.e., the Saturday movement - it was called by this name because the workers worked on Saturdays without any payment) began to develop, Lenin greeted with youthful joy the spontaneous emergence of the communist labour movement as *"the beginning of a change of momentous importance."*

"The bourgeois gentlemen and their hangers-on ... sneer at the insignificance of the number of subbotniks compared with the vast number of cases of thieving, idleness, decline of productivity, spoilage of raw materials and finished goods, etc." but "... these starving workers, surrounded by the malicious counter-revolutionary agitation of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, are organising 'Communist Subbotniks', working without any pay, and achieving an enormous increase in the productivity of labour in spite of the fact that they were weary, tormented and exhausted from malnutrition. Is this not the beginning of a change of momentous importance?" (*A Great Beginning*).

He goes on to call for the mobilisation of a concerted effort to promote the development of these "new shoots" of communism:

"We must carefully study the new shoots, we must devote the greatest attention to them, doing everything to promote their growth and 'nurse' these feeble shoots. Some of them will inevitably perish ... But that is not the point. The point is to foster each and every shoot of the new; and life will select the most virile." (*ibid.*).

Further, socialism "is a matter of transforming the very habits of the people, habits that have for a very long time been defiled and debased by the accursed private ownership of the means of production, and also by the atmosphere of bickering, distrust, enmity, disunity and mutual intrigue that is inevitably generated - and constantly regenerated - by small individual economy.

"We shall work to eradicate the accursed rule 'every man for himself and God alone for us all', to eradicate the habit of regarding work only as a duty, and of regarding as legitimate only such work as is paid for at certain rates. We shall work ... gradually but steadily to introduce communist discipline and communist labour."

But to the Siks of the revisionist world, the subbotnik movement did not represent the shoots of the newly-emerging socialist society - shoots which were destined to get stronger with each victory of socialism - but a passing phenomenon, caused by the enthusiasm generated among the ignorant mass of workers by the superficial side-effects of the revolution. According to these sages, far from strengthening these shoots, the growth of socialism will destroy them, and in their place put a proper system of material rewards.

Prices of Production under Capitalism and 'Market Socialism'

Under capitalism commodities don't simply sell at their value, for if that were the case the profits of industries with the highest labour content (variable capital) would always have higher profits (since labour power alone creates value) than industries with a lower labour content. But no capitalist would be content with less than an average profit. Investment of capital is forever chasing the rate of profit. The higher the rate of profit in a given industry, the higher the investment in it; and vice versa. This constant movement, this competition of countless capitals, gives rise to a tendency for profit on capital invested to be averaged in all branches of production, irrespective of its "organic composition" (labour/constant ratio). This takes place through "prices of production" (i.e., cost price plus an average profit).

"The whole difficulty arises from the fact that commodities are not exchanged simply as commodities, but as products of capitals, which claim participation in the total amount of surplus-value, proportional to their magnitude." (*Capital*, Vol. III p. 175).

"So far as profits are concerned, the various capitalists are just so many stockholders in a stock company in which the shares of profit are uniformly divided per 100, so that profits differ in the case of individual capitalists only in accordance with the amount of capital invested by each in the aggregate enterprise, i.e., according to investment in social production as a whole, according to the number of his shares ... His cost prices are specific. But the profit added to them is independent of his particular sphere of production, by a simple average per 100 units invested" (*ibid.* pp. 158-9).

But, says Marx, the law of average profit "acts as a prevailing tendency only in a very complicated and approximate manner, at a never ascertainable average of ceaseless fluctuations." (*ibid.* p.161).

Until the triumph of Khrushchevite revisionism, the Marxian proposition according to which prices of production and the law of average profit are characteristic of capitalist production, was not challenged. Equally unchallenged was the view that under socialism the law of prices of production does not operate. However, in 'market socialism' these categories (i.e., prices of production and the law of average profit) are also bound to arise, otherwise enterprises which had an above-average organic composition of capital (a higher ratio of machinery to labour) would end up making below-average profit.

Before the 'economic reform', since every enterprise engaged in socially-necessary production as a part of the national production plan, it was of no consequence whether it made a loss or a lower than average rate of profit. No enterprise had to shoulder the responsibility of its capital investment out of its own sales, nor was the remuneration of its personnel related to its profit. After the 'economic reform', however, it makes complete nonsense that an enterprise be forced to realise below-average profit for reasons of the organic composition of its capital. And only through the prices of production can profits be averaged. Not only Sik, but also the Soviet revisionists, were compelled to admit the truth:

"If we recognise the commodity character of production as one of the general features of a socialist economy, a new standpoint logically arises in regard to price as one of the basic categories of commodity production ... The initial price formation must be one which endeavours to harmonise the partial interests of groups of producers in a certain enterprise with the interests of consumers and through them with the interests of the whole society. This is a production price which covers the actual costs of production and average profit." (*The Problems of Commodity Relations in a Socialist Economy*, 1964, p.365).

Liberman's proposal of 1956 that the measure of production efficiency be "only one index, profitability, instead of several indices of production costs," (*Kommunist*, 1956 no.1) merely meant that he had committed himself to prices of production.

We know that only labour power creates value. There are, however, two ways for measuring the surplus produced by labour. If £100 expended on wages produces £100 surplus, the latter measured directly over the former produces a rate of surplus of 100% - called by Marx the rate of surplus value. No capitalist will measure his rate of profit in this way, however. He will measure the surplus as against the total capital invested (i.e., variable capital - that which is spent on buying labour power and which alone creates value - plus the constant capital - that which is spent on machinery, raw materials, etc., and which does not create any value). If, therefore, in the above example the capitalist has to expend £900 on constant capital in order to set to work labour power bought with £100, the rate of surplus will come down to 10%. And this is the rate of profit which in a market system is the only sensible measure of efficiency.

Liberman's critics in the USSR objected to his above proposal:

"Cde. Liberman views this index (profit) as the ratio of net profit to the sum of current and fixed assets ... This index, which is widely used in capitalist countries ... is neither more nor less than the rate of profit on invested capital ..." (I Kasitskii, *The Main Question*, in *Voprosy ekonomiki* 1962 no 11).

Another critic, Zverev, stated that Liberman's "understanding of profitability and profit contradicts generally accepted theoretical concepts, according to which profit is the main part of the surplus produce created by the workers' surplus labour. According to E Liberman's conception, it seems that profit is created not only by the workers' labour but also by the fixed and current assets. It is hardly necessary to prove the erroneousness of such a 'Theory' ... the author's ideas lead to the conclusion that the ... basis of price formation in a planned socialist economy should be the price of production, which is characteristic of the capitalist system of economy" (*Against Oversimplification*).

Although the critics of Liberman were right in pointing out that his proposals measured profits in a capitalist way and implied prices of production, since they like Liberman accepted 'market socialism' with its commodity production, the basis of their criticism was merely sentimental. The only way of avoiding such groundless sentimentality would have been to challenge the entire basis of 'market socialism'.

Not long after this Leontiev wrote:

"An analysis of commodities as products of socialist production leaves no doubt that their prices must be fixed with due consideration to products' capital-output ratio or, as economists say, perhaps not very aptly, by their 'price of production' formula. The consideration of the capital-output ratio in price formation is an essential prerequisite for paid production assets. To recognise the need for paid production assets and reject the need for considering the capital-output ratio in prices is, to say the least, tantamount to manifesting inconsistency." (*The Plan and Methods of Economic Management*, in *Pravda* 7 September, 1964).

And further, "Marx provided an analysis of the commodity as a product of capitalist production, and he showed that the price of such a commodity is determined not by value directly, but by its modified form - the price of production. An analysis of commodities as products of socialist production leaves no doubt that their prices must be fixed ... by the 'price of production formula'" (*ibid.*)

Novozhilov, another prominent revisionist theoretician of the time, also came down in favour of prices of production albeit in a style that has rightly

been described as "ponderous obscurantism" (B&ICO). In his *Cost Benefit Comparisons in a Socialist Economy*, (1959, English translation in V Nemchinov and A Nove (eds.) *The Use of Mathematics in Economics*, 1964), he first singles out the dichotomy between theory and practice in Russian economics, saying that while it was theoretically maintained that labour was the sole source of value, in practice constant capital (or its scarcity) was regarded as a source of value. "... [I]n practice no hesitation is felt in taking scarcity as a factor which increases costs." (p. 134). Proceeding from the fact that this scarcity is charged for in exactly the same way as a labour outlay, and that this charge makes for the increased efficiency of the 'socialist' market, deriving these not from a particular social organisation of production, not from relations of production, but from a certain level of development of the productive forces themselves - there is even a suggestion that they are derived from the "laws of mathematics."

"It follows that the price of production is based not only in capitalist competition; it has yet another, and more solid basis" [i.e., the fact that commodities are produced not merely by labour but by the total invested capital].

"This reveals the deep foundation of the price of production, a basis which exists not merely in a capitalist economy, but also in a communist one as well. For then both instruments of production and labour will enter materially in the actual labour process..."

"The price of production is a result of competition. But competition is engendered by the objective conditions of the social economy and therefore leads to socially important results ...

"... from the point of view of the capitalist, every ruble in invested capital must yield the same profit. From the point of view of society, every ruble of investment, taken separately, equally involves feedback outlay to the extent of the minimum effectiveness of the accepted variant of investments" (*ibid* pp.157-8).

The last sentence is the 'socialist' marketpeak for expressing the same thing which is expressed in a capitalist way by the preceding sentence. In other words they mean the same thing.

We are given the soothing reassurance that 'market socialism' purifies the prices of production of the distortions they undergo under capitalism, that socialism by getting rid of monopoly and restoring free market competition raises the prices of production to a new, higher level:

"The price of production is the first, and still very incomplete, expression of differential outlay ... In a capitalist economy ... the development of the use of differential outlay is retrogressive: the growth of capitalist monopolies distorts the effect of competition, which is the force transforming value into price of production and imposing economy of outlay." (p.159).

In 1959, when the Russian economy was not yet a system of competing enterprises even though it was systematically being changed in that direction, the prominent revisionist theoretician Strumulin could write in the following terms:

"Under capitalist conditions, ... as a result of bitter market competition between private capitalists, prices are levelled out spontaneously according to the so-called prices of production in which profit, depending upon the capital invested, tends to the uniform rate of profit, ... common to all lines of business. In a planned economy the law of the average rate of profit does not operate, owing to the absence of competition, and prices are fixed on the basis of costs of production." (*On the Determination of Value in Voprosy ekonomiki* no.8, 1959 - our emphasis).

But what is true under a system characterised by the "absence of competition" as well as the absence of the need for enterprises to secure their production assets out of their sales, such fixing of prices "on the basis of costs of production" would be intolerable under a system of competing enterprises. Only a couple of years later S Pervushkin, yet another revisionist economist, gave a rather different explanation of production prices in which he not only obscures the connection between competition, on the one hand, and prices of production and the law of average profit, on the other hand, but also distorts Marxism by asserting that the capitalist "striving for maximum profit" hampers the operation of the law of average profit. Marx on the contrary showed that this law resulted precisely from the striving of each capitalist for maximum profit. According to Pervushkin:

"Such economic categories as the general (average) rate of profit and the price of production arose not because of the subjective wishes of the capitalists but as the inevitable result of the development of the productive forces and, at the same time, as a necessary condition for the successful development of large scale machine production based on the division of labour. Such laws governing the development of the productive forces cannot be ignored in a socialist society. It must be remembered that under capitalism such a law could not manifest itself fully since the limits of private property and the striving for maxi-

mum profits hamper the manifestations of these processes ... " (S Pervushkin, *The Law of Value and Prices in Planovoe Khosiasstvo*, 1961, no.7).

The reader may find it worth recalling that monopoly capitalism, by restricting competition, hampered the operation of these laws, and it would appear from his description that socialism had no other destiny than to restore the free competitive capitalism of the 19th century.

In passing it must be stressed that the prices of production do not arise from a certain level of technological development, as is asserted by Novozhilov and Pervushkin. They arise under a system in which commodity production has achieved its highest - fullest - development, namely, under capitalism. When this system of production assumes the role of a barrier to the further development of the productive forces, it is got rid of (as in Russia in 1917) by the revolutionary proletariat and replaced by socialism. And under the latter the question of prices of production retaining their economic validity simply does not arise. Thus the attempt by revisionist theoreticians to justify the existence under socialism of prices of production, that is, capitalist market prices, by reference to the stage of technological development is just another piece of trickery.

And if we are to believe Kondrashev, the prices of production (capitalist market prices) will attain their highest development in the period of full communism! Having stated that "[t]he Party Programme requires that prices reflect, to an ever increasing degree, the socially necessary expenditure of labour ... The opponents of the principle of bringing prices closer to value often tell us that in setting prices it is necessary to weigh 'on the scale of reason' all the factors which require setting a price above or below value ... This is an erroneous conception because it divorces price from its economic foundation - the expenditure of labour." (D Kondrashev, *Prices are an Important Tool for Creating a Communist Economy*, in *Financy SSSR* 1963 no 4), he goes on to add that the conformity between price and value "rises as socialist society develops. Consequently ... the fullest possible conformity between prices and value will be attained only when communism has been largely built. Prices will then be fixed by means of adding average outlays on production and the average rate of profitability ... The former principle that prices should be close to production costs has been replaced by the principle of profitability of prices, so that profits will be large enough for reproduction on an enlarged scale of heavy industry." (*Ibid.*)

We now know only too well what Kondrashev meant by the phrase "*when communism has been largely built*". Shorn of its ponderous revisionist circumlocutions, and in the light of developments over the past three decades, culminating in the dramatic events of August 1991, it can only have meant that capitalism is the inevitable outcome of the revisionist 'economic reforms', for their 'full communism' is indistinguishable from capitalism.

Conclusion

To begin with the revisionist economic theoreticians had to argue the case for 'economic reform', they had to prepare the ideological and political conditions, which they did by a wholesale revision, and a downright distortion, of Marxian political economy - employing in the process all the artful dodging, deceit, trickery and sophistry at their command. Once this had been done their job was then to reconstruct the market and its categories (which had suffered a great decline as a result of central planning during the Stalin years) by "*a well thought out system of measures*." Let Kondrashev speak:

"In the recent discussion in Pravda, E Liberman suggested that the efficiency of an enterprise be evaluated by a single economic criterion - profit. This, however, would be possible only if profits were already an expression of the value of the surplus product created at each enterprise. Actually, however, the magnitude of profits at enterprises, in branches, sectors and divisions of social production at the present time differs considerably from the surplus product created in them. This problem must be solved step by step. This calls for a well thought out system of measures designed to level out profitability."

Kondrashev is correct in saying that if profit is to be the most efficient yardstick of production efficiency, then there must be a real functioning market. Profit and value as actual economic categories, as distinct from the mere concept of profit and value, needed to be re-established through the development of a single centralised market. At the time Kondrashev was writing, such a functioning market was far from realised, there being only a series of local markets. But with the 'economic reforms', the revisionists began the reconstruction of the market, which had suffered such a haemorrhage because of, we are told, "*Stalin's personality cult*". There is nothing remarkable, therefore, that at the time, as Kondrashev rightly remarks, in the then incompletely developed market, value should have something of a local character and vary not only from one locality to another, but even from one

enterprise to another. But gradually over the last three decades, a functioning market - though still not as efficient as the one in the orthodox capitalist countries - has been reconstructed; value has acquired a general character throughout the USSR (or what was formerly the USSR); the law of value is operating as a regulator of production; and profit has actually become the supreme criterion of production efficiency. With this we have finally reached full 'communism' for which revisionism has been preparing so assiduously. In this 'communism' prices of production have recaptured the power and the glory that is theirs under capitalism.

Appendix I Section A

LALKAR

January/February

1990

A Counter-Revolutionary Current Sweeps Eastern Europe

A dangerous counter-revolutionary current is sweeping across Eastern Europe. Except in the case of Romania, without a single shot being fired, this counter-revolution, taking the form of mass peaceful street processions, candle-lit marches and demonstrations, and using the deceptive and seemingly non-class slogan of 'greater democracy' is in the ascendant. With bewildering rapidity, one after the other, Communist Party-led governments in the East European countries have made way for governments in which the non-communist, or even anti-communist, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements, with long standing ties to Western imperialism and local reactionaries, predominate.

The spectacular successes of this counter-revolutionary current have been greeted with delirious glee by the imperialist bourgeoisie and its 'left' lackeys - the revisionists and the Trotskyites alike. In its editorial 'Decade of Democracy' the *Financial Times*, the most thinking and yet most stupid representative of British imperialism, describing the year 1989 as "a true annus mirabilis" - a year of miracles - declares with smug satisfaction:

"With the bloody uprising against Ceaucescu, the totalitarian epoch in European history, begun by Lenin in 1917, has virtually ended, with Albania, the sole, unabashed survivor." (Financial Times, 2 January 1990).

Being unable to contain its satisfaction, and not wanting to withhold the credit from its rightful claimant, the *Financial Times* adds: "What's more, it is Lenin's successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, who has been the midwife of this re-birth of liberty"

The Trotskyite counter-revolutionaries echo the same imperialist sentiment by exulting at the turn of events in Europe, which they interpret as the

"*crumbling of Stalin's empire*" and yet another proof of the 'correctness' of the absurd and counter-revolutionary theory of so-called permanent revolution expounded by Trotsky - a master intriguer against the Bolshevik Party, a bitter opponent of its world-historic achievements in war and peace, and who ended up by lining his oppositionist rump on the side of imperialism in general and Nazi Germany in particular.

The revisionist renegades of the CPGB, not wishing to lag behind the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary agents of imperialism, go even further, Martin Jacques, the editor of *Marxism Today* (Don't laugh! That, strangely, is the name of the CPGB's 'theoretical', not to say trendy and pornographic, rag - Ed.), and the very person who presented the opening statement at the recently-held Congress of the CPGB, has this to say in an editorial in one of the issues of that magazine:

"The Stalinist system has finally foundered. It has reached the point of no return. But it is not simply the end of Stalinism, in an important sense, it's the end of Leninism".

With such renegade utterances, which can be guaranteed to warm the hearts of the bourgeoisie, it is not to be surprised at that Mr Martin Jacques is a frequent and welcome guest on television programmes aimed at annihilating Marxism-Leninism and pronouncing its end for the millionth time.

Programme of Capitalist Restoration

If one tears off the mask of general and innocuous-sounding phrases concerning greater democracy, one finds that the real aim of the opposition (New Forum in the GDR; Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia; Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria; National Salvation Front in Romania; Solidarity in Poland) is not to democratise, reform or revitalise socialism, but to get rid of it altogether, and with it all the gains of socialist construction made by the working class of these countries during the past four decades in the fields of housing, education, health, social welfare, the arts, sports facilities, full employment, etc., and to replace it with bourgeois democracy, with all its attendant attributes of privatisation, free market bankruptcies, unemployment, soaring prices, drug trafficking pornography, prostitution, national and religious strife, racial and sex discrimination, rise of fascist organisations, nationalist hysteria and warmongering.

In Hungary the work of bourgeois opposition is led by the former (former because it has changed its name) Communist Party. In Poland the for-

mer opposition led by Solidarity has already formed the government. In other East European countries Communist Party rule has in reality been ended, with the opposition holding a majority of ministerial portfolios and demanding free multi-party elections, free market, free press, freedom of conscience, and conducting a deliberate and conscious anti-communist, anti-working class, pro-imperialist class offensive on the economic, political, cultural and ideological front. As the once proud Communist Parties crumble, the opposition (or former opposition), gaining strength by the day, is becoming ever bolder and openly coming out with its programme of fully-fledged restoration of capitalism. In Poland Lech Walesa, the darling of the British Trotskyite and revisionist 'left', has offered to sell Poland and its working class to Western imperialist countries in the sale of the century. During his recent tour of the USA he begged:

"We seek buyers for 80% of the Polish economy ... In Eastern Europe you can make the business deals of the century ..."

The Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia has expressed its conviction that the planned economic system "*cannot be improved*" and its determination to "*create a developed market ... and real competition*." So as not to leave matters in doubt, an advisor to the Civic Forum has added that "*we need a Madam Thatcher here*".

In Bulgaria, where the opposition set to work under the guise of a movement for improving ecology, the so-called ecoglasnost, gaining strength at the expense of the Bulgarian Communist Party, has metamorphosed into the present-day Union of Democratic Forces, advocating a full-blooded introduction of free-market economy, i.e., capitalism, and an end to the monopoly of the Communist Party rule, to wit, an end to the rule by the working class.

Similar in content is the programme of the opposition in the GDR and in Romania.

Everywhere in these countries the opposition's programme can be summed up in two slogans. First, an end to the Communist Party's monopoly of power and the introduction of a multi-party democracy and multi-party elections. Secondly, an end to the centrally-planned socialist economy and its replacement by a market economy.

While the first of these demands has already been realised, a concerted effort on the part of the opposition in these countries and imperialism is being made to realise the second, and much more important, demand. For

only with the realisation of this second demand, only with the dismantling of the planned economy and all that goes with it, can socialism in Eastern Europe be pronounced dead and can predatory imperialism turn Eastern Europe into its hunting ground and transform the countries of Eastern Europe into a vast reservoir of cheap and highly-trained labour, cheap raw materials, and a huge market for surplus capital investment and goods - thus giving itself a further lease of life.

The IMF and the big banks in all the imperialist countries are busy preparing packages for multi-billion dollar aid to Eastern Europe, conditional on sweeping away its centrally-planned socialist economies and their replacement by a free market economy, privatisation and price reforms involving elimination of subsidies on food, housing, transport and other necessities of life for the working class of these countries. The West German Finance Minister, in response to calls for economic aid to the GDR, had this to say:

"In no way will we finance the past or new form of socialist planned economy in East Germany".

Chancellor Kohl stressed the same point by insisting:

"Without a fundamental reform of the economic system, without scrapping the planned economy and erecting a market-led order, all assistance will be futile".

The results of the introduction of that which is being demanded by the IMF and the major imperialist countries and financial institutions may be gleaned from the Polish experience, where the introduction of free market mechanisms has already at this early stage led to unemployment queues and soup kitchens, where prices of essentials have rocketed and working people go hungry while meat continues to be exported to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay interest on Poland's huge foreign debt.

To the bourgeois there is only one freedom which is supreme, namely, the freedom of one person to exploit another. Without this freedom all other freedoms are meaningless to him. In the editorial already cited above, the *Financial Times* declares:

"Democracies crumble when the state encroaches too far on the market ..."

In its zeal to defend this supreme bourgeois freedom, the *Financial Times* goes as far as to give its blessing to the "restoration of the market through dictatorship" by the fascist General Pinochet of Chile back in the

seventies. In other words all infamies, all butchery, all holocausts and wars are permissible and legitimate in the defence of this, the only real bourgeois freedom! So much then for all the hypocritical cant and humbug about human rights!

Together with the above anti-working class and pro-imperialist economic programme, the counter-revolution has a fully worked-out political programme, which is being methodically put into practice. In every Eastern European country one hears demands for 'free elections', 'free press', 'freedom of conscience' and above all for an end to the 'leading role of the Communist Party', for without the leading role of the Communist Party the proletariat cannot exercise its dictatorship over hostile classes; for without it the proletariat is unable to prevent a restoration of capitalism and of old ways in these countries.

Further demands are being made for the banning of all political organisation in the workplace; thus the counter-revolution, while demanding all the 'freedoms' for itself, wants to deny the working class the means of defending its own class interests through organisation at work.

Already, with the Communist Parties marginalised in these countries, the introduction of bourgeois 'freedoms' has produced some nasty results, which are only a foretaste of things to come. For instance, in the GDR, the Memorial in East Berlin to the 30,000 Soviet soldiers who died for the liberation of Berlin from the Hitlerite fascist yoke, is frequently daubed with slogans such as "Hitler lives". The graves of some Soviet soldiers have been dug up and similar graffiti written on them. The West German fascist Republican Party is making preparations to take part in multi-party 'free' elections due to take place in the GDR in the earlier part of this year; to this end the fascists have been leafleting working-class estates in the GDR, and pro-Nazi elements have been taking part in the weekly demonstrations in Leipzig. With the introduction of the 'freedoms' demanded by the proponents of capitalist restoration, the counter-revolutionaries can now organise without fear of suppression. Before the present upheavals they would never have dared show their hideous faces.

Why the Successes of Counter-Revolution?

In view of the events of Eastern Europe, the question must be asked: How is one to explain that after 40 years of socialist construction the counter-revolutionaries were found to have the strength and degree of or-

ganisation to overwhelm the Communist Party-led socialist governments, and how is it that the once proud Communist Parties in these countries were found so wanting in strength and organisation that they, to use Fidel Castro's word, surrendered the banners of the Revolution and of Socialism without a fight? By way of an answer to this extremely important question, we offer the following explanation.

First, socialism came to the countries of Eastern Europe in the wake of the victorious divisions of the Red Army. As the Communist Parties in most of these countries were too weak to rule alone, so they merged or coalesced with social-democratic and other parties, the latter having little option in view of the post-war realities and the presence of the victorious and prestigious Red Army. Although socialist structures of government were created and a tremendous amount of socialist construction took place, the final guarantee, the underpinning, of socialism in these countries was always provided by the Soviet Union. But now, for reasons to be explored elsewhere, Gorbachev has pulled the plug and signalled the Soviet Union's unwillingness or inability to sustain the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe. This has acted as a green light to the opposition. No longer fearful of the mighty Red Army, which tore the guts out of the fascist Wehrmacht, the counter-revolutionaries in Eastern Europe are surging ahead at an unprecedented pace.

Secondly, the leaders of the counter-revolutionary opposition have been able to exploit the disenchantment and profound alienation of the working class from the Communist Parties. While the counter-revolutionaries organised larger and larger numbers in street demonstrations, under deceptive and apparently non-class slogans such as 'greater democracy for all', the working class did not come out to oppose the opposition's anti-working class economic and political programme - preferring instead to play a passive role. This has happened because, far from eliminating the weaknesses with which they started, the Communist Parties went on to compound them. As pointed out, as their initial weakness required the Communist Parties to work with other, non-Communist, parties, there was already a basis for the presence of opportunist elements in a large measure within the Communist Parties. The need, therefore, was for the Communist Parties to be ever-vigilant against opportunism and to weed it out by welding themselves ever more closely with the working class, by enlisting the support of the working class in thoroughly smashing all that remained of the old bourgeois state structure. This could only have been done by getting rid of bourgeois parliamentarism and putting into effect the principles of the

Paris Commune; all officials to be fully elective and subject to recall; public service to be discharged at the wage rate of a working man; power to rest with an armed working class uniting within its hands the legislative and executive arms of the state; and breaking up the instrument of spiritual oppression, the power of the priests.

Instead of putting the above principles rigorously into operation, instead of paying modest sums to state and party officials for discharging their functions, instead of making them accountable and subject to immediate recall, the Communist Parties and the governments led by them became instruments of privilege and careerism, thus contributing to the growth of bureaucracy. Such practices, far from bringing working people into the work of administration, simply alienated them from the government and the Party. It is this alienation that the counter-revolutionary opposition were able to exploit, so that when anti-privilege protests, in the GDR for instance, are turning into open Communist baiting, the Communist Parties do not have the political and the moral strength to combat the counter-revolution by mobilising the working class.

As to breaking up the power of the priests, this instrument of spiritual oppression, this was far from complete, and in the case of Poland hardly even begun. If the first state of the working class, the Paris Commune, in one of its decrees, set out to break the power of the clergy it was precisely out of a deep understanding of the role of the clergy in maintaining existing bourgeois property relations, and its stupefying spiritual power over the working class in the interests of private property. As Marx correctly remarked:

"The established church will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on the thirty-ninth of its income ... atheism is itself culpa levis [a slight fault] as compared with criticism of existing property relations."

One may appreciate the wisdom contained in the above penetrating observation of Marx from the fact that in many East European countries, particularly in Poland, where the process has been helped along by the Polish 'communist' Pope - the most reactionary Pope even by Papal standards - the church has played a far from insignificant role in rallying the counter-revolutionary opposition which is now demanding the dismantling of the planned socialist economies and their replacement with free market capitalist economies. This is the sum total of the church's cry of freedom of conscience! It is not for nothing that the imperialist bourgeoisie, which supports every sup-

pression of democratic expression in South Africa, in Palestine, El Salvador, Ireland and in dozens of other countries, unfailingly stands for freedom of conscience in Eastern Europe. No one has ever been prevented in Eastern Europe from practising his religion. The restrictions there have only been designed to separate the church from the state, to prevent the church from dabbling in the affairs of the state, which are this-worldly and therefore of no concern to people who ought to be occupied in arranging the affairs of spheres celestial. It is a pity that these restrictions were not as successful as they might have been.

Thirdly, the imperialist-led arms race has forced the socialist countries to spend an ever-increasing proportion of their wealth on armaments, thus forcing them to divert resources that could otherwise be used for the uplift of their people. Imperialist countries, relying as they do on the past and present exploitation of the super-exploited masses in the vast continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America, have greater resources at their command than do the socialist countries. For over three decades, if not more, it has been the calculated policy of the imperialist countries grouped in NATO to bankrupt the socialist countries by causing them to spend greater and greater sums on armaments - with considerable success it would appear.

Fourthly, socialist countries have lagged behind the imperialist bloc in the matter of technique and productivity. Instead of finding indigenous socialist solutions to these problems, as the mighty Soviet Union did during the thirties and forties, the socialist countries have pinned their hope on getting technology from imperialism. Imperialism for its part has through the COCOM maintained a tight embargo on the export of sophisticated technology to the socialist countries, who ought to have known better than to have entertained hopes of getting technique from the imperialist countries. Imperialism is prepared to help, but only on the condition that the planned socialist economies be dismantled and replaced by market economies. The successes of the counter-revolutionary current in Eastern Europe have only served to whet the imperialist appetite. While noting with satisfaction the successes achieved by imperialism in this regard in the 1980s, they are looking forward to the break up of the Soviet Union itself and the restoration of capitalism there in the 1990s. Here is how the *Financial Times* of 2 January puts it:

"For all the success of the 1980s, much remains to be done in the 1990s ... in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union as well, working market economies now have to be established to underpin the stability of their new democracies".

And the *Independent* (not of the imperialist bourgeoisie, of course) of 26 December, 1989, in its leading article on the triumph of the counter-revolutionary coup d'etat in Romania, has this to say:

"Romania's common frontier with the Soviet Union is second only in length to Poland's. The completion of the circle of democratic reform among those neighbouring states must increase the pressure on President Gorbachev to loosen the bonds which tie the constituent republics of the union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Moscow. The series of elections due in Eastern Europe this spring is bound to encourage demands for similar rights within the Soviet Union. Mr Gorbachev's cautious but hostile reactions to the Lithuanian Communist Party's declaration of independence from the Soviet parent party suggests that, as with economic reform, he is not yet ready for bold strokes which might pre-empt reformist demands.

"Yet it is only by drastic measures, such as the restoration of property rights and the creation of a looser confederation of republics that Mr Gorbachev can hope to ride the tiger which glasnost and perestroika have unleashed. The courage of young Romanians has shown that even the most ruthless repression and the most chilling carnage cannot suppress the power of ideas and the yearning for freedom".

The fact has to be faced that only by strict adherence to the science of Marxism Leninism in the field of economics, politics, ideology and philosophy, can the crisis of socialism be overcome, can socialist society be revitalised. What is happening in Eastern Europe, far from proving the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, as is being gloatingly asserted by the imperialist bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois flunkies, the Trotskyites and revisionists, is proving the collapse of a departure from the principles of this science, a collapse of the attempts to apply capitalist norms, since the mid-fifties, to the working of the socialist economies¹.

Fifthly, the split in the international communist movement at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and which has only recently begun

1 This is dealt with in detail in Chapter 11, *Economics of Class struggle*, in this book

to be healed, caused severe damage to the cause of socialism and national liberation - the two mighty currents of our epoch. The two giants of the socialist world - the USSR and the People's Republic of China - openly clashed with, and adopted stances hostile to, each other. In this way, notwithstanding their desires, one side or the other in each major area of conflict in the international arena ended up by objectively lining up with imperialism, thus bringing succour to the latter.

Last, but not least, the rear of imperialism is no longer threatened. The socialist movement (by this we mean the Marxist-Leninist movement, for in the contemporary world one has no right to speak of any other movement as being genuinely socialist) in the various imperialist countries is extremely weak or hardly exists. The organised 'left' is dominated by revisionism and counter-revolutionary Trotskyism. Neither these two tendencies, nor the social democrats, present any danger to imperialism. On the contrary, as we have noted at the beginning of this article, they act as the shameless cheer leaders for imperialism's class offensive in Eastern Europe. Their past has been counter-revolutionary as is their present, and so too will be their future. They are a reliable ideological weapon in the armoury of imperialism. The communist movement must pull itself up by its bootstraps and begin to organise itself. Better late than never. There is no need to be gripped by the despair, so characteristic of the petty-bourgeois. For despite all the zigzags of history, if humanity has a future, as we fervently believe it has, then this future certainly belongs to the proletariat, to socialism and eventually to the higher stage of socialism, namely, communism. It certainly does not belong to the exploiting classes and to imperialism. Having seen, and lived through, socialism in Eastern Europe, for instance, the proletariat is no more likely to go back to capitalism than was the French bourgeoisie forced to go back to feudalism notwithstanding the restoration of the monarchy following the French Revolution.

The struggle is by no means over and the developments in Eastern Europe are anything but a foregone conclusion. As socialism is undermined and the introduction of free market economies brings in its train unemployment, poverty, soaring prices, homelessness and all other such wonderful 'freedoms' of capitalism, the working class of every East European country, brought up as it is in conditions of full employment, cheap and decent - yes, decent - food and living conditions for ALL, is bound to put up severe resistance against the whittling away of the planned socialist economy. That there is trouble ahead for the new governments in Eastern Europe, intent

on introducing free market economies, is admitted to even by bourgeois journalists. Roger Boyes, writing in the *Times* of 2 January 1990, has this to say on this score:

"Both Poland and Hungary will struggle to keep control of their reformist agendas. The free market plans - unemployment, soaring prices, bankruptcies, privatisation of the Solidarity government will put more and more pressure on the Poles ... discontent will bubble over in street riots and infighting within Solidarity." (Learning to Share Power).

In this context, the following words of Daniel Passant, deputy editor of *Polityke* the organ of the Polish Communist Party, are worthy of our attention:

"The left will not perish completely. Socialism left durable traces in people's consciousness. The trend towards re-privatisation - the re-establishment of private schools, the rich villas and limousines of the new bourgeoisie, the Church's great influence, the revival of right-wing nationalism and obscurantism, deeper and deeper poverty and the spectre of unemployment in a market economy - will create a climate for the left's revival. This will be a new left, smaller but more authentic than the traditional models of the past..."

CONCLUSION

Moreover, to look at the events in Europe, and draw therefrom the conclusion that socialism has had its day is not only to commit a grave error, but to take too narrow and Eurocentric a view of the international proletarian movement. In the forty five years since the end of the Second World War, the proletariat - not only in Eastern Europe but also internationally - has made tremendous advances and has grown numerically on an enormous scale - in the Far East, India, South Africa and Latin America. The national liberation movements have scored, and are continuing to score, great victories against imperialist domination and plunder - Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador are but a few examples.

In a world which has claimed 25 million lives in 'little' wars imposed by imperialism, where 70 million children are homeless in Latin America alone, where 30,000 children die each day from hunger and hunger-related diseases, where 1.3 billion people in the Third World are seriously sick or malnourished, where people of oppressed nations (constituting three fourths of the world's population) are subjected not only to the violence of hunger, malnutrition, poverty and disease caused by imperialist super- ex-

plotation, but also to imperialist bullying and war, there is little chance of peace. In the face of such oppression and exploitation there is bound to be resistance. The lessons of the 'free market' that the working class of Eastern Europe will soon learn are already well absorbed by three quarters of the world's population. To this overwhelming section of humanity, if not to others temporarily, the science of Marxism-Leninism and a planned economy in the interests of the people, rather than the law of the jungle characteristic of capitalism, not only make a lot of sense but represent the only hope and pledge of a bright future and escape from its present misery. This vast sea of humanity is in a businesslike fashion digging away at the foundations of imperialism. The imperialist bourgeoisie is too drunk and too busy celebrating its initial victories in Eastern Europe to see the hundreds of millions elsewhere who are preparing its funeral pyre.

The proletariat in Eastern Europe and elsewhere is bound to realise that the present crisis of socialism is neither inherent nor inevitable, but a product of a combination of imperialist warmongering and the opportunist mistakes, even crimes, that the proletariat is bound to commit on its long and tortuous road to final victory - the liberation of humanity from exploitation, hunger, disease, illiteracy, ignorance, degradation and war.

The proletariat cannot, and will not, renounce its right to revolution, for *"the right to revolution is, after all, the only real 'historical right', the only right on which all modern States without exception rest ..."* (Engels, *Introduction to Marx's Class Struggles in France*). It is a historical right which, in the case of the proletariat is caused by the workings of the capitalist system, in which social production and private appropriation lead to periodical crises. It has reached a stage of development, or rather long ago reached this stage, historically when it has no answers to the problems of humanity. It may look powerful but it is inherently weak. It is a colossus with feet of clay. Exercising its historical right to revolution, the proletariat is bound to give this colossus a knockout blow.

Appendix I Section B

LALKAR

August/September

1990

The 28th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The 28th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was held from the 2nd to the 13th of July, 1990, attended by 4,700 delegates who met amid growing public dissatisfaction at the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in the country, declining output, nationalist demands, extreme factionalism within the Party (represented by various outfits such as the Democratic Platform, the Marxist Platform, etc.) disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, ideological bankruptcy, and an atmosphere characterised by rancour and bitterness. Far from being a Congress of militant fighters for socialism, it resembled an army in retreat and disarray. Never before has the prestige of the CPSU sunk so low. Never before has any leader of the CPSU been treated with such contempt as was Gorbachev at the Congress, whose two-hour opening address to the Congress barely received any applause. In this address he made the most open call ever for the restoration of capitalism. In a key paragraph on the economy, he said:

"Nothing prevents us from beginning to turn state enterprises into joint stock companies, from granting real freedom of enterprise, from leasing small enterprises and shops, and putting up housing, stocks, shares and other equities, as well as part of the means of production, for purchase and sale.

"We must accelerate the formation of commodity and stock exchanges, and the banking reform, launch an interest rate policy, provide conditions for the emergence of competing enterprises and associations, and small and medium-sized enterprises, especially those that produce consumer goods".

To press the point home, and in order to leave no-one in any doubt, he went on:

"Improvement of the Soviet economy depends largely on how it integrates itself in the system of the international division of labour", - a thinly disguised way of saying how it develops a market economy.

He referred to government proposals, under preparation, related to economic activity abroad. These proposals call for expanding ties with capitalist countries, changeover to world prices and settlements in hard currency within the COMECON, and "revision and introduction of certain correctives in our co-operation with Third World countries". In other words, not only the East European members of COMECON (if this organisation survives at all) but also others, such as Cuba, Vietnam, etc., would have to conduct their trade with the USSR in hard currency. And, the "revision and introduction of certain correctives in our co-operation with Third World countries" can only mean that the USSR will from now on mete out to these countries the same sort of treatment that has been meted out to them by the imperialist countries. All of this is tantamount to a complete renunciation of the more than seven decades old tradition of proletarian internationalism, guided by which the USSR rendered unstinting fraternal support to countless proletarian and national liberation movements the world over. It is not surprising that the 28th Congress excluded all fraternal delegates.

The new programme presented to the Congress by Gorbachev and his acolytes excludes all reference to the class struggle, and even to Marxism-Leninism, and in their stead seeks to emphasise the "needs of the individual" - the sanctity of property, including private property, and the switch to a market economy, as its major aims. This programme is entitled *Towards Humane and Democratic Socialism*, the implication being that the past seven decades in the USSR have been years of inhumane and undemocratic socialism. It recommends the market economy as the basis of production relations and concedes a multi-party system within which the CPSU must operate. Flouting the most basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, it makes the vile assertion that it "was false to think of socialism as a society based on a state monopoly of property and a dictatorship operated by a party-state leadership in the name of the proletariat ..."

It makes the candid admission that the centralised and planned socialist economy has been wrecked with nothing to show for it: "The old economic system no longer works and a new one has yet to be created".

Having stated that "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a party of socialist choice and communist perspective," it adds the following banal and

incomprehensibly meaningless sentence: "Its social ideal includes the moral origins of human culture, eternal dreams of a better life and social justice ...". Following this the iron fist emerges from the velvet glove: "The party proposes," says the programme, "emergency measures to normalise the consumer market and switch to unrestricted price-formation but via the maintenance of fixed prices for a range of basic necessities ..."

"The CPSU is against total de-nationalisation but it is for a regulated market ... Enterprises must be given complete freedom to produce and compete. Production, banking, trade, and scientific research must be de-monopolised. Help must be given to developing a network of small and medium enterprises ... The state should continue to run the main lines of transport, telecommunications and energy and for the next few years defence enterprises".

Completely repudiating the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the programme concludes with the following clarion call of renegacy:

"The CPSU stands for a civil society and a state based on the rule of law. The only source of power must be the sovereign will of the people; a law-based state rules out the dictatorship of any class, party, group or bureaucratic elite, and guarantees all citizens access to public affairs, and any official job."

Not surprisingly, this programme of renegacy preceded by five years of chaos that have accompanied the dismantling of the centralised planned socialist economy, were the target of vehement attack on the part of those delegates (and these were the majority) who remain loyal to Marxism-Leninism. Yegor Ligachev was in the forefront of such critics. To thunderous applause, Ligachev denounced the five years of *perestroika* in the following terms: "Thoughtless radicalism, improvisation and swinging from side to side have yielded us little good during the past five years of *perestroika*."

Such was the strength of feeling against the leadership that countless delegates attacked the leadership's policy and its record, with several delegates calling for the resignation of the leadership. In the teeth of Gorbachev's opposition, Ligachev even managed to get elected to the position of Chairman of the Party's Commission on Agriculture with a majority of 2,233 votes against 1,968 for Gorbachev's candidate. This is particularly significant as Ligachev is well-known for his opposition to the proposals for de-collectivisation of agriculture put forward by Gorbachev and his economic advisers such as Petrakov, Shatalin and Abalkin.

Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, received enthusiastic applause when he warned delegates that the introduction of a 'market economy' would entail mass unemployment, which, he said, was unacceptable. His warning that the USSR continued to face an external threat also received the wholehearted endorsement of the overwhelming majority of the delegates.

The delegates from the armed forces were extremely critical of Soviet foreign policy, and they subjected the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, to the most humiliating grilling ever received by anyone in charge of Soviet foreign policy.

These attacks at the 28th Congress on Soviet policy in general, and its foreign policy in particular, followed close on the heels of similar attacks at the founding Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the second half of June. At this founding Congress, General Albert Makashov, referring to the collapse of eastern Europe, attacked present Soviet foreign policy in the following bitter terms:

"because of the so-called victories of our diplomacy, the Soviet Army is chased away without battle from the countries are fathers liberated from fascism."

Criticising the *"Gorbachev reforms, which had left the USSR open to attack,"* and pledging that the Soviet armed forces would never opt for ideological surrender, General Makashov went on to demolish the illusions entertained and fostered by the Gorbachev leadership that the USSR was safe from any external danger:

"Germany is re-uniting and will probably become a member of NATO," he said. *"Japan is becoming a decisive force in the Far East. Only our learned peacocks are crowing that no-one is going to attack us,"* he said to loud applause. *"Comrades, the army and the navy will be needed yet by the Soviet Union."* He went on:

"Sixty-eight per cent of Soviet troops are deployed on the territory of the Russian Federation. We are not ready for ideological surrender."

At this very Congress, another delegate, Ivan Osadchy, expressed the sentiments of the majority when he said:

"Instead of strengthening the party, the leadership has reduced it to crouching unarmed in the trenches, under massive shelling by anti-socialist forces."

"We reject the removal of socialist ideology from Soviet society. We want a Leninist party with a communist perspective."

With these sentiments expressed at the founding Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, it is hardly surprising that Gorbachev and his allies, including Yeltsin, tried to get the 28th Congress postponed - but to no avail.

Thus it was clear from the beginning that the leadership was in for a hell of a time. Sentiments similar to those expressed at the Russian Federation Congress were repeated by delegate after delegate at the 28th Congress. On only the second day after its opening the Congress inflicted a humiliating defeat on the leadership by rejecting all references to a 'market economy' in the instructions to the Party's economic commission, with less than one-fifth of the delegates voting in favour. A string of other proposals from the platform were likewise defeated.

These defeats forced the leadership to change tactics. When it became clear that his candidate to head the important Rules Commission would be defeated, Gorbachev put himself forward. Even this tactic could not prevent more than 1000 delegates voting against him. Alarmed by these defeats, Gorbachev moved to mend his fences with the Centre in an effort to isolate the staunchly Marxist-Leninist forces led by people such as Ligachev. Gorbachev was largely successful in this tactic, which provides an explanation for the disappointing results of a Congress which began with such promise.

The founding Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation had seen the election of Ivan Polozkov as the General Secretary. He defeated a candidate strongly supported by Gorbachev. The Congress witnessed calls for the resignation of Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU. No less a person than Yegor Ligachev had backed this demand, saying that *"one cannot head the party, this leading force, without dedicating all one's time to it."* And yet within less than two weeks after this founding Congress, both Ligachev and Polozkov, in a dramatic reversal of tactics, decided to back the candidacy of Gorbachev for the position of General Secretary of the CPSU. What is even more shameful, Polozkov and his supporters decided not to support to candidature of Ligachev for the important newly-created position of Deputy General Secretary. With the forces of Marxism-Leninism so hopeless and confusedly divided, Gorbachev had plenty of opportunity for fishing in troubled waters. And it must be ad-

mitted, alas, that he took advantage of the situation with his characteristic consummate skill as an adept opportunist double-dealer.

In his final pre-election speech, Gorbachev, who has done so much to destroy socialism in the USSR and elsewhere, sought to present himself as a true defender of socialism. "We must prove that we did not live in vain after the revolution," he declared. "I defend the socialist choice. I will never be linked to those who want to push the country back to capitalism," adding with great haste: "This does not mean that I will put a concrete wall between our country and elsewhere. What is useful in other nations we will take."

In his address only a day earlier he had rounded on delegates who had attacked the changes in Soviet society put into motion under his leadership during the previous five years:

"Has our entire history not shown, comrades, the futility of attempts to get out of the plight ... by patching up the command-and-administrative system? If we continue to act in this way then, I shall be frank, we will bankrupt the country."

On day one of this Congress Gorbachev insisted on the introduction of a 'market economy' as the only way forward for the USSR. Ten days later, sensing the hostility of the majority of the delegates, he says just the opposite, asserting that he will "never be linked with those who want to push the country back to capitalism". In other words, the Gorbachev of 10 July 1990 will never be linked with the Gorbachev of 2 July 1990! How can such a man expect to be taken seriously by any thinking - never mind communist - person? How could the majority of the 4700 delegates belonging to a party with such impeccable credentials and such glorious revolutionary anti-imperialist traditions believe in and rally round such a charlatan? This is the question every revolutionary must ask and answer. This is a question which we shall endeavour to answer in a separate article on another occasion. But to return to the 28th Congress.

Gorbachev's unexpected success at the 28th Party Congress has sent the imperialist media ecstatic. The *Sunday Times* of 15 July, referring to the singing at the conclusion of the Congress of the *Internationale*, gloatingly declared that as "he sang the words, however, Gorbachev knew that within hours the party would end its 70-year rule of the Soviet Union."

The *Sunday Times* bases the above estimation on the newly-elected politburo, which is a collection of nobodies. Says the *Sunday Times*: "With the

exception of Gorbachev, the cabinet that has run this country unchallenged since Lenin's time contains politicians of no importance."

Continues the *Sunday Times*: "This move is the Soviet leader's greatest achievement to date. Like St George, Gorbachev has inflicted a near-fatal blow on the Communist Party dragon by chopping off its head."

Gorbachev had been able to persuade the Congress early in the second week of the proceedings to include in the politburo leaders of the 15 Republics, thus reducing in one blow "the mightiest executive body in the country to a rubber stamp. With the republics' leaders having to fly to Moscow for every meeting, the party's top body can only meet once a month at most". (ibid)

Notwithstanding the above successes of Gorbachev, the so-called Democrats nevertheless walked out of the party. Yeltsin, Gavriel Popov (the mayor of Moscow), and Anatoly Sobchak (the mayor of Leningrad) quit the CPSU, stating that the party was not reforming itself quickly enough. This may appear to be a split between Gorbachev on the one hand, and the so-called Democratic Platform on the other hand. Actually it is no more than a continuation of the very dexterous and skillful division of labour between the two sides. Both sides are continuing to do what they are best at, namely, destroying the CPSU and the planned socialist economy - Gorbachev from within the CPSU and Messrs Yeltsin, Sobchak and Popov from outside. If and when the latter succeed in building a powerful bourgeois party capable of effectively challenging the CPSU, Gorbachev will just as surely walk out of the CPSU.

In the light of the history of the past five years, it is clear as daylight that Gorbachev has been trying to separate the CPSU from the Soviet state, which historically have been inextricably intertwined. More than that, he has sought to reduce the influence of the party and correspondingly to increase the influence of the government, it being his intent to remove the guiding and vanguard role of the Party. With the election of the Congress of People's Deputies and the creation of the executive Presidency, he appears to be well on the way to achieving his ambition. As the *Financial Times* of 2 July 1990 correctly states:

"Six months ago it appeared that Mr Gorbachev had finally decided that he could walk away from the party. When he became state president in March, he appeared to be deliberately setting himself up in an alternative power base, making it only a matter of time before he abandoned his position as party

leader to a lesser ally, confident that he no longer needed the political base". (The Communist Party's Waterloo by Quentin Peel).

But the founding Congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation changed all this. It jolted Gorbachev out of his complacency and made him realise that out of the CPSU he was a mere cipher. So he decided not only to stay within, but to stay at the head of, the party. This is how he expressed himself at the Russian Party Congress:

"I think we should come to the division of powers in a natural way. However, I am convinced that at this moment we must keep things as they are in principle, although in different forms, perhaps I think you will agree with me that the process of dividing power (between the party and elected bodies) has not yet been completed ... Should we divide the posts, or keep things as they are? I believe that we should keep things as they are."

Although the Marxist-Leninists, a majority at the 28th Congress, knew what they did not like, they appear not to have been certain as to what they liked. They lacked not only a coherent programme but also a coherent strategy and tactics. That is why they were pipped at the post by Gorbachev. As to why Gorbachev is still the head of the CPSU, and why the so-called conservatives, to wit, Marxist-Leninists, have been beaten despite their numerical majority, and finally, why Gorbachev has agreed to such compromises as the maintenance of the principle of democratic centralism, at least in name, and the continuation of political education in the armed forces, the KGB, and the police, the following editorial comment from the *Independent* (not of the bourgeoisie of course) of 6 July 1990 is extremely illuminating:

"The paradox of Mikhail Gorbachev's situation is that he owes everything to the party's monopoly of power, even though he is doing very well in his attempt to undermine and remove it. The party whose leadership he has used to launch his subversive reforms remains the biggest single obstacle to their implementation. The predominance of conservatives within the congress's 4,600-odd delegates was much in evidence: a depressing reminder of the intractable nature of the tasks he faces. Prominent conservatives, like Yegor Ligachev, spent much time attacking the miserable outcome of five years of perestroika. Yet they provided no constructive alternative ideas."

"Although Mr Gorbachev felt obliged to propitiate them periodically, as in rejecting suggestions that state bodies like the KGB and army should be depoliticised, his big speech was unrepentantly reformist. The root cause of the So-

viet Union's present sorry economic and ecological state was not perestroika but the disastrous mistakes of the past, he said. To overcome them, there was no choice but to embrace reforms." (A Congress of Irrelevance).

What has emerged from this Congress is a collection of eclectic and mutually contradictory decisions: the commitment to socialism being countered by the need to introduce a market economy; the commitment to democratic centralism accompanied by the belittling of the very role of the party through the legalisation of factions ('platforms' if you please); the superiority of the socialist system accompanied by a damnation of its practice over the past seven decades, and so on and so forth.

The Congress has ended in a kind of draw. At this state it is by no means certain that the forces of capitalist restoration, represented by Messrs Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Sobchak, Popov, and suchlike people, will be victorious. Much will depend on the reaction of the rank and file party members and the wider working class and the collective peasantry, and the attitude they adopt to the market mechanisms to be introduced the coming Autumn. There is much to be fought for, and won. The coming days promise to be momentous, and both the friends and foes of the Soviet Union will be watching these events with much more than a passing interest. The real battle has now moved to the local level - to factories and army units, where Marxist-Leninists will fight it out with all kinds of bourgeois scoundrels and capitalist roaders. We express the expectation and the hope that the forces of Marxism-Leninism, of socialism and progress, will inflict a crushing defeat on those of counter-revolution and capitalist restoration.

Appendix I Section C

LALKAR

November/December

1991

Counter-Revolutionary coup against the Counter-revolutionary regime fails and strengthens the Soviet Counter Revolution.

On Monday 19th August 1991, news began to filter out that the army had risen in revolt against Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and had ousted him from office. A momentary hope arose among progressive people all over the world that at last the fight back had begun against the destruction of socialism in the USSR and the reintroduction of the market economy. The hopes faded fast, however, on learning the names of those who had been proclaimed members of the leading junta. All of them were in the Gorbachev government team and had, indeed, been handpicked by him.

Antecedents of the coup leaders

What, for instance, were the credentials of Yanayev? He was elected to the Politburo only last year and was designated Vice-President of the Soviet Union by Gorbachev himself, who spoke in favour of his election saying that he needed by his side someone in whom he could place the utmost trust. Poltaranin, the Russian Minister of Information, caustically commented at the time that what Gorbachev liked beside him was shadows rather than personalities. All in all, unlikely material to spearhead the revolution at a time of extreme difficulty.

Yazov was a Gorbachev-appointed Minister of Defence. Pavlov had been Finance Minister since 1989 - key figure in the introduction of the market economy. Kryuchkov became head of the KGB in 1989 and a member of the politburo in 1989 - a Gorbachev man through and through.

While in theory all things are possible, in practice it seemed quite improbable that these Gorbachev shadows had materialised into Marxists and

would now lead the struggle to undo the damage that they had not so long ago been helping to inflict on the Soviet people. Shortly afterwards came the junta's political manifesto which confirmed one's worst fears: - Yanayev sent a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations to the effect that:-

** The measures that had been adopted were temporary. There was no question at all of abandoning progress towards profound reforms in all spheres of existence of the State and of the society;

** The measures taken were necessitated by the vital need to rescue the economy from collapse and the country from hunger and to prevent the escalating menace of a large-scale civil conflict that would have unpredictable consequences for the peoples of the Soviet Union and the international community.

In other words, they were as committed to market reforms as Gorbachev, but thought this could be done in an orderly manner and without allowing the Soviet Union to be broken up.

Not a word was said about the need to restore socialism, which is the real issue facing the Soviet people. All the statement involves is a programme of containment of the chaos that has been the unavoidable result of the introduction of capitalist norms. Still, perhaps it is not the right thing to go on about the restoration of socialism when addressing the General Secretary of the United Nations who is, after all, unlikely to be convinced by such things.

But how then did the junta approach the Soviet people? Did it point out to them how they had been duped by unfulfillable promises of a life of plenty? Did they invite the people to draw the lesson from their present hardships that nothing could come from restoring capitalism? Did it denounce the reactionaries, especially Gorbachev, who have brought the Soviet Union from the status of superpower to that of beggar in a few short years and demonstrate that nothing else could have been expected from restoring capitalism? Did it point out that in the present circumstances of profound economic crisis in the capitalist world even imperialist countries were beginning to feel the icy tentacles of recession and warn that the horrors of the 1930's were only just round the corner for the countries with a capitalist economy? Did it point out how much greater the hardships of recession would be in non-imperialist capitalist countries, flood the television screens with images of the untold suffering of the world's poor, or warn the people

that a capitalist Soviet Union (especially a Balkanised Soviet Union) was more likely to join the third world than the first or even the second? Did it remind the Soviet people of how their parents and grandparents had suffered misery and poverty during Russia's great and glorious imperial past? Did it remind people how socialism had saved the Soviet people from the recession of the 1930's, enabled them to build up the economic strength to defeat Nazi Germany, and brought the Soviet Union to the status of superpower in 12 brief years? In short, did it do anything at all to win the hearts and minds of the Soviet people or to mobilise them for action? Did it in any way offer the ideological leadership that communists are supposed to provide? No, it did not.

Here is the junta's programme as announced by Radio Moscow:-

"Compatriots, citizens of the Soviet Union, at a dark and critical time for the destiny of our country and our people, we address ourselves to you. A mortal peril threatens our great nation! The political reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, conceived as a measure for securing the dynamic development of our country and the democratisation of our lives, have reached the end of the road for a variety of reasons.

"The original enthusiasm and hope have been replaced by lack of credibility, apathy and despair. The authorities have, at every level, lost the confidence of the people. Politicking has left no room in public life to take care of the future of our country and of its citizens. There has been implanted an evil mockery of our state institutions. The country has become, in effect, ungovernable. Taking advantage of liberties granted to them, riding roughshod over the traces of democracy that have only just appeared, extremist forces have risen up with the aim of destroying the Soviet Union, bringing about the collapse of the State, and intent on seizing power at all costs ... It is the people who must decide what kind of social system they desire, but every effort has been made to deprive them of that right ...

"All citizens are feeling growing uncertainty as to what tomorrow will bring and deep alarm for their children's future. The power crisis has had a catastrophic effect on the economy. The chaotic and uncontrolled slide towards the market [note that there is no suggestion that the problem is one of introducing a market economy. All that is condemned is the 'chaotic manner' of doing so - as if there were really any other] has caused an explosion of self seeking - among regions, among groups and among individuals. ... The time has come to tell the people the truth: unless we take urgent and firm measures

to stabilise the economy, we will inevitably face in the near future a new spiral of growing poverty from which is only a step away from demonstrations of spontaneous mass discontent and their devastating consequences. It is only irresponsible people who can now place any faith in assistance from outside. No charity can solve our problems. Our salvation is in our own hands. The moment has arrived for us to measure the prestige of each person or organisation according to their real contribution to recovery and development of our national economy ...

"This is the bitter truth. Until yesterday the Soviet citizen who journeyed abroad felt he was a respectable citizen of an influential and respected state. Today he is often a second-class citizen, and is met with disdain or pity. The pride and honour of the Soviet citizen must be completely restored.

"We promise to organise a wide national debate on the draft Union Treaty ... We will endeavour straight away to restore legality, law and order ... We will clear the streets of our cities of criminal elements ... We are in favour of a truly democratic process, and a conscious political reform ...

"We call upon all true patriots, all people of good will, to put an end to the confusion that reigns."

We think it is readily to be seen that there is not a single sentence in that tirade designed to enlighten Soviet citizens, or anyone else, about anything at all. No sensible analysis appears as to why the Soviet Union finds itself in such a bad way, and there is no programme - other than liberal use of the big stick - for putting things to rights. In effect the junta was saying: 'Gorbachev's government (in which we were big shots) got it all wrong by being too liberal. We will put it all right by being illiberal' - an appeal that was hardly likely to (and was surely not intended to) bring the masses rushing into the streets to defend socialism. In fact one cannot help feeling that had the coup leaders sat down to consider carefully and scientifically how best to strengthen the hand of Yeltsin and others advocating the fastest possible demolition of everything that socialism has ever achieved, they could not easily have thought up a scheme more effective than the one they put into effect, allegedly in an effort to defend socialism!

What was the motivation, then, of these shadowy (not to say shady) characters in bringing about the coup and giving up after only three days? Why start a coup if you are going to give up virtually without a shot being fired in anger?

Why start the coup?

Considerable insight into the background of the coup can be gained from the US imperialist mouthpiece, *Time* magazine. Its issue of 2 September is particularly revealing. Amidst what one organisation has aptly called "the runny-brained euphoria about the final triumph of Western democratic history, etc." now "thankfully dried up", appear revealing pieces of information.

First of all, there is a quite graphic description of how Gorbachev has been destroying the Soviet Union, which cannot but give insight into why progressives (and even bourgeois reactionaries with ambitions to enter the big time) would be alarmed and dismayed, while US imperialism would be rubbing its hands with glee:

"For years, as they watched Mikhail Gorbachev bull his way through history, remaking his country, his era and himself. Soviets and Westerners alike wondered whether there was anything he couldn't do. Wasn't there some innovation so radical, or some capitulation so abject, that he simply couldn't get away with it? ... Kremlinologists speculated about the existence of a 'red line' that Gorbachev could not cross without reaping the whirlwind. ...

"Could Gorbachev unilaterally end the decade-long occupation of Afghanistan? Could he pull the plug on Soviet support for the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and pressure them into elections they would lose? More crucially, could he permit 'fraternal' regimes to topple in Eastern Europe, giving up the buffer zone that Joseph Stalin had created after World War II and retiring the Warsaw Pact?

"The answer, he kept demonstrating to the astonishment of all and the dismay of many, was yes...

"Gorbachev's daredevil act was veering toward a new red line: the 62,750 km border around the periphery of the USSR. ... Could Gorbachev actually give up what many of his colleagues in the leadership and the Soviet power structure considered to be pieces of the motherland?

"For three days last week, the answer seemed to be no. By the beginning of the year it was clear that if Gorbachev's policies continued, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would eventually leave the USSR, and re-establish their independence."

Thus the first issue that galvanised the coup leaders into such action as they were capable of was the disastrous effect that *perestroika* and *glasnost* were having on the unity of the Soviet people, on which the country's ability to be a force to be reckoned with (whether as a socialist or even as a bourgeois power) depended. In fact it was to prevent Gorbachev signing the Union Treaty, ceding away from the centre even the right to raise revenue for the state, which prompted the coup leaders to act at the particular moment they did. But the coup leaders did not realise that it was not the Union Treaty that was tearing the Union apart but the nationalist rivalries that restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union had brought about. Since they too supported restoration of market forces, they had no answer to nationalist rivalries and it seems that either they had no stomach to suppress them forcibly, or no confidence that the army would carry out such a programme on their behalf. It seems clear also that in the last few years Gorbachev has been extremely busy purging the army of people whose support for his reactionary policies was in any way dubious. In his book *The August Coup* (which contains little information about the coup, but a great deal of praise for Western democracy in general and the United States in particular), Gorbachev writes (pages 31-34):

"If the coup d'etat had happened a year and a half or two years earlier it might, presumably, have succeeded. But now society was completely changed

... "The whole of society had changed, including the Army that was part of it. Officers and privates refused to go against their own people despite the threat of court martial. ...

"The conspirators tried to do the most frightful thing: to turn the Army against its own people. But this didn't work for them either. Many commanders, officers and most soldiers, whole units and other formations refused to carry out their orders ...

"The Army showed that it is already a different army: as a result of very difficult and painful changes brought about by perestroika a new army is being born in our country ..."

While Gorbachev is giving the impression that perhaps the dominant ideology in the army changed because the dominant ideology in society changed, and softpedals any idea of his having purged the army, when he turns on page 43 to the KGB, it is clear what the situation is for he says:

"The obviously necessary reorganization of the ... KGB had not been carried out." Hence the KGB supported the coup because it had not been purged.

Another appalling Gorbachev capitulation, that even the emasculated Communist Party of the Soviet Union leadership could not stomach, was the betrayal of Saddam Hussein's courageous stand against US imperialist bullying. It was realised then that *"Soviet votes in favor of the US-backed resolutions in the United Nations [were] a symbol of a willingness to surrender Moscow's global influence and accept subservience to Washington."* This was totally unacceptable to the coup leaders and the CPSU as a whole, but affected as they were by Gorbachevism and dreams of 'democracy', and disaffected as they were from the masses, they had to try to stop what was happening by diktat like King Canute ordering back the waves. They then found it was not as simple as that; that force would have to be used - how undemocratic! - and so they chickened out betraying all those who supported them. They thought that Gorbachev was so unpopular that he would be powerless to stop them. They failed to realise how thoroughly he had entrenched himself, so that his lack of popularity was not that much of a problem.

One does not need a deep understanding of Marxism to know that Gorbachev's actions were the grossest betrayals of Soviet interests.

With information coming in for months from their intelligence networks concerning the total disillusionment of the Soviet people with Gorbachev, once the coup not unexpectedly did take place, the Western imperialists expected it to succeed, putting an end to Gorbachev's wild orgy of destruction. They knew of *"Gorbachev's near zero popularity [which] stemmed from his failure to bring even a modicum of improvement to living standards."* They knew the effect on people's enthusiasm for *perestroika* of facts such as a 48% rise in prices, and the complete breakdown of the distribution system. Thus, though they were very happy with what Gorbachev had been doing, they could not believe that he could get away with it for ever. Western imperialism was resigned, following the coup, to the Soviet Union going back to a less dizzying speed of restoration of capitalism - which, as we shall see, might well be wiser even from the point of view of the bourgeoisie.

Thus when the coup came, President Bush and the various EEC countries were very slow and half-hearted in their denunciations of it. *"Because previous Soviet crackdowns had rarely failed, he [Bush] was reluctant to bet*

against, much less condemn, the junta." But then, to their utter astonishment, the coup was thoroughly bungled.

Almost uncomprehendingly *Time* wrote:

"Yet it was obvious even that early that the coup was ill planned and curiously half-hearted. The plotters neglected to carry out that sine qua non of successful coups: the immediate arrest of popular potential enemies before they could begin organizing a resistance. In particular, the failure to make sure that Yeltsin was taken into custody ... was fatal. Inexplicably, the putschists did not even pull the plug on the communications of anyone except Gorbachev. Bush and other foreign leaders were amazed at how easily could get through by telephone to Yeltsin; he in turn seems to have had no difficulty coordinating action with other coup opponents across the country.

"Most successful coup organizers also begin by moving reliable troops into key positions. Yet US intelligence analysts, poring early Monday over satellite pictures taken during the previous two days, detected no evidence of any unusual troop movements ..."

Edward Luttwak of Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies was even more brutally frank in pointing out that the biggest mistake the coup leaders had made was not to kill both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He commented that *"They may have had Leninist nostalgia but they didn't have a Leninist temperament - which is to shoot the bastards."* Perhaps the true nature of the Pax Americana can be gauged from these somewhat unguarded expressions of astonishment from well-placed guardians of 'democracy'.

They lacked the most elementary resolve, and the reason can only have been their lack of a programme and their lack of a platform on which to mobilise the Soviet people. Immediately following the coup, its leaders started developing mystery illnesses - scornfully dubbed by the bourgeois press after the event *"coup flu"* (Symptoms: cold feet and a weakening of the backbone):

"Mr Pavlov, aged 53, and with no known history of blood problems, had been bed-ridden with high blood pressure since early on Monday ... Next to be hit by the epidemic was the Defence Minister, Dmitri Yazov, whose continuing membership of the Committee was an on-off affair ..."

"Analysts said the more likely explanation for the confused and conflicting reports of sickness, resignations, and reinstatements was splits and arguments

among the grey men on how to proceed. They had bitten off more than they could chew."

Had they been Marxists, there would have been no splits and arguments. The task would have been to mobilise the masses to restore socialism.

Once the imperialist hyenas realised that the coup leaders lacked the political will to carry through the coup, it did not take them long to take advantage of the situation. The public relations departments of the intelligence services got to work building up an image of Yeltsin - the greatest capitulator, by whose side even Gorbachev almost manages to look like a defender of socialism - as the hero of the popular masses, single handedly winning through despite overwhelming odds. The truth of the matter was very different.

While it was true that as a result of the wrecking activities that have taken place in the name of communism since 1956, it might be hard to mobilise the masses in the name of communism, it is also true that the masses are far from thrilled by the prospect of starvation and poverty that the restoration of capitalism can be seen to be offering them. The masses are, as a result, largely apathetic. Again, carefully concealed among passages of hysterical anti-communist diatribe, one can find the truth even in the bourgeois press. After all journalists from the Western imperialist countries cannot do their job effectively unless they sincerely believe that they work for a free press that allows them to tell the truth about everything - so concessions have to be made by imperialism to their employees' naivete. Hence we read:

"But what counted was the people. In truth there was not an overwhelming number of them.

"The number of those who stayed overnight was very much smaller: on the dangerous, foully wet night of Tuesday it was perhaps 10,000."

In fact even that 10,000 was bourgeois hyperbole. The foreign TV camera crews scouring Moscow for trouble spots to film were never able to find crowds of more than about 200, even in the case of the group of rioters from among whom 3 were killed - 2 Christians and an orthodox Jew out to create the right conditions for the flourishing of obscurantism and having nothing at all in common with the vast majority of bewildered and betrayed Soviet people.

The Yeltsin glorification campaign masterminded in Washington was soon spread through Soviet news media, for Soviet revisionism long ago destroyed any influence on the Soviet press that Marxists had, and thus deprived it of any ability to analyse situations objectively and expose the windbagery, pipe dreams and empty promises of reactionaries trying to ingratiate themselves with the masses. The Soviet media too were full of well-meaning (and less well-meaning) ignoramuses with a liking for well-told fairy tales about how capitalism, the good fairy, would ensure happiness forever after for the Soviet people, who would all become rich and be able to buy anything they wanted if only they got rid of the nasty socialist system. Freed from the influence of Marxism, they were free to succumb to the most outrageous reaction - and many did.

The future.

But what of the future. Following the failure of the coup, the Soviet Union is in the process of being balkanised. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been banned - presumably in order to remove its assets from the grasp of anyone who might conceivably be able to organise in the interests of the working class, of whom there may still be a fair number in the rank and file of the Party. Since revisionists and capitulators gained the upper hand in the Soviet Communist Party in 1956, they have had 35 years in which gradually to wipe out Marxist influence in the key areas of government of the Soviet Union. Ignorance has been encouraged to bloom. Among the younger generation it is reportedly rife. Nevertheless it seems improbable that the working class, having once tasted power, is going to succumb meekly to being re-enslaved. According to visitors to the Soviet Union in October, there was a gigantic demonstration against Gorbachev and Yeltsin in Moscow while they were there. Can the 'genie be forced back into the bottle', as the bourgeois press would have it? Will workers who are used to full employment, a living wage, free education, free health care, various cultural amenities and an input into the planning of production and the government of their country (even though the latter were considerably curtailed under revisionist rule) meekly reconcile themselves to the standards appropriate for workers in a third world country? Will they be prepared to exchange all they had for the freedom to enjoy non-stop incantations of mullahs and the wailing of priests as to the joys of the hereafter? Or shall we be seeing the pockets of Marxism that never died out despite all revisionism's best efforts growing in size and influence as the

workers stand up and fight, and turn to Marxism for the ideological guidance necessary to ensure that they win their fight and sustain their victory. We are certain that the working masses of the Soviet Union are bound to resist the Yeltsin- Gorbachev intensified capitalist assault. It is precisely the fear of such resistance that is forcing the 'democratic' rulers of Russia to resort to draconian and dictatorial measures, for, as we go to press, the news has come in that the Russian parliament has banned demonstrations, local elections and referenda for an indefinite period while it simultaneously implements its restorationist economic programme on the short- sharp-shock lines of the Polish programme for the restoration of capitalism.

Appendix I Section D

LALKAR

August/September

1989

Chinese Counter-Revolution Crushed

It is just over a month since the dramatic events of 3-4 June in Tienanmen Square, Beijing. The gigantic power of the print and electronic media of all the imperialist countries, in particular those of the United States, has been mobilised to misrepresent these events as a "massacre" and a "blood-bath" of the innocent students demanding little more than "democracy" and an end to corruption. Not only have the propaganda machines of the junior partners of US Imperialism fallen into line, but also the various petty-bourgeois 'socialists', from Euro-communists to various Trotskyist outfits, ever ready to malign and maliciously slander the achievements of socialism, have swallowed the misrepresentation of these events hook, line and sinker. The liberal Trotskyite, Mr Tariq Ali, long ago discarded by the working-class movement, has even turned to poetry and joined the chorus of imperialist lackeys engaged in the falsification of the happenings in Beijing. What is surprising, however, is that even a section of those organisations and individuals who describe themselves as Marxist-Leninists have fallen for this distorted version. In view of this it is extremely important to look at these events closely so that a clear picture of what actually happened may emerge.

The student demonstrations, which culminated in the events of 3-4 June in Tienanmen Square, actually started in April following the death of Hu Yao Bang, the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The pretext for these demonstrations was to cherish and honour the memory of the departed Hu. At the same time the demonstrators levelled accusations of "corruption" and "profiteering" at the leadership, demanding more democracy.

Neither the CPC nor the Chinese Government tried to interfere with these demonstrations since some of the slogans initially raised by the demonstrators expressed also the legitimate concern of the Party, which has

been trying to eliminate corruption and profiteering - of which a minority of Party members are undoubtedly guilty. In fact the Government conducted several negotiations with the students and conceded some of their demands immediately, while promising to look into others. But the students were not satisfied. Each concession by the Chinese Government only had the effect of the demonstrators demanding further concessions. In the end it became clear that the demonstrators were not out to reform the socialist system in China with a view to eliminating corruption and promoting socialist democracy; what they wanted was to overthrow the Chinese Government and replace socialism by capitalism, socialist democracy by bourgeois democracy of the American type. They asserted that China should be completely Westernised, that Marxism-Leninism had no relevance to China; and that the Chinese Government should step down. Nothing could symbolise the real aims and demands of the demonstrators more than the raising of the Statue of Liberty, to an accompaniment of delirious joy on the part of those who have been longing and plotting for quite a number of years for the restoration of capitalism in China, with its market of 1.2 billion people. The putting up of this so-called Goddess of Liberty, this symbol of US imperialist plunder and exploitation of weaker nations, right opposite the portrait of China's greatest proletarian revolutionary Mao Zedong, was nothing short of a provocation.

As time went on, alien elements, irreconcilably hostile to socialism, were setting the agenda, trying to use the students for their own purposes, encouraging them to boycott classes, organise huge illegal demonstrations and go on hunger strike, thus creating turmoil in Beijing and some other cities as well. Those students who wanted to leave Tienanmen Square were forcibly prevented from doing so by hostile and alien elements, who more and more came to control this movement. In the twenty days leading up to the events of 3-4 June, the situation in Beijing went from bad to worse. While the Chinese Government, exercising the greatest restraint in the face of extreme provocation, tried to resolve the problem by peaceful means, the anti-socialist diehards in control of the movement, egged on and encouraged by the presence of hundreds of bourgeois journalists from several imperialist countries, providing an instant service for broadcasting their views and programme, became more and more brazen. They even dared to besiege the Party and Government headquarters in an effort to paralyse and overthrow the Chinese Government, get rid of the socialist system and replace it with capitalism.

The Chinese Government could not take a kindly attitude towards such attempts. Its patience exhausted, through the person of Premier Li Peng, it declared martial law on May 20 and demanded that the demonstrators leave the Square, but to no effect. As a matter of fact the demonstrators set up barricades and soldiers brought into Beijing on trucks were stopped.

At last the Chinese Government gave a warning that it took a serious view of the continuing turmoil, that people should "*protect their lives*" and go home. On June 3, the Government sent troops into Tienanmen Square. Far from taking the Government's warning seriously, the response of the demonstrators was derision and violent attacks on the soldiers. Some thugs set fire to army vehicles and beat up soldiers. Even the bourgeois media, biased as it is, provides unequivocal evidence in the form of newsreel and eyewitness accounts, to the effect that the soldiers hit back only after having been viciously attacked. Newsreels reveal army trucks and armoured personnel carriers ablaze, their crews incinerated. There is photographic evidence of the bodies of the soldiers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) who had been lynched and burned. There are pictures too of students flaunting weapons they captured early on Saturday before the troops fought back. Even the *New York Times* of June 6 felt obliged to report a broadcast of a videotape by Chinese television showing a "*a crowd of young men throwing rocks at an army truck whose engine had stalled. They hurled rocks through the windshield, apparently killing two soldiers inside*".

The news programme reported that thugs and criminal elements had killed several dozen soldiers, beaten up more, set fire to vehicles and indulged in indiscriminate looting and burning. Long before the army used their weapons, the soldiers of the PLA had tried extremely hard to clear the Square of the violent and riotous mob by use of persuasion, tear gas and by firing their weapons into the air. The reluctance of the PLA to use its weapons was taken by the criminal elements and their imperialist backers as a sign of the army's weakness and ascribed to divisions within the army rather than being recognised for what it really was, namely, the ingrained respect for human life that every PLA soldier, not to speak of the socialist Chinese Government, has. The soldiers had strict orders to use every peaceful means to disperse the crowds. Only this explains the scale and magnitude of injuries suffered by the soldiers. In Beijing alone 5,000 soldiers were injured, as opposed to 2,000 students receiving injuries. Only when hundreds of guns had been stolen from the army, dozens of soldiers killed and hundreds beaten up, did the army take resolute action. Earlier there was no vi-

olence. Western media have run scare stories about deaths among the allegedly peaceful innocent students demanding "democracy" and an end to corruption. The facts are that in Beijing not all the guns were fired by the soldiers. In Tienanmen Square the army negotiated with the students and a majority of the latter decided to leave of their own accord. But the criminal counter-revolutionary elements, who were in charge and bent upon overthrowing the socialist system, were by no means agreeable to such an outcome. They tried forcibly to prevent ordinary students from leaving. They instigated and indulged in wanton violence against the soldiery.

When it became absolutely clear that this criminal coterie would accept no other resolution of the problem than the complete overthrow of the socialist system and its replacement by capitalism, that to achieve this nefarious end the conspirators were prepared to kill, burn and loot, to practise thuggery and intimidation, the Chinese Government and the army decided to take resolute action. It would have been a criminal dereliction of duty in such grave circumstance for the Government and the army not to have resorted to the use of force. In fact, should we not accuse the Chinese Government and the army of not having acted resolutely early enough? Should we not accuse them of showing patience for far too long? Should we not accuse the Chinese authorities of tolerating the presence in Beijing and elsewhere of hundreds of bourgeois journalists, who acted as cheerleaders for the criminal conspirators in Beijing in flagrant disregard of Chinese law?

The Chinese people achieved their liberation from imperialism in 1949 after a long and arduous struggle. During the course of this struggle millions of Chinese people perished and many more suffered extreme hardship. After liberation they completed the democratic tasks of the revolution and under the leadership of the CPC, the vanguard of the Chinese working class, they went on to begin the construction of socialism. They have made untold sacrifices and suffered much in order to reach the present stage of affairs when no Chinese dies of hunger, there is no illiteracy, there is basic health care available to everyone, and last but not least, China is no longer a pushover for imperialism. It is no longer possible for the imperialist powers to wage opium wars against China or to sack Nanking or Beijing. Having reached this state of affairs, the Chinese people, with their long revolutionary traditions, the history of their struggle and sacrifice, are not lightly going to let a few thousand criminal elements, albeit with strong connections with international imperialism, overthrow the socialist system. The People's Liberation Army is a guarantee of that: it is the cutting edge of the dictator-

ship of the proletariat in China and if this causes outrage among imperialist circles, their hired hacks and their ideologues, the Chinese people can afford to treat it with the contempt such outrage deserves. If the resolute actions of the Chinese Government and the PLA sent petty-bourgeois 'socialists' - the Trotskyists and the Euros and even some would-be Marxist Leninists - into a state of paroxysm, this only goes to show that at every critical juncture in the development of the revolutionary movement the world over, during every major crisis, our petty bourgeois socialists are as unfailingly bound to support the imperialist bourgeoisie as they are to stab the working-class and the national liberation movements in the back.

Once the PLA had taken the resolute action and used its force, something it had tried hard to avoid, the imperialist media launched a frenzied campaign of lies with the aim not only of discrediting socialist China, but also of creating confusion, and instigating civil war within China. It put out wild rumours of thousands of students having been shot dead, that Premier Li Peng had been shot at and injured in an attempt on his life, that Deng Xiaoping had died, that one section of the PLA was converging on Peking to fight another. These rumours, reported as gospel truth in the imperialist media, were beamed hourly into China as "news" by the *Voice of America* and a vast communications network of fax machines and phone calls which have been enthusiastically paid for by US corporations. Chinese students in the Boston suburb of Newton, Massachusetts, who feed information from China to the *Voice of America*, have been given free space and phone lines since May 24 by an outfit called the Walker Centre for Ecumenical Exchange.

The *Voice of America*, the US Government's propaganda arm, was even more blatantly interventionist than the rest of the US media. The *New York Times* of June 9 carried the report that during the height of the crisis "the *Voice of America* had begun sending television signals to China, the first time that the agency had taken such a step. These television signals were going directly to about 2,000 satellite dishes in China, operated mostly by the People's Liberation Army". The *New York Times* went on to say that "the broadcast of news to military units is significant because of reports that units backing the pro-democracy demonstrators may have exchanged fire" with units supporting the socialist government of China. In short, the imperialist media were busy broadcasting a continuous stream of rumours, lies and disinformation in order to foment civil war within the PLA with the hope of helping the counter-revolutionary forces.

With the passage of time the rumours and lies put out by the imperialist media turned out to be untrue and an expression of wishful thinking on their part. Sections of the media changed their tune in an attempt to correct their earlier lies. These corrections, however, came not in the form of banner headlines but buried in the obscurity of inside pages. The *Washington Post* of June 12 carried the following important admission:

"The [Chinese] government is depicting the [Tiananmen Square] operation as a textbook case of restraint in the face of wild provocation and the casualties almost entirely on its side.

"The government's case is bolstered by the fact that, in some areas, demonstrators did attack troops who did not respond, and these incidents were captured on videotape.

"On television every night now, images are broadcast of protesters stoning troops, beating them with poles and, in some particularly dramatic photos, fire-bombing trucks, buses and even armored personnel carriers. In some cases, soldiers were still inside at the time.

"On one avenue in western Beijing, demonstrators torched an entire military convoy of more than 100 trucks and armored vehicles. Aerial pictures of the conflagration and columns of smoke have powerfully bolstered the government's argument that the troops were victims, not executioners. Other scenes show soldiers' corpses and demonstrators stripping automatic rifles off unresisting soldiers".

On June 12, the *New York Times* reproduced an 'eyewitness' account of the alleged Tiananmen Square massacre by an "unnamed 20-year old student" from the Hong Kong newspaper *Wen Wei Po*. This account was full of horrific details, blood, beatings and shootings of students, battles at the Heroes' Monument in Tiananmen Square, machine guns on the roof of the Revolutionary Museum, etc. This "eyewitness" report was fabricated to such an extent that it threatened to discredit the *New York Times*. As a result Nicholas Kristoff, who had been covering the events for the *New York Times*, was obliged to dissociate himself completely from this version and to confirm the correctness of the claim by the Chinese Government that there was no 'massacre' at Tiananmen Square.

"The central scene in the [June 12] article is of troops beating and machine-gunning unarmed students clustered around the Monument to the People's Heroes in the middle of Tiananmen Square", says Kristoff of the re-

port. *"Several other witnesses, both Chinese and foreign, say this did not happen ...*

"There is also no evidence of machine-gun emplacements on the roof of the history museum ... witnesses say that armored vehicles did not surround the monument". In fact, witnesses say that "students and a pop singer, Hou Dejian, were negotiating with the troops and decided to leave at dawn, between 5 and 6 am. The students all filed out together."

Kristoff concludes, *"The Wen Wei Po article, reprinted as gospel by the 'New York Times', has the clashes unfolding in the wrong places."*

To get truth from the bourgeois media one has almost to indulge in archaeological excavations. If one has the stamina to do that, one finds even in this media the corroboration of the accounts put out by the Chinese Government. One finds, for instance, that the Chinese Government figures of 300 people killed is much nearer to the truth than the baseless and wildly exaggerated figures put out by the media in the imperialist countries. Furthermore, of the 300 killed, half were soldiers beaten to death, set on fire or killed by bullets. Of the remaining dead only 30 were students and the rest were simply onlookers who became victims in the chaos prevailing in the streets at the time.

The more deeply we go into these events, the more we become convinced that the protest in Tiananmen Square was a counter-revolutionary rebellion. This is not to say that quite a few innocent and gullible students did not join the protest. What is important, however, is that the programme of those who led the protest and their foreign backers was to overthrow the socialist government and the socialist system in China. It is precisely this that explains the violent reaction of the US and other imperialist governments to the suppression of this counter-revolutionary rebellion by the PLA, and not any concern for any alleged violation of human rights by the Chinese government. The ruling circles and governments of the imperialist countries do not give a fig for human rights. The only "human" right they defend most resolutely is the right of capital to exploit labour and the right of imperialism to oppress, exploit, subjugate and plunder weak nations. It is in pursuit of the attainment of this "human" right that they happily arm counter-revolutionary bandits in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Angola; it is in the pursuit of this self-same "human" right that they give full backing to such fascist regimes as those of South Africa, Israel and El Salvador; it is for the same reason that they greeted with undisguised glee the

murder of over one million people by the fascist Suharto military dictatorship that overthrew in the late 1960s the Indonesian government of the late Dr Sukarno. These gentry have very little to teach us about respect for human rights and human life.

In his polemic against Kautsky (who opposed the October Revolution in the name of "democracy"), Lenin said:

"It is natural for a liberal to speak of democracy in general; but a Marxist will never forget to ask 'for what class?'" Continues Lenin: *"If we are not to mock at common sense and history, it is obvious that we cannot speak of 'pure democracy' so long as different classes exist; we can only speak of class democracy ... 'Pure democracy' is the mendacious phrase of a liberal who wants to fool the workers."*

With equal justification we can say that the cry for human rights in the abstract, divorced from class reality, is the "mendacious phrase" of a flunkey and a stooge of imperialism who wants to fool the workers. In this category of flunkies and stooges fall not just the ordinary bourgeois hacks and ideologues but also the Trotskyites and revisionists of various hues. Like all other crises, the crisis in China has had the effect of revealing all too clearly the reactionary features of these flunkies who in normal times are able to hide their reactionary nature under the cover of 'left', even Marxist, phrasemongering.

One thing is certain, i.e., if the counter-revolutionary rebellion in China had succeeded, it would have been followed by an unprecedented massacre that would have been considered by imperialism and its hangers-on as a small price to pay for the restoration of "democracy" - i.e., the overthrow of socialism and the reinstatement of the basic "human" right, i.e., the exploitation of man by man - capitalism - in China.

It is for this reason, and being guided solely by the interests of the proletariat, that we unhesitatingly support the suppression by the PLA of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Tienanmen Square. It is for this reason that we denounce and oppose the sanctions and pressure being sought to be put on the Chinese government by US Imperialism and its junior partners.

One last question that we must raise is: how could this counter-revolutionary rebellion have arisen in the first place? In their effort to modernise China, the Chinese leadership has been trying for nearly a decade to break into the monopoly over technology held by Western and Japanese imperialism, by offering them special economic zones and joint ventures. This, ac-

companied by the loosening of the centralised economic planning, the dissolution of the communes, wider pay differentials between the masses and managers and intellectuals, have disrupted the socialist economy and led to inflation, unemployment and dislocation of vast numbers of workers and peasants. These economic factors have been accompanied by an ideological relaxation and a lessening of emphasis on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism at a time when an increasing number of Chinese students studying in America and other Western countries were not simply acquiring technical and scientific expertise, but also having their heads stuffed with bourgeois ideology. (At present there are 73,000 Chinese students in America and another 250,000 visitors).

The CPC must take a hard look at these economic and ideological factors, which together contributed much to produce the counter-revolutionary rebellion. It must learn the necessary lessons and put an end to those practices - economic and ideological - which led to the present crisis. We wish the Chinese working class every success in tackling these problems.

Appendix II

Trotsky, the Market Socialist.

Although Trotsky's political diatribes against the Soviet regime are well-known, his contribution to economic thought has by and large remained unacknowledged - particularly by the milliard of Trotskyite outfits the world over. And this for a very sound reason, namely, that in the only pamphlet that Trotsky ever wrote on this subject, he comes out clearly and unequivocally as an advocate of 'market socialism'. We have in mind Trotsky's pamphlet *Soviet Economy in Danger*, which he published in 1933 and in which he denounces, in terms most violent, every revolutionary step taken by the Soviet government in the direction of socialist construction, and he parrots bourgeois economic ideas *a la* Von Mises and Brutzkus, which made him the darling of the imperialist enemies of socialism.

In 1929, having put an end to the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Soviet government embarked on its second assault on capitalism through socialist industrialisation and collectivisation - both measures of world revolutionary historic significance. Trotsky, however, came out in opposition to these measures, declaring that the "*correct and economically sound collectivisation, at a given stage, should not lead to the elimination of the NEP, but to the gradual reorganisation of its methods.*" (p. 32).

In other words, no attempt should be made to eliminate capitalism in general, and capitalism in the countryside in particular.

Pretending to stand for some sort of control of the market, Trotsky's method of controlling the market is to leave it to the market to control itself! "*The regulation of the market itself must depend upon the tendencies that are brought out through its medium.*" (p. 30). In other words, market forces must control the market!

Every revolutionary giant stride forward of the Soviet economy at that time, because outside the market, is portrayed by this high priest of 'market socialism' as disorder and "*economic chaos*". He says:

"*By eliminating the market and installing instead Asiatic bazaars the bureaucracy has created ... the conditions for the most barbaric gyrations of prices and consequently has placed a mine under commercial calculations. As a re-*

sult the economic chaos has been redoubled." (p.34).

Trotsky, who in December 1925, at the 14th Party Congress of the CPSU, had tried to force on the Party the policy of immediate collectivisation of the peasantry, when the conditions necessary for such collectivisation were totally lacking - the same Trotsky, in 1933, when collectivisation was well on the way to completion, comes out in opposition to the policy of liquidating the kulaks, demanding instead the establishment of "a policy of severely restricting the exploiting tendencies of the Kulak" (p.47).

In other words, capitalism must not be abolished.

And this mountebank, who railed against the Soviet regime for its policy of eliminating the kulaks some twelve years after the socialist revolution in Russia, had the audacity to denounce as a total capitulation to the bourgeoisie the policy, put forward in 1936 - i.e., long before the socialist revolution - by Mao Tse-tung, of moderating the agrarian class struggle in the Chinese countryside in the interests of maintaining national unity in the national revolutionary struggle against Japanese imperialism.

Praying for miracles, declares Trotsky: "*commodities must be adapted to human needs ...*" (p.44). Trotsky's position amounts to this: "*Economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations.*"

That is what Professor Von Mises said in 1920. And it was precisely for writing an article in the same vein that Brutzkus was exiled in 1922. At the time Trotsky described the Soviet government's attitude towards the likes of Brutzkus as "preventative humanity." "*Learned ideologists,*" he wrote in *Pravda*, "*are not at present dangerous to the Republic, but external or internal complications might arise which would oblige us to have these ideologists shot. Better let them go abroad ...*" (Quoted from B Brutzkus, *Economic Planning in Soviet Russia*, English translation, 1935).

But eleven years later the same Trotsky, literally parroting Von Mises and Brutzkus, says that society can never be rid of the market, for "*economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations.*"

Trotsky therefore comes to the conclusion that: "*It is necessary to put off the Second Five Year Plan. Away with shrieking enthusiasm!*" (p. 41).

Although bourgeois economics learnt nothing from Trotsky's *Soviet Economy in Danger*, seeing as he had but repeated, in a clumsy way, what had been said a decade earlier by Von Mises and Brutzkus, it was nevertheless extensively quoted in the imperialist press by the bourgeois critics of so-

cialist construction, for it enabled the latter to stress that their 'objective' and 'impartial' critique of socialism, and their dogma that it was impossible for society to free itself from the market, were fully accepted by this 'old Bolshevik'.

Incidentally, Trotsky's adherence to 'market socialism' explains why so many Trotskyists find themselves in the Labour Party in Britain and similar social-democratic outfits elsewhere, and why they busy themselves with developing bourgeois reformism - for if 'market socialism' were actually socialism, as this gentry along with the revisionists believe it to be, it is only another way of saying that the social needs of the working class can be expressed and met through the market, that is, through the conflict of private interests in production for the market. If this were to be the case, why on earth should capitalism not evolve itself into socialism without any need for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism? If that were to be revealed by life, then one would have to admit that Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were wrong, whereas Duhring, Proudhon, Bernstein, Kautsky, Trotsky and Tito were right.

However life, far from confirming this, actually provides an eloquent refutation of 'market socialism'. Yugoslavia, which embarked on the path of 'market socialism' ten years earlier than the USSR and other Eastern European countries, is a perfectly good example. Its economy is characterised by high unemployment, mass emigration and subjection to foreign monopoly capital. Socially it is being torn asunder. It was the Titoites' adherence to 'market socialism' which led to Yugoslavia's expulsion from Cominform and not, as is claimed by an assortment of renegade socialists (not to mention the imperialists) Stalin's alleged unsuccessful attempt to impose Soviet hegemony over Yugoslavia. This was made perfectly clear when the proponents of 'market socialism' in the USSR, the Khrushchevite revisionists, having triumphed at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, went on to establish fraternal relations with the Titoite revisionists. Khrushchev rightly regarded Tito as a pioneer of this new variety of 'socialism'.

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